Department of Energy Programmatic Spent Nuclear Fuel Management and Idaho National Engineering Laboratory Environmental Restoration and Waste Management Programs Final Environmental Impact Statement, Volume 1, Appendix C by United States Department of Energy
Utah State University 
DigitalCommons@USU 
All U.S. Government Documents (Utah Regional 
Depository) 
U.S. Government Documents (Utah Regional 
Depository) 
1995 
Department of Energy Programmatic Spent Nuclear Fuel 
Management and Idaho National Engineering Laboratory 
Environmental Restoration and Waste Management Programs 
Final Environmental Impact Statement, Volume 1, Appendix C 
United States Department of Energy 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.usu.edu/govdocs 
 Part of the Environmental Sciences Commons 
Recommended Citation 
United States Department of Energy, "Department of Energy Programmatic Spent Nuclear Fuel 
Management and Idaho National Engineering Laboratory Environmental Restoration and Waste 
Management Programs Final Environmental Impact Statement, Volume 1, Appendix C" (1995). All U.S. 
Government Documents (Utah Regional Depository). Paper 375. 
https://digitalcommons.usu.edu/govdocs/375 
This Report is brought to you for free and open access by 
the U.S. Government Documents (Utah Regional 
Depository) at DigitalCommons@USU. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in All U.S. Government Documents 
(Utah Regional Depository) by an authorized 
administrator of DigitalCommons@USU. For more 
information, please contact digitalcommons@usu.edu. 
l,;UMt'L~1 ~U t /.)(. .. ' «" > flO/ii 1'1-' C 
DOElEIS-0203-F 
Department of Energy Programmatic 
Spent Nuclear Fuel Management 
and 
Idaho National Engineering Laboratory 
Environmental Restoration and 
Waste Management Programs 
Final Environmental Impact Statement 
Volume 1 
Appendix C 
Savannah River Site 
Spent Nuclear Fuel Management Program 
April 1995 
U.S. Department of Energy 
Office of Environmental Management 
Idaho Operations Office 
DOElEIS-0203-F 
Department of Energy Programmatic 
Spent Nuclear Fuel Management 
and 
Idaho National Engineering Laboratory 
Environmental Restoration and 
Waste Management Programs 
Final Environmental Impact Statement 
Volume 1 
Appendix C 
Savannah River Site 
Spent Nuclear Fuel Management Program 
April 1995 
U.S. Department of Energy 
Office of Environmental Management 
Idaho Operations Office 
1. 
2. 
BLANK PAGE 
3. 
/1 
CONTENTS 
INTRODUCTION 
BACKGROUND 
2. 1 SRS Overview 
2.1.1 Site Description ........... . .... . ... .... ... . . . .. .. . .. . . 
2.1.2 Site History .......... . ... .. . .... .... ... . . . . 
2.1.3 Mission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ............ • 
2.1.4 Management ...... . .. .... . . .. ... . ....... . . 
2.2 Regulatory Framework 
2.2.1 Federal 
2.2.2 State .. 
2.2.3 Local 
2.3 Spent Nuclear Fuel Management Program at the Savannah River Site . . 
2.4 Vulnerabilities Associated with SRS Spent Nuclear Fuel 
2.5 Representative Host Sites ........... . 
2.5 .1 
2.5.2 
F· and H·Areas 
Undeveloped Representative Host Site 
SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL ALTERNATIVES 
3. 1 SRS Management Approach .... ..... .. .• ............. 
3.1.1 Management Options 
3. 1.1.1 
3.1. 1.2 
3.1. 1.3 
Wet Slorage .............. ..•• • •. .. . ... . ... . 
Dry Storage .............. . . • . • •. . .. 
Processing and Dry Storage .. . . • •• •• . 
3. 1.2 Management Plan 
3. 1.2. 1 
3. 1.2.2 
Aluminum·c1ad Fuels 
Nonaluminum·clad Fuels 
3.2 Description of Alternatives. 
3.2. 1 Overview ........... .. . .. . 
3.2.2 Alternative I . No Action 
3.2.2. 1 
3.2.2.2 
Overview .. .. ... . .... . . . 
SRS Altemati'e I . Wet Storage 
1· 1 
2·1 :J... 
2.1 ::L 
2·1 J.. 
2·6 '7 
2.6'/ 
2.7S' 
2.7~ 
2·7~ 
2·8 OJ 
2·9,0 
2·910 
2. 111J.-
2·14/5 
2.16 /7 
2. 16/7 
3·1 iq 
3·2 cQa 
3.2~O 
3.3.;)./ 
3·36l1 
3.3;;t. / 
3·4 cQ.2 
3.4~'d 
3·4~ <9.. 
3.6~4 
3·~'1 
3· IOOl~ 
3.1~~ 
3· I O~'i? 
iii VOLUME I. APPENDIX C 
CONTENTS (continued) 
3.2.3 Ahemative 2 - Decentralization 
3.2.3. 1 Overview 
3.2.3.2 SRS Options 2a. 2b. and 2c 
3.2.3.2 .1 
3.2.3.2.2 
3.2.3.2.3 
Option 2a - Dry Storage 
Option 2b - Wet Storage. 
Option 2c - Processing and Storage 
3.2.4 Ahemative 3 - 1992/1993 Planning Basis 
3.2.5 
3.2.4. 1 Overview .. .. .• .. . . ... . . .. . .• . ... 
3.2.4.2 SRS Options 3a. 3b. and 3c 
3.2.4.2.1 
3.2.4.2.2 
3.2.4.2.3 
Option 3a - Dry Storage 
Option 3b - Wet Storage .. 
Option 3c - Processing and Storage 
Alternative 4 - Regionalization . 
3.2.5. 1 
3.2.5.2 
Overv i ~w ...••• • ••. 
SRS ptions 4a. 4b. and 4c (Regionalization A) .. 
3.2.5 .2.1 
3.2.5 .2.2 
3.2.5.2.3 
Option 4a - Dry Storage 
Option 4b - Wet Storage. 
Option 4c - Processing and Storage 
3.2.5.3 SRS Options 4d. 4e. 4f. and 4g (Regionalization B) 
3.2.5.3. 1 
3.2.5.3.2 
3.2.5.3.3 
3.2.5.3 .4 
Option 4d - Dry Storage . . . ..... ... . 
Option 4e - Wet Storage . . . .... . .. . . . . . 
Option 4f - Processing and Storage .. .... . . . . . 
Option 4g - Shipment Off the Site ...... . . ... . .. . 
3.2.6 Ahemative 5 - Centralization 
Overview 3.2.6. 1 
3.2.6.2 SRS Options 5a. 5b. 5c. and 5d 
3.2.6.2.1 
3.2.6 .2.2 
3.2.6.2.3 
3.2 .6.2.4 
3.3 Comparison of Ahemat ives 
VOLt.:~t E I. APPEN DIX C 
Option 5a - Dry Storage 
Option 5b - Wet Storage. 
Option 5c - Processing and Storage 
Option 5d - Shi pment Off the Site 
iv 
3- 11 c::q 
3- IIJ,q 
3- 12,30 
3- 1230 
3-1230 
3-13 .::j' I 
3-133 1 
3_133l 
3-133l 
3- 143~ 
3-14-.=lbl-
3-143d. 
3 - 14~ 
3- 14'3) 
3-1533 
3- 163'-+ 
3-163-l 
3-1634 
3-163if 
3- 1735 
3-173; 
3-173 
3-1 8 l3Io 
3-18qc 
3-18'3tf 
3_ 18 3 l.D 
3-1937 
3_ 1937 
3- 1937 
3-203'6 
3-20~ 
4. 
CONTENTS (continued) 
AFFECTED ENVIRONMENT 
4.1 Overview ..... ... . .... . . . 
4.2 Land Use 
4.3 Socioeconomics ........ . 
4.3. 1 Employment and Labor Force ... ... . ....... • •. 
4 .3.2 Personal Income ...... . . ...... .. . 
4 .3.3 Popu lation ....... ... .............. . ... .. . 
4.3.4 Housing............... . . . . . .. .... . ... . 
4.3.5 Community Infrastructure and Services ... ... .. .. .. . . ... . .. . .. . . 
4.3.6 Government Fiscal Structure .. .. ...... ..... . . ... ... . . . 
4.4 Cuhural Resources 
4- 1 54 
4_15'4 
4- 1 5'!-
4-5 5~ 
4-5 '5'8 
4-65q 
4-65q 
4-7 w O 
4-7U,O 
4-8 (vI 
4-9 w::2 
4.4.1 Archeological Sites and Historic Structures 
4.4.2 Native American Cuhural Resources 
. " .. ............... 4-9 {J;::l 
4.4.3 Paleontological Resources . ......... . 
4.5 Aesthetics and Scenic Resources . ......... .. .......... ... . . .. . .... , 
4 .6 Geology ........... . 
4.6. 1 General Geology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. • ... . . . . 
4.6.2 Geologic Resources . ......... . . . .. ... . . . ... ... . . . . 
4.6.3 Seismic and Volcanic Hazards ....... .. . . ... . .. . .. . . . .... . 
4.7 Air Resources . ... 
4.7 .1 Meteorology and Climatology 
4.7.2 
4.7.3 
4 .7. 1.1 
4.7. 1.2 
Occurrence of Violent Weather . . .......... • .. . . 
Atmospheric Stability .................. . 
Nonradiological Air Quality ........... .. ............. .. . . .. . 
4.7 .2.1 
4 .7.2.2 
4.7.2.3 
4 .7.2.4 
4.7.2.5 
Background Air Quality ........ .•.. ... ...... ....... 
Air Pollutant Source Emissions . .... . . .. . . .. .. . . . 
Ambient Air Monitoring ... 
Atmospheric Dispersion Modeling ...... .. . 
Summary of Nonradiological Air Quality . ................ . 
Radiological Air Quality 
4.7.3.1 
4 .7.3.2 
Background and Baseline Radiolog ical Conditions 
Sources of Radiolog ical Emissions .............. . 
4-10 (p3 
4- 11 (£;If 
4-11 (PLf 
4-11 1..04 
4-124'5 
4-16 i.£q 
4-16 wC) 
4-23 ·Ie., 
4-23 '7(p 
4-26 '1Q 
4-27 &) 
4-27 \S() 
4-27 8'0 
4-27lSU 
4-28 8' I 
4-28 '? I 
4-28 %1 
4-28 'i!- ( 
4-28 '2' ( 
4-31 8'1 
VOLUME I. APPENDIX C 
CONTENTS (continued) 
4.8 Water Resources . . . ... ... .... . ... , .. . . .. . 
4.8.1 Surface Water 
4.8.1.1 
4 .8.1.2 
SRS Streams 
Surface Water Quality 
4.8.2 Groundwater Resources .. 
4 .8.2. 1 
4.8.2.2 
4.8.2.3 
4.8 .2 .4 
Hydrost ratigraphic Units .. ........ . 
Groundwater Flow 
Groundwater Quality ...... ... .. . . ........ . 
Groundwater Use 
4.9 Ecological Resources ... 
4.9.1 Terrestrial &:ology ..... .. .. ... .. ... ... . . . ... . 
4.9.2 Wetlands .. . . . . . .•.•••. . .. . . . .. 
4.9.3 Aquatic Ecology . . . . . ......• • 
4.9.4 Threatened and Endangered Species ... . . .. ... .• 
4. 10 Noise. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . .. .. . . ... . 
4.11 Traffic and Transportation .. ... ....... .. . 
4 .11 .1 Regional Infrastructure 
4.11.1.1 Regional Roads .... 
4.11.1.2 Regional Railroads 
4 .11 .2 SRS Infrastructure 
4.11 .2.1 SRS Roads . . . .... ••••... 
4. 11 .2.2 SRS Railroads ..... . . .... . . . •.. . 
4 .12 Occupational and Public Radiological Health and Safety ..... ...•• •. 
4 .12.1 Occupational Health and Safety ... .... ..... . ..... • . • . 
4 .1 :.2 Public Health and Safety ........ •• . .. . ...... . . . .. .. 
4. 13 Utilities and Energy .... . . . . . ... . ... • .. 
4. 13.1 Electricity .. .. .. . ..•.. . . . . . 
4 .13.2 Water Consumption .. .. .••.••. .. .. .. ....... ........ .... . 
4 . 13.3 Fllel Consumption ....... • . ....... ............... . ...... . 
4.13.4 Wastewater Treatment . . . . . . . . . . . ....... . . ... . 
VOLU~E I. APPENDIX C vi 
4-32 ~5 
4-32<6'5 
4-35~ 
4-36gej 
4-3gq 
4-36gq 
4-40q.3 
4-4zC/S 
4-46C(1 
4-4fJ1C\ 
4-48101 
4-49 I D2-
4-50\03 
4-50103 
4-52105 
4-5310 (0 
4-53 IOU> 
4-5410'1 
4-5411YJ 
4-5410, 
4-5410'1 
4-58 1\ 1 
4-60 \I ':J 
4-60 11 ~ 
4-621 15 
4-65 1 \q 
4-65 II ~ 
4-66 11q 
4-66 11Q 
4-66 11q 
5.0 
CONTENTS (continued) 
4. 14 Materials and Waste Management . . . 
4.14.1 High-Level Waste ........ . . .. ..... ............ . 
4 .14.2 Transuranic Waste 
4.14.3 Mixed Low-Level Waste 
4.14.4 Low-Level Was te 
4.14.5 Hazardous Waste 
4.14.6 Sanitary Waste . . 
4. 14.7 Hazardous Materials 
ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES 
5.1 Overview.......... ... ..... . . ........ . . . . . . . . . . .. .... . .. . . 
5.2 Land Use 
5.3 Socioeconom.ics .............. . . •.• ... .••••.. . . .. . . . • ... . .. 
5.4 
5.5 
5.6 
5.7 
5.3. 1 Potential Impacts 
Cultural Resources 
Aesthetic and Scenic Resources 
Geologic Resources . 
Ai r Quality Consequences 
5.7. 1 
5.7.2 
5.7.3 
5.7.4 
5.7.5 
Alternative I - No Action 
Alternative 2 - Decentralization . ...... .. .. • . ••• ••• •• ... . .•••. 
Alternative 3 - 1992/1993 Planning Basis 
Alternative 4 - Regionalization .......... . 
Alternative 5 - Centralization .. ...... . 
5.8 Water Quality and Related Consequences 
5.8.1 Alternative I - No Action 
5.8.2 
5.8.3 
5.8.4 
5.8.5 
5.8 .1.1 Option I - Wet Storage 
Alternative 2 - Decenlr3lization 
Alternative 3 - 1992/1993 Planning Basis 
Alternative 4 - Regionalization . 
Alternative 5 - Centralization 
5 .9 Ecology 
5.9. 1 
5.9.2 
Alternat ive I - No Action 
Allernative 2 - Decentralization 
5.9.2.1 
5.9.2.2 
5.9.2.3 
Option 2a - Dry Storage . . . . . . . . . . . ....... . 
Option 2b - Wet Storage ........... ... ..... .. ....... . . 
Option 2c - Processing and Storage ......... . 
4-67 I ~C 
4-701{).3 
4-73 l c9.fo 
4_74 ,6V7 
4-74 I,;)/f 
4-75 1 Q~ 
4-75/~'? 
4-75 la'? 
5-1 ,a:! 
5- 1 ,~q 
5-1 Id-Q 
5-2 190 
5-2 1'20 
5-5 133 
5-6 1.8'+ 
5-6 131-1 
5-7 135 
5-20 14'8 
5-2 11'-1q 
5-21 \>tq 
5-21 J'4Q 
5-21 I,+q 
5-22 150 
5-27 155 
5-27 I 55 
5_27 155 
5-28 150 
5-28 15(p 
5-2815<0 
5-29 15'7 
5-29 157 
5-29 157 
5-29 / 57 
5-30/5'\? 
5-30 15~ 
vii VOLUME I. APPENDIX C 
CONTENTS (continued) 
5.9.3 Alternative 3 - 199211993 Planning Basis 
5.9.4 Alternative 4 - Regionalization 
5.9.5 Alternati ve 5 - Centralization ....... . . . 
5.10 Noise. 
5.9.5. i 
5.9.5 .2 
5.9.5.3 
5.9.5.4 
Option 5a - Dry Sto ... ge ....... . - - - • • •. 
Option 5b - Wet Storage .. .. •. . . . . 
Option 5c - Processing and Storage . . . .. . .. . . . . 
Option 5d - Shipment off the Site . . . . .. ... . . . . . 
5.11 Traffic and Transportation 
5.11.1 Traffic .. 
5.11.2 Transportation 
5.11.2.1 Onsite Spent Nuclear Fuel Shipments .. ... •... ..... . 
5.11.2.2 Incident-Free Transportation Analysis . . . - - .. . ... . 
5.11.2.3 Transportation Accident Analysis. . . ... - - - - - - . .. . . 
5.11.3 Onsite Mitigation and Preventative Measures ... 
5.12 Occupational and Public Health and Safety 
5.12.1 Radiological Health .... .. - - . .. .... . 
5.12.2 Nonradiological Health ...... . . . ... .. .. .. . •.• ••. .. - ....... . 
5.12.3 Industrial Safety .... __ .. ... .. . .. - - . ... • • .. . 
5.13 Utilities and Energy ........ . .••. ... .. 
5.14 Materials and Waste Management .... .. . . ... . 
5.14.1 Alternative Comparison . .. 
5.14.2 Impact on the SRS Waste Management Capacity 
5.15 Accident Analysis . . - - . . .. - ........ 
5.15. 1 Historic Accidents at the Savannah River Site .. - - . . . - .... .. . 
5.15.2 Potential Facility Accidents 
5.15.2.1 Alternative I ~ No Action .. ....... .... . 
5. 15.2.2 Alternative 2 - Decentralization 
5.15.2.2.1 Option 2a - Dry Storage 
5. 15.2.2.2 Option 2b - Wet Storage . . .. . - . .. . 
5.15 .2.2.3 Option 2c . Processing and Storage . ...... . .. . 
5.15.2.3 Alternative 3 - 199211993 Planning Basis 
5.15.2.3.1 Option 3a - Dry Storage .. . 
5.15.2.3.2 Option 3b - Wet Storage . .. . . 
5.15 .2.3.3 Option 3c - Processing and Storage ............. . 
VOLUME 1. APPENDIX C viii 
5-30 151$ 
5-30 1 5 ~ 
5-30 15 '5 
5-30 158' 
5-32 1 (00 
5-32 lIDO 
5-32 I lID 
5-33 1 tv , 
5-34 1102-
5-34 I~~ 
5-34 lCo~ 
5-35 l {o3 
5-35 163 
5-36 I CD>1 
5-37 1105 
5-38 lfolo 
5_38 1bb 
5-40 168 
5-44 172 
5-4617'1 
5-48/'76 
5-50 178 
5-51/7q 
5-51 net 
5-52 /'0 
5-53 / 8L 
5-551'03 
5-571f?5 
5-57 / 1)5 
5-61 1 '6Q 
5-62 / QO 
5-63 1 q I 
5-63,q I 
5-64 /Q 2 
5-64 lq~ 
CONTENTS (continued) 
5.15.2.4 Alternative 4 - Regionalization ....... . ..... ..... .. ... .. . 
5. 15.2.4 .1 Option 4a - Dry Storage ........ . 
5.15.2.4.2 Option 4b - Wet Storage . ............. . 
5.15.2.4.3 Option 4c - Processing and Storage 
5.15.2.4.4 Option 4d - Dry Storage 
5.15.2.4.5 Option 4e - Wet Storage ... ..... ... . . . 
5.15.2.4.6 Option 4f - Processing and Storage ... . ... ... .. . 
5.15.2.4.7 Option 4g - Shipping Off Site. . ... . .... . 
5.15.2.5 Alternative 5 - Centralization 
5.15.2.5.1 
5.15.2.5.2 
5.15.2.5.3 
5.1 5.2.5.4 
Option Sa - Dry Storage 
Option 5b - Wet Storage 
Option 5c - Processing and Storage 
Option 5d - Shipping Off Site . . .... . .... ... . . . 
5.15.3 Chemical Hazard Evaluation 
5.15.3.1 
5.15.3.2 
5.15.3.3 
5.15.3.4 
Receiving Basin for Offsite Fuel ... . .. . . ... . 
Reactor Basins ........ . . ..... ...... . 
H-Area ........ . ... .. .. .. . . .. . ....... . 
F-Area ........ . . .• .. ... 
5.15.4 Secondary Impacts 
5.15.4.1 
5.15.4.2 
5.15.4.3 
5.15.4.4 
5.15.4.5 
5.15.4.6 
5.15.4.7 
5.15.4.8 
Biotic Resources ..... .. . . .. . . ........ , , 
Water Resources ......•.•••. 
Economic Impacts 
National Defense .. 
Environmental Contamination . .. . . ... .. . ..... .. .. . .. . . 
Endangered Species . . .... .. . .... ••.. ...... ... 
Land Use .. . ...... . ..... .. .... .. .... .. . .... . .. .. . 
Treaty Rights 
5.15.5 Adjusted Point Estimale of Risk Summary 
5.16 Cumulative Impacts. 
5.16.1 Land Use 
5.16.2 Socioeconomics .... . . .... . . . .. .......•• ••• .... . .. . 
5. 16.3 Air Quality. . .................... . 
5. 16.4 Water Resources ............... . 
5.16.5 Occupational and Public Health and Safety 
5.16.6 Waste Management. . .......... . 
5.17 Unavoidable Adverse Environmental Impacts . .......... . 
5-64 Iq~ 
5-65,Q3 
5-65,Q3 
5-65,Q3 
5-65 i (j~ 
5-65 ,Q3 
5-65 Iq::, 
5-66 'QI1 
5-66(0).\ 
5-66iQ4 
5-671Q5 
5-67 105 
5-67'Q5 
5-67,05 
5-67 1Q6 
5-69 jqfj 
5-691 qrJ 
5-69,q! 
5-70 lq~ 
5-70 ,Cl8 
5-70 ,Cj8' 
5-72~CD 
5-72d-Co 
5-72<!XD 
5-72.;;1.00 
5-72.aCO 
5-72OlCO 
5-73 ;0( 
5-73 ~O\ 
5-86 d 1Y 
5-9 1O:> lq 
5-91dtcl 
5 -97~ 
5-980l.;;l0 
5-9~~7 
5-99J.d7 
i. VOLUME I . APPENDIX C 
CONTENTS (continued) 
5.18 Relationship Between Shon -Tenn Use of the Environment and the 
Maintenance and Enhancement of Long-Tenn Producti vity .. . • • . • • .. . 
5.19 Irreversible and Irretrievable Commitments of Resources. 
5.20 Potential Mitigation Measures .. . . .. . ... . . . •.. •••••• •• • . 
5.20.1 
5.20.2 
5.20.3 
5.20.4 
5.20.5 
5.20.6 
5.20.7 
5.20.8 
5.20.9 
5.20.10 
5.20. 11 
5.20.12 
Pollution Prevention ... . . . .. .. . • • . . .. . 
Socioeconomics . . .. .. . . . .... . . ... . 
Cultural Resources . .. . . . . . . . . . .. . . . 
Geology . . . .. . 
Air Resources 
Water Resources 
Ecological Resources .. 
Noise . . .. . . .. ... . . . . 
Traffic and Transponation .. ... . . . .. . .... . •.. . 
Occupational and Public Health and Safety .. .. . . . .. . . .. . .• . . • . .. 
Utilities and Support Services . . . .. . . . . . .. . . 
Accidents " .. . .. . ... . .. . . . . . . . 
Auachment A - Accident Analysis .. . ... .. ....... . .. . . . ...• • • • • •.•. . .. • . •.. . . 
VOLU~IE I. APPENDIX C 
5- I OOC1Q~ 
5- 10 Id£).Q 
5-1 020l.30 
5-10~ 
5-102cl3O 
5-1035151 
5- 103Q3} 
5- 10<!023Q 
5- 1 (J4Q.5~ 
5-1()4O&3Q 
5-lOsQB3 
5-1O~3 
5- 10~ 
5-105&3'3 
5-105;:,2S.3 
A-IQZ35 
2- \' 
2-2. 
2- , 
3-\. 
3-2. 
3-3. 
4- \. 
4-2. 
4-3. 
4-4. 
4-5. 
4-6. 
4-7. 
4-8. 
TABLES 
Description of functions and principal fac ilit ies at SRS areas 2-4 
SRS Fuel Inventory by Facility 2- 10 
~RS vulnerabilities by facility. vulnerability. tracking number. priority categorization. 
and Action Plan status . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 2-13 
Quantities of spent nuclear fuel that would be received. shipped. and managed at 
the SRS under the fi ve alternatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-2 
Actions required under each of the fi ve alternatives at the SRS .......... . .. .. . 3-7 
Comparison of impacts for the five alternatives ..... . .. . 3-2 1 
Forecast e, lployment and population data for the Savannah River Site and the region 
of influence . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 4-6 
Eanhquakes in the SRS region with a Modified Mercall i Intensity greater than V . . . . . 4-20 
Eanhquakes in the SRS region with a Modified Mercalli Intensity greater than IV or a 
magnitude greater than 2.0 .... . ...... . . . . . . . . . .. ..... . . . . . . . . 4-21 
Estimated ambient concentration contributions of criteria air pollutants from existing 
SRS sources and sources planned for construction or oper. tion through 1995 
Baseline 24-hour average modeled concentrations at the SRS boundary - toxic air 
pollutants regu lated by South Carolina from existing SRS sources and sources 
planned for construction or operation through 1995 ...................•. 
Radioactivity in ai r at SRS perimeter at 160-kilometer ( IOO-mile) radius 
Average atmospheric trit ium concentrat ions on and around the Savannah River Site 
Operational groupings and function of radionuclide sources 
4-29 
4-30 
4-3 1 
4-3 1 
4-32 
4-9. Annual quant ity of radionucl ide emissions from the Savannah River Site . . 4-33 
4- 10. Water quality in the Savannah River above the confluence with Upper Three Runs 
near the Savannah River Site in 1990 4-37 
4- 11 . Water quality in the Savannah River below the connuence with Lower Three Runs 
near the Savannah River Site in 1990 4-38 
4- 12. Representative groundwater quality data for nonradioactive constituents from the 
Savannah River Site . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-43 
4- 13. Representative groundwater data for radioactive constituents from the Savannah 
River Site 4-44 
xi VOLUME I. APPENDIX C 
TABLES (continued) 
4-14. Land cover of undeveloped areas on the Savannah River S ite . 4-47 
4-15. Threatened. endangered. and candidate plant and animal spec ies of the SRS 4-5 1 
4-16. 
4- 17. 
4-1 8. 
4-19. 
4-20. 
4-21. 
4-22. 
4-23. 
SRS traffic counts - major roads 
Radioactivity in ai r at the Savannah River Site and vicinity 
Tritium measured in air at the Savannah River Site 
Maximum radioactivity concentrations in soil at the Savannah River Site 
Annual involved worker doses. 1983- 1987 
Annual involved worker doses. 1993 
Major sources of radiation exposure to the public in the vicinity of the Savannah 
River Site 
Average atmospheric tritium concentrations in the vicinity of the Savannah River Site 
4-59 
4-61 
4-61 
4-62 
4-63 
4-63 
4-63 
4-64 
4-24. Current capaci ties and usage of utilities and energy at SRS 4-65 
4-25. 
5-1. 
5-2. 
5-3. 
5-4. 
5-5 . 
5-6. 
5-7 . 
5-8. 
Average annual waste generation forecast for the Savannah River Site . 4-73 
Direct construction employment and total population changes by ahemative, 
1995-2004 . . . 5-3 
Estimated increases in employment and population related to construction 
activi ties for Option 5b. from 1995 to 2004 5-4 
Estimated incremental air quality impacts at the Savannah River Site boundary from 
operations of SNF ahematives - cri teria pollutants . 5-8 
Estimated incremental air quality impacts at the Savannah River Site boundary from 
operations of SNF ahematives - toxic pollutants. . . . . .. 5- 11 
Incremenlal air quality pollutant emission rates re lated to spent nuciear fuel 
alternatives - criteria pollutants 
Incremental air quality pollutant emission rates related to spent nuclear fuel 
alternatives - toxic pollutants 
Estimated maximum annual emissions (in curies) of radionuclides to the 
atmosphere from spent nuclear fuel management activities ... . 
5- 14 
.. ... . .. 5- 16 
5-20 
Annual groundwater and surface water usage requirements for each alternative . 5-23 
VOLUME I. APPE~Dt X C xii 
TABLES (cont inued) 
5-9. Estimated maximum liquid radiological releases (in curies) to the Savannah River 
from spent nuclear fuel management activities . . . . . . . .. 5-24 
5- 10. Collecti ve doses and health effects for onsite. incident-free spent nuclear fuel 
shipments by alternative .... ....... .. ........................ . 
5-11. Im~acts on maximally exposed individual from spent nuclear fuel transportation 
aCCident on the Savannah River Site .... . . , .......... . ... ......... . 
5-12. Impacts on offsite population from spent nuclear fuel transportation accident 
on the Savannah River Site , , , , . . . ......... .. .... . 
5-13. Incremental radioactive contaminant annual ~xposure summary ... 
5-14. Incremental fatal cancer incidence and maximum probability for workers .... 
Incremen.tal.f~tal cancer incidence and maximum probability for Ihe maximally 
exposed mdlvldual and offsite population (air and water pathways) ....... . . 
5- 15. 
5- 16. Nonradiological annual incremenlal heahh effects summary 
5- 17. 
5- 18. 
5-19. 
5-20. 
5-21. 
5-22. 
5-23. 
5-24. 
5-25. 
Incremental induslrial hazard maximum annual incidence summary 
Estimates of annual electricity, steam. and domestic wastewater treatment 
requirements for each alternative .. . ... , .. , , ......... , , , , .. , , , ...... . . 
Annual average and total volume of radioactive wastes produced under each 
allemative during the 40-year interim management period ........ ... ... . 
Highest point estimates of risk among receptor groups (option I) 
Radioactive release accidents and health effects for spent nuclear fuel alternatives 
Highest point estimates of risk among receptor groups (option 2a) 
Highest point esti mates of risk among receptor groups (option 2b) 
Highest point estimates of risk among receptor groups (option 2c) 
Resulls of analyzed chemical accidenl 
5-26. Qualitative summary of expected secondary impacts 
5-27. Adjusted poinl estimates of risk for the maximally exposed offsite individual 
(radiological accidents) ...................... .. ............. . 
5-28. Adjusted poinl est imates of ri sk for the colocatcd worker radiological accidents} 
5-36 
5-38 
5-38 
5-4 1 
5-42 
5-43 
5-45 
5-46 
5-47 
5-49 
5-57 
5-58 
5-61 
5-62 
5-63 
5-68 
5-71 
5-74 
5-78 
xiii VOLUME I. APPENDIX C 
TABLES (continued) 
5-29. Adjusted point estimates of risk for the general population - SO kilometers 
(radiological accidents) . 
5-30. 
5-S2 
Cumulative impacts associated with construction and operation of spent fue l alternatives 
at Savannah River Site 5-S7 
5-31. Total ma x. imum ground-Ievd concentrations of criteria and toxic air pollutants at SRS 
boundary resulting from normal operations and spent nuclear fuel management 
alternatives 5-92 
5-32. Annual cumu lative health effects to workers and offsite population due to SRS radioactive 
releases during incident-free operations 5-95 
VOLL:~IE I. APPENDIX C xiv 
FIGURES 
2-1. Nalional location of SRS. 2-2 
2-2. Localion of principal SRS faci lities .............. . 2-5 
2-3. Representative host sites on Savannah River Site 2- 15 
3-1. Diagram of how SRS would manage aluminum-clad and nonaluminum-c1ad fuels 3-5 
3-2. Types of facilities required for each alternative 3-9 
4-1. Generalized land use at the Savannah River Site and vicinity .......... . 4-3 
4-2 . Federal and state forests and parks wi thin a 2-hour drive from Savannah River Site 4-4 
4-3. Location of the Savannah River Site in the southern United States. 4-13 
4-4. Generalized subsurface cross-section across the Savannah River Site 4-14 
4-5. Stratigraphy of the SRS region 4-15 
4-6. Geologic st ructures within 150 km of Savannah River Site .. . . ............. . . 4-17 
4-7. Geologic faults of the Savannah River Site .. . . .. ___ . _ .. _ ... . . . .. .. . 4-19 
4-S. Seismic hazard curve for SRS .. ............. . . __ _ . .. • . 4-24 
4-9. Wind rose for the Savannah River Site (19S7- 199I) 4-25 
4-10. Savannah River Site, showing lOG-year noodplain. major stream syslems and facilities 4-34 
4-11. Comparison of lithostratigraphy and hydrostratigraphy for the SRS region 4-39 
4-12. Groundwater contamination at the Savannah River Site 4-45 
4- 13. Regional transportation infrastructure 4-55 
4-14. Major SRS roads and access points 4-56 
4- 15. SRS rail road lines 4-57 
4-16. Wasle management facilities althe Savannah River Site 4-69 
4-17. Flow diagram for high-level radioactive waste handling at the Savannah River Site 4-71 
4- IS. Flow diagram for waste handling at the Savannah River Site 4-72 
5-1. Accident analysis process .. 5-56 
xv VOLUME I. APPENDIX C 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The u.s. Depanment of Energy (DOE) is engaged in two relatcJ decisionmaking processes 
conceming: ( I) the transponation. receipt. processing. and storage of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) at the 
DOE Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (INEL) which will focus on the next 10 years; and 
(2) programmatic decisions on future spent nuclear fuel management which will emphasize the next 40 
years . 
DOE is analyzing the environmental consequences of these svent nuclear fuel management 
actions in this two-volume Environmental Impact Statement (EIS). Volume I suppons broad 
programmatic decisions that will have applicability across the DOE complex and describes in detail the 
purpose and need for this DOE ac tion. Volume 2 is specific to actions at the INEL This document. 
which limits its discussion to the Savannah River Site (S RS) spent nuclear fuel management program. 
suppons Volume I of the EIS . Other documents supponing Volume I focus on spent nuclear fuel 
management programs for the Hanford Site. INEL. Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program. and other si tes. 
As pan of its planning process for this two-volume EIS. DOE issued an Implementation Plan on 
October 29. 1993. The organization of this document is consistent with the provisions established in 
the Implementation Plan and are outlined below: 
Chapter 2 contains background information related to the SRS and the framework of 
environmental regulations peninent to spent nuclear fuel management. 
Chapter 3 identifies spent nuclear fuel management ahematives that DOE could implement 
at the SRS. and summari zes their potential environmental consequences. 
Chapter 4 describes the existing environmental resources of the SRS that spent nuclear fu el 
activi ties could affect. 
Chapter 5 analyzes in detail the environmental consequences of each spent nuclear fuel 
management alternative and describes cumulative impacts. The chapter also contains 
information on unavoidable adverse impacts. commitment of resources, short-term use of the 
environment and mitigation measures. 
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2. BACKGROUND 
The chapter contains an overview of the Savannah River Site (SRS) and a description of the 
regulatory framework related to the actions that this document evaluates. In addition, it discusses the 
U.S. Depanment of Energy (DOE) Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) Management Program as it relates to the 
SRS. Finally. it describes the representative si tes located on the SRS that could serve as locations for 
spent nuclear fuel facilities. 
2.1 SRS Overview 
The SRS is a key DOE facility for research on and processing of special nuclear materials. The 
U.S. Government built the Site in the early 1950s to produce the basic materials - primarily 
plutonium-239 and tritium - used in the fabrication of nuclear weapons. The DOE Savannah River 
Operations Office manages the SRS. and Westinghouse Savannah River Company (WSRC) operates 
the Site under contract to DOE. 
2.1.1 Site Description 
The SRS occupies an area of approximately 3 10 square miles (800 square kilometers) in western 
South Carolina, in a generally rural area about 25 miles (40 kilometers) southeast of Augusta. Georgia. 
and 12 miles (19 kilometers) south of Aiken, South Carolina (Figure 2-1). The Savannah River forms 
the southwestern border of the SRS. which includes ponions of Aiken, Barnwell. and Allendale 
Counties. The average population density (1990 census data) in the six-county region of influence 
around the Site is 140 people per square mile (54 per square kilometer); the largest concentration is 
2.595 people per square mile (1.002 per square kilometer) in the City of Augusta (HNUS 1992). Four 
other popUlation centers - Aiken. Allendale. Barnwell. and Nonh Augusta, South Carolina - are 
within 22 miles (40 kilometers) of the Site. Three small towns - Jackson. New Ellenton. and 
Snelling. South Carolina - are adjacent to the SRS boundary to the nonhwest. nonh. and east. 
respectively. Based on 1990 U.S. Census Bureau data. the popUlation within a 50-mi le (80-kilometer) 
radius of the SRS is approximately 620.100 (Amen et al. 1993). 
The Site consists primarily of managed upland forest with some wet land areas. Facilities and 
roadways occupy approximately 5 percent of the SRS land area. Access to the Site is controlled. with 
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Figure 2-1. National location of SRS. 
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public transportation limited to through traffic on South Carolina Highway 125 (SRS Road A). 
U.S . Highway 278. SRS Road 1. and the CSX Railroad corridor. 
The SRS contains 15 major production. service. and research and development (R&D) areas that 
previously supported nuclear materials production and can support process ing operat ions and waste 
management a~tiv ities. Major SRS facilities include five nuclear reactors. two chemical separations 
plants. a fue l and target fabrication fac il ity . the Defen se Waste Processing Facil ity (DWPF). the 
Replacement Tritium Facility. a heavy-water rework plant . and the Savannah Ri ver Technology Center 
(SRTC). formerly called the Savannah River Laboratory. In addition, the Unive rsi ty of Georgia 
Research Foundation operates the Savannah River Ecology Labontory (SREL) on the Site under 
contract to DOE. Under an interagency agreement. the U.S. Forest Service operates the Savannah 
River Forest Station. which manages the natural resources and secondary roads on the Site. These 
faci lities are in defined areas scattered across the Site. Each area is identified by a letter designation. 
as summarized in Table 2-1 . Figure 2-2 shows the locations of the principal SRS facilities. The 
reactor. waste storage . and separations areas are at least 4 miles (6 kilometers) ins ide the nearest SRS 
boundary. 
The primary SRS facilities were related to the production of nuclear materials. M-Area 
manufac tured fue l and targe t components for shipment to the SRS reactors. Originally. the Site 
operated fi ve reactors: at present . all are in shutdown status. Shielded railroad cars transported 
irradiated fuel to the F- or H-Area Canyon for the recovery of nuclear materials. The F- and H-Area 
separations processes dissolve irradiated components in acid. and extract and separate the desired 
nuc lear materials. In H-Area. add itional processes extract other products from irradiated components. 
DOE neutralizes and stores the high-level liquid radioactive waste generated by the separations 
faci li ti es in underground tanks . DOE plans to process this waste into a borosilicate g lass waste !ijnn 
in the Defense Waste Processing Faci lity when that fac ility becomes operational. and to store this glass 
waste form at the SRS until an offsite geological repository is ava ilable. [DOE has prepared a 
Supplemental EIS re lated to Defense Waste Processing Fac ility operations (DOE 1994a).] In addition 
to the underground waste storage tanks. DOE has established a centrally located 196-acre 
(O.8-square-kilometer) si te be tween F- and H-Areas. ca lled E-Area. for the disposal of solid low-level 
radioacti ve waste and the storage of transuranic (TR U) radioactive waste and mixed (hazardous and 
radioactive) waste. The Site a lso has a central sanitary landfi ll and buildings in the Central Shops 
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Table 2-1. Description of functions and principal faci lities at SRS areas. 
Area Function 
A Main DOE administration area. 
research laboratories 
B Wackenhut Services, Inc ., 
administrat ion area (security) 
C One of five SRS reactors 
D Central powerhouse and heavy-water 
rework 
E Waste disposal and storage 
F Process plutonium 
G Various support functions 
H Process uranium and tritium 
K One of fi ve SRS reactors 
L One of five SRS reactors 
M Product ion of fue l and target 
assembl ies 
N Receiving 
P One of five SRS reactors 
R One of five SRS reactors 
S Process high-level radioactive waste 
TNX Applied research and development 
Z Waste treatment and handling 
Princ ipal facilities 
Main administration building. Savannah River 
Technology Center, Savannah River Ecology 
Laboratory, powerhouse 
Administration bui lding. WSRC Engineering 
building, WSRC training buildings 
C-Reactor. training faciliti es. cooling basin 
Powerhouse. heavy-water rework facility 
Solid Waste Disposal Facility 
F-Area Canyon, FB-Line. tank farm 
Spread throughout the Site: railroad yard. 
U.S. Forest Service installations 
H-Area Canyon. HB-Line. Ernuent Treatment 
Facility. tank farm , Receiving Basin for Offsi te 
Fuels. Consolidated Incineration Facility 
K-Reactor. cooling basins. cooling tower 
L-Reactor. cooling basins 
Slug and target production faci lities, ernuent 
treatment facility 
Central Shops 
P-Reactor. cooling basins 
R-Reactor. cooling basins 
Defense Waste Processing Facility 
Analytical laboratory. Defense Waste Processing 
Technology faci lities, various mockups, ernuent 
treatment facilities 
Saltstone facility 
(N-Area) for the storage of nonradioactive hazardous wastes and rnixed waste. DOE is preparing an 
EIS on waste management act ivities at the SRS (DOE 1995a). 
The Site contains facilities for processing support and for research and development. These 
include operational coal-fired powerhouses in A-. D-, and II-Areas that generate electricity and steam. 
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Figu re 2-2. Location of principal SRS facilities (see Table 2- 1). 
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The largest powerhouse. which is in D-Area. produces electricity and sends process steam to C-. F-. 
H-. and S-Areas through a 7-mile (II -kilometer) steam line. D-Area also contains the heavy-water 
rework facility at which DOE purified the deuterium oxide (heavy water) used as the moderator and 
coolant in SRS reactors. TNX-Area fac ilities study chemical and waste processing problems and test 
production-scale equipment. Finally. A-Area fac ilities include the Savannah River Technology Center. 
the Savannah River Ecology Laboratory. and the DOE and Westinghouse Savannah Ri ver Company 
administrative offices. 
The SRS employs approximate ly 20.000 people. Most of these employees work for 
Westinghouse Savannah River Company and its subcontractors. The remainder work for DOE. the 
Savannah River Ecology Laboratory. Wackenhut Services, Inc., the U.S. Forest Service . and other 
contractors. 
2.1 .2 SHe History 
The U.S. Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), a DOE predecessor agency, selected the location 
for the SRS in November 1950 after a study of more than tOO prospective sites. The government 
selected E. I. du Pont de Nemours and Company, Inc., to build and operate the facility. Construction 
began in February 1951 ; the basic plant was completed in 1956 at a cost of $1.1 billion, including the 
land. On October 3, 1952, operations began with the startup of a unit of the heavy-water extraction 
plant. C riticali ty occurred in the first production reactor on December 28. 1953. 
In 1972, the AEC designated the SRS as the nation's first National Environmenta l Research Park. 
Through the years , scientists have performed a wide range of investigations on the diverse habitats. 
nora. and fau na of the Site. 
2.1.3 Mission 
The historic mission of the SRS was to serve the nationa l security interests of the United States 
by safe ly proce"ing nuclear materials while protecting the health and safety of employees and the 
public and protecting the envi ronment. The SRS was responsible for producing tritium and special 
nuclear materials for national defense. At present . it supports the viability of the weapons stockpile by 
recycling limited-life components. The SRS also produces isotopes for nonweapons appl ications in the 
nation' 5 space program and for medical applications. 
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The SRS spent nuclear fuel mission is to manage DOE-owned spent fue l in a cost-e ffec tive way 
that protects the safety of SRS workers. the public. and the environment. The goals of near-term 
acti vities are the accurate quantification and characterization of DOE-owned spent nuclear fu el. 
assessment of spent nuclear fuel storage facilities. elimination of current spent nuclear fuel storage 
vulnerabilities. and idenrification of technologies and requirements for interim management and 
ultimate disposition of spent nuclear fuel. 
2.1 .4 Management 
The DOE Savannah River Operations Office manages the SRS; the Westinghouse Savannah 
River Company operates the Site under contract to DOE. Westinghouse assumed operational 
responsibility in April 1989 from E. I. du Pont de Nemours and Company. Inc .. which had operated 
the Site s ince 1951. 
2.2 Regulatory Framework 
This section summarizes the framework. of environmental protection regulations applicable to 
spent nuclear fuel management at the SRS. The framework is based on Federal and South Carolina 
laws and one local ordinance. as discussed below. Volume I (Section 7.0) of this Environmental 
Impact Statement (EIS) provides additiona l information on the major Federal environmental laws and 
regulations. Executive Orders. and DOE Orders that apply to spent nuclear fue l management 
alternatives. 
2.2.1 Federal 
The U.S. Environmenta l Protection Agency (EPA) has authorized South Carolina to implement 
most provisions of the Clean Air Act, Resource Conservation and Recovery Act. and Clean Water Act 
that apply to SRS spent nuc lear fuel management. EPA Region IV has the lead responsibility for 
Clean Air Act standards for radionucl ide emissions from DOE fac ilities. imposing monitoring and 
approval requirements on SRS spent nuclear fue l management activities that could result in 
radionuclide emissions. 
In addi tion. EPA Region IV has Resource Conservation and Recovery Act authori ty over 
radioacti ve hazardous (mixed) waste management, affecting wastes from spent nuclear fuel processing . 
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EPA Region IV and the DOE Savannah River Operations Office have entered into a Federal Facility 
Compliance Agreement on SRS mixed waste management. 
The U.S. Anny Corps of Engineers District Engineer for the Charleston District implements the 
Clean Water Act Section 404 and the Rivers and Harbors Act penniuing program for SRS spent 
nuclear fuel construction activities that would affect U.S. waters. 
In accordance with the Endangered Species Act. the SRS would consult with the U.S. Fish and 
Wildlife Service. Charleston Field Office on impacts that spent nuclear fuel construction activities 
could have on thr~atened and endangered species. 
2.2.2 State 
The South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control implements the following 
State laws that would affect SRS spent nuclear fuel management activities: 
Pollution Control Act (nonradioactive emissions and discharges. and nonhazardous waste 
management) 
Hazardous Waste Management Act (nonradioactive hazardous waste management) 
Safe Drinking Water Act 
Groundwater Use Act 
Stormwater Management and Sediment Reduction Act 
The U.S. Anny Corps of Engineers District Engineer for the Charleston District has an 
agreement with the South Carolina Depanment of Health and Environmental Control whereby that 
depanment issues Clean Water Act Section 401 water quality cenifications. The South Carolina 
Depanment of Health and Environmental Control also receives SRS repons in accordance with the 
Emergency Planning and Community Right-To-Know Act. 
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The South Carolina State Depanment of Archives and History includes the State Historic 
Preservation Office. In accordance with the National Historic Preservation Act. the SRS would consult 
with the State Historic Preservation Officer on impacts that construction activities could have on 
cultural resources. 
2.2.3 Local 
The on ly local requirement applicable to SRS spent nuclear fuel management is the Aiken 
County Sediment Control Ordinance, which would affect construction activities. 
2.3 Spent Nuclear Fuel Management Program at the Savannah River Site 
This EIS addresses the management of approximately 2.742 metric tons of heavy metal (MTHM: 
3.023 tons) of spent nuclear fuel that would be stored at various locations within the DOE Complex 
over the next 40 years (1995-2035). At present. DOE has stored approximately 206.3 MTHM 
(227.4 tons). or about 8 percent of this material. at the SRS. The spent nuclear fuel currently stored at 
the SRS that DOE has included in the analyses in this document includes: 
184.4 MTHM (203.3 tons) of Savannah River Defense Production [highly enriched uranium 
(HEU) aluminum-clad fuels]. including plutonium target material. and other aluminum-clad 
fuels 
4.6 MTHM (5. 1 tons) of commercial spent fuel (primarily zirconium-clad) 
11.9 MTHM (13.1 tons) of test and experimental reactor Zircaloy-c1ad fuel 
5.4 MTHM (6.0 tons) of test and experimental reactor stainless steel-clad fue l 
Spent nuclear fuel is currently stored in the Receiving Basin for Offsite Fuels (RBOF). in th ree 
reactor disassembly basins. and in basins in F- and H-Canyons. Table 2-2 shows the quantity of spent 
fuel stored at these facilities. 
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Table 2-2. SRS Fuel Inventory by Facil ity. 
Facility 
Recei ving Basin for Offsite Fuel 
L-Reactor Disassembly Basin 
K-Reactor Disassembly Basin 
P-Reactor Disassembly Basin 
F-Canyon 
H-Canyon 
Total 
Source : Wichmann (1995). 
Quantity (MTHM) 
60. 73 
11 8. 11 
3.32 
1.41 
22.63 
0.07 
206.27 
The F- and H-Area Canyons at the SRS are among the only remaining operable chemical 
separations facilities of their kind in the DOE Complex. Each canyon has an associated storage basin 
that serves as an interim staging area where reactor fuel bundles and targets await the Chemical 
Separations Process. The basins currently contain 13 reactor fuel assemblies (H-Area) and aluminum-
clad targets (F-Area). 
DOE has stored most of the remaining aluminum-clad spent nuclear fuel from SRS reactor 
operations under water in concrete reactor storage basins. Three reactor disassembly basins (K-. p-. 
and L-Reactors) contain reactor fuel and target material. These structures were built in the 19505 and 
were not intended for the prolonged storage of radioactive materials. Wet (underwater) storage. while 
poter.tially viable for stainless steel-clad fuel elements, is not satisfactory for aluminum-clad elements. 
which are subject to corrosion and pitting. 
In March 1992. chemical processing operations were suspended in the canyons to address a 
potent ial safety concern. The concern was subsequently addressed but prior to resumption of 
processing. the Secretary of Energy directed that defense related chemical separations activities (i.e., 
reprocessi ng) be phased out at the SRS. Since the decision. DOE has determined that funher action 
related to the disposition of nuclear material. including spent nuclear fuel . is subject to the National 
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) process. Non-safety related facility operations have remained shut 
down wi th the exception of Pu-238 processing associated with the suppon of NASA missions. 
As a result of these shut-downs. the canyons and the basins used for storage of spent nuclear fuel 
and irradiated targets have a large inventory of in-process solutions and fuel and targets (respecti vely). 
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Some materials stored in the l - and K-Reactor disassembly basins have corroded. releasing fi ssile 
materials to the pool water. DOE is preparing an environmental impact statement that will evaluate 
risks that these and other SRS materials represent to the public and workers and will assess the 
near-Ienn need for the actions 10 stabilize these materials to ensure continued safe management 
(DOE 1995b). These actions would take place over the shon-term (about 10 years). until DOE can 
make programmatic decisions on disposition. 
DOE stores other spent fuel in the Receiving Basin for Offsite Fuels (RBOF) on the SRS. This 
basin . which is in H-Area near the center of the Site. has been operating and receiving fuel s of U.S. 
origin since 1964. This 15.000-square-foot (I .393-square-meter) facility consists of an unloading 
basin. two storage basins. a repackaging basin. a disassembly basin. and an inspection basin . The 
basins and their interconnecting transfer canals hold about 500.000 gallons (1.893.000 liters) of water. 
Spent fuel elements arrive in lead-lined casks weighing from 24 to 70 tons (about 22 to 64 metric 
tons). which a crane lifts from a railroad car or truck trailer and places in the unloading basin . About 
30 percent of the fuels in the Receiving Basin for Offsite Fuels consist of uranium clad in stainless 
steel or Zircaloy. which SRS facilities cannot process wilhout modifications. 
2.4 Vulnerabilities Associated with SRS Spent Nuclear Fuel 
In August 1993. the Secretary of Energy commissioned a comprehensive baseline assessment of 
the environmental, safety, and health vulnerabilities associaled with the storage of spent nuclear fuel in 
the DOE complex. The purpose of this assessment was to determine the inventory and condition of 
the Department's Reactor Irradiated Nuclear Material. which includes spent nuclear fuel and reactor 
irradiated target material. The assessment also evaluated the condition of the facilities that store spent 
fuel and identified the vulnerabilities and problems currently associated with these facilities. 
Vulnerabilities in nuclear facilities are conditions or weaknesses that could lead to radiation exposure 
to the pUblic, unnecessary or increased exposure to workers, or release of radioactive materials to the 
environment. l oss of institutional controls, such as a cessation of facility funding or reductions in 
facility maintenance and control. could cause some vulnerabilities. 
Based on this evaluation process DOE released a repon to the Secretary of Energy. ent itled Spellt 
Fuel Workillg Group Report 0 11 Im'emory and Storage of the Departmem's Spem Nucle,,, Fuel and 
other Reactor Irradiated Nuclear Materials and Their Ellvirollmelllll i. Safety (IIul Health 
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Vulnerabilities (i .e .. "The Working Group Repon ." Vulumes I. II. and III). to the public on 
December 7. 1993 (DOE 1993). Thi s repon identified over 100 vulnerabilities associated with spent 
fue l storage in the DOE complex. including 19 at the Savannah River Site. The repon also determined 
that five facilities and three burial grounds warranted priority attention from management to avoid 
unnecessary increases in worker radiation exposure and cost during cleanup. The Savannah River Site 
L- and K-Reactor Disasssembly Bas ins were among these facilities. The repon grouped vulnerabil ities 
associated wi th each facility into three categories for management attention based on when corrective 
ac tion shou ld be initiated: less than I year. I to 5 years, and more than 5 years. 
After issuing the Working Group Repon. DOE developed a Plan of Action to address all 
vulnerabilities. taking into consideration currently available resources for implementation. The Plan of 
Action is a consolidation of individual action plans designed to address each spent nuclear fuel 
vulnerability in a manner that reflects the DOE (I) sense of urgency. (2) concern for worker 
protection. (3) commitment to avoid or otherwise mitigate environmenlal impacts. and (4) need for 
compatible long-term solutions. 
The interim goal for the Savannah River Site reactor disassembly basins, pending completion of 
the removal of the stored material. is the stabilization of basin conditions to reduce corrosion and to 
address known vulnerabili tes. The long-tenn goal of the action plan is a safe stan of the removal of 
reactor-irradiated nuclear material within a S-year period, consistent with safe and environmentally 
sound operations. including completion of appropriate NEPA review. These actions wi ll lead to 
mitigating the identified vulnerabilities while DOE pursues other courses of action. 
The 19 vulnerabilities identified for the Savannah River Site now have complete Action Plans 
(DOE 1994b, 1994c. I 994d). Table 2-3 lists SRS vulnerabilities by fac ility. tracking number, priority 
categori za tion. and Action Plan status. 
DOE is currently implementing a number of the 19 Action Plans. These act ions have been 
evaluated under the NEPA review process. The remaining corrective ac tions. those that will be carried 
out through FY99. would also undergo NEPA review prior to implementation. Only one of these 
outstanding actions. the construc tion of a dry storage fac ility. would likely require detailed NEPA 
documentation (e .g .. an EIS). The construction of such a facility is addressed programmatically in thi s 
EIS as pan of the Decentralization. 1992/1 993 Planning Basis. Regionalizat ion. and Centralization 
alternati ves. Construction of new facilit ies wou ld require site-specific NEPA documentation, however. 
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Table 2-3. SRS vu lnerabilities by facility. vulnerability. tracking number. priori ty categorization. and 
Action Plan status. 
SilciFacilily 
Vulnerabili ty Number 
Descri ption 
SRSIL·Reactor Disassembly Basin 
SRS·O I 
Potemial unmonitored buildup of radionuclide or fissile 
male rials in sand fil ters. 
SRSIL.Reactor Disassembly Basin 
SRS.Q4 
Lack of authorizatic:1 basis in operating the sand fi lter 
cleanup system for L·Area Disassembly Basin. 
SRSlReactor Disassembly Basins 
SRS·05 
Corrosion of aluminum clad fuel. largets. and 
components. 
SRS/L·Reactor Disassembly Basins 
SRS·Q6 
Cesium-l37 activi ty level in L·Basin. 
SRSIL·Reactor Disassembly Basins 
SRS·07 
Determine whether gas bubbles release is a potential 
hazard above the bucket storage area at L·Reactor. 
SRS/K-. L·, P· Reactors 
SRS·08 
Lack of Reactor Authorization Basis. 
SRSfK-Reactor Disassem bly Basins 
SRS·09 
Corrosion of Mark J I A and B target slugs in K and L 
disassembly basins. 
SRSIP·Reactor Disassembly Basins 
SRS-t O 
Hoist Rod COrTosion 
SRS/K-. L-Reactor Disassembly Basins 
SRS·II 
Reactor Disassembly Basin Safety Analysis Envelope. 
SRSfL-Reactor Disassembly Basin 
SRS· 12 
Inadvenent flooding of L·Reactor Disassembl y Basin. 
SRS/K-Reactor Disassembly Basin 
SRS· t3 
Inad ... enem flooding of K·Reactor Disassembly Bas in . 
SRSIP· Reaclor DisllSStmbly Basin 
SRS· t4 
Inadvenent f100chng of P·Reactor Dis:lSscmbly Basin. 
Priority 
Eight major 
faci lities with Less than Greater than Action Plan 
vulnerabil ities I year I year status 
Complete 
Complete 
Complete 
Complete 
Complete 
Complete 
Complete 
Complete 
Complete 
Complete 
Complete 
Complete 
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Table 2·3. (continued). 
SitclFacility 
Vulnerability umber 
Description 
SRSIRBOF; p., R· , L·, C·, R·Reaclors 
SRS-IS (NOTE: RBOF is a less than I year 
vulnerability) 
Conduct of operations at reactor facilities and RBOF. 
SRSlReceiving Basin for Offsite Fuel (RBOF) 
SRS- 16 
Inadequate tornado protection at RBOF. 
SRSlReceiving Basin for Offsite Fuel (RBOF) 
SRS-17 
Seismic vulnerability of RBOF. 
SRSIH·Area Canyon 
SRS-IS 
Seismic vulnerability of H-Area Canyon . 
SRSIF·Area Canyon 
SRS-19 
Seismic vulnerability of F-Area Canyon. 
SRS/K·, L·, P·Reactor Disassembly Basins and RBOF 
SRS-20 
Inadequate leak detection system in the underground 
water-filled RINM storage basin. 
SRSIL·, K·, P·Reactor Disassembly Basins 
SRS-21 
Inadequate seismic evaluation and potential inadequacies 
of structures, systems, and components to withstand a 
design basis event. 
Eight major 
facilities with 
vulnerabilities 
./ 
Priority 
Less than 
I year 
./ 
2.5 Representative Host Sites 
Greater than Action Plan 
I year status 
Complete 
Complete 
Complete 
Complete 
./ Complete 
Complete 
Complete 
DOE has identified two SRS areas as representative host sites for potential facilities related to the 
implementation of programmatic decisions on spent nuclear fuel management (Figure 2·3): 
F· and H·Areas (considered together) for the modification or expansion of existing facilities, 
new wet storage, and support facilities 
An undeveloped si te for the construction of major new facilities. primarily an Expended 
Core Facility or dry storage vault . 
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2.5.1 F- and H-Areas 
Th~se two areas contain most of the current spent nuclear fuel faci lities and operations at the 
SRS. including the Receiving Basin for Offsite Fuels. Therefore. DOE wou ld focus fu ture actions 
under any of the alternatives in these areas as well. for cost·efrectiveness and because construction 
would occur in areas that had been previously disturbed. 
F- and H-Areas are about 2 miles (3.2 kilometers) apart near the center of the SRS. The neares t 
Site boundary is approximately 7.5 miles (12 kilometers) to the west. DOE uses the land wi thin a 
5-mile (8-kilometer) radius of the two areas either for industrial purposes associated wi th SRS 
operations or as managed forest land. The closest facility to F- and H-Areas is the E-Area Solid 
Waste Disposal Faci lity. which lies between the two areas (Figure 2-3). DOE uses this facility to 
dispose of SRS solid low-level radioact ive waste and to store TRU radioactive waste and mixed waste . 
The F-Area separations facilities occupy about 420 acres ( 1.7 square kilometers). These facili ties 
were designed primarily fer the recovery of plutonium-239 from irradiated and unirradiated feed 
materials. DOE used the F-Area Canyon to dissolve target materials and produce solutions that 
contained the various products extracted from fiss ion products. Further process ing converted the 
products from solution to solid form for shipment off the Site. Large tanks in F-Area store high-level 
liquid radioactive waste for future stabili zation and disposal through the Defense Waste Processing 
Facility. 
H-Area facilities occupy about 395 acres ( 1.6 square kilometers). The H-Area Canyon processed 
irradiated fuel elements or target assemblies from reactors. Primary operations included the dissolution 
of irradiated targets and fuel tubes. chemical and physical separation. and purification of materials. 
DOE stores high- level liquid waste in large tanks in H-Area. as in F-Area. for future processing and 
disposal through the Defense Waste Processing Facility. 
2.5.2 Undeveloped Representative Host Site 
DOE has selected an undeveloped representative host site for the construction of new facilities 
that F- or H-Area could not accommodate. This site is to the south and east of H-Area. adjacent to 
SRS Road E and close to an existing rai lroad line. as shown in Figure 2-3 . The SRS could make 
connections to existing electricity. water. and steam networks wi th minimal additional construction. 
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The use of this si te would have the advantage of consolidating spent nuclear fuel-related activities near 
F- and H-Areas and close te the center of the SRS. 
This site is representative of many available areas on the SRS that could support spent nuclear 
fuel management activities. For example. DOE has identified a different representative site for the 
possible construction of the Expended Core Facility for the management of naval spent nuclear fuel 
(see Appendix D of Volume I of this Environmental Impact Statement). DOE would conduct a 
detailed siting analysis before implementing any programmatic decision at the SRS. DOE would 
assess, as necessary . the environmental consequences of the siting of any facilities as part of the site-
specific NEPA documentation. 
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3. SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL ALTERNATIVES 
This chapter describes the five management alternatives for spent nuclear fuel that the 
U.S . Depanment of Energy (DOE) has evaluated for the Savannah River Site (SRS) as pan of 
Volume I of this Environmental Impact Statement. These alternatives are: 
I. No Action 
2. Decentralization 
3. 199211993 Planning Basis 
4. Regionalization (with 2 suballematives fo r the SRS) 
5. Centralization (with 2 suballematives for the SRS) 
The activities covered by the alternatives range from maintaining the current inventory of spent 
fuel at the SRS without receiving any more shipments (Allemative I). through keeping the existing 
inventory and accepting or sending off some limited shipments (Allematives 2 through 4), to receiving 
at the Site all DOE spent nuclear fue l and some from other sources (Allemative 5). DOE also 
examined an option for shipping all spem nuclear fuel at the SRS to another location 
(a variation of Allematives 4 and 5). Table 3-1 summarizes the quantities of material that would be 
received. shipped out. and ullimately managed at the SRS under the various allernatives. DOE has 
assessed the aluminum-clad spent nuclear fuel separately from nonaluminum-c1ad fuel (i .e., stainless 
stee l and Zircaloy) because the options for managing them at the Site could be differem as explained 
in Section 3.1. 
The analyt ical approach used in this document produces estimates of consequences that would be 
as large as or larger than any that could occur or be expected under the allernatives and provides a 
comparison of the impacts of the principal technologies for managing spent nuclear fuel at the SRS. 
This chapter also provides an overview of the SRS management approach and describes the five 
allemati ves as they relate to the SRS (Sec tions 3.1 and 3.2). In addition. the chapter summarizes and 
compares the potential environmental consequences of each allernative (Section 3.3). 
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Table 3-1 . Quamities (MTHM)' of spent nuclear fuel that would be received. shipped. and managed 
at the SRS under the five alternatives.bot 
TOIals managed 3.1 
Cuntntlyat SRS under Ihis 
Aitcm3li\'c Fuel Type SRS Receive Ship Out al1emalive 
I. No Action Aluminum 184.40 0.00 0.00 184.40 
!!m Q.!!! 21.87 NonaJuminum 21 .87 ioo.i7 TOlals 206.27 0.00 0.00 
2. DccentraJizalion Aluminum 184.40 11 .02 0.00 195.42 
Nonaluminum 21.87 2.60 0.00 24.47 
Tulals i06.i7 i3T2 0.00 2 19.89 
) . 199211993 Planning Basis Aluminum 184.40 13.69 0.00 198.09 
Nonaluminum 21.87 MQ Qm 
..l!!& 
TOlals i06.27 16.49 0.00 222.76 
4. Regionalizalion . A Aluminum 184.40 28.69 0.00 213.09 
(by fuellYPC) Nonaluminum 21 .87 0.00 llL.!1l. ...ill!!! 
TOIaJs i06.i7 28.69 (2 1.87) 213.09 
4. Regionalizalion . B Aluminum 184.40 19.93 0.00 204.33 
2 1.87 30.42 Qm 52.29 (by location at SRS) Nonaluminum 
iS6.6i TC)(als i06.21 50Ts 0.00 
4 . Regionalizalion - B Aluminum 184.40 0.00 (1&4.40) 0.00 
..l!1Z 2m -iill1l 0.00 (by location. elsewhere) Nonaluminum 0:00 TOlalS 206.27 0.00 (206.27) 
S. Cenlr.llizalion Aluminum 184.40 28.69 0.00 213.09 
(alSRS) Nonaluminum 
..ll!l 2506.84 Q;2Q 2528.71 
Totcls 206.27 2,535.53 0.00 2,741.80 
S. Centnlizalion Aluminum 184.40 0.00 (t84.4O) 0.00 
(elsewhere) Nonaluminum 21 .87 Q;2Q 
-iill1l !hQQ 
TOlaiS 206.27 0.00 (206.27) 0.00 
a. To conven metric tons of heavy metal to tons, multiply by 1.1023. 
b. Numbers may not sum due to rounding, 
c. Source: Wichmann (1995). 
3.1 SRS Management Approach 
3.1.1 Management Options 
DOE has evaluated three options for the managemem of spent nuclear fue l at the SRS under the 
fi ve alternatives considered for this EIS. These technical management options are wet storage or dry 
storage of all fuel s and the processing of aluminum-clad fuels. DOE could implement these options 
individually or in combination under any of the fi ve alternatives. DOE would base its selection of one 
or more of these technical management options on additional analysis. including a separate SRS-
specific National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) review based on this programmatic EIS . 
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3.1.1.1 Wet Storage. As described above in Section 2.3. the SRS currently maintains its 
s~nt nuclear fuel in wet storage in the Receiving Basin for Offsite Fuels and several reactor ba!\ins. 
Wet srorage under the 40-year inlerim management plan (except under the No Action alternat ive) 
wou ld require that DOE construct a new wet storage pool at the SRS and move all fuel to this faci lity. 
Prior to this transfer. DOE could place all the aluminum-clad fuel in stainless steel canislers to prevent 
further corrosion and breakdown of the fue l cladding. The stainless steel · and Zi rcaloy·c1ad fue ls 
could also require canning . The SRS would monitor and maintain the water quality and the condition 
of the fue l in the storage pool throughout the interim management period . 
Under this wet s~ ordge option. the spent nuclear fuel would be in an interim storage form. which 
could requITe further treatment depending on the DOE decision on its ultimate disposi tion. 
3.1.1.2 Dry Storage. DOE currently has no dry storage facilities for spent nuclear fuel at the 
Site. Dry storage of SRS aluminum·c1ad fuels under this management plan would require technology 
development prior to the construction of a dry storage facility . Although such facilities exist at other 
DOE si tes and at commercial locations. DOE believes that the characteristics of SRS spent fuel are 
sufficiently different to require some research and development before the design and construction of a 
facil ity for th is fuel. DOE would can all fuel before placing it into the dry storage vaults. II would 
also have to maintain and monitor the facility for the remainder of the 40-year management period. 
As with wet storage. the dry storage option would place the spent fuel into an interim storage 
fonn that could require further treatment later depending upon DOE's decision on ultimate disposition. 
3.1.1.3 Processing and Dry Storage. One method under this option would be for the SRS 
to process existing aluminum-clad spent nuclear fue l through the existing separations facilities in the 
F· and H·Area Canyons. and place the nonaluminum·c1ad fuels and any future receipts in dry storage. 
The process using existing capabili ty would resull in the generation of both separated actinides 
(e.g., uranium oxide), which would be stored on the site in existing facilities. and solutions of fi ss ion 
products that would be placed in existing waste storage fac ilities for later conversion to a glassified 
form through the Defense Was te Processi ng Facili ty (DWPF). DOE would maintain and monitor the 
dry storage faci lity containing the nonaluminum·c1ad spent fuel. Variations of this processing option 
are also possible. such as processing all the aluminum·c1ad fuel currently on the Site plus all that is 
received from elsewhere. or developing the capability at the SRS for processing for vitrification 
wi thout chemical se parations. 
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The process option selected for evaluation in this document is representative of possible 
processing options that might be employed. but is not necessarily the one that DOE would selecl. 
Detai led NEPA evaluations would be requi red to implement any spent nuclear fue l management plan 
at the SRS. 
3.1.2 Management Plan 
Figure 3·1 summarizes DOE' s overall plan for the interim management of aluminum·c1ad and 
nonaluminum.clad fuels at the SRS. This flowchart shows Jctions for all ahematives except No 
Action. as explained in Section 3.2.1. 
3.1.2.1 Aluminum-clad Fuels. Depending on the alternative and option selected, DOE could 
(within constraints of mission commitments) consolidate some aluminum-clad fuel in the Receiving 
Basin for Offsite Fuels to take advantage of this faci lity' s superior water quality and then move a ll 
aluminum.c1ad fuel into dry swrage, wet storage, or initiate processing (Figure 3·1). DOE could also 
process aluminum·c1ad fuel without any consolidation work. Before moving the fuel into dry or wet 
storage. DOE would place it in cans. DOE would hold the canned fuel or the stabilized products from 
processing in storage for the 40-year interim management period until it decided their fin al disposition . 
DOE would place. aluminum·c1ad fuels received by the SRS from other locations in wet or dry 
storage. DOE could not implement any of the options for aluminum·c1ad fuels. with the exception of 
processing using existing SRS capabilities, without a technology development effort . 
3.1.2.2 Nonaluminum-clad Fuels. DOE options for the management of nonaluminum·clad 
fuels at the SRS are somewhat different, in that only dry or wet storage is considered (Figure 3· 1). 
The processing of these fuels at the Site is not an option because the SRS does not currently have 
operat ional facilities capable of separating these materials. To improve aluminum·c1ad fue l storage. 
DOE could consolidate the nonaluminum-clad fuel inventory in a reactor basin where the more 
resistant stainless steel or Zircaloy cladding would be less susceptible to corrosion. The fuel would 
remain there until DOE buill new dry or wet storage faci lities. DOE would then can the fuel and 
move it into the new storage. DOE would place any nonaluminum·clad fuel received at the SRS after 
completion of the new facilities directly into storage. The fuel would remain in this interim storage 
until DOE decided its uhimate disposition. 
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Figure 3-1. Diagram of how SRS would manage aluminum-clad and nonaluminum-clad fue ls. "Near-term Rece ipts" re fe rs to the fue l that would 
be received be fore ne w wet or dry storage facil ities are available. 
3.2 Description of Alternatives 
3.2.1 Overview 
Table 3-2 compares actions under each of the five alternatives. These actions relate to the 
requirements for transportation. stabilization, facilities, and research and development that DOE wou ld 
address for each alternative. Transportation would include onsite movements as well as the receipt or 
shipment of spent fuel. The consideration of facilities addresses not only new ones that could be 
required, but also the use of existing structures and capabilities such as the F- and H-Area Canyons at 
SRS. Finally, each alternative would involve some level of research and development on matters 
related to spent nuclear fuel interim management (e.g., stabilization. transportation casks) and its 
ultimate disposition . 
Alternative 1 (No Action) addresses only the interim wet storage option, while the analysis of 
Alternatives 2 through 5 considers three options: dry storage. wet storage, and processing of existing 
aluminum-clad fuels and placing the other fuels into storage. In addition. Alternatives 4 and 5 include 
an option for the shipment of spent nuclear fuel off the SRS. This analytical approach shows the 
relative impact of viable interim storage technologies for the range of alternatives this EIS is 
considering for the SRS. However, this informarion is not sufficient to support the selection of a 
specific interim storage technology at the SRS because DOE has not completed site-specific research 
and development for dry storage and wet storage methods or an evaluation of other processing options. 
In addition. the specific quantities of offsite fuel that DOE would manage are ubject to change. The 
selection of an interim storage technology will be the subject of eparate NEPA documentation pecific 
to the SRS. 
Figure 3-2 is a matrix showing the types of facilities that would be required for each alternative 
and option. The list includes tho e facilities already operating at the SRS (e.g. , Receiving Basin for 
Offsite Fuels) as well as potential facilities (e.g., fuel characterization facility). DOE considered these 
facilities in its evaluation of the consequences of each alternati ve. as described in Chapter 5. 
The alternat ives described below address interim storage to 2035: further treatment of the spent 
nuclear fuel would be necessary before DOE obtained a final di sposable waste form . Thi EIS doe. 
not addres this additional treatment. However. DOE would carry out a full NEPA documentati on for 
any deci ion on final di sposition of spent nuclear fuel. 
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Table 3-2, Actions required under each of the fiw alternatives at the SRS. 
Alternative 
I . o Arllon 
2. Dcn.'nlrali/alH1I1 
.~ . 1')I)2JI')')J Planl11 n)! 
lia'" 
~ . Rq!lon.IIit;lIl l1n - A 
(1'1 _ ful'! l~pt.' ;'1 lhl.' 
SRS ) 
Transpnrtalion Stabilization 
o ,hlpll1l.'nb In nr lrom lhe Sileo Plan: alull1inull1-daLl fuel s lhal 
LII11Il ,'n,ill.' lran,fl.'r:. 10 lho,1.' arl.' hadly corroLled and in 
rl.'qulrl.'d lor ,:I f.: ,tora)!l.' . L1anger of claLlLlin)! failure in 
conlainl.'rs and relurn lhl.'l11 to 
Wl.'l storage. 
Rl.'rc l\'e ah,'ul I:\.(, MTIIM ( 15.0 
Ion,) of alull1inull1-daLl anLl 
nonalummull1-claLl fuel>. Llmil 
omlle lr:llhf.:r, to lho,1.' requireLl 
lor ,.If.: ~lorage. l'I1I1'oliLlali(lfI. 
.lI1d re'l.'arl'h anLl L1e\'l.'lnpml.'nl. 
Laler re· lnl·all.' fud s 10 nl.' w \1.1.'1 or 
L1r 'lnr.tgl.' facllily or ll1uve 
alul11lnull1-clad fud~ to F- :lnLl 
II -Canyon, fur prol'es, ing. 
Re'rl.' l\': ahow 16.5 MTIIM ( IX.2 
Ion,) of alummum-clad anLl 
nonaluminull1-daLl ful'! s. I. ilr,il 
on"l': lr.m,kr, tn lhme r<.'quir.:L1 
fnr 'af.: , lora)!e. l·un. oliLlaliun . 
anLl re,ean:h and L11.'\'elopmenl. 
Lall.'r rl.'l llI:a ll.' fuels h) new weI or 
L1ry ' lnragl.' fariiily . or move 
alummu m-clad Iuds 10 F- anLl H-
em),on for pWl'e,smg. 
Rerel\': ahoul 2 .7 MTHM (J 1.6 
IonS) of aluminum-dad fuel. 
Ship III ILlaho alional 
F.n)!mel.'nng Lahoralory ahoul 
21 () MTI-IM ( 2~ . 1 IOn') of 
,1:lInl.:" 'led anLl Zirl'a loy fuel. 
RclOl',ll1.' .l lummum-ciad fuel> to 
Rerel\ mg Ih,m fur Off,ile 
Fud,. a, necl.' , .Iry: lhen 10 new 
Wl.' l or L1ry ,lOrage facllilie,. or 
mme alummu m-clad luel ~ 10 F-
Jnd II -Cany"n for pnll:es,ing. 
Can alu minum-dad fuel s anLl 
plal'e lhem in weI or dry 
slorage or pWl'ess exisling fuel 
lhrough F- and H·Canynns. 
Can slainless-sled anLl 
Zircaloy fuel s and plan: in weI 
or dry slurage. 
Can aluminum-daLl fuds anLl 
plal'e lhem in wet or dry 
,lOrage or prm:ess cxiMing fuel 
lhrough F- and H-Canyons_ 
Can ,lai nless ,leel anLl 
Zirl'aluy fuel s anLl place in weI 
or L1ry ~torage . 
Can aluminum-clad fuels and 
plan! lhem in weI or dry 
,loragc: nr prol'e~s e)(iSling 
fuel through F- and 
H-Canyons. 
Facilities 
Slure fuels in Rel'eiving Basin for 
Ofl'sile Fucls and in an upgradeLl 
real'lor hasin . Requires no new 
facililics . 
Slorc fuels in Receiving Basin for 
Off. ite Fucls or upgraded reactor 
hasin unlil new weI or dry sloragc 
facilily is buill. Requires new 
l'haral'lerization facilily . new weI 
or dry canning facility . anLl new 
wet or dry slorage facilily. 
Stnn: fucls in Rccei ving Basin for 
OITsi te Fucls or upgraded reaclor 
hasin until ncw wct or L1ry storagc 
facility is buill. RCljuircs new 
l'haral'lerizatiun facility. new wct 
or dry canning fal'ilily and new 
wet or L1ry slOmgc farility . 
Store fucl in C)(i Sling Rcceiving 
Basin for Offsitc Fuels or 
upgradcd reaclllr basin until new 
wet or dry storage facility is 
available. or until fuel is 
proccsscd. Rcquircs ncw receiving 
anLl charactcrization fdcilities. ncw 
wct or dry canning facilitics. and 
new wet or dry storagc facilities. 
Research and Development 
Continue e)( isting spent nuclear 
fucl-rclated research and 
devclopment. 
Dcvelop tcchnology (l'anning 
and storage dcsign) 10 storc SRS 
aluminum-dad fuels in dry 
slorage vault. Condul't research 
and pilot-scalc operations to 
delermine bcst tcchnology for 
ultimate disposition of 
aluminum-dad fuels. 
Devclop technology (canning 
and storage dcsign) to store SRS 
aluminum-clad fucls in dry 
sloragc vault . Conduct rcscarch 
and pilot-scale opcralions to 
dclcrmine hcst technology for 
ultimatc disposi tion of 
aluminum-dad fuels . 
Dc velop tel'hnology (canning 
and storage design ) to store 
aluminum-clad fuels in dry 
storagc vault . Conduct research 
and pilot-scale opcrations to 
L1etermine hcst tcchnology fo r 
ultimate disposition of 
aluminum-clad fue l ~ . 
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Table 3-2. (continued). 
Alternative 
~. Regionalization - B 
(by location at the 
SRS) 
4. Regionali z:lI ion - B 
(by location 
at another site) 
5. Centrali zation (at 
,he SRS) 
5. Centrali7ati on (at 
another site) 
Transportation 
Receive approx imately 50.4 
MTHM (55.6 tons) of spent fuel 
fro m other locations. Limit 
onsite transfers to those required 
tor safe storage, consolidation, 
and research and development. 
Relocate fuels to new dry or wet 
storage fac il ity or move 
aluminum-d ad fuel to F- and 
H-Canyons fo r processing. 
Move all fuels to new 
characteri zation faci lity prior to 
shi pment offsite. Ship out about 
206.3 MTHM (227.4 tons) of 
spent fuel. 
Receive about 2,535.5 MTHM 
(2, 79~ . 9 tons) of spent fuel from 
offsi te. Limit onsite transfers to 
those required fo r safe storage. 
consulidation. and research and 
development. Relocate fuels to 
new dry or wet storage faci lity or 
move al uminum-d ad fuel to F-
and H-Canyons for processing. 
Move all fue ls to new 
characterization fac il ity prior to 
shipment offsite. Ship out about 
206.3 MTHM (227.4 tons) of 
spent fuel. 
Sta bilization 
Can aluminum-d ad fuels and 
place them in wet or dry 
storage; or process ex isti ng 
aluminum-clad fu els through 
F- and H-Canyons and store 
re maining fuel. Characterize 
and can fuel received from 
offsite that is not in a form 
suitable for direct placement 
into storage. 
Charac teri ze and can all spent 
fuel prior to shipment. 
Can aluminum-c lad fuels and 
place them in wet or dry 
storage; or process ex isting 
aluminum-clad fuels through 
F- and H-Canyons and store 
remaining fuels. Characterize 
and can fuel received from 
offsite that is not in a form 
suitable for direct placement in 
storage. 
Characteri ze and can all spent 
fuel prior to shipment. 
Facilities 
Store fuels in Receiving Basin for 
Offsite Fuels or upgraded reactor 
basin unt il new storage faci lity is 
ava il able. Store new fuel 
shipments in new wet or dry 
storage facility. Requires new 
receivi ng. characterization and 
canning facilities. new wet or dry 
storage fac ility. and possibly a new 
Expended Core Facility. 
Store existing fuels in Receiving 
Bas in for Offs ite fuel and in a 
reactor basin until characterization 
and shipment offsite. Requires 
new characterization fac ility. 
Storc fuel in Rcceivi ng Bas in fo r 
Offsite Fuels or in an upgraded 
reactor basin until new slOrage 
faci lities are available. Store new 
fuel shipments in 'lew wet or dry 
storage fac il ity. Requires new 
receivi ng. charac teri zation and 
canning facilities. new wet or dry 
storage facility. and new Expended 
Core Faci lity. 
Store existing fuel in Recei ving 
Bas in for Offsite Fuel or in an 
upgraded reactor basin until 
charac terization and shipment 
offsite. Requires new 
characterization fac ility. 
Research and Development 
Develop technology (canning 
and storage design) to store SRS 
aluminum-clad fu els in dry 
storage vault. Conduct research 
and pilot-scale operations to 
determ ine best technology for 
ultimate disposition of 
aluminum-clad fuels. 
Develop technology for 
stabilization. canning. and 
shipment of degraded aluminum-
clad fuel. 
Develop technology (canning 
and storage design) to store SRS 
aluminum-clad fuels in dry 
storage vaul t. Conduct research 
and pilot-scale operations to 
determine best technology for 
ultimate disposition of spent 
nuclear fuels. 
Develop technology for 
stabilization. canning. and 
shipment of degraded aluminum-
clad fuel. 
No Decentral ization 1992/93 Ren1~~~~~~~~"ei A Act ion Planning Basis 
Option Option Option Option Option Option Option Option Option Option 
Facility 
1 2. 2b 2e 3. 
We. Dry We' Processc D,y 
Reaclor Basins • • • • • Receiving Basin Olfsite Fuels • • • • • New Fuel Characterization 0 0 0 0 
New Dry Canning 0 0 0 
New Interim Dry Storage 0 0 0 
New Expended Core (Navy) 
New Fuel Receiving 0 0 0 0 
New Wei Canningb 0 
New Fuel Storage Pool 0 
H-CanyonlH ·Area Separations X • F-CanyoniF-Area Separations X • 
Rew,~n~!i~::lg~) -B 
Option Option Option 
Facility 40 4e 41 
Dry Wet Processc 
Reaclor Basins 
Receiving Basin effsile Fuels 
New Fuel Characterization 
New Dry Canning 
New Interim Dry Storage 
New Expended Core Facility (Navy) 
New Fuel Receiving 
New Wet Canningb 
New Fuel Storage Pool 
H-Canyon/H-Area Separations 
F-Canyon/F-Area Separations 
Legend: 
o New faCllitres required under each case 
• EXisting facilities required under each case 
• • 
• • 0 0 
0 
0 
* * 0 0 
0 
0 
X EXisting facllilles that would be Involved to maintain safe storage 
* May be needed 
a. Information denved from WSRC ( t994) . 
b. Includes fuel repackaging facility. 
• 
• 0 
0 
0 
* 0 
• 
• 
Option 
49 
Ship 
• 
• 0 
c Option Includes processing of existing aluminum· clad fuels and storage of others. 
Figure 3-2. Types of facilities requi red for each alternati ve.a 
3-9 
3b 3e 4. 4b 4e 
We. Processc D,y We. Processc 
• • • • • 
• • • • • 0 0 0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
• • 
• • 
Centra lization 
Option Option Option Option 
Sa 5b 5e 50 
Dry Wet ProcessC Ship 
• • • • 
• • • • 0 0 0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 
0 
• 
• 
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3.2.2 Alternative 1 - No Action 
3.2.2.1 Overview. This alternat ive deals only with the minimum act ions that DOE would 
d~em necessary for the cont inued safe and secure management of spent nuclear fuel. It is not a slaWs 
quo condition. Rath~ r . across its complex of facilities. DOE wou ld maintain spent nuclear fu~ 1 close 
to generation or current storage locations wi th no shipment between sites. Facility upgrades or 
rep lacements and ons ite fuel transfers would occur only to support safe and secure interim storage. 
DOE would continue existing and new research and development ac tivities for spent fuel interim 
management. Stabilization acti vities would be limited only to those minimum ac tions required to store 
spent nuclear fuel safe ly. 
3.2.2.2 SRS Alternative 1 - Wet Storage. DOE would iniliate the various SRS programs 
and activities necessary to obtain optimum use of existing spent nuclear fuel faci lities for the extended 
storage of existing Site inven.ories totalling 206.3 metric tons (227.4 tons) of heavy me.al (MTHM) in 
the following quant it ies: 
184 .4 MTHM (203.3 tons) of Savannah River Defense Production [highly enriched uranium 
(HEU) aluminum-clad fuels}. including plutonium target material. and other aluminum-clad 
fuels 
4.6 MTHM (5. 1 tons) of commercial spent nuclear fue l (primarily zi rconium-clad) 
5.4 MTHM (6.0 tons) of test and experimental reactor sta inless steel-cl ad fuel 
11 .9 MTHM (13. 1 tons) of test and experimental reactor Zi rcaloy-clad fuel 
The goal of this program would be to relocate some aluminum-c lad fuels to the Receiving Basin 
for Offsite Fuels where precisely maintained wate r quality would prolong the storage life of these fuel 
types. In addit ion. DOE wou ld re locate a portion of the stainless steel- and Zircaloy-c1ad fuels to a 
reac tor basin. where their more resistant c ladd ing would maintain fuel containme nt for an extended 
period. These actions \\'ould be accomplished wi th in the constraints of miss ion requirements. 
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The following desc ribes one method that could be employed to improve the storage of 
aluminum-clad fue l. Variation!' of this plan that would involve only the use of existing storage basins 
are al50 possible. 
Selec t a reactor basin for upgrading and for the interi m storage of SNF. 
Relocate aluminum-clad fuel s from the selected reactor basin to other on site basins to enable 
cleaning and repair of the basin chosen for upgrade w improve wate r quality. 
Consolidate fuels in the Receiving Bas in for Offsite Fuels to tho extent possible. 
After cleaning and renovating the selected reac tor basin. move a portion of the stain less steel 
and Zircaloy-c1ad fuel assemblies now at the Rece iving Basin for Offsite Fuels to the 
renovated reac tor basin. 
Move the aluminum-clad fuels temporarily stored at other locations to the Receiving Bas in 
for Offsite Fuels or the renovated reactor basin. 
DOE will continue to place heavily corroded aluminum-clad fuel e lements that could be in 
danger of c ladding fai lure into containrrs in the wet pool as required to minimize any spread of 
materials throughout the pool. This act ion would be much simpler than canning the elements. which 
would occur under the other alternatives. 
This alternative wou ld require no new fac ilit ies. DOE would continue existing spent nuclear 
fuel-rela ted research and development. 
3.2.3 Alternative 2 - Decentralization 
3.2.3.1 Overview. Under this a lternative. DOE would maintain existing spent nuclear fuel in 
.;; torage at the current locations. and the SRS would receive some shipments of university fue l and 
fore ign fue l. This allernati ve differs from the No Action alte rnative by allowing siJ!r.ificant facility 
de velopment and upgrades. DOE could transpon fu el on the Si te for safety. fue l consideration. or 
rec;earch and development ac tivi ties. In addition. DOE could undertake actions it deemed desirable. 
though not essential. for safe ty and could perform spent nuclear fuel process ing. treatment. research. 
and development. 
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3.2.3.2 SRS Options 2a, 2b, and 2c. DOE analyzed three options specific to the SRS for 
thi ~ alternative: Option 2a d~als with dry storage. Option 2b deals with wet storage. and Option 2c 
involves processing existing SRS aluminum-clad spent nuclear fuel and storing the remaining fuel. 
The: ,lmount of spent fuel that tht.' SRS would manage includes its current inventory. as described 
above: for Alternative I . plus: 
11.0 MTHM (12.0 tons) of aluminum-clad fuel 
1.1 MTHM ( 1.2 tons) of stainless steel-clad fuel 
0 .7 MTHM (0.8 ton) of Zircolo),-c lad fuel 
0.8 MTHM (0.9 ton) of other e'perimental fuel 
Under this aiternative. SRS would manage a total of about 219.9 MTHM (242.4 tons) of spent 
nuc lear fuel. The SRS would rece ive spent fuel from research reactors as existing storage allowed and 
as new storage was constructed . 
3.2.3.2.1 Option 2a - Dry Storage - Under this option. DOE would store existing SRS 
inventories in wet pools while deve loping the technology and constructing the necessary facilities to 
examine. characterize. and can the fuel s and transfer them to a new dry storage vault to await 
treatment for final disposition. The SRS would proceed with the fuel rearrangement plan described 
above for Alternative I to provide acceptable storage conditions 10 minimize failure s of the 
aluminum-clad material before its placement in a dry-storage container. 
Placement in a dry· storage fac il ity would require a technology development program into DOE 
capabilities to examine. characteri ze. and can aluminum-clad fuel elements before placing them in a 
vault . In addition. the SRS \'Iiould investi!; He technologies for the ultimate disposition of spent nuclear 
fuel. In addi tion to a dry storage faci lity. the SRS would build new fuel receiving. characteri zation. 
and dry canning faci lities. 
3.2.3.2.2 Option 2b - Wet Storage - Under this option. DOE could rearrange e,isting 
spent nuclear fue l as described above for Alternative 1 to provide interim wet slO rage capacity while 
constnlcting new faci lities. SRS could also modify thi s rearrangement plan to acc~pt shipments of 
~pent fuel from offsite and place them directly into the Receiving Ba5in for Offsitc Fue ls. as 
ci rcumstances warrant. The new wet storage faci lit ies required under this option would include the 
capability 10 examine and characteri ze fue ls and to can deteriorating fue ls in a stainless steel package 
for placement in the new pool. DOE would move all fuel to the new storage pool once it was 
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complete. SRS would build new fuel receiving. characterizatiun. and wet-canning faci lit ies as well as 
a new wet storage pool. SRS would in vestigate technologies for the ultimate disposition of spent 
nuclear fue l. 
3.2.3.2.3 Option 2c - Processing and Storage - Under this option. SRS would 
process ex isting aluminum-clad spent nuclear fuel to consolidate and stabilize the nuclear material for 
swrage in vaults. and would place the stainless steel- and Zircaloy-cl ad fue l and new receipts of 
aluminum-clad fuel in dry storage. The fuel would remain in the current wet pools while awaiting 
processing or the construction of new dry swrage fac ilities. DOE would use existing F- and H-Area 
facilities to process the aluminum-clad fuel to safe. stable. consolidated fomls. 
The new faci lities that the SRS would require under this option would be similar to those 
descri bed for dry storage (Option 2a). except they would be much smaller because the amount of fuel 
to be stored would be small : only about 11.0 MTHM (12.0 tons) of aluminum·c1ad and about 24.5 
MTHM (27 .0 tons) of nonaluminum-c1ad fuel. 
The SRS would investigate technologies required for the ultimate disposi tion of spent fuel. 
3.2.4 Alternative 3 - 1992i1993 Planning Basis 
3.2.4.1 Overview. This alternative assumes the continued transportation, receipt, processing, 
and storage of spent nuclear fuel. Foreign and university research reactor spent nuclear fue l would be 
sent to the INEL and the SRS. DOE would assess the construction of new facilities required to 
accommodate current and projected spent nuclear fuel storage requirements. This alternative would 
include activities related to the treatment of spent nuclear fuel . including research and development 
and pilot programs to support futu re decisions on its ultimate disposition. 
3.2.4.2 SRS Options 3a, 3b, and 3c. DOE analyzed the same three options for this 
alternative as for Alternative 2: dry storage (Option 3a). wet storage (Option 3b). and the processing 
of existing SRS aluminum-clad fuel and storing the remaining fue l (Option 3c). The quantities of fuel 
would be somewhat greater than those for Alternative 2 because the options assume that the SRS 
would manage its present inventory (see Alte rnative I) plus approx imately: 
13.7 MTHM (15.1 tons) of aluminum·c1ad fuel 
1. 3 MTHM ( 1.4 tons) of stainless steel·c lad fue l 
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0 .7 MTHM (0.8 ton) of Zircaloy·c1ad fuel 
0.8 MTHM (0.9 ton) of other experimental fue l 
a small amount «0.1 ton) of commercial nonaluminum-clad fuel 
The total spent nuclear fuel managed would equal about 222.8 MTHM (245.6 tons). The Site 
would rece ive shipments of fuel from other locations as existing space allowed and as new fac ilities 
were completed. 
3.2.4.2.1 Option 3a - Dry Storage - The Site would store current inventories in 
existing wet pools while developing technology and construcling faci lities necessary to examine. 
charac teri ze. and can the fuels and transfer them to a new dry storage vault to awai t treatment for final 
disposition. 
The actions that SRS would undertake under this option and the new facilities to be constructed 
would be the same as those described for Option 2a - Dry Storage under Alternative 2 
(Decentralization) in Section 3.2.3.2.1. 
3.2.4.2.2 Option 3b - Wet Storage - DOE could rearrange existing spent nuclear fuel 
as described in Alternative I above to provide interim wet storage capacity while building new 
facilities. The Site could also accept new shipmenls directly into the Receiving Basin for Offsite 
Fuels. as required. The actions that SRS would undertake under this option. and the new fac ilities to 
be constructed. would be the same as those described for Option 2b ~ Wet Storage under Ahernative 2 
(Decentralization) in Section 3.2. 3.2.2. 
3.2.4.2.3 Option 3c - Processing and Storage - Under this option. the :;RS would 
process existing aluminum-clad spent nuclear fuel and would place the stainless steel- and Zircaloy-
clad fuel and new receipts of aluminum-clad fuel in storage as described for Option 2c ~ Processing 
under Alternative 2 (Decentralization) in Section 3.2.3.2.3. The requirements for new facilities and for 
technology development would also be the same. 
3.2.5 Alternative 4 - Regionalization 
3.2.5. 1 Overview. This alternative has two subalternati ves. The firs t (Regionalization A) 
would involve the distribution of existing and new spent nuclear fue l among DOE sites based 
primarily on the similari ty of fuel type. although DOE would also consider transpon distances. 
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available processing capahilities. avai lable storage capabilities. or a combination of these factors. 
Under this subalternative. SRS would receive all aluminum-clad fuel and would transfer its ex isting 
inventory of stainless steel- and Zircaloy-c1ad fuel to another DOE site. The SRS would manage a 
total of about 213.1 MTHM (234.9 tons) of spent fuel under the Regionalization A subalternative. 
The second subaltemative (Regionalizat ion B) would require DOE to consolidate all existing and 
new spent fuel at two sites - one to the east of the Mississippi River and one to the west -
depending on the location or generation site of the fuel. Under this alternative, the SRS wou ld either 
receive a ll spent nuclear fuel in the east [approximately 256.6 MTHM (282.9 tons)] or ship its current 
inventory offsile to the Oak Ridge Reservation in Tennessee. An additional option if SRS becomes 
the Eastern Regional Site is for DOE to construct an Expended Core Facility at the SRS to manage 
some Naval fuel. This opt ion is described in Appendix D of Volume I of this EIS. 
Under either subaltemative, DOE would undenake facility upgrades, replacements, and additions 
as appropriate. This alternative would include research and development and pilot programs to support 
current management and future decisions on spent fuel disposition. 
3.2_5_2 SRS Options 4a, 4b, and 4c (Regionalization A). DOE analyzed three options 
for the regionalization of fuels by fuel type: dry storage (Option 4a). wet storage (Option 4b) and 
processing of existing SRS aluminum-clad fuels and storing the remaining fuel (Option 4c). This 
subahemative assumes that the SRS would manage: 
Its current inventory of 184.4 MTHM (203.3 tons) of aluminum-clad fuels. plus 
Approximately 28.7 MTHM (31.6 tons) of research reactor aluminum-clad fuel from other 
sites 
The SRS would ship to the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory approximately: 
5.4 MTHM (6.0 tons) of stainless steel-clad flle l 
4.6 MTHM (5. 1 tons) of commercial nonaluminum-clad fuel 
11.9 MTHM ( 13. 1 tons) of Zircaloy-clad spent fuel 
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DOE would manage a total of about 213.1 MTHM (234.9 tons) of spent nuclear fue l at the SRS 
under thi !" !"ubalternative. The.! site would receive shipme.!nts from olher locations as existing space 
b\:camt! avai lable and as it shipped the non aluminum-clad fuel. 
3.2.5.2.1 Option 4a - Dry Storage - The actions that the SRS would undertake under 
Ihis option. and the new facilities to be constructed. would be the same as for Ihose described for 
Option 2. - Dry Storage under Alternative 2 (Decentralization) in Section 3.2.3.2. 1. 
This option would require an extensive research and development program into capabilities to 
examine. characterize. and can the SRS aluminum-clad fuel for dry storage. 
3.2.5.2.2 Option 4b - Wet Storage - The SRS would carry out the same actions and 
construct the same Iypes of facilitie s under this option as it would for Option 2b - Wet Storage under 
Alternative 2 (Decenlralization) as described in Section 3.2.3.2.2. Research and development activities 
would also be similar to those conducted under this Decentralization alternative. except the SRS would 
not perform studies on nonaluminum-clad fuels. 
3.2.5.2.3 Option 4c - Processing and Storage - Under this option. the SRS would 
process the existing aluminum-clad fuel as described for Option 2c - under Alternative 2 
(Decentralization) and place the aluminum-clad fuel received from offsite into wet storage. The 
requirements for new construction would be different than in Option 2c. in that dry storage facilities 
would not be required because the nonaluminum-clad fue ls would be shipped off the site . The small 
amount of aluminum-clad fuel to be rece ived could be more readily stored in pools rather than 
developing new dry storage. Therefore. Option 4c would require DOE to construct a new fuel 
receiving. wet canning and wet storage facility to manage the fuel received after the major processing 
operations are completed. These fac ilities would be much smaller than those required for other 
alternatives. 
3.2.5.3 SRS Options 4d, 4e, 4', and 4g (Regionalization B). DOE analyzed the same 
three options for the regional ization of spent fue l on the basis of geographic locat ion as for the other 
alternatives: dry storage (Option 4d). wet storage (Option 4e). and processing of existing 
aluminum-clad fuel and storing the remaining fuel (Opt ion 40 . In addition. it assessed the option of 
shipping all SRS inventory offs ite (Option 4g). 
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The amount of material that the SRS would manage if all the spent fu el in the East were shipped 
to the Site would IOtal about 256.6 MTHM (282.9 tons). This would include the CU fTent SRS 
inventory of about 206.3 MTHM (227.4 tons) as detailed in Section 3.2.2 pl us: 
19.9 MTHM (2 1.9 tons) of aluminum-clad fuel 
26.7 MTHM (29.4 tons) of commercial nonaluminum-c1ad fue l 
1.0 MTHM ( I.I ton) of stainless steel-clad fuel 
1.3 MTHM (1.4 tons) of experimental Zircaloy-clad fuel 
1.4 MTHM ( 1.5 tons) of other experimental fuel 
The acti vities that DOE would have to undertake at the SRS. and the facilit ies that it would have 
to build. under the dry slOrage. wet storage. or processing options would be very similar to those 
required for the Decentralization alternative (Section 3.2.3). The difference would be that the size of 
the storage fac ilities would be somewhat greater because the amount of fuel to be managed would be 
larger [256.6 MTHM (282.9 tons) versus 21 9.9 MTHM (242.4 tons)] . In addition. DOE would 
conduct additional research and development on the other fuel types that SRS would manage under 
these options. 
3.2.5.3.1 Option 4d - Dry Storage - The actions that the SRS would undertake under 
this opt ion. and the new fac ilities to be constructed. would be similar to those described for 
Opt ion 2a . Dry Storage under Alternative 2 (Decentralization) in Section 3.2.3.2. 1. This option 
would require an e:« ensive research and development program into capabi lities to examine. 
characterize. and can the SRS aluminum·clad fuel for dry storage. 
3.2.5.3.2 Option 4e - Wet Storage - The SRS would carry out the same actions and 
construct the same types of facilities under this opt ion as it would for Option 2b . Wet Storage under 
Alternative 2 (Decentralization) as descri bed in Section 3.2.3.2.2. Research and development ac tivi ties 
wou ld also be similar to those conducted under this Decentralization alternative. 
3.2.5.3.3 Option 4' -Processing and Storage - Under this opt ion. the SRS would 
process the ex isting aluminum·c1ad fuel and place nonaluminum·c lad fuel and aluminum·c lad fuel 
received from offsite in dry storage as described for Option 2c . Processing with storage under 
Alte rnative 2 (Decentralization). The requirements for new fac ili ties and for research and development 
would also be s imilar. 
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3.2.5.3.4 Option 4g - Shipment Off the Site - Under this option. the SRS would ship 
its CUfTent inventory of about 206.3 MTHM (227.4 tons) to the Oak Ridge Reservation. The acti vities 
and facilities required for this option are the same as those described below for Option 5d of the 
Centralization alternative (Section 3.2.6.2.4). 
3.2.6 Alternative 5 - Centralization 
3.2.6.1 Overview. Under this ahemative. DOE would collect all current and future spent 
nuclear fuel inventories from DOE sites. the Navy. and other sources at a single location for 
management until fin al disposition. DOE would construct new fac ilities at the centralized site to 
accommodate Ihe increased inventories. The originating sites would characterize and stabilize their 
spent nuclear fuel before shipping. They would then close their spent fuel facilities. This alternative 
would include the centralization of activities related to the treatment of spent nuclear fuel . including 
research and development and pilot programs to support future decisions on its disposition. 
3.2.6.2 SRS Options Sa, Sb, Sc, and Sd. DOE analyzed four options for this alternative. 
Three deal with shipping all DOE spent nuclear fuel to the SRS for disposition and management in 
dry storage (Option 5a). wet storage (Option 5b). c r by processing existing aluminum-clad fuel and 
storing the remaining fuel (Option 5c). The fourth case involves the shipment of all SRS fu el off the 
Site to another location (Option 5d). Options 5a. 5b. and 5c concern the following fue ls: 
65.2 MTHM (7 1.7 tons) of naval fue l 
213.1 MTHM (234 .9 tons) of aluminum·c1ad fuel 
2 103.2 MTHM (2.318.4 IOns) of Hanford defen se fuel 
27.6 MTHM (30.4 tons) of graphite fuel 
156.5 MTHM (1 72.5 tons) of commercial nonaluminum·clad fue l 
96.5 MTHM ( 106.4 tons) of experimental stainless steel-clad fuel 
78.0 MTHM (86.0 tons) of Zircaloy-c1ad fue l 
1.7 MTHM ( 1.9 tons) of other fuel types 
DOE would manage a total of about 2.74 1.8 MTHM (3.022.3 tons) of spent nuclear fue l at the 
SRS under the fi rst th ree options. Options 5a and 5b would involve slOring all the fuel on the Site . 
Option 5c would requ ire processing the exist ing aluminum-clad fuel [ 184.4 MTHM (203.3 tonsll and 
plac ing the remain ing nonaluminum·clad SRS fuels and all fue l rece ived from other locations 
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12.557 .4 MTHM (2.819.0 tons)1 into dry storage. The SRS could accept shipments from offsite 
sources and place them in storage as it built new fac ilities and transfe rred the onsile in ventory. 
Under Option 5d. shipments leaving the Site would amount to ahoUl 206.3 MTHM (227.4 IOns). 
which is equal to the inventory of spent nuclear fuel at the SRS under Alternative I. 
3.2.6.2.1 Option 5a • Dry Storage - The ac tions that the SRS would undenake under 
this option would be the same as those described for Option 2a - Dry Storage under Alternat ive 2 
(Decentralization) in Section 3.2,3.2.1. However. the number and size of the new facilities needed to 
implement thi s central~zat i on option would be much greater because of the larger volume of fU I I that 
the Site would manage. In addition. DOE would have to build a new Expended Core Fac ility at the 
SRS to exami ne and characterize the naval fuels. 
This option would require an extensive research and development program into capabilities to 
examine. characterize. and can SRS and other fuel types before their placement in a dry storage vault. 
DOE would also carry out research and development into other aspects of the management of the 
spent fuels. including those re lated to its ultimate disposition . 
3.2.6.2.2 Option 5b • Wet Storage - Under this option. DOE would undenake actions 
similar 10 those described in Section 3.2.3.2.2 for Option 2b - Wet Storage under Ahemative 2. As 
with Opt ion 5a (Dry Storage). the SRS would have to build major new faci lities to manage the large 
volume of fuel it would receive. DOE would also have to build a new Expended Core Facility at the 
SRS . Research and development would be greatly expanded as well . 
3.2.6.2.3 Option 5c • Processing and Storage - DOE would process the current 
inventory of aluminum·c1ad spent fuel under this option in the same manner as described for the other 
alternatives. All other fue l onsite and all fue l received from e lsewhere would be canned and placed in 
new dry storage faci lit ies. The SRS would shut down the F- and H-Area separations faci lities after 
processing the existi ng inventory of aluminu m·clad fuel. Thereafter. any aluminum·c1ad fuel sent to 
the SRS wou ld be placed in dry storage. 
This opt ion would require major new fac ilities. including a new Expended Core Faci lity. DOE 
would also conduct extensive research and deve lopment in spent fuel management. 
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3.2.6.2.4 Option 5d· Shipment Off the Site - DOE would consolidate and prepare 
all spent nuc lear fu el on the SRS for shipment to another DOE site; this would require the construction 
of a new fu el characte ri zation facility . Some fuel s could require canning before shipment. SRS would 
use existing facilities to accomplish this. DOE would then close all SRS spent nuclear fuel-related 
facili ties. 
DOE would conduct research and development into methods of stabilizing. canning. and 
transporting aluminum·clad fuel s. particularly that which is corroded or otherwise degraded. 
3.3 Comparison of Alternatives 
Table 3·3 summarizes the environmental consequences of the five alcernatives. Chapter 5 
presents detailed descriptions of these consequences. 
In general. the levels of impacts associated with Alternatives I through 4 wou ld be similar 
because the amounts of spent nuclear fuel that DOE would manage at the SRS under these cases 
would be approximately the same [e.g., about 206 to 257 MTHM (227 to 283 tons)1 and activities 
would extend throughout the full 40-year management period. The lowest level of impac t at SRS 
would occur under Option 4g or Option Sd (Regionaiization or Centralization at another site) because 
DOE would ship the SRS spent fuel off the Site well before the management period ended in 2035. 
Ahemative 5. under which DOE would ship all spent nuclear fuel to the SRS. would resuh in the 
greatest on site impacts; the Site would have to manage approximately 2.74 1.8 MTHM (3.022.3 tons) 
of spent fuel. 
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Table 3·3. Comparison of impacts for the five alte rnatives. 
Land Use 
Socioeconomics 
Cultural Resou rces 
Aesthetics and Scenic 
Resources 
Geology 
Air Resources 
Water Resources 
Ecological Resources 
Noise 
T raffic and Transpon ation 
Occupational and Publ ic 
Health and Safety 
(Radiological) 
ALTERNATIVE 1 • NO ACTION 
No new faci li ties would be required. 
Oplion 1 
Wei Storage 
No new opcr3lions jobs and only about 50 construction jobs would be created. 
No new construction wou ld be carried oul. No impacts are anticipated. 
Facilities arc in an e~isting industrial area not visible from public access roads or from off 
the Site. No impacts are anticipaled. Emissions wou ld not impact visibility. 
No minerals or economic val ue are in affected area. No impacts are anticipated. 
Emissions of criteria air poll utants and to~ic air pollutants wou ld be onl y a small fraction 
of air quality standards. 
This option · .... ould not require use (If additional surface water beyond the 75.7 billion 
li ters (20 billion gallons) per year that the SRS withdraws at present. 
Thi s option would not r ui re withdrawals of additional groundwater beyond the 
14.0 biJIion liters (3 .7 bill ion gallons) per year the SRS uses. Activities related to this 
option currentl y use about 35. 1 million liters (9.3 million gallons) of groundwater per 
year. Impacts would be minimal . 
No perenni al streams or other surface waters would be affected. 
Accidemal releases could contaminate shallow groundwater that is not a source for 
drinking waler or domestic use. Releases would not affect surface streams or drinking 
water aquifers. 
Minor disturbance of wildlife due to traffic would occur. 
No wet lands or threatened or endangered species would be affected. 
The onl y noise e~perienced by offsite populations would be gc:nerated by employee traffic 
and by truck and rail deliveries. There would be no change in traffic noise impacts. 
This option would not increase site traffic. 
Number of LCF'. nonnal transpon : 
Worker: 6.0 ~ 10 .... 
Publ ic: 7.0.11: 10" 
Maxi mum LCF' probabilities: 
Worker: 4 x 10" 
Offsite popu lation: 4 x lO'u (air) 
I x IO·I ~ (water) 
Annua l LCP incidences: 
Worker: 8 x 10" 
Offslle population: 2 x 10.9 
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Table 3·3. (conlinued). 
Option 1 
Wet Storage 
Occupational and Public 
Health and Safety 
(Nonradiological) 
Hazard index: 
Utilities and Energy 
Materials and Waste 
Management 
Accidents' 
a. Not applicable. 
Worker: 2 x 1O.fI 
Maximall y exposed individual: 2 x 10.1 
Minimal changes in demand for electricity. steam. domestic water and wastewater 
trealment would occur. Current SRS capacities 3re adequate for these additions. Impacts 
would be minimal. 
Annual average volume of waste generated (cubic meterst: 
LLW: 400 
TRU: 17 
HLW: 0.4 
No impact on site waste management capaci ties. 
Greatest point estimate o f ri sk~: 
Worker: Data not calculated' 
Colocated worker: 7.7 x 10" 
Maximally exposed individual : 1.6.11: 10.1 
Offsite population: 1.4 x 10') 
b. LLW = low-level waste: TRU = transuranic waste: HLW = high-level waste . 
c. Data is provided as adjusted point estimates o f risk by receptor group to demonstrate a relative compari son of each 
alternative on an option-by-option basis. The adjusted values were taken from Tables 5-27 through 5-29. 
d. Units for adjusted point esti mates of risk are given in terms of potential fatal cancers ~r year. 
e. The safety analysis reports from which infonnation was extracted were written before Issuance o f DOE Order 5480.23: 
previous orders did not require the inclusion of workers. 
LCF - latent cancer fatalities. 
vOtuME I. APPENDIX C 3·22 
Table 3·3. (conlinued). 
ALTERNATIVE 2· DECENTRALIZATION 
Option 23 
Dry Storage 
Option 2b 
Wet Storage 
Land Use Most new construction would Same 3S Option 2a . 
be in parts of F- and H-Arcas 
already dedicated to industrial 
use. Impacts would be 
minimal. 
Socioeconomics Operations jobs would be fi lled Same as Opt ion 2a. 
by current employees. A 
maximum of about 600 
construction jobs would be 
created. 
Cullura) Resources Same as Option \ . 
Aesthetics and Scenic Same as Option 1. 
Resources 
Geology 
Air Resources 
Water Resources 
Same as Option I. 
Same as Option I . 
New withdrawal s of 
approximately 6.1 million li ters 
( 1.6 million gallons) per year of 
cooling waler from Savannah 
Ri ver would be requi red. 
Impacts would be minimal. 
Additional groundwater 
wi thdrawals would total about 
48.7 million liters (12.9 million 
gallons) per year. Impacts 
wou ld be minimal. 
No perennial streams or other 
surface walen; wou ld be 
affected . 
Accidental releases could 
contaminate shallow 
groundwater that is not used as 
a source for drink ing water or 
domestic use. Releases would 
not arrect surface streams or 
dnnk ing water aquifers. 
Same as Option I . 
Same as Option I . 
Same as Option I . 
Same as Option I . 
New withdrawals or 
approx imately 7.2 mi llion liters 
(1.9 million gallons) per year 
or cooling water rrom 
Savannah River wou ld be 
required. Impacts would be 
minimal. 
Additional groundwater 
withdrawals would total about 
50.6 mi llion Iilers ( 13.4 million 
gallons) per year. Impacts 
wou ld be minimal. 
No perennial streams or other 
su rrace waters wou ld be 
afrected. 
Accidental releases could 
contaminate shallow 
groundwater that is not used as 
a sou rce for drinking water or 
domestic use. Releases wou ld 
not arrect surface streams o r 
drinking water aqui fers. 
3·23 
All 
Option 2c 
Processing 
Same as Option 2a. 
Operat ions jobs would be 
fi lled by current employees. 
A maximum of about 550 
construction jobs would be 
created. 
Same as Option I . 
Same as Option I . 
Same as Option I . 
Same as Option I. 
New withdrawals of 
approximatcly 311 million 
Ii tcrs (82.2 million gallons) 
per year of cooling water 
rrom Savannah River would 
be required. Impacts would 
be minimal. 
Same as Option 2a. 
No perennial streams or othcr 
surface waters wou ld be 
affec ted. 
Accidental releases cou ld 
contaminate shallow 
groundwater lilat is not used 
as a source fo r drinking water 
or domcstic use. Releascs 
wou ld not affect surfacc 
streams or drinking water 
aquirers. 
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Opt ion 2a 
Dry Storage 
Option 2b 
Wet Storage 
Ecologil' al 
Resources 
Small increase in traffi c would Same as Option 23. 
cause slight increase in road 
kIlls and in distu rbance of 
wildlire due to noise. Impacts 
would be minimal. 
No wet lands or threatened or Same as Option 2a. 
endangered species would be 
affected. 
Noise Onl y noise experienced by Same as Option 2a. 
Traffic and 
Transponation 
Occupational and 
Public Health and 
Safety 
(Radiological) 
communities wou ld be generated 
by employee traffic and by truck 
and rail deli\·eries. 
Changes in traffic levels are 
expected to result in only very 
small changes in noise impacts. 
This option would increase site 
traffic slightly. 
Number of lep. nonnal 
transport : 
Worker: 1.0 x 10') 
Public : 1.2 x 10 .... 
Maximum LCP probabilities: 
Worker: 3 x 10·$ 
Orfsite population: 
4 x 10'" (air) 
I x IO" ~ (water) 
Annual LCP incidences: 
Worker: 7 x 10" 
Offsilc popu lation: "] x 1 0'~ 
Same as Option 2a. 
Maxi mum LCP probabi lities: 
Worker: 4 x 1 0' ~ 
Offsite population: 
5 x 10" ~ (air) 
2 x 10'" (waler) 
Annual LCP incidences: 
Worker: 8 x 10" 
Offsite popu lation: 2 x 10'~ 
Occupational and Same as Option I. Same as Option I. 
Public Health and 
SafclY 
(Nonradiological) 
Utilities and Energy Requirements would increase Same as Option 2a. 
3 10 7 percent above present 
le ... els. Current SRS capaci ties 
are adequate for thcse increases. 
Material s and Waste Annual average volume of waste Same as Option 2a. 
Management generated (cubic mcters)h: 
LLW: .I{)() 
TRU: 18 
HLW: 0..1 
No impact on sile capacities. 
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Option 2, 
Processing 
Small increases in tram .. ' ,",ould 
cause small im:rease in road 
kill s and in disturbance or 
wildlife due to noisc. Impacts 
would be mi nimal . 
Same as Option la. 
Same as Option 2:1. 
This option would increase site 
traffic slightly. 
Number of Lefl . normal 
transport: 
Worker: 2.1 x 10-' 
Public : 1.9 x 10" 
Maximum LCP probabilities: 
Worker: 6 It 10" 
Offsi te popu lation: 
2 x 10.1 (air) 
6 x 10.8 (water) 
Annual LCfI incidences: 
Worker: 3 x 10.1 
Offsite population: 8 x 10.1 
Hazard index: 
Wo rker: 6 x 10-1 
Maximally exposed 
indi vidual : 5 It \0 .... 
Very simil ar to Option 2a. 
Annual average volume o f 
waste generated (cubIC 
meterst: 
LLW: 800 
TRU: 19 
HlW: 23' 
No Impact on site capaci ties. 
Table 3-3_ (continued). 
Option 23 
Dry Storage 
Option 2b 
Wet SlOragc 
Option 2c 
Processing 
Gremes! point estimate of risk": Greatest point estimate of ri sk" : Greatest point estimate o f ri sk<; 
Worker: Data not calcu lated' Worker: Data not calcu lated' Worker: Data not ca lculated' 
Colocatcd worker: 1.6 x I O'~ Colocatcd worker: 1.7 x 10 6 Colocalcd worker: 7.7 x 10" 
Max imally exposed individual: Maximall y exposed individual: Maximally exposed 
3.3 x 10.1 3.5 X JO.1 indi vidual: 1.6 x 10" 
Offs ilc population: 2.8 x 100 ) Orfsile popu lation: 3.0 x 10,1 orfsitc population: \.4 x 10"' 
a. NA = not applic:lble. 
b. LLW = low-Ic\'cl waste: TRU = lransuranic waste: HLW = high-le vel waslc. 
c. High·level wa.'ite will be generated only during approximately the fi rst 10 years. 
d. Data is provided as adjusted point estimates of risk by receptor group to demonstrate a relative comparison of each 
alternative on an option·by·option basis. The adjusted values were taken from Tables 5·27 through 5· 29. 
e. Units for adjusted point estimates of ri sk are given in tenns of potential fatal cancers per year. 
The safety analysis repons from which information was extracted were wrinen before issuance o f DOE Order 5480.23: 
previous orders did not require the inclusion of workers. 
g. LCF = latent cancer fatalities. 
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Table 3-3. (continu<d). 
ALTERNATIVE 3 - 199211993 PLANNING BASIS 
Land Usc 
Socioeconomics 
Cultural Resou rces 
Aesthetics and 
Scenic Resources 
Geology 
Air Resources 
Water Resources 
Ecological 
Resources 
Noise 
Traffic and 
Transponalion 
Occu pational and 
Publi c Health and 
Safety 
(Radiological) 
Occupational and 
Public Health and 
Safety 
(Nonradiological) 
Utililies and Energy 
Materials and Waste 
Management 
Accident s' 
Option 3a Option 3b 
Dry Storage Wet Storage 
Same as Option 201. Same as Option 2a. 
Same as Option 2a. Operations jobs would be filled 
by current employees. A 
maximum of about 650 
construction johs would be 
created. 
Same as Option I . Same as Option I . 
Same as Opcion I. Same as Option I . 
Same as Option l. Same as Option I. 
Same as Option I . Same as Option I . 
Same as Option 2a. Same ilS Option 2b. 
Same as Option 2a. Same as Option 2a. 
Same as Oplion 2a. Same as Option 2a . 
Same as Option 201. Same as Option 2a. 
Same as Option 2a. Same as Oplion 2b. 
Same as Option 1. Same as Option I . 
Same as Option 2a. Same as Option 2a. 
Same as Option 201. Same as Option h . 
Greatest point estimate of riskd: Same as Option 3a. 
Worker: Data not calcu lated" 
Colocated worker: 1.9 x I O~ 
Maximally exposed individual: 
4 .0 x 10'1 
Orrs ite population: 3.4 x 10') 
Option 3c 
Processing 
Same as Option 201. 
Same as Option 2c. 
Same as Option I . 
Same as Option I . 
Same as Option 1. 
Same as Option I . 
Same as Option 2c. 
Same as Option 2c . 
Same as Option 2a. 
Same as Option 2c. 
Same as Option 2c . 
Same as Option 2c. 
Very similar to Option 2a. 
Annual average volume of 
waste generated (cubic 
meters)': 
LLW, 750 
TRU, 19 
HLW: 1 . 7 ~ 
No impact on site capacities. 
Greatest point estimate of ri skd : 
' Vorker: Data not calculated" 
, lCated worker: I . I x 10·/1 
.u imally exposed indi vidua l: 
2. 3 x 10.1 
Offsite population: 2.0 x 10') 
I a. LLW = low·lcvel wastc; TRU = transurani c waste; HLW = high· level waste. b. High·level waste will be generated only during approximatcly the fir st 10 years. 
c. Data is provi ded as adjusted point estimates of risk by receptor group to demonstrate a relative comparison of each 
alternati ve on an option·by·option basis. Thc adjustcd values were takcn from Tables 5·27 through 5·29. 
d. Units fo r adjusted point estimates of ri sk arc given in terms of potcntial fa tal cancers per year. 
e. The safe ty analysis repom from which information was ex tracted were written before issuance of DOE Order 5480.23; 
prev ious orders did nOI requ ire the inclusion of workers . 
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Table 3-3. (conlinued). 
ALTERNATIVE 4 - REGIONALIZATION A (By Fuel Type) 
Option 43 
Dry Storage 
LandU", Same 3S Option 23. 
Socioeconomics Same as Option 3b. 
Cultural Same as Option I. 
Resources 
Aesthetics and Same as Option I. 
Scenic Resources 
Geology Same as Option I. 
Air Resources Same as Option I. 
Water Resources Same as Option 21. 
Ecological Same as Option 2a. 
Resources 
Noise Same as Option 2a. 
Traffi c and Same as Option la. 
Transponalion 
Occupation31 and Same as Option 2a. 
Public Heallh and 
Safety 
(Radiological) 
Occupalionai and Same as Option I. 
Public Heahh and 
Safety 
(Nonradiological) 
Utilities and Very si milar to Option 2a. 
Energy 
Material s and Same as Option I . 
Waste 
Management 
Option 4b 
Wei Storage 
Same as Option 241. 
Same as Option 3b. 
Same as Option I. 
Same as Option 1. 
Same 3S Option I . 
Same as Option I. 
Same as Option 2b. 
Same as Option 2a. 
Same as Option Za. 
Same as Option 2a. 
Same as Option 2b. 
Same as Option I. 
Same as Option la. 
Same as Option I . 
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Option 4c 
Processi ng 
Same as Option 2a. 
Same as Option 2c . 
Same as Option I. 
Same as Option I . 
Same as Option I. 
Same as Option I. 
Very similar to Option 2e. 
Same as Option 2e. 
Same as Option 2a. 
Same as Option 2e. 
Maximum LCP probabilities: 
Same as Oplion 2e. 
Annual LCP incidences: 
Worker: 3 x 10·l 
Offsite population: 9 x 10') 
Same as Option 2e . 
Very si milar to Option 2a. 
Annual average volume o f waste 
generated (cubic meters)~: 
LLW, 790 
TRU, 18 
HLW: 2.3c 
No impact on si te capacities. 
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Table 3-3. (conlinued). 
Option .sa 
Dry Storage 
Option .ab 
Wet Storage 
Greatest poi nt estimate o f risk' : Same as Option 3a. 
Worker: Data not calculatedt 
Colocated worker: 2. 1 x 10.6 
Ma.l;i mall y e:o:poscd indi vidual: 
.aA x 10.1 
Offslle population: 3.7 x 10" 
a. LCF = latent cancer fatalities. 
b. LLW = low-le vel waste : TRU = transuranic waste: HLW = high· level waste. 
Option -lc 
Processing 
Greatest point estimate of ri sk": 
WorkC' r: Data not calculatedt 
Colocaled worker: 1.3 x 10.6 
Maximall y exposed indi\'idual: 
2.8" 10.1 
Offsite population: 2.4 " 10'} 
c. High·level waste will be gC'nerated only during approxi m3tely the first 10 years. 
d . Data is provided as adjusted point estimates of risk by receptor group 10 demonstr:u e a relati\'e comparison of each 
alternativc on an option-by-option basis. The adjusted values were taken from Tables 5-27 through 5-29. 
e. Units for adjusted point estimates of risk arC' gh'en in terms of potential fatal cancers per year. 
The safety analysis repons from which information was extracted were writlen before issuance of DOE Order 5480.23: 
prC' \'ious orders did not require the inclusion of workers. 
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Table 3-3. (continued). 
ALTERNATIVE 4 - REGIONALlZATION B (By Location)' 
Option -kJ Option Jc Option 4f 
Dry Storage WeI Sl0ra~e Processing 
Land Usc Same as Opt ion 2a . Same as Option 2a. Same as Option 2a. 
Socioeconomics Operations jobs would be lilled Opcr:lIions jobs would be filled Same as Option 3b. 
by curren! employees. by current employees. 
A maxi mum of about 700 A maximum of about 800 
construction jobs wo uld be const ruction jobs would be 
crealed. created. 
Cultural Same as Option I. Same as Option I. Same as Option I. 
Resources 
Aesthetics and Same as Option I . Same as Option 1. Same as Option 1. 
Scenic Resources 
Geology Same as Option I. Same as Option I. Same as Option I . 
Ai r Resources Same as Option I . Same as Option I. Same as Option 1. 
Water Resources Same as Option la. Same as Option 2b. Very simil ar 10 Option 2c. 
Ecological Same as Option 2a. Same as Option 2a. Same as Option 2c. 
Resources 
Traffic and Same as Option 2a . Same as Option 2a. Same as Option 2e. 
Transponalion 
Occupational and Maximum LCP probabi lities: Maximum LCP probabilities: Maximum LCP probabilities: 
Public Health and Worker. 4 x 10" Worker: 5 x 10·' Worker: 1 x 10" 
Safety Onsite population: Offs ite population: Offsile population: 
(Radiological) 5 x 10·" (air) 6 x 10.1' (air) 2 x. 10.1 (air) 
2 x l er 1' (water) 2 x 10.1' (water) 6 x 10" (water) 
Annual LCP incidences: Annual LCP incidences : Annual LCP incidences: 
Worker: 8 x I er' Worker: I x 10'" Worker: 3 x ler! 
Offsite population: 2 x IO.Q Offsite population: 2 x 10.9 Offsile population: 9 x 10·) 
Occupational and Hazard index: Same as Option 4<1. Hazard index.: 
Public Health and Worker: 2 x 10-6 Worker: 8 x 10') 
Safet y MaXimall y exposed Max imally exposed 
(Nonradiologlcal) individua l: 3 x 10.1 individual: 6 x 10'" 
Uti lities and Same as Option 2a. Very similar 10 Option 2a. Very si mil ar to Option 2a. 
Energy 
Malenals and Same as OptIOn 1. Same as Option I. Same as Option 4c. 
Waste 
Managemenl 
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Table 3-3. (continued). 
OptIOn .1d Opllon -k 
Dry Storage: Wei Storage 
Grcatc:-I pOInt CSllmal(" Same: as Opclon .t.d 
uf osk": 
Worker: Dala nOI (alcui:Jled" 
Colocatcd .... arker: 2.0 -..: 10 '" 
~1 axlmally e.-":J>Osed Indlvujual : 
"1.1 x 10 ' 
O ffSlle popu lat ion: 3.5 x 10 ' 
Option .u 
Processi ng 
Greatest point estimatc 
o f nsk.": 
Workcr: D:na not cah::ul:ucdJ 
Colocatcd worker: 1.2 x 1 0 ~ 
M3.l.:Imally exposed individual : 
2.5 x 10·' 
Offsile population: 2. 1 :t 10 ' 
a. Impacts for Option ~g. Ship Om,ile . ..... ould be the same as for Op"on 5d as described in the. lasl ent ry ~ n thi s tablc. 
b. Dala is pro\'ided as adjusted point estimates of ri sk by rcrcptor group 10 demonstrate a relalJ\'c companson of each 
alternati ve on an option·by,opllon basis. The adjusted val ues ..... ere taken from Tables 5-27 through 5-29. 
c . Units for adjusted point cstimates of risk are gh·cn in tenos of potential fa tal cancers per yeaT. 
d . The safety analysis reports from ..... hich infonoation ..... as ex.tra~ted ..... ere ..... ritten before issuance of DOE Order 5-180.23: 
previous orders did not require the indusion of worke~. 
e. LCF = latent eancer fatalities. 
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Table 3-3. (conl inued). 
Land Use 
Socioeconomics 
Cultural 
Resources 
ALTERNATIVE 5 - CENTRALIZATION 
Option 5a Oplion 5b 
Dry Slor.lge Wei Storage 
Most new const ruction would be Same as Option Sa. 
in pans of F- and H-Areas 
al ready dcdlc:;ucd 10 industrial 
usc. Additional maximum of 
O . .l square kilometer (100 acres) 
would be converted from pine 
plantation to indumial usc. 
Impacts would be minimal. 
Operat ions jobs would be filled 
by present employees. A 
maximum of about 2.550 
construction jobs would be 
cre:lIro. 
No known historical. 
archeological. or paleontological 
resources are in areas to be 
affected. All areas are classified 
as having low or moderate 
probability of contai ning 
archeological site. Impact is 
unlikely. 
Operations jobs would be fill ed 
by presenl employees. A 
maxi mum of about 2.700 
construction jobs would be 
created . 
Same as Option Sa. 
Aesthetics and Same as Option I . Same as Option I. 
Scenic Resources 
Geology 
Air Resou rces 
Water Resources 
Same as Option I. 
Same as Option 1. 
Same as Option 2a. 
Additional groundwater 
withdrawals would tOlal about 
67.7 million liters 117.9 million 
gallons) per year. Impacts 
l40uld be minimal. 
:-';0 perenmal streams or other 
surface waters would be 
aff~Cled . 
ACCIde ntal releascs could 
contaminate shallow 
~rouodwater that is not used as 
a sou rce for dnnking water or 
domestIC usc. Releases would 
nOl affect surface streams or 
dnnktng water aqUifers. 
Same as Option 1. 
Same as Option I . 
Same as Option 2b. 
Additional groundwater 
withdrawals wou ld total about 
69.6 million liters (18.4 million 
gallons) per year. Impacts 
would be minimal. 
Same as Option Sa. 
Accidental releases could 
contaminate shallow 
groundwater that is not used as 
a source for drinking water or 
domestic usc. Releases ..... ould 
nOl affect surface streams or 
dnnki ng water aquifers. 
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Option 5c 
Processing 
Same as Option 5a. 
Operations jobs would be filled 
by present employees. A 
maximum of about 2.550 
construCiion jobs would be 
created . 
Same as Option 5a. 
Same as Option 1. 
Same as Option 1. 
Same as Option 1. 
Same as Option 2c. 
Same as Option Sa. 
Same as Option Sa. 
Accidental releases could 
contaminate shallow 
groundwater that is not used as 
a source for drinking water or 
domestic usc . Releases would 
not affect surface streams or 
drinking water aquifers. 
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Table 3-3. (conlinued). 
Option Sa 
Dry Storage 
Option 5b 
Wet Storage 
Option 51: 
Processing 
EcologlGlI 
Resources 
Same as Option 1a. plus Same as Option Sa. Same as Option Sa. plus 
Noisc 
Traffic and 
Transportation 
Occupational and 
Publ ic Health and 
S.lfelY 
(Radiological) 
Occupational and 
Public Health and 
SafelY 
(Nonradiologica l) 
Loss of up 10 O ..l square 
kilometer 1I00 ac res) of 
loblllily pine. Impacts wou ld 
be minor. 
Same as Option 2:1. 
Same as Option 2a. 
Maximum LCF' prob;o bilities: 
Worker: 4 x 10'" 
Offsite population: 
5 x IO .• J (ai r) 
2 x 10'" (water) 
Annual LCP incidences: 
Worker: 9 x 10'" 
Offsite population: 2 x 10" 
Same as Option I. 
Utilities and Energy Similar to Option 2a. 
Malerials and Waste Annual average \'olume of 
Management waste generated (cubic 
meters)~ : 
LLW: 400 
TRU: 16 
HLW: 0 
No impact on si te capacities. 
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Increased dislUrhancc duc (0 
more worker Imffic. Impacts 
would be minor. 
Same as Option 2a. Same as Option 2a. 
This option would increase site Same as Option 21:. 
traffic by about 17 percent. 
Impacts would be small. 
Number of lCFs' would be 
same as for Option 2b for 
nonnal transport. 
Maximum lCF' probabilities: 
Worker: 5 x 10"" 
Orfsite population: 
6 x 10.0 (air) 
2 x lO··J (water) 
Annual LCP incidences: 
Worker: I x IO'} 
Offsite population: 3 x 10'-
Same as Option I. 
Similar to Option 2a. 
Annual a\'crage volume of 
waste generated (cubic 
melers)~: 
LLW: 400 
TRU: 20 
HLW: 2 . 3 ~ 
No impact on site capacities. 
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~'faximum lCF' probabilities: 
Worker: 6 x 10'" 
Offsite population: 
2 x 10.1 (air) 
6 x 10'~ (water) 
Annual LCP incidences: 
Worker: 3 x 10': 
Offsite popul:lIion: 9 x 10" 
Same as Option 2c . 
Requirements for c\eClricllY 
would increase by about 
17 percent . Other increases 
would be similar to Option 2c. 
Impacts would be minor. 
Annual average volume of 
waste gcne rated (cubiC 
meters)l: 
LLW: 800 
TRU: 20 
HLW: 2.3' 
No impacI on Site capaCltlcs. 
Table 3·3. (cont inued). 
Option Sa 
Dry SlOragc 
Greatest point estimate of risk': 
a. NA = not applicable. 
Worker: Data nOI calcul ated' 
Colocatcd worker: 4.0 x 10'/> 
Maximall y c.'(poscd individual: 
SA x 10.7 
Offsilc population: 7.2 x 10") 
Option Sb 
Wet Storage 
Same as Option Sa. 
b. LLW = low·tc\'ci waste; TR U = transuranic waSle; HLW = high-level waslc. 
c. High-level waste will be generated only during approximate ly the fi rst 10 years. 
Op:ion 5c 
Processing 
Greatest point estimate of risk"; 
Worker: D:ua nOI calculated' 
Coiocalcd worker: 3.3 x 10'1> 
Maximally cxposec..l 
individual: 6.8 x 10.1 
Offsile popul ation: 5.8 x lO·l 
d. Data is provided as adjusted poi nt estimates of risk by receptor group to demonstrate a relati ve comparison of each 
alternative on ail option-by-option basis. The adjusted values were taken from Tables 5-27 through 5-29. 
c. Uni ts for adj usted point l!stimates of risk arc given in terms of potential fatal cance rs per year. 
f. The safety analysis repom from which information was ex tracted were written before issuance of DOE Or~er 5480.23 ; 
previous orders did not require :he inclusion of workers. 
g. LCF = latent cancer fatalities. 
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Table 3·3. (continued). 
Land Use 
Socioeconomics 
Cultural Resources 
Aesthetics and Scenic 
Resources 
Geology 
Air Resources 
Water Resources 
Ecological Resources 
Noise 
Traffi c and Transportation 
Occupational and PUblic 
Health and Safety 
(Radiological) 
Occupational and Public 
Health and Safety 
(Nonradi ological) 
Utilities and Energy 
Materials and Waste 
Manage ment 
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AL TERNA TlVE 5 . CENTRALIZATION 
ALTERNATIVE 4· REGIONALIZATION B 
Same as Option I. 
Option 4g and Option Sdb 
Ship Oul 
No new operations jobs and onl y about 200 construction jobs would be created. 
Same as Opt ion I. 
Same 35 Option I . 
Same as Option I. 
Same as Option I. 
This option would require new withdrawals of approximately 3.0 million liters 
(790 thousand gallons) per year o f cooling water from the Savannah River. Impacts 
would be minimal. 
II abo would require additional groundwater withdrawals of about 38. 1 mil lion liters 
(10. 1 million gallons) per year. Impacts would be minima\. 
Impacts to surface water and groundwater would be similar to those from Option I. 
Same as Oplion I. 
Same as Option 2a. 
NA' 
Less than Option I. 
Same as Option I. 
Requirements would increase 2 10 6 percent above current levels during fir st 10 years. 
Current SRS capacities arc adequate for these inc reases. 
Annual average volume of waste generated initial 10 years only (cubic meters)'; 
LLW: 400 
TRU: t8 
HLW: 0 
3·34 
Table 3-3_ (continued). 
a. NA = not appl icable. 
Greatest point estimate of risk~: 
Worker: Data not calculated! 
Colocalcd Worker: 
Option 4g: 8. 1 x 10" 
Oplion 5d: 8.2 :< 10" 
Maximally exposed individual: 
Option 4g: 1.7 x 10" 
Oplion 5d: 1.7 x 10" 
orfsite population: 
Option 4g: 1.4 x 10') 
Option 5d: 1.4 x 10') 
Option 4g and Option Sdb 
Ship QuI 
b. Im pacts for Option 4g (Regionali zation-S ) are the same as for Option Sd. 
c. lLW = low- level wdSle; TRU = transuranic wasle: HLW = high-level wasle. 
d. Data is provided as adjusted point estimates of risk by receptor group 10 demonstrate a relative ,\omparison of each 
alternative on an option-by-option basis. The adjusted values were taken from Tables 5-27 through 5-29. 
c. Units for adjusted poi nt estimates of ri sk are given in terms of potentia l fatal cancers per year. 
The safety anal ysis reports from which information was extracted were written before issuance of DOE Order 5480.23: 
previous orders did not require the inclusion of workers. 
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4. AFFECTED ENVIRONMENT 
4.1 Overview 
Thi s section describes the ex isting environment at the Savannah River Site (SRS) and nearby 
areas. Its purpose is to support the assessment of environmental consequences of the alternative 
actions regarding spent nuclear fuels described in Chapter 3. Chapter 5 describes the environmental 
consequences in detail. 
4.2 Land Use 
The SRS occupies an area of approximately 198.000 acres (800 square kilometers) in western 
South Carolina. in a generally rural area about 25 miles (40 kilometers) southeast of Augusta. Georgia. 
The SRS, which is bordered by the Savannah River to the southwest, includes portions of Aiken. 
Barnwell. and Allendale Counties (Figure 2-1). 
Land use on the SRS falls into three major categorics: forest/undeveloped . water/wetlands, and 
developed faciliti es. About 181,500 acres (735 square kilometers) of the SRS area are undeveloped 
(USDA 199Ia). Approximately 90 percent of this undeveloped area is forested (Cummi ns et al. 1991). 
In 1952, an interagency agreement between the U.S. Department of Energy [DOE. which was then the 
Atomic Energy Commission (AEC)] and the Forest Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture. created 
an SRS forest management program. In 1972. the AEC designated the SRS as a National 
Environmental Research Park (NERP); at present. approximately 14.000 acres (57 square kilometers or 
7 percent) of the SRS area are designated as "Set-Asides. " areas specifically protected for 
environmental research activities that are coordinated either through the Umversity of Georgia 
Savannah River Ecology Laboratory (S REL) or the Savannah River Technology Center (SRTC; Davis 
1994). Administrative. production. and support facilities occupy approximately 5 percent of the total 
SRS land area. 
DOE is considering dec isions that could affect the long-range land use of the SRS. 
Programmatic dec isions on the reconfiguration of the nuclear weapons complex. spent nuclear fue l 
interim strategies. and waste management and environmental restoration activities that could result in 
significant changes in the SRS mission are in the early stages of discuss ion. In the shoner term. 
however. a Land Use Technical Committee consisting of representatives from DOE, Westinghouse 
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Savannah Ri ver Company. and various stakeholder groups is evaluating alternative land use strategies 
and pote nt ia l future uses. These ac tivities are consiste nt with the guidel ines for land use plans 
contained in DOE Order 4320. 1 B. "Site Development Planning." and in the Resource Conservation 
and Recovery Act (RCRA) and the Co mprehensive Environmental Response. Compensation. and 
Liabi lity Act (CERCLA). 
Land use bordering SRS is primarily forest and agricultural. There is also a significant amount 
of open water and non forested wetlands along the Savannah River va lley. Incorporated and industrial 
areas are the only other significant use of land in the vicinity (Figure 4- 1). None of the three counties 
in which the SRS is located has zoned any of the Site land. The only adjacent area with any zoning is 
the Town of New Ellenton. which has two zoning categories for lands that bound SRS - urban 
development and residential development. The closest residences to the SRS boundary include several 
wi thin 200 feet (6 1 meters) of the Site perimeter to the west. north. and northeast. 
Various industrial. manufacturing. medical. and fanning operations are conducted in areas 
surrounding the Site . Major industrial and manufacturing facilities in the area include textile mills . 
plants producing po lystyrene foam and paper products. chemical processing plants. and a commercial 
nuclear power plant. Farming is diversified in the region and includes crops such as peaches. 
waterme lon. cotton. soybeans. com. and small grains. 
There is a wide varie ty of publ ic outdoor recreation fac ilit ies in the SRS region (Figure 4-2). 
Federal outdoor recreation fac ilities include portions of the Sumter National Forest [47 miles 
(75 kilometers) to the northwest of the Site). the Santee National Wildlife Refuge [50 miles 
(80 kilometers) to the east). and the Clarks Hill/Strom Thurmond Reservoi r. a U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers impoundment [43 miles (70 kilometers) to the northwest] . There are also a number of state. 
county. and local parks in the region. most notably Redcl iffe Plantation. Rivers Bridge. Barnwell and 
Aiken County State Parks in South Carolina. and Mistletoe State Park in Georgia (HNUS I 992a). 
The SRS is a controlled area with public access limited to th rough traflic on South Carolina 
Highway 125 (SRS Road A). U.S. Highway 278. SRS Road I. and the CSX ra il way. The SRS does 
not contai n any public recreation facilitie s. However. the SRS conducts controlled deer hunts each 
fall. frolO mid-October through mid-December: hunters can also kill feral hogs during these hunts. 
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Legend: 
;;; Residential 
1m Industrial 
• Agricultural 
D Forest/undeveloped 
_ _ Site boundary 
Source: DDE (19930) 
Figure 4-1. Generalized land use at the Savannah River Si te and vicinity . 
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Figure 4-2. Federal and state forests and parks within a 2-hour drive from Savannah River Sile. 
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The intent of (he hunts is to control the resident populations of these animals and to reduce 
ani mal-vehicle accidenls on SRS roads. 
No onsite areas are subject to Native American treaty rights. The SRS does not contain any 
prime farmland . 
4.3 Socioeconomics 
This section discusses baseline socioeconomic conditions within a region of influence where 
approximately 90 percent of the SRS workforce lived in 1992. The SRS region of influence includes 
Aiken, Allendale. Bamberg, and Barnwell Counlies in South Carolina, and Columbia and Richmond 
Counlies in Georgia (Figure 4-2). 
4.3.1 Employment and Labor Force 
The labor force living in the region of influence increased from aboul 150,55010209,000 
between 1980 and 1990. In 1990, approximately 75 percent of the total labor force in the region of 
influence lived in Richmond and Aiken Counties. Assuming a conslant unemploymenl rate of 5.8 
percent, the regional labor force is like ly to increase to approximately 257,000 by 1995 (Table 4- 1). 
Belwoen 1980 and 1990, total employmenl in Ihe region of influence increased from 139.504 to 
199. 161, an average annual growth rate of approximately 5 percent. Table 4-1 lists projecled 
employment data for Ihe six-county region of influence. As shown, by 1995 employment levels 
should increase 22 percent 10 approximately 242.000. The unemployment rales for 1980 and 1990 
were 7.3 percent and 4.7 percenl, respectively (HNUS I 992a). 
In 1990. employment al the SRS was 20,230 (DOE 1993a), representing 10 percent of the 
employment in Ihe region of influence. In Fiscal Year 1992. employ ment at the SRS increased 
approximately 15 percent to 23.351, wi th an associated payroll of more than $ \.1 billion. Due 10 
planned budget reductions. Sile employment could decline by as many as 4.200 jobs (Fiori 1995). As 
shown in Table 4-1. this would reduce Site employment to approximately 15.800 by 1996. 
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Table 4-1. Forecast employment and population data for the Savannah River Site and the region of 
innuencc.1 
Labor Force Employment Population 
Year (Region) (Region) SRS Employment' (Region) 
1994 254.549 239.785 21.500 456.892 
1995 256.935 242.033 20.000 461.705 
1996 258.500 243.507 15.800 465.563 
1997 260.680 245.561 15,800 468.665 
1998 263.121 247.860 15.800 47 1,176 
1999 265.694 250,284 15,800 473. 186 
2000 268,430 252.861 15,800 474.820 
200 1 271.265 255,532 15.800 476,179 
2002 274.238 258,332 15,800 477,332 
2003 277.3 18 261.234 15,800 478.340 
2004 280,415 264.151 15.800 479,182 
a. Source: HNUS ( 1993). 
b. Sources: Turner (1994). Fiori (1995). 
4.3.2 Personal Income 
Personal income in the six-county region has doubled during the past two decades, increasing from 
approximately $3.4 billion in 1970 to almost 56.9 billion by 1989 (in constant 1991 dollars). 
Together. Richmond and Aiken Counties accounted for 75 .4 percent of the personal income in the 
region of influence in 1989. because these two counties provide most of the employment opponunities 
in the region. Personal income in the region is likely to increase 3 percent to approximately 
57.1 billion by 1995 and to almost 58.2 billion by 2000 (HNUS I 992a). 
4.3.3 Population 
Between 1980 and 1990. the population in the region of influence increased 13 percent from 
376.058 to 425.607 . More than 88 percent of the 1990 population lived in Aiken (28.4 percent). 
Columbia ( 15.5 percent). and Richmond (44.6 percent) Counties. Table 4-1 also lists population data 
for the region of influence forecast to 2004. According to census data, in 1990 the estimated average 
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number of persons per household in the six-county region was 2.72, and the median age of the 
populat ion was 31.2 years (HNUS 1992a). 
4.3.4 Housing 
From 1980 to 1990. the number of year-round housing units in the six-county region increased 
23.2 percent from 135.866 to 167,356. In 1990. approximately 68 percent of the total housing uni ts 
were single-family units. 18 percent were multifamily units , and 14 percent were mobile homes. In 
the same year. the region had a 4.7-percent vacancy rate with 7.818 available unoccupied housing 
units . Of the available unoccupied uni ts. 29 percent (2.267) were available for sale and 71 percent 
(5.55 1) were available for rent (HNUS I 992a). 
4.3.5 Community Infrastructure and Services 
Public education facilities in the six-county region include 95 elementary and intermediate 
schools and 25 high schools. Aside from the public school systems. 42 private schools and 16 post-
secondary facilities are avai lable to residents in the region (HNUS I 992a). 
Based on a combined average daily attendance for elementary and high school students in the 
region of influence in 1988. the average number of students per teacher was 16. The highest ratio was 
in Columbia County high schools where there were 19 students per teacher (1987- 1988). The lowest 
ratio occurred in Barnwell County' s District 29 high school. which had only 12 students per teacher 
( 1988- 1989) (HNUS I 992a). 
The six-county region has 14 major public sewage treatment facil ities with a combined design 
capac ity of 302.2 million liters (79.8 million gallons) per day. In 1989. these systems were operati ng 
at approximately 56 percent of capacity. with an average daily flow of 170 mi llion liters (44.9 million 
gallons) per day . Capacity utilizat ion ranged from 45 percent in Aiken County to 80 percent in 
Barnwell County (HNUS I 992a). 
There are approximately 120 public water systems in the region of influence. About 40 of these 
county and municipal systems are major facilities. while the remainder serve individual subdivis ions. 
water districts. trailer parks. and miscellaneous facilitie s. In 1989. the 40 major facilities had a 
combined total capacity of 576.3 million liters ( 152.2 million gallons) per day. With an average daily 
now rate of approximately 268.8 million liters (7 1 million gallons) per day, these systems were 
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operating at 47 percent of total capacity in 1989. Facility utilization rates ranged from 13 percent in 
Allendale County to 84 percent in the City of Aiken (HNUS 1992a). 
Eight general hospitals operate in the six-county region with a combined bed capacity in 1987 of 
2.433 (5.7 beds per 1.000 population). Four of the eight general hospitals are in Richmond Cou nty: 
Aiken . Allendale. Bamberg. and Barnwell Counties each have one general hospital. Columbia County 
has no hospital. In 1989. there were approximately 1.295 physicians serving the regional population. 
which represents a physician-to-population ratio of 3 to 1.000. This ratio ranged from 0.8 physician 
per 1.000 people in Aiken and Allendale Counties to 5.4 physicians per 1.000 people in Richmond 
County (HNUS 1992a). 
Fifty-six fi re departments provide fire protection services in the region of influence. Twenty-
seven of these are classified as municipal fire depanments. but many provide protection to rural areas 
outside munic ipal limits. The average number of firefi ghters in the region in 1988 was 3.8 per 
1.000 people. ranging from 1.6 per 1.000 in Richmond County to 10.2 per 1.000 in Barnwell County 
(HNUS I 992a). 
The county sheriff departments and municipal police departments provide most law enforcement 
services in the region of influence. In addition. state law enforcement agents and state troopers 
assigned to each county provide protection and assist county and municipal law enforcement officers. 
In 1988, the average ratio in the region of full-time police officers employed by state, county, and 
local agencies per 1.000 population was 2.0. This ratio ranged from 1.4 per 1,000 in Columbia 
County to 2.5 per 1,000 in Richmond County (HNUS I 992a). 
4.3.6 Government Fiscal Structure 
This section discusses the fi scal structure of Aiken and Barnwell Counties because these two 
counties would have the greate" potential for fi scal impacts from changes at SRS. 
Public services provided by Aiken County are funded principally through the county's general 
fund . In Fiscal Year 1988, revenues and expenditures of th is fund were $ 15.5 million and 
S 18 million. respectively. The current property tax rate is 55.8 mills for county operations and 
8.0 mills for debt service. Long- term general obligation bond indebtedness was $9.3 million at the 
end of Fiscal Year 1988. and reserve general obligation bond indebtedness was $5.5 million. The 
assessed value of property in the county was 5182.5 million in Fiscal Year 1988 (HNUS I 992a). 
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Assuming revenues and expenditures increase in proportion to projected growth in the 
employment and population. estimated revenues and expenditures for Aiken County over the period 
from Fiscal Year 1990 to Fiscal Year 2000 will be $ 15.6 million to $ 17.0 million (in constant 1988 
dollars) (HNUS 1992a). 
Public services provided by Barnwell County also are funded principally through the county's 
general fund . In Fiscal Year 1988, revenues and expenditures of th is fund were $4.0 million and 
$4.9 million. respectively. The property tax rate is 23.9 mills of assessed valuation. Budgeted Fiscal 
Year 1990 revenues were approximately $4.5 million (HNUS I 992a). 
4,4 Cultural Resources 
4.4.1 Archeological Sites and Historic Structures 
Field studies conducted under an ongoing program over the past two decades by the South 
Carolina Institute of Archeology of the Univers ity of South Carolina, under contract to DOE and in 
consultation wi th the South Carolina State Historic Preservation Officer. have provided oonsiderable 
information about the dist ribution and content of archeological and historic resources on the SI'S. By 
the end of Fiscal Year 1992, approximately 60 percent of the Site had been examined, and 858 
archeological (historic and prehistoric) si tes had been identified: these include 706 prehistoric and 
350 historic components. some of which are mixed (i .e., contain elements of both). Of the 858 sites, 
53 have been determined to be eligible for the National Register of Historic Places: 650 have not been 
evaluated. Approximately 21 of the 53 (40 percent) are historic sites. such as building foundation s: 
none are standing structures. These sites provide knowledge of the area's history before 1820. The 
remainder are primarily prehistoric sites and some are mixed (historic and prehistoric). No SRS 
facilities have been nominated for eligibility to the National Register for Historic Places and there are 
no plans for such a nomination at this time (Brooks 1993: Brooks 1994). The existing SRS nuclear 
production faci lities are not likely to be eligible for the National Register, either because they might 
lack architectural integrity, might not repr~sent a particular architectural style. or might not contribute 
to the broad hisloric theme of the Manhattan Project and initial nuclear materials production 
(DOE 1993a). 
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Archeologists have divided areas of the SRS into three sensitivi ty zones related to the ir potent ial 
for containing sites with multiple archeological components or dense or diverse artifacts. and the ir 
potentia l for e ligibility to the National Register of Historic Places (SRARP t 989). 
Zone I is the zone of the highest archeological site density with a high probabi lity of 
encountering large archeological sites with dense and diverse art ifacts. and high potential for 
nomination to the Nat ional Register of Historic Places. 
Zone 2 covers areas of moderate archeological site density that should contain sites of 
similar composition. Activities in this zone have a moderate probability of encountering 
archeological sites. but a low probability of encountering large sites with more than three 
prehistoric components. All areas within the zone are conducive to site prese rvation. The 
zone has moderate potential for encountering sites that would be e ligible for nomination to 
the National Register of Historic Places. 
Zone 3 covers areas of low archeological site density. Activities in this zone have a low 
probability of encountering archeological sites and virtually no chance of en.' _ring large 
sites with more than three prehistoric components: potential for site preservation is low. 
Some exceptions to this definition have been discovered in Zone 3, so some sites in the 
zone could be considered eligible for nomination to the National Registe r of Historic Places. 
4.4.2 Native American Cultural Resources 
In conjunction with 199 1 studies re lated to a proposed New Production Reactor. DOE conducted 
an investigation of Native American concerns over re ligious righlS in the Central Sav:mnah River 
Valley. During th is study thre< Nat ive American groups - the Yuchi Tribal Organization. the National 
Council of Muskogee Creek. and the Indian People 's Muskogee Tribal Town Confederacy - expressed 
concerns over sites and items of re ligious signifi cance on the SRS. DOE has included these 
organizations on its environmental mailing list and sends them documents about SRS environmental 
activities (NUS 199 1 a) . 
Native American resources in the region mclude villages or town sites. ceremonial lodges, burial 
sites. cemeteries. and areas containing tradi tional plants for cen ain rituals. Villages or townsi tes might 
contain a variety of sensi tive fea tures assoc iated with different ceremonies and rituals. The Yuchi and 
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Muskogee Creek tribes have expressed concerns that the area might contain several plants tradit ionally 
used in tribal ceremonies (DOE 1993a). 
4.4.3 Paleontological Resources 
In vertebrate fossil remains occur within the McBean. Barnwell . and Congaree fonnations of the 
Eocene Age (54 million to 39 million years ago) on the SRS. Relati vely large quantities of marine 
invertebrate fossils have been recorded for the McBean and Barnwell Fonnations. Relative assessment 
of foss il localities is difficult because the South Carolina Geological Survey has not established crite ria 
for. or registry of, important paleontological locations (DOE 199 1 b). 
4.5 Aesthetics and Scenic Resources 
The dominant aesthetic setting in the vic inity of the SRS consists mainly of agricultu ral land and 
foresl, with some limited residential and industrial areas. Because of the distance to the Site boundary. 
the rolling terrain. nonnally hazy atmospheric conditions. and heavy vege tation. SRS fac ilities are not 
generally visible from off the Site . The few locations that have views of some of the SRS structures 
are quite distant from the fac il ity [5 miles (8 kilometers) or more]. 
SRS land is heavily wooded, and developed areas occupy only approximately 5 percent of the 
total land area. The fac ilities are scattered across the SRS and are brightly lit at night. Typically. the 
reactors and princ ipal processing fac ilities are lage concre te structures as much as 100 feet 
(30 meters) high and usuall y colocated with lower administrative and support bui ldings and parking 
lots. The fac ilities are visible in the direct line-of-sight when approac hing them from SRS access 
roads. A 500-foot cooling tower is located in K-Area . Otherwise. heavily wooded areas that border 
the SRS road system and public highways that cross the Site lim it views of the fac ili ties. 
4,6 Geology 
The SRS is on the Upper Atlanl ic Coasla l Plain of South Carolina. which consists of 2 13 to 
366 meters (700 to 1.200 feet) of " nds. c lays. and li mestones of Tert iary and Cretaceous age . These 
sediments are underla in by sandstones of Triassic age and olde r metamorphic and igneolls rocks 
(Arnett et 31. 1993). There are no known capable faults on the S RS or volcanic ac tivities with in 
800 kilometers (500 miles) of the Sile . 
4- 11 VOLUME I. APPENDIX C 
4.6.1 General Geology 
The SRS is in the Coastal Plain physiographic province of western South Carolina, 
approximately 32 kilometers (20 miles) southeast of the Fall Line, which separates the Piedmont and 
Coastal Plain provinces (Figure 4-3). The Coastal Plain province is underlain by a wedge of 
seaward-dipping and th ickening unconsolidated and semiconsolidated sediments that extend from the 
Fall Line to the Continental Shelf (Figure 4-4). 
In South Carolina, the Coastal Plain province is divided into the Upper Coastal Plain and the 
Lower Coastal Plain. Subdivisions of the Coastal Plain in the State include the Aiken Plateau and the 
Congaree Sand Hills in the Upper Coastal Plain, and the Coastal Terraces in the Lower Coastal Plain. 
The Congaree Sand Hills trend along the Fall Line nonheast and nonh of the Aiken Plateau. The 
Savannah and Congaree Rivers bound the Aiken Plateau, on which the SRS is located: the plateau 
extends from the Fall Line to the Coastal Terraces. The surface of the plateau is highly dissected and 
characterized by broad interfluvial areas with narrow steep-sided valleys. The plateau is generally well 
drained, although poorly drained depressions (Carolina bays) do exist (DOE 199 Ib). Because of the 
prox imity of the SRS to the Piedmont province. it has more relief than areas that are nearer to the 
coast, with on site elevations ranging from 27 to 128 meters (89 to 420 feet) above mean sea level. 
The sediments of the Atlantic Coastal Plain of South Carolina overlie a basement complex 
composed of Paleozoic crystalline and Triassic sedimentary rocks. These sediments dip gently 
seaward from (he Fall Line and range in age from Late Cretaceous to Recent. The sedimentary 
sequence th ickens from essentially zero at the Fall Line to more than 1,2 19 meters (4,000 feet) at the 
coast. Regional dip is to the southeast. Coastal Plain sediments underlying the SRS consist of sandy 
clays and clayey sands, although occasional beds of c lean sand, grave l, clay, or carbonate occur 
(Figure 4-5). Two clastic limestone zones occur within the Teniary age sequence. These calcareous 
zones vary in thickness from about 0 .6 meter (2 feet) to approximate ly 24 meters (80 feet). Most of 
the clastic sediments are unconsolidated , but thin semiconsolidated beds also occur (DOE 199 Ib). 
Underlying sediments are dense crystalline igneous and metamorphic rock or younger consolidated 
sc:diments of the Triassic Period. The Triassic formations and older igneous and metamorphic rocks 
are separated hydrologically from the overly ing Coastal Plain sedi ments by a regional aqui tard, the 
Appleton Confining System (Amell et al. 1993). Section 4 .8.2 contains a deta iled discussion of 
hydrogeology on the SRS . 
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Fall line 
Source: OOE (1991.) 
Figure 4-3, Location of the Savannah River Site in the southern United States. 
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4.6.2 Geologic Resources 
SRS construction ac tivities have used clay. sand. and gravel to a limited e~tent. These materials 
are not of major economic value due to their abundance throughout the region. The SRS historically 
has been a major user of groundwater in Ihe region. wilhdrawing aboul 33 million lilers (9 million 
gallons) per day. Seclion 4.8.2 describes Ihe groundwaler resources al Ihe SRS. 
4.6.3 Seismic and Volcanic Hazards 
The ciosesl offsile faull syslem of significance is Ihe Augusla Faull Zone, approximalely 
40 kilomelers (25 miles) from Ihe SRS. In Ihis faull zone, Ihe Belair Faull has experienced Ihe mosl 
recenl movement, bUI il is nOI considered capable of generaling major earthquakes (DOE 1987a). 
There is no conclusive evidence of recent displacement along any fault within 320 kilometers (200 
miles) of Ihe SRS, wilh Ihe possible exceplion of Ihe buried faull s in Ihe epicenlral area of Ihe 1886 
earthquake al Charleslon. Soulh Carolina, approximalely 145 kilomelers (90 miles) away (DOE 
199Ib). Faulling in Ihe subsurface Coaslal Plain sedimenlS in Ihe Charleslon vicinity has been 
suggested. based on structure contour mapping of the Eocene-Oligocene unconformity. which lies at a 
deplh of aboul 30 10 6 I melers (1 oo 10 2oo feel) below ground surface (WSRC 1994a). However. 
because il is not known if Ihese faulls offsel sedimenls younger Ihan Eocene·Oligocene. Ihese shallow 
faulls cannot be relaled 10 modem earthquakes Ihal occur al deplhs grealer Ihan aboul 1.9 kilomelers 
(1.2 miles). Figure 4·6 shows Ihe geologic slruClures wilhin 150 kilomelers (95 miles) from Ihe SRS. 
some of which are discussed above. 
Several Triassic·Jurassic basins. 14010230 million years old. have been idenlified in Ihe Coaslal 
Plain province of South Carolina and Georgia. The Dunbarton Triassic bas in. which underlies a 
port ion of Ihe SRS, was formed by faull movemenl resulling from eXlensional forces operal ing during 
the formation of (he Atlant ic Ocean. After the erosion of basin margins and infi lling of the bas in with 
Triassic age sediments. possible movement of an opposite sense to that during basin formation 
occurred along the fault during the Late Cretaceous age. Geophysical data indicate minimal movement 
on fault s at the basement-Coastal Plain interface. with the exception of possible reverse fault motion 
along Ihe Pen Branch Faull up inlo Ihe Tertiary (WSRC 1994a). 
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Researchers have mapped the Pen Branch Fault for at least 24 kilometers (15 miles) across the 
central portion of the SRS (Snipes et al. 1993). This fault is probably a continuation of the northern 
boundary fault of the Triassic age Dunbarton basin and is interpreted as being at least a 
Cretaceousrrertiary (144-1.6 million years) reactivation of that fault (WSRC I 994a). Observed 
displacements of the Coastal Plain sediments range from about 26 meters (85 feet) at the 
Basement/Cretaceous contact to about 9 meters (30 feet) in the shallower sediments (WSRC 1994a). 
Based on the available data, there is no evidence to indicate that the Pen Branch is a "capable fault" a~ 
defi ned by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Under the NRC definition. a fault is 
capable if it has moved within the last 35,000 years, has had recurring movement within the last 
500.000 years. is related to any eanhquake activity. or is associated with another capable fault . A 
recent study (Snipes et al. 1993) examined a Quaternary light tan soil horizon in SRS railroad cuts. 
The soil horizon, which has a thickness of 3 to 6 meters (10 to 20 feet), revealed no detectable offset, 
indicating that there has been no recent Pen Branch Fault activity . Figure 4-7 shows the locations of 
the Pen Branch Fault and other known or suspected faults within the Paleozoic and Triassic Basement 
(DOE 199Ib). 
Seismicity in the Coastal Plain of South Carolina occurs in three dist inct seismic zones near the 
Charleston area (WSRC I 994a): Middleton Place-Summerville, about 19 kilometers (12 miles) 
northwest of Charleston: Bowman, about 59 kilometers (37 miles) northwest of the Middleton 
Place-Summerville; and Adams Run, about 30 kilometers (19 miles) southwest of the Middleton 
Place-Summerville (WSRC 1994a). Of th ! distinct seismic zones within the Coastal Plain province. 
the Charleston area has been and remain~ the most seismically active. The Charleston area is also the 
most significant source of seismicity affecting the SRS. both in tenns of maximum historic site 
intensity and the number of earthquakes felt in the area (WS RC 1994a). 
Tables 4-2 and 4-3 summarize the historic information on earthquakes that have occurred in the 
SRS region. Two notable earthquakes have occurred within 320 kilometers (200 miles) of the SRS. 
The first was a major earthquake in 1886 centered in the Charleston area about 145 kilometers 
(90 miles) from the Site; it had an estimated Richter magnitude of 6.8. DOE estimates that the SRS 
would have felt a tremor with an estimated Modified Mercalli Intensity (MMI) of VI to VII and an 
estimated peak horizontal acceleration of 10 percent of gravity. or O. IOg. due to that earthquake 
(WSRC 1994a), The second earthquake was the Union County. South Carolina. earthquake of 1913. 
which had an estimated Richter magnitude of 6.0 and occurred about 160 kilometers ( 100 miles) from 
the SRS (WSRC 1994a). This earthquake. which is the closest significant event to the SRS other than 
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< Table 4-2. Earthquakes in the SRS region with a Modified Mercalli Intensity greater than V: 0 
r-
c 
3: Reported or tTl Coordinates 
- Estimated Estimated 
» La!. Long. Maximum Distance from Intensity at Richter Acceleration 
" 
" 
Date· Location (ON) (OW) Intensity SRS (km)" SRS Magnitude at SRS(g) tTl 
Z 
52 181 1 Jan 13 Burke Co .. Ga. 33.2 82.2 V 55 III-IV NAd 0.02 
X 
() 1811 -18 12 New Madrid. Mo. 36.3 89.5 XI -XII 850 V-VI NA 0.05 
(3 shocks) 
1875 Nov 02 Lincolnton. Ga. 33.8 82.5 VI 100 III-IV NA 0 .02 
1886 Sep 02 Charleston. S.c. 32.9 80.0 X 145 VI 6.8 0.10 
1886 Oct 22 Charleston. S.c. 32.9 80.0 VII 155 III-IV NA 0.02 
1897 May 31 Giles Co .. Va. 33.0 80.7 VIII 455 III NA 0.02 
1913 Jan 01 Union Co .. S.c. 34.7 81.7 VII-VIII 160 IV 6.OC 0.02 
"'" 
1920 Aug 01 Charleston. S.c. 33.1 80.2 VII 135 III-IV NA 0.02 
I 
IV 
0 1972 Feb 03 Bowman. S.c. 33.5 80.4 V 115 IV 4.5 0.02 
1974 Aug 02 Willington. S.c. 33.9 82.5 VI 105 IV 4.1 0.02 
1974 Nov 22 Charleston. S.c. 32.9 80.1 VI 145 III-IV 4.3 0.02 
a. Source: DOE (199Ib). 
b. Based on Greenwich mean time. 
c. Conversion factor: I kilometer = 0.6214 mile. 
d . NA = data not available. 
e. Estimated. 
~3 
Table 4-3. Earthquakes in the SRS region with a Modified Mercalli Intensity greater than IV or a magnitude greater than ~.0.3 
Coordinates Reported or 
Estimated Estimated 
La!. Long. Maximum Distance from Intensity at Richter Acceleration 
Date" (ON) (OW) Intensity SRS (km)< SRS Magnitude at SRS(g) 
1811 Jan IY 33.2 82.2 V 55 III -IV NAt 0.02 
1853 May 20 34.0 81.2 VI 102 NA NA NA 
1945 Jul 26 33.8 81.4 V 77 NA 4.4 NA 
1964 Mar 07 33.7 82.4 NA 85 NA 3.3 NA 
1964 Apr 20 33.8 81.1 V 96 NA 3.5 NA 
1968 Sep 22 34.1 81.5 IV 102 NA 3.5 NA 
1972 Aug 14 33.2 81.4 NA 27 NA 3.0 NA 
1974 Oct 28 33.8 81.9 IV 72 NA 3.0 NA 
~ 
1974 Nov 05 33.7 82.2 III 77 NA 3.7 NA , IV 
1976 Sep 15 33. 1 81.4 NA 25 NA 2.5 NA 
1977 Jun 05 3.1 81.4 NA 35 NA 2.7 NA 
1982 Jan 28 32.9 81.4 NA 40 NA 3.4 NA 
1985 Jun 08 33.2 81.7 III Onsi te III 2.6 NA 
1988 Feb 17' 33 .6 81.7 III 45 NA 2.6 NA 
1988 Aug 05 33. 1 81.4 NA Onsite 
" 
2.0 NA 
1993 Aug 08 NA NA NA NA NA 3.2 NA 
< 0 
r 
a. Source : DOE (199Ib). 
:s:: b. Ba 'ed on Greenwich mean time. tTl 
- c . Conversion factor: I kilometer = 0 .6214 mile . 
>- d . Located in Burke County, Ga. "tl 
"tl 
tTl e. NA = data not available . z 
S2 f. Located at Aiken, S.c. 
x 
() 7t/ 
the Charleston-area earthquake. produced an estimated in tensity of" to III (MMI) in the City of 
Aiken. which is approximately 19 ki lometers (12 miles) north of the Si te (DOE 199 1b: WSRC I 994a). 
Two earthquakes have occurred on the SRS during recem years (see Figure 4-7) . On June 8. 
1985. onsite instruments recorded an elrthquake wi th a Richter magn itude of 2.6 and a focal depth of 
about 1.0 ki lometer (0.6 mile) (WSRC I 994a). The epicenter was just west of the C- and K-Areas. 
The ground acceleration from th is event did not act ivate instrumentation in the reactor areas (detection 
limits of 0.002g). On August 5. 1988. an earthquake with a Richter magnitude of 2.0 and a focal 
depth of approximately 2.7 kilometers (1.7 miles) occurred (Stephenson 1988): earthquakes of Richter 
magnitude 2.0 are normally detected only by speciali zed instrumentation. The epicenter for this event 
was just northeast of K-Area. Allhough th is evem was not fell by workers on the SRS. it was 
recorded by sensors within 96 kilometers (60 miles) of the Site. A report on the August 1988 
earthquake (Stephenson 1988) also reviewed the latest earthquake history for the region . This report 
predicts recurrence period of I year for a magnitude 2.0 e' ent for the southeast Coastal Plain. 
However. the report "ntes that historic data to calculate recurrence rates accurately are sparse. SRS 
workers did feel the effects of two other events that occurred in the area within the past 7 years. A 
Richter magnitude 2.6 earthquake occurred in the City of Aiken. approximately 19 kilometers 
( 12 miles) north of the SRS on February 17. 1988. Reports indicate that this event was felt in the 
Aiken area and on the SRS (DOE 199 Ib). Most recently. a Richter magnitude 3.2 earthquake 
occurred on August 8. 1993. approximately 16 kilometers ( 10 miles) east of the City of Aiken near 
Couch ton. South Carolina. Residents reported feeling this earthquake in Aiken. New Ellenton 
(immediately north of the SRS). North Augusta (approximately 40 kilometers [25 miles] northwest of 
the SRS). and the Site. 
Based on seismic activity information in the past 300 years, this analysis does not project 
eanhquakes greater than a Richter magni tude 6.0. which correspond, to a Modified Mercalli Intensity 
of VII. to occur on the SRS. The design-basis earthquake for the SRS is a Modified Mercalli 
Intensity VIII event. which corresponds to a horizontal peak ground acceleration of 0.2g. Based on 
current tec hnology. as applied in various probabilist ic evaluations of the se ismic hazard in the SRS 
region. the 0.2g peak ground acceleration can be associated with a 2 x 10" annual probability of 
exceedance (5.ooo-y 'ar return period). DOE Star ards 1020 (DOE 1994a) and 1024 (DOE 1992) 
summarize the results of recent seismic analyses at DOE sites and show chat maximum horizontal 
ground accelerations for the Savannah Ri ver Site for 500 year. 1.000 year. 2.000 year. and 5.000 year 
seismic events are O.IOg. 0.13g. 0 .18g. and 0.19g respectively . The seismic hazard information 
presented in this EIS is for general seismic hazard comparisons across DOE sites. Potential seismic 
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hazards for existing and new facilitie s should be evaluated on ;] facility-specific basis consistent with 
DOE Orders and standards and site-specific standards. 
Historically. DOE has generally selected the more conservative 0.20g as the peak ground 
acceleration for the 5.000 year seismic event when preparing safety analysis repons and environmental 
impact statements for the SRS. For consistency with these existing analyses. this environmental 
impact statement assumes 0.20g to be the peak horizontal ground acceleration that would result from 
the 5.000 year seismic event. Figure 4·8 shows seismic hazard curves for the SRS. 
A number of paleoliquefac tion sites have been identified in Beaufort County. South Carolina. 
some 50 miles (80 kilometers) southeast of the SRS. indicating a likelihood of prehistoric seismic 
events outside of the currently-active Charleston seismic zone (Rajendran and Talwani 1993). There is 
no evidence to suggest that seismically-induced liquefaction of soils represents a hazard at SRS. 
however. Weak subsurface zones are encountered occasionally during drilling. These zones are 
associated with carbonate materials and appear to be related to dissolution of these materials. 
Engineering investigat ions have been conducted on granular soils underlying the Defense Waste 
Processing Facility [in S-Area just north of H-Area (see Figure 2-3)] to evaluate the cyclic mobility 
(liquefaction under cyclic stresses) of these soils (WSRC I 992b). These investigations determined that 
the sands and clayey sands throughout the subgrade will not experience liquefaction (strength loss 
leading to bearing capacity failures) and will not develop cyclic mobilily (significant cyclic or 
accumulate deformations) under the safe shutdown eanhquake with a peak horizontal ground surface 
acceleration of 0.20g (9.8 meters/second' or 32. 1 feetlsecond'). 
4.7 Air Resources 
4.7.1 Meteorology and Climalology 
The SRS collects wind data from instruments mounted 00 seven onsite 6 1-meter (200-foot) 
meteorological towers. Figu re 4-9 shows a wind rose that represents annual wind direction frequencies 
and wind speeds for the SRS from 1987 through 1991. The maximum wind directional frequencies 
are from the nonheast and west-southwest. The average wind speed for this 5-year period was 
3.8 meters per second (8.5 miles per hour). Calm winds (less than I meter per second or 2.2 miles 
per hour) occurred less than 10 percent of the time during the 5-year period. Seasonally. wind speeds 
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were greatest during the winter at 4. 1 meters per second (9.5 miles per hour) and lowest during the 
summer at 3.4 meters per second (7.6 miles per hour) (WS RC 1994a) . 
The an nual average temperature at the SRS is 18 degrees C (64 degrees F): monthly averages 
range from a low of 7 degrees C (45 degrees F) in January to a high of 27 degrees C (8 1 degrees F) 
in July. Relative humidity readings taken four times each day range from 36 percent in April to 
98 percent in August (DOE 1991 a). 
The average annual precipitation at the SRS is approxi mately 122 centimeters (48 inches). 
Precipitat ion distribut ion is fairly even throughout the year. with the highest precipitation in the 
summer [36. 1 centimeters (14.2 inches)] and the lowest in autumn [22.4 centimeters (8.8 inches)]. 
Snowfall has occurred in the months of October through March. with the average annual snowfall at 
3.0 centimeters (1.2 inches) . Large snowfalls are rare (DOE 199I a). 
Winter storms in the SRS area occasionally bring strong and gusty surface winds wi th speeds as 
high as 32 meters per second (72 miles per hour). Thunderstorms can generate winds wi th speeds as 
high as 18 meters per second (40 miles per hour) and even stronger gusts. The fastest I-minute wind 
speed recorded at Augusta between 1950 and 1986 was 37 meters per second (83 miles per hour) 
(DOE 199 Ia). 
4.7.1 .1 Occurrence of Violent Weather. The SRS area experiences an average of 56 
thunderstorm days per year. From 1954 to 1983. 37 tornadoes were reported for a I-degree square of 
latitude and longitude that includes the SRS (DOE 199 Ia). This frequency of occurrence is equivalent 
to an average of about one tornado per year. The estimated probabi lity of a tornado striking a point 
on the SRS is 7 x 10" per year (DOE 199 Ia). Since operations began at the SRS in 1953. nine 
confirmed tornadoes have occurred on or near the Site. They caused nothing more than light damage. 
wi th the exception of a tornado in October 1989 that caused considerable damage to forest resources in 
an undeveloped southeastern sector of the SRS (WSRC I 994a). 
From 1700 to 1992. 36 hurricanes occurred in South Carolina. resulting in an average frequency 
of about one hurricane every 8 years. Three hunric.nes were class ified as major. Because SRS is 
about 160 kilometers ( 100 miles) inland. the winds associated with hurricanes have usually diminished 
below hunricane force [i .e .. equal to or greater than a sustained wind speed of 33.5 meters per second 
(75 miles per hour)] before reaching the SRS. Winds exceeding hurricane force have been ~bserved 
only once at SRS (Hunricane Gracie in 1959) (WSRC I 994a). 
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4.7.1.2 Atm, ! ~heric Stability. Based on measurements at onsite meteorological stations. the 
atmosphere in the S;> ~ region is unstable approximately 56 percent of the time. neut ral 23 percent of 
the time. and stable about 2 1 percent of the time. On an annual basis. inversion conditions occur 
2 1 porcent of the time at the SRS (WSRC 1994a). 
4.7.2 Nonradiological Air Quality 
4.7.2. 1 Background Air Quality. The SRS is in the Augusta (Georgia) . Aiken (South 
Carolina) Interstate Air Quality Control Region (AQCR). This Air Quality Control Region. which is 
designated as a Class II area. is in compli ance with National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) 
for criteria pollutants. The criteria pollutants include sulfur dioxide. nitrogen oxides reported as 
nitrogen dioxide. part iculate matter (less than or equal to 10 microns), carbon monoxide. ozone, and 
lead (CFR I 993a). The closest nonauainment area to the SRS is the Atlanta. Georgia. air quality 
region. 233 ki lometers ( 145 miles) to the west. which is in nonauainment of the standard for ozone. 
The SRS will have 10 comply with h event ion of Significant Deterioration (PSD) Class II 
requirements if there is a significant increase in emis.sions of cri!eria air pollutants due to a 
modification at the Site (CFR 1993b). Development at the SRS has not yet triggered Prevention of 
Significant Deterioration permiuing requirements. If a permit were required. the SRS would have to 
address several requirements. including impacts on the air quality of Class I areas within 10 kilometers 
(6.2 miles) of the Site (CFR 1993b). The nearest Class I area to the SRS is the Congaree Swamp 
National Monument in South Carolina. approximately 73 kilometers (45 miles) to the east-northeast of 
the Site. Therefore. d Prevention of Signifi cant Deterioration permit. if required for the SRS. would 
not have to address Class I areas. 
4.7.2.2 Air Pol/utant Source Emissions. The SRS utilized the 1990 comprehensive 
emissions inventory data to establish the baseline year for showing compliance with State and Federal 
air quality standards· calculating both maximum potential and actual emi ssion rates. The ai r quality 
compliance demonstration also included sources forecast for construction or operation in this decade 
(for which the SRS had obtained air quality construction permits through Decembe r 1992). The SRS 
based its calculated emission rates for the sources on process knowledge. source testing. permi tted 
operating capacity. material balance. and U.S. Envi ronmental Protection Agency (EPA) Air Pollution 
Emission Factors (AP·42 : EPA 1985 ). 
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4.7.2.3 Ambient Air Monitoring. At present. the SRS performs no onshe ambient ai r quali ty 
monitoring. State agencies operate ambient air quality monitoring sites in Barnwell , Aiken . and 
Richmond Count ies. These areas. which include the SRS. are in allainment with National Ambient 
Air Quality Standards for sulfur dioxide. ni trogen oxides. carbon monoxide. paniculme mailer. ozone. 
and lead (CFR 1993a). 
4.7.2.4 Atmospheric Dispersion Modeling. The SRS has performed atmospheric 
dispersion modeling for criteria and toxic air pollutants for both maximum potenti al and ac tual 
emissions for the base year 1990. using the EPA Industrial Source Complex Shon Term No. 2 Model. 
The SRS used 199 1 meteorological data collected at the Site meteorological stmions for input to the 
model. 
4.7.2.5 Summary of Nonradiological Air Quality. The SRS is in compliance with 
National Ambient Air Quality Standards and with the gaseous fluoride and t01a1 suspended pan iculate 
standards requi red by South Carolina Depanment of Heahh and Environmental Control (SCDHEC) 
Regulation R.6 1-62.5 . Standard 2, "Ambient Air Quali ty Standards" (AAQS) (see Table 4-4). 
The SCDHEC has non-rad iological ai r quality regu latory authority over the SRS. The 
Depanment determines SRS ambient air quality compliance based on SRS air pollutant emissions 
modeled at the Site perimeter (excluding SC Highway 125 . which crosses the southwestern quadrant of 
the SRS). 
The SRS is in compliance with SCDHEC Regulation R.6 1-62.5. Standard 8. "Toxic Air 
Pollutants." which regulates the emission of 257 toxic substances. The SRS has identi fied emission 
sources for 139 of the 257 regulated substances; the modeled resuhs indicate that the Site is within 
applicable Depan ment of Heahh and Environmental Contro l standards (WSRC I 993a). Table 4-5 lists 
SRS emissions of toxic ai r pollutants of concern related to the SRS spent nuclear fuel ahernati ves. 
based on 1990 baseline data and the potential sources of air pollution permilled for construction or 
operation in December 1992. 
4.7.3 Radiological Air Quality 
4.7.3.1 Background and Baseline Radiological Conditions. In the SRS region. airborne 
radionuclides originate from natural resources «errestrial or cosmic). worldwide fallout. and Site 
operat ions. The SRS maintains a network of air monitoring stations on and around the Site to 
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Table 4-4. Estimured ambient concentration contributions of criteria air pollutants from existing SRS 
sources and sources planned for construction or operation th rough 1995 ( ~glm3) .'.' 
Maximum 
Potential 
SRS Maximum Most stringent Concentration 
Averaging Potential AAQS' (Federal as a Percent of 
Poll utantt lime Conccntralion Actual or state) AAQS' 
SO, A nnual 18 10 80' 22.5 
24·hour 356 185 365'" 97.5 
3-hour 1.2 10 634 1.300'., 93 
NO, A nnual 30 100' 30 
CO 8-hour 818 23 10.000'" 
I·hour 3.553 180 40.000'" 
Gaseous fl uorides 12·hour 2.40 0.62 3.7' 65 
(as HF) 24·hour 1.20 0.31 2.9' 41 
I-week 0.6 0. 15 1.6' 38 
I -month 0. 11 0.03 0.8' 14 
PM,o Annual 9 3 50' 18 
24-hour 93 56 150' 62 
0 , I -hour NA NA 235'" NA 
TSP Annual 20 II 75' 2.7 
geometric 
mean 
Lead Calendar 0.0015 0.0003 1.5' 0.1 
quarter 
mean 
a. Source: WSRC (1994b). 
b. The contributions listed are the maximum values at the SRS boundary. 
c. SO, = sulfur d ioxide; NO, = nitrogen oxides; CO = carbon monoxide; PM ,. = paniculate matter ~ 
I O~m in diameter; TSP = Total Suspended Paniculates. 0 , = Ozone. 
d. AAQS = Ambient Air Quali ty Standard . 
e. Source: SCDHEC (1976). 
r. Source: 40 CFR Pan 50. 
g. Concentration not to be exceeded more than once a year. 
NA = Not available. 
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Table 4-5. Baseline 24-hour average modeled concentrations at the SRS boundary - toxic air 
pollutants regulated by South Carolina from ex isting SRS sources and sources planned for construction 
or operation through 1995 (~glm'J.· 
Maximum 
Maximum Potential 
Regulatory Potential Actual Concentration as a 
Pollutant' Limit ConcentrationC Concentrationd Percent of AAQS' 
Nitric acid 125 51 4.0 41 
1.1.1 -Trichloroethane 9,550 81 22 
Benzene 150 32 31 21 
Ethanolamine 200 <0.01 <0.0 1 <0.1 
Ethyl benzene 4,350 0.58 0.12 <0.1 
Ethylene glycol 650 0.20 0.08 <0.1 
Formaldehyde 7.5 <0.01 .;0.01 <0.1 
Glycol ethers Pending <0.01 <0.01 
Hexachloronapthalene I <0.01 <0.01 <0. 1 
Hexane 200 0.21 0.072 <0. 1 
Manganese 25 0.82 0.10 3 
Methyl alcohol 1,310 2.9 0.51 0.2 
Methyl ethyl ketone 14.750 6.0 0.99 <0.1 
Methyl isobutyl ketone 2.050 3.0 0.51 <0.1 
Methylene chloride 8,750 10.5 1.8 <0.1 
Naphthalene 1,250 0.01 0.0 1 <0. 1 
Phenol 190 0.03 0.03 <0.1 
Phosphorus 0.5 <0.001 <0.001 <0. 1 
Sodium hydroxide 20 0.01 om <0.1 
Toluene 2.000 9.3 1.6 <0.1 
Trichloroethylene 6,750 4.8 1.0 <0.1 
Vinyl acetate 176 0.06 0.02 <0.1 
Xylene 4.350 39 3.8 0.9 
a. Source: WS RC ( 1994b). 
b. Pollutants listed include compounds of interest regarding spent nuclear fuel alternatives. 
c. Maximum potent ial emissions from all SRS sources for 1990 plus maximum potential emissions 
fo r sources permitted in 1991 and 1992. 
d. Actual emissions from all SRS sources plus maximum potential emissions for sources permitted for 
construction through December 1992. 
e. AAQS = Ambient Air Quality Standard. 
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delermi nl! conce ntrations of radioact ive paniculates and aerosols in the air (Arnell et al. 1992). 
Tabl\! .... -6 li sts avc rilgc tlnd maximum atmospheric radionuclide concenlrations at the SRS boundary 
and background 1160-kilometcr (IOO-m ile) radius I monitoring locations during 1991. Table 4-7 lists 
the average conce ntrations of tritium in the atmosphere. as measured at 0 0 - and offsite monitoring 
locations. 
Table 4-6. Radioactivity in air at SRS perimeter and at 160-kilometer (lOO-mile) radius (pCilm').' 
Gross Nonvolatile 
Location Alpha Beta Sr-89,90' Pu-238' Pu-239' 
Site perimeter 
Average 2.6 IxI0·' 1.78x 10" 4.90xlO·' 1.22x I 0" 2.1 I x 10" 
Maximum 1.07x10·' 4.63xI0·' 5.1 I x 10" 1.94xlO·' 5.40xI0·' 
Background 
(l60-ki lometer 
radius) 
Average 2.60xI0·' 1.76xlO·' 2.00xI0·' 1.44x I0·' 6.I OxI0·7 
Maximum 9.3IxI0·' 5.26xI0·' 2.08xI0·' 2.39xI0·' 5.40xI0·' 
a. Source : Amell et a!. ( 1992). 
b. Monthly composite. 
Table 4-7. Average atmospheric tritium concentrations on and around the Savannah River Site 
(pCilm' ).' 
Location 1991 1990 1989 
Onsite 250 430 640 
Site perimeter 21 32 37 
40-kilometer radius II 12 14 
160-kilometer radius 8.5 8.8 9 
a. Source: Arnett et a!. (1992). 
4.7.3.2 Sources of Radiological Emissions. Table 4-8 lists groups of facilities that 
released radionuclides to the atmosphere ill 1992; the facilitie s are grouped according to the principal 
function that resulted in the re lease of radioac ti ve male rials. 
Table 4-9 lists both the identified radionuclides that contributed to the SRS dose and the percent 
contributi on of each radionuclide to the total site effective dose equivalent. 
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Table 4-8. Operational groupings and function of radionuclide sources. 
Group Function 
Reactor Materials Production of fuel and targets 
Reactors Irradiation of fuel and targets 
Separations Separation of usefu l radionuclides (other than tritium) 
Analytical Laboratories Process Control Laboratories 
Tritium Extraction. purification. and packaging 
Waste Management Management of radioactive waste 
Savannah River Technology Center Research and development to support SRS processes 
4.8 Water Resources 
4.8.1 Surface Water 
The Savannah River bounds the SRS on its southwestern border for about 20 miles 
(32 kilometers). approximately 160 river mi les (260 kilometers) from the Atlantic Ocean. At the SRS. 
river now averages about 10.000 cubic feet (283 cubic meters) per second. River nows range from 
3.960 cubic feet (1 12 cubic meters) per second to 7 1.700 cubic feet (2.030 cubic meters) per second. 
Five upstream reservoirs - Jocassee. Keowee. Hartwell . Richard B. Russell. and Strom Thurmond 
- minimize the effects of droughts and the impacts of low now on downstream water quality and fi sh 
and wildlife resources in the river. 
At the SRS. a swamp occupies the n oodplain along the Savannah River for a distance of 
approximately 10 miles ( 17 kilometers): the swamp is about 1.5 miles (2.5 ki lometers) wide. A 
natural levee separates the river from the swampy noodplain. Figure 4-10 shows the 100-year 
noodplain of the Savannah River in the vicinity of the SRS as well as the noodplains of major 
tributaries drai ning the SRS. A 500-year noodplain map of the SRS has not been completed. but 
would be required prior to the siting of any spent nuclear fuel management facilitie s. in compliance 
with DOE regulations (CFR 1979). These regulations require DOE to evaluate the potential effects of 
nooding to proposed "critical ac tions" (for example. the storage of highly toxic or water-reactive 
mater.als). which it defines as those for which even a slight chance of nooding would be unacceptable. 
The five principal tributaries to the rive, on the SRS are Upper Three Runs Creek. Fourmile 
Branch. Pen Branch. Steel Creek. and Lower Three Runs Creek (Figure 4-10). These tributaries drain 
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Table 4-9. Annual quantity of radionuclide emissions from the Savannah River Site.'" 
Radionuclide Annual Quantity (curies) Percent of Total Site Dose 
H-3 (ox ide) l.00xIO' 98.0 
Pu-239 7.45xI0·' 0.6 
U-235.238 1.58xlO·' 0.4 
Pu-238 4.46xI0·' 0.3 
Ar-41 2.5lx I0' 0.3 
1- 129 3.50x 10" 0.2 
Am-24 1.243 1.13x 10" 0.1 
Sr-89.90 (Y-90) 2.03xlO·' 0.Q2 
Cm-242.244 2.3IxI0·' om 
Cs-137 (Ba- 137m) 2.50x I 0" 0.01 
C- 14 1.86xI0·' 0.0 1 
H-3 (elemental) 5.59x 10' <0.01 
1- 135 1.34x 10" <0.01 
Kr-85 4.99x I0' <0.01 
1- 131 9.99x I0·' <0.0 1 
Ru-l06 (Rh-I06) 1.81 x 10" <0.01 
1- 133 1.15x 10') <0.01 
Co-60 3.6OxI0·' <0.0 1 
Xc-135 2.43xI0·' <0.01 
Cs-134 3.75x I0·' <0.01 
Ce-144 (Pr-I44. I44m) 1.16x I 0" <0.01 
Eu-154 3.44x 10' " <0.01 
EII-155 1.63x I0·" <0.01 
Sb- 125 7.27x 10'" <0.01 
Zr-95 (Nb-95) 2.39x I0·" <0.01 
a. Source: Arnett et al. ( 1993). 
b. Includes emissions to the atmosphere and surface water. 
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PK54-2 
Figu re 4-10_ Savannah River Site. showing 100-year floodplain, major stream systems and facilities . 
VOlU~'E I. APPE~DIX C 4-34 
BEST COPY AVAILABLE 
almost all of the SRS. Eac h of these streams originates on the Aiken Plateau in the Coastal Plain and 
descends 50 to 200 feet (: 5 to 60 meters) before discharging into the river. The streams. which 
historically have received varying amounts of effluent from various SRS operations. are not 
commercial sources of water. The natural flow of SRS streams ranges from less than 10 cubic feet 
(I cub,c meter) per second in smaller streams such as Pen Branch to 240 cubic feet (6.8 cubic meters) 
per second in Upper Three Runs Creek. 
4.8.1.1 SRS Streams_ This section describes the peninent physical and hydrolog ic propenies 
of Upper Three Runs Creek and Fourmile Branch. whic h are the streams closest to most SRS spent 
nuclear fue l management locations (Figure 4-10). These two streams are among the largest on the 
SRS. and they border the areas where DOE is most likely to locate new spent nuclear fuel facilities. 
Upper Three Runs Creek is a large. cool [annual maximum temperature of 26.1 degrees C 
(79 degrees F)j blackwater stream in the nonhern pan of the SRS. It drains an area of approximately 
210 square miles (545 square kilometers). and has an average discharge of 330 cubic feet (9.3 cubic 
meters) per second at the mouth of the creek. Upper Three Runs Creek is approximately 25 miles 
(40 kilometers) long. with its lower 17 miles (28 kilometers) inside the boundaries of the SRS. This 
creek receives more water from underground sources than the other SRS streams and. therefore. has 
low conductivity. hardness. and pH values. Upper Three Runs Creek is the only major tributary on 
the SRS that has never received thermal discharges. 
Fourmile Branch is about 15 miles (24 kilometers) long and drains an area of approximately 
34 square miles (89 square kilometers ). In its headwaters. Fourmile Branch is a small blackwater 
stream that receives relati vely few impacts from SRS operations. The water chemistry in the 
headwater area of the creek is very similar to that of Upper Three Runs Creek. wit h the except ion of 
nitrate concentrations. which are an order of magnitude higher than those in Upper Three Runs Creek 
(WSRC 1994a). These elevated nitrate concentrations are probably the result of groundwater transpon 
and outcropping from the F- and H-Area seepage basins. In its lower reaches. Fourmile Branch 
broadens and fl ows through a delta formed by the deposition of sediments. Although most of ,he fl ow 
through the delta is in one main channel. ,he delta has many standing dead trees. logs. stumps. and 
cypress trees that provide structure and reduce the water velocity in some are;>as . Downstream of the 
delta. the creek fl ows in one main channel and most of the flow discharges into the Savannah River at 
Ri ver Mile 152 (kilometer 245). while a small portion of the creek fl ows west and enter!' Bca\'t~ r Dam 
Creek. a small onsite tributary . 
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4.8.1.2 Surface Water Quality. The Savannah River. which fonns the boundary between the 
States of Georgia and South Carolina. supplies potable water to several users. Upstream of the SRS. 
the ri ver supplies domestic and industrial water needs for Augusta. Georgia. and North Augusta. South 
Carolina. The river al so recei v" ~ s sewage treatment plant effluent from Augusta. Georgia: North 
Augusta. Aiken. and Horse Creek Valley. South Carolina: and as described above from a variety of 
SRS operations via on site stream discharges. Approximately 130 river· miles (2 10 kilometers) 
downstream of the SRS. the river supplies domestic and industrial water needs for Savannah. Georgia. 
and Beaufort and Jasper Counties in South Carolina through intakes located at about River Mile 29 
and River Mile 39. In addi tion. Georgia Power s Vogtle Electric Generating Plant wi thdraws an 
average of 1.3 cubic meters per second (46 cubic feet per second) for cooling and returns an average 
of 0.35 cubic meters per second (12 cubic feet per second) of cooling tower blowdown . Also. the 
Urquhart Steam Generating Station at Beech Island. South Carolina withdraws approximately 7.5 cubic 
meters per second (265 cubic feet per second) for once-through cooling water. 
The South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control regulates the physical 
properties and concentrations of chemicals and metals in SRS effluents under the National Pollutant 
Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) program . This agency also regulates chemical and biological 
water quality standards for SRS waters. On April 24. 1992. the agency changed the classification of 
the Savannah River and SRS streams from "Class B waters" to "Freshwaters." The definitions of 
Class B waters and Freshwaters are the same. but the Freshwaters classification imposes a more 
stringent set of water quality standards (Arnett et al. 1993). Tables 4-10 and 4-11 list the 
characteristics of SRS surface-water quality upstream and downstream, respectively. due to 
contributions from SRS and possibly other sources. A comparison of these results indicates that 
influences from SRS or other sources are not seriously degrading Savannah River water quality. 
4.8.2 Groundwater Resources 
4.8.2.1 Hydrostratigraphic Units. There are two hydrogeologic provinces in the subsurface 
beneath SRS (WSRC 1994a). The fi rst. referred to as the Piedmont hydrogeologic province 
(Figure 4- 11 I. includes Paleozoic metamorphic and igneous basement rocks and Triassic-aged lithified 
mudstone. sandstone . and conglomerate contained within the Dunbarton Basin . The second. referred 
to as the Southeastern Coastal Plain hydrogeologic province. represents the major aquifer systems and 
consists of a wedge of unconsolidated Coastal Plain sediments of Late Cretaceous and Tertiary age 
(Figure 4- 11 ). These two units are overlain by the vadose or unsaturated zone, which extends from 
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Table 4-10. Water quality in the Savannah River above the confluence with Upper Three Runs near 
the Savannah River Site in 1990.'" 
fuisli ng W:ucr-Body Conc~ntr.lIion ' 
Pat:uncler Unit of Measure MeL cJl or DCG' Avcr:lge Maximum 
Aluminum mgIL 0.05-0.2' NC' 1.1 
Ammonia mgIL NA' 0.1 0 .2 
Cadmium mgIL 0 .{)()5I NC <0.0 1 
Calciulll mgIL N.' NC 4.4 
Ct!sium- l 37 pCVI.. 12(1 0 .()()88 0.030 
Chemical ox),gen demand mgIL NA 9.7 17 
Chloride mgIL 250" 7.8 II 
Chromium mgIL O. I ~ NC <0.02 
Copper mgIL 1.0" NC <0.0 1 
Dissolved ox)'gen mgIL >5 8.0 9.6 
Fecal coliform Colonies per 1000mi UXXl' 54 t97 
Gross alpha pCVI.. 15g 0.04 0 .36 
Iron< mgIL 0.3~ NC 1.5 
l ead mgIL O.QIS
' 
NC 0.27 
Magnesium mgIL NA NC 1.4 
Manganese' mgIL 0.05' NC 0.12 
~1cn::ury mgIL 0.002" NC <OJJCMJ2 
Nickel mgIL 0. 1' NC <0.05 
NilrileINimue mgIL 10' 0 .32 0.99 
Nonvolatile bela (dissolved) pCiIL 50' 1.9 3.6 
pH pH UnilS 6.5-8.5' Not reponed 7.4 
Phosphate mgIL NfA 0.09 0.16 
Plutonium·238 pCiIL 1.6< 0.0006 0.002 1 
Plutonium-239 pCilL 1.2' 0.0005 0.002 1 
Sodium mgIL NA NC II 
Stro ntium-89 pCiIL 800' 0.23 1.0 
Strontium·90 pCiIL 8' 0.09 0 .22 
Sulfate mgIL 250" 7.8 II 
Suspended solids mgIL NA 13 22 
Temperature lkgrl'Cs Celsius 32.2\ 18.0 27 
TOlal dissoh'ed solids mg/L 500' 62 76 
Tritium pCVI.. 20,()()()" t 50 1. 11 0 
Zinc mgIL 5" NC 0.02 
a. Source: Cummins et al . (1991). 
b. Parn~ters arc tho~e for whic h DOE routinel), ~e:l5ures as a regulatory rcquirt'men t Of as part of ongoing mon iloring progrnms. 
c. M:u~mum Contarmnant Le\'el (MCl). EPA National Primary Drinking Water Regulations (CFR 19H). 
d . M:Ulmum Contami nan1 l .c\·eI (MCl); Soulh Carolina ( 1976). 
e. U.!;. ~partment of Ene.rg.)' Derived Concent ral ion Guides (DCGs) (or Vl:ller (DOE J993b). DCG vaiut!s are bascd on committed 
~~~~;:~~~~ 100 mllhrem per year: howcver. because drinking wate r MCl is based on 4 mill in:m pe r year. number listed IS 4 
f. ~\.t!r:lgc co~cenlralion o( sam.ples I~~~ at downstream moni toring slat ion. M:u;mum is highest sampkd concentration along reach of 
nvc r poten~I :lII)' affected b)' site actIVIties. Less than «) indicates concentration be low :lnalysis delcclion limLt. 
g. Conct!nlrallOn ellc«d~d water qualil )' c~teria ;. ho~ever . Iht!5e criteria ru-c lisled for comparison only. Simil:uly. dnnking wall:r siandards 
and DOE DCG~ are ilsted. ~ater Quailt)' Cntena (WQCs) and sel:ondary stand:uds are nOl legally enroret!abk . 
~ . Secondary MaXimum Conta~manl ~c"el (S MCl), EPA National Sl:cond:lry Drinking Watt!r Regulations ICFR 199 1) 
1. NC = Not ealcul:lll:d duc 10 msufficlcnl number or samples. 
j . NA = None applicable. 
k. Shal l nOI ellce~d ~·t!ek l~ ~\'erage o( 32 .2 degret!s Celsius aftt! r mixing nor rise more Ihan 2.8 degrees CelSIUS m I week unless apprupnah! 
temperalure cn tenon mixing lone has been established. 
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Table 4-11 . Water quality in the Savannah River below the confluence with Lower Three Runs near 
the Savannah River Site in 1990.'·' 
E:\isling Water-Body Concentr.llion' 
P:U':UTk'h:r Unil ofMcasurc fo.1CL • .d or OCC' A,-cr:'gc 
r-.'I:lXimum 
Aluminum mgll. 0.05-0.2' NC' 
l.l 
Ammonia mgll. NA' o. t 0.2 
C3dmium mgll. 0.005' NC 
<0.01 
CO\Id um mgll. NA NC 
4 ,-' 
CO:Slum-I ) 7 pCiIL 12(1 O.o:!8 0.037 
Chemical oxygen demand mgll. NA 9 .8 t4 
Chlorhk mgll. 250" 8 
10 
Chronuum mgll. OY NC <0.02 
C OpJ)l:f mgll. 1.0' NC 
<0.0 1 
Dissoh'cd ox ygen mgll. >S 7 .7 9.5 
Fecal coliform Colonies IXf lOOlml 1.000' 54 197 
Gross alpha pCilL IS, 0.08 
1.48 
Iron- mgll. O,Y NC I.S 
'-'''' 
mgll. 0.015' NC 0.0\ 
~f3gncsium mgll. NA NC 1.3 
Mangancse< mgll. O.05
ft NC 0 .1 
Men:ury mgll. O.OO2
J NC <0.0002 
Nickel mgll. 0. 1< NC 
<0.05 
Nilnle/Nnr.ue mgll. 10' 0.28 
0.43 
Nonvol:mlc bela (dissolved) pCiIL SO' 2.1 S.I 
pH pH Units 6.5-8.5" Not ~poned 
8.2 
Phosphate mgll. N/A 0.1 0.16 
Plutonium·2J 8 pCiIL 1.6' 0.0006 
0.0029 
Plulonium·2 )9 pCilL 1.2" 0.0014 0.0079 
Sodium mgll. NA NC 
II 
Su onllum-89 pCiIL 800' 0 .2S 
0 .98 
Slrontlum·90 pCiIL 8' 0.13 
0.30 
Sulf:ale mgll. 250" 8.S 
12 
Suspended solids mgll. NA 12 
19 
Tcmpc=r:llurc: IXgrecs Cdsius J2.2k 18.0 
27 
TOf :a.l d lssoh·ed solids mgll. SOO' 63 71 
Tnllum pCiJ1.. 20.000'" 900 
6.8 10 
Zinc mgll. S' NC 
0 .02 
, Source Cummins el:ll (1 99 1). 
b Par:lmctcrs are those: for ..... hich DOE routind y measurc:s :IS 3 rc:gulatory rc:quin=ment or as p3l1 of ongoing monitoring progr.uns. 
c i\"".'umum Cont:lImn':lnl Lnel (MCL). EPA National Prim:ll)' Drinking Water Regulations (CFR 1974). 
d M3Xlmum Contaminant Le,·d (MCl l: South Carolin:l (1976). 
&:: U S Dep3l1~nl of Energy Derived Concentration Guides (DCGs) for Water (DOE 1993b). DCG v:llues are based on commiued 
dfco l'c dose of 100 mllhrc:m per year: ho ..... c'·e r. beC:luse drinking Wolter MCL is bascd on 4 millirem per ye31. number listed is 4 
percen! of DCG 
r A\·crage concentration o f s:lmples taken :II do ..... nsuc:lm monitoring Slalion . M:lltimum is highest sampled conccntration along rc:ach of 
m er pou: nt l:llly :lffected by site 3CII \·llles. Less Ih:ln « ) ;ndicoltes concenlration below anollysis detection limit . 
g Concentrolllon cxceeded ..... :ller qu:a.l lty c ritcna: howe ver. thcsc criteria arc liSled for cnmparison only. Similarly. drinking w:lIer s!3Jldards 
and DOE OCGs are hstcd Woller Quality Criteria ( WQCS) and second:ll)' standards are not legallY t=nforceablc. 
h Secondary ~ta" lmum Cont:lmln:lnl Level (SMCL). EPA N:llio n:a.l SC(ond:uy Drinking W:lIer Rt=gul:1tions (CFR 19( 1). 
1 NC = Not C.:llcul:l1ed due 10 InSUHie lCnl number of samples. 
NA = None :lppitcol ble 
Shal l nOf exct=cd .... eckl y a\·c rage o f 32 2 degrc:es Celsius :lftcr mi xing nor rise morc th3JI 2.8 degrees Celsius in I ..... t=t=k unless :lppropriale 
Icmper:lture cnl( n On mixing zone has bet:n (stabli ~hed . 
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Figure 4-11. Comparison of lithostratigraphy and hydrostratigraphy for the SRS region. 
4-39 VOLUME I. APPENDIX C 
the ground surface to the water table . The unsaturated zone is a heterogeneous unit of clean. clayey. 
or si lty sand through which recharge takes place. 
The sediments that make up the Southeastern Coastal Plain hydrogeologic province in 
west-central South Carolina are grouped into three major aquifer systems divided by two major 
confi ning systems. all of which are underlain by the Appleton confining system (Figcre 4· 11). The 
Appleton system separates the Southeastern Coastal Plain hydrogeologic prov;nce from the underlying 
Piedmont hydrogeologic province. Locally. each of the major aquifer systems contains individual 
aqu ifer and confining units. Figure 4-11 shows the regional lithostratigraphy of the geologic province 
wi th the attendant primary hydrostratigraphic subdivision of the province. The complexly interbedded 
strata that form tho three aquifer systems consist primarily of fine- to coarse-grained sand and local 
gravel and limestone deposited under relatively high energy conditions in fluvial to shallow marine 
environments (WSRC I 994a). 
Figure 4-11 shows the current aquifer/aquitard terminology at the SRS. Aquifers. in ascending 
order. include the McQueen Branch. the Crouch Branch. and the Steed Pond. For comparison. the 
figure also includes the corresponding aquifer terminology used on the Georgia side of the Savannah 
Ri ver. These include the Midville. Dublin. and Floridan aquifer systems. In addition. the three 
aquifers are separated by confining layers which include. in ascending order. the Appleton. Allendale. 
and Meyers Branch confining systems (WSRC I 994a). 
4.8.2.2 Groundwater Flow. Excellent quality groundwater is abundant in this region of 
South Carolina from many local aquifer units. As a result. the South Carolina Department of Health 
and Environmental Control has classified all aquifers in the state as Class GB (South Carolina 1976). 
or U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Class II. meaning that the aquifers can provide 
resource-quality water. but are not the sole source of supply (South Carolina Class GA or EPA CI~.ss I 
aquifers) (DOE 199Ib). 
The main source of recharge to the vadose zone is rainfall . The annual precipitation at the SRS 
is 48 inches ( 121.9 centimeters). with an est imated 16 inches (4 1 centimeters) designated as surface 
recharge at the center of the SRS. in bare and grass-covered areas (WSRC 1994a). The direction of 
groundwater fl ow in the vadose zone is predominantly downward. However. given the lenses of si lt 
and clay that exist. there is significant lateral spread in some areas. In general. the vadose zone 
thickness ranges from approximately 130 feet (40 meters) in the northernmost portion of the SRS to 
o feet where the water table intersects wetlands. streams. or creeks. 
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The following discussion of groundwaler flow in the CC'astal Plain hydrogeologic province 
begins wi th the deepest aquifers at the SRS and proceeds to shallower units. It does not address fl ow 
in the confining units because few hydraulic head measurements are available for these units and. to a 
good approximation. flow in aquitards is limited predominantly to vertical flow between aquifer units. 
The Midville or McQueen Branch aquifer (which has also been called the Middendorf. the Lower 
Cretaceous. the Tuscaloosa. and Aquifer IA) is highly transmissive and. therefore. serves in part as the 
production aquifer for much of the SRS. This aquifer flows horizontally. predominantly toward the 
Savannah River. In the past. groundwater production wells at the SRS were screened in both the 
Midville (McQueen Branch) and Dublin (Crouch Branch) aquifers. In 1985 DOE committed to the 
South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control to complete production wells only in 
the McQueen Branch aquifer to minimize the potential for contamination to reach such wells and 
spread in the deeper aquifers. 
Flow in the Dublin or Crouch Branch aquifer (which has also been called the Black Cre.k. the 
Tuscaloosa. the Upper Cretaceous. and Aquifer 18) is more complicated than flow in the deeper 
McQueen Branch aquifer because of the apparent communication with Upper Three Runs Creek on the 
SRS. Nonetheless. horizontal flow in the Dublin (Crouch Branch) aquifer is predominantly toward the 
Savannah River. However. there is an upward vert ical flow component near the river and Upper 
Three Runs Creek. Recharge to the Dublin-Midville aquifer system occurs in areas exposed at the 
ground surface near the Fall Line (see Figure 4-3). 
Horizontal flow in the Gordon aquifer (previously called the Congaree. the Tertiary. and 
Aquifer II) ;< IOwJrd Upper Three Runs Creek and the Savannah Ri ver. depending on the area of the 
SRS. Both the river and Upper Three Runs Creek intercept this aquifer. The. Gordon aquifer receives 
most of its recharge from groundwater that originates on the SRS. 
Previous SRS studies have called the Upper Three Runs aquifer the "water table aquifer"; others 
have defined it as both the BarnwelllMcBean and water table aquifers in the central portion of the SRS 
where those aquifers were thought to be separated by a "tan clay." The Upper Three Runs aquifer is 
the shallowest aquifer at the SRS. The horizontal groundwater flow is generally toward the nearest 
surface-water feature that is in communication with the water table . Most SRS streams. except Tims 
Branch in the northeastern part of the Site. are in communication with the water table. Tims Branch is 
a "losing stream." meaning it provides. or "loses." water to the Upper Three Runs aquifer. However. 
the Upper Three Runs aquifer recei ves most of its recharge from precipitation . The Upper Three Runs 
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aquifer is not a source of domestic or production water on the SRS because the lower aquifers provide 
a more abundant supply of higher quality water (WSRC 1994a). 
4.8.2.3 Groundwater Quality. The quality of groundwater in the principal hydrologic 
systems beneath the SRS depends on both the source of the water and the inorganic and biochemical 
reactions that take place along its nowpath . Quality is strongly innuenced by the chemical 
composition and mineralogy of the enelosing geologic materials (WSRC 1994a). 
In general. the quality of the groundwater in the Coastal Plain sediments at the SRS and the 
surrounding areas is suitable for most domestic and industrial purposes. The waters have low 
concentrations of total dissolved solids (IDS). ranging from less than 10 milligrams per liter to about 
150 to 200 milligrams per liter. The pH values range from 4.9 to 7.7 (where the groundwater is in 
contact with limestone). Much of the groundwater is corrosive to metal surface$ due to its low solids 
content and frequently low pH values. High dissolved iron concentrations can also be of concern in 
some groundwater units. The SRS uses degasification and filtration processes to raise the pH and 
remove iron in domestic water supplies where necessary (WSRC I 994a). 
Table 4-12 summarizes groundwater quality data from 85 existing waste sites on the SRS 
compared to drinking water standards; Table 4-13 lists similar information for selected radiological 
consti tuents. The data in these tables are from ongoing monitoring programs on the Site. 
EPA-accepted methods and guidelines for sampling and analysis are an integral part of this monitoring 
program. Several of the facilities discussed below have state-approved sampling and analysis plans. 
The shallow aquifers beneath 5 to 10 percent of the SRS have been contaminated by industrial 
solvents. metals. tritium. or other constituents used or generated on the Site. Figure 4-12 shows the 
locations of facilities where the SRS monitors groundwater and areas with constituents that exceeded 
drinking water standards in 1991.: the concentrations shown on Figure 4-12 represent the maximum 
data from one monitoring well on at least one occasion at a given area. Contamination is limited to 
the shallow aquifers. with one exception (see next paragraph). Most contaminated groundwater at the 
SRS is beneath a few fac ilities; contaminants renect the operations and chemical processes those 
facilities perform. For example. contaminants in the groundwater beneath A- and M-Areas inelude 
chlorinated volatile organics. radionuelides, metal s. and nitrate. At F- and H-Areas. contaminants in 
the grou ndwater inelude tritium and other radionuelides, metals, nitrate, chlorinated volatile organics at 
values much smaller than those found at A- and M-Areas. and sulfate. The groundwater beneath the 
Sanitary Landfill contains chlorinated volatile organics, radionuelides, and metals. The groundwater 
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Table 4-12. Representative groundwater quality data for nonradioactive constituents from the 
Savannah Ri ver $ite .;I 
Parameter (Unit) Standard Maximum Value 
Alkalinity (as CaCO,) (mglL) 100 1,360' 
pH (pH units) 8.5' 13' 
Antimony (mglL) 0.005 0.013 
Arsenic (mgIL) 0.05 0.1 
Beryllium (mglL) 0.011' 0.0043 
Cadmium (mgIL) 0.005' 0.34 
Chromium (mglL) 0.1' 0.82 
Mercury (mglL) 0.002' 0 .12 
Lead (mgIL) 0.0 15' 1.0 
Nitrate-N (mglL) 10' 278' 
Sulfate (mgIL) 400' 73,500' 
Pentachlorophenol (mgIL) 0.001 ' 0.0032 
Lindane (mgIL) 0.0002' 0.00048 
Carbon tetrachloride (mglL) 0.005 0.43 
1.2-Dichloroethane (mglL) 0.005' 0.27 
1.1 , I-Trichloroethane (mgIL) 0.2' 0.2 1 
I,I -Dichloroethylene (mglL) 0.007' 0.15 
Trichlorethylene (mglL) 0.005' 147 
Tetrachloroethylene (mglL) 0.005' 101 
a. Data compiled from 85 existing wastes sites (Amell et al. 1993). 
b. The elevated values for alkalinity and pH might be due to faulty well installation ; the elevated 
sulfate and nitrate values might be due to acid spi lls near wells. 
c. National secondary drinking water regulations (CFR 1991). 
d. National primary drinking water regulat ions (CFR 1974). 
e. Action level at which providers of public drinking water apply treatment technique to reduce lead 
levels (CFR 199 1). 
4-43 VOLUME I. APPENDIX C 
q(D 
Table 4-13. Represenlative groundwater data for radioactive const ituents from the Savannah River 
Site (pCilliter).' 
Maximum 
Constituent Standard' Concentration 
Gross alpha 15 2.700 
Nonvolati le beta 50 19.000 
Tritium 20.000 1.8 x 10' 
Cesium-137 200 980 
Cobalt-60 100 290 
lodine-129 72 
Ruthenium-106 30 170 
Total radium (radium-226 and 5 50 
radium-228) 
Strontium-90 8 5,300 
a. Source: Arnett et al. ( 1993). 
b. National Primary Drinking Water Regulations (CFR 1974), (56 FR 33052). 
beneath all the reactor areas except R-Area contains tritium, other nuclides, metals, and chlorinated 
volatile organics. At R-Area, groundwater contaminants include radionuclides and cadmium. The 
groundwater beneath D-Area contains metals, radionuclides. sulfate. and chlorinated volatile organics. 
At TNX-Area. the groundwater contains chlorinated volatile organics. radionucl ides. and nitrate (Arnett 
e t al. 1993). None of these cases indicated the presence of groundwater contaminat ion beyond Site 
boundaries. With the ongoing and expanding "pump and treat" system at the A-1M-Area 
, Figure 4- 12). concentrations in the volatile organic compound plume are likely to decrease with time. 
Contamination of groundwater in a drinking water aquifer has been found in only one relatively-
small area north of A-Area. in the northwest portion of the site. In the early 1980s. SRS monitors 
found low concentrations of trichloroethylene (1 1.7 microgram per liter) in water from one production 
well (53A) completed to the Dublin-Midville Aquifer System (fonnerly called the Tuscaloosa 
Fonnation) in M-Area. The monitors found the contamination only at 430 and 480 feet (131 and 
146 meters) in this well . which is 670 fee t (204 meters) deep. The well is screened intennittently 
from 387 feet ( 11 8 meters) to the bottom. DOE concluded that the contamination is probably 
migrating down the outside well casing from soils near the surface that are contaminated with 
trichloroethylene. This contaminated water enters the well through screens set in the Dublin-Midvi lle 
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Figure 4-12. Groundwater contamination at the Savannah River Site. 
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System (Du Pont 1983). In addition. in 1992 trichloroethylene and tetrachloroethylene were detected 
above Primary Drinking Water Standards in cretaceous zone (Dublin-Midvi lle) well MSB 55TA. 
which is approximately 3.500 feet west of well 53A and 1.500 feet north of A-Area (Arnett et al. 
1993). 
4.8.2.4 Groundwater Use. The McQueen Branch aquifer. which becomes shallower toward 
the Fall Line. forms the base for most municipal and industrial water supplies in Aiken County . 
Toward the coast. in Allendale and Barnwell Counties. th is aquifer exists at increasingly greater 
depths. As a consequence. the shallower Gordon aquifer supplies some municipal. industrial, and 
agricultural users (Arnett et al. 1993). 
DOE has identified 56 major municipal. industrial. and agricultural groundwater users within 
20 miles (32 kilometers) of the center of the SRS (DOE 1987a). The total pumpage for these users is 
about 49 billion li ters (13 billion gallons) per year. The SRS withdraws approximately 14.0 billion 
liters (3.7 billion gallons) of groundwater per year for domestic and industrial uses (DOE 1990). 
4.9 Ecological Resources 
The u.s. Government acquired the SRS in 1951. At that time. the Site was approximately 
two-thirds forested and one-third cropland and pasture (Dukes 1984). At present. more than 
90 percent of the SRS is forested. An extensive forest management program conducted by the 
Savannah River Forest Station, which is operated by the U.S. Forest Service. has converted many 
pastures and croplands to pine plantations. With the exception of the SRS production and support 
areas. natural succession has reclaimed previously disturbed areas. Table 4-14 lists SRS land cover. 
other than the land used for nuclear reactors and support facilities. 
The SRS is important to maintaining the biodivers ity of the region. Satell ite imagery of the Site 
shows a circle of wooded habitat within a matrix of cleared uplands and narrow forested riparian 
corridors. The SRS provides more than 734 square kilometers (18 1.000 acres) of contiguous forested 
cover broken only by unpaved secondary roads. transmission line corridors in various stages of 
succession. and a few paved primary roads. Carolina bays. the Savannah River swamp. and several 
relatively intact longleaf pine-wiregrass communities provide important contributions to the 
biodiversity of the SRS and of the entire region. 
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Table 4-14. Land cover of undeveloped areas on the Savannah River Site.' 
Land cover types Square kilometers' 
Longleaf pine 150 
Loblolly pine 258 
Slash pine 117 
Mixed pine/hardwood 23 
Upland hardwood 20 
Bottomland hardwood 117 
Savannah River swamp 49 
Total 734 
a. Source: USDA (I99Ia). 
b. To convert square kilometers to acres, multiply by 247. 1. 
Percent of 
total 
20 
35 
16 
16 
7 
100.0 
F- and H-Areas. located near the center of the SRS and approximately 1.6 kilometers ( I mile) 
southeast of Upper Three Runs Creek. are heavi ly industrialized with little natural vegetation 
remaining inside the fenced areas. These areas are dominated by buildings. paved parking lots, 
gravelled construction areas, and laydown yards. While some grassed areas occur around the 
administration buildings and some vegetation is present along the ditches that drain the area, the 
majori ty of the site contains no vegetation. Wildlife is absent except for occasional crows (Corvus 
brachyrhYllcl!os) and nesting bam swallows (Hirllndo rllstica) around the buildings. 
Figure 2-3 shows the location of a representative host si te at the SRS for potential spent nuclear 
fuel ac tivities. F- and H-Areas (and ~eve loped areas immediately adjacent to them) would house most 
spent nuclear fuel management facilities. while Ihe undeveloped area south and east of H-Area would 
be used for the construction of new faci lities that F- and H-Areas could not accommodate. The 
undeveloped area. which was 98 percent cleared fields in 1951. is now almost completely forested. for 
the most part wilh 5- to 40-year-old upland pine stands that are aCli vely managed by the Savannah 
River Forest Station. Most of these stands are loblolly pine (PiIiIlS taeda). but there are small stands 
of slash pine (P. eilio((; i). upland hardwoods (predominantly oaks and hickories). and bottomland 
hardwoods (most commonl y sweetgum. Liqllidambar styraciJllla. and ye llow poplar. Liriodendroll 
tlIlipijera) assoc iated with two small Carolina bays located south of H-Area. The area south of H-Area 
lies in the Fourmile Branch watershed. while the area east of H-Area is in the McQueen Branch (a 
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tributary of Upper Three Runs Creek) watershed. Neither area is likely to contain any threatened or 
endangered species or their habitats. 
The general area of the representative host site contains suitable habitat for white-tailed deer and 
feral hogs as well as other faunal species common to the mixed pinelhardwood forest s of South 
Carolina. Additional wildlife species found in the area include gray squirrel (Sdllrus caro/ill ellsis). fox 
squirrel (S. lIiger) . wild turkey (Meleagris gallapom) . cottontail rabbit (Sylvilaglls floridalllls). raccoon 
(Proc\"ofl [otoT). bobcat (Felix rufus). and gray fox (Urocyon cinereoargentells). 
4.9.1 Terrestrial Ecology 
The SRS is near the transition area between the oak-hickory-pine fore st and the southern mixed 
forest. As a consequence. species typical of both associations occur (Dukes 1984). In addition. 
farming. fire. soil features. and topography have strongly influenced existing SRS vegetation patterns. 
A variety of vascular plant communities occurs in the upland areas (Dukes 1984). Typically. 
scrub oak communities occur on the drier. sandier areas. Longleaf pine (Pinus palt,strus). turkey oak 
(Qllerclls laevis), bluejack oak (Q. incana). blackjack oak (Q. marilandica), and dwarf post oak 
(Q. margarella) dominate these communities. which typically have understories of wire grass (Aristida 
stricta) and huckleberry (Vaccinillm sr.). Oak-hickory communities occur on more fertile. dry 
uplands: characteristic species are white oaK (Q. alba). post oak (Q. stellata), southern red oak 
(Q. falcata), mockernut hickory (Carya tomemosa). pignut hickory (c. glabra). and loblolly pine. with 
an understory of sparkleberry (Vaccinillm arborellm), holly (flex sp.), greenbriar (Smilax sp.), and 
poison ivy (Rhlls radicans). 
The removal of human residents in 1951 and the subsequent restoration of forest cover has 
provided the wildli fe of the SRS with excellent habitat. Furl>earers such as gray fox . raccoon. 
opossum (Didelphis virginiana), bobcat. beaver (Cas/or canadensis) , and ouer (Lutra canadensis) are 
relatively common throughout the Site. Game species such as gray squirrel and fox squirrel , 
white-tai led deer (Odocoilells virginia1JlIs) . cottontail rabbit. and wild turkey arc also common. The 
Savannah River Ecology Laboratory has conducted numerous studies of reptile and amphibian use of 
the wetlands and adjacent uplands of the SRS. 
DOE allows carefully regulated public hunting for white-tailed deer and feral hogs (SIIS scrofa) 
on most of the SRS to reduce the incidence of animaUvehide collisions and maintain healthy 
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populations within the carrying capacity of the range. SRS personnel monitor all animals removed 
from the Site for contamination before releasing them to the hunters (WSRC I 992a). 
Before releasing any animal to a hunter. SRS technicians perform field analyses for c .. ium-1J7 
at the hunt site. In 1992. hunters collected 1.519 deer and 168 hogs. The maximum 1992 c .. ium-l37 
field measurement for deer was 22.4 picocuries per gram: the average was 6.4 picocuries per gram 
(Arnett et al. 1993). For hogs. the maximum value was 22.9 picocuries per gram and the average was 
3.5 picocuries per gram. The field technicians determine estimated doses from consumption of the 
venison and pork and make this information available to the hunters. 
In 1992. the estimated maximum dose received by a hunter was 49 millirem per year. The basis 
for this unique hypothetical maximum dose, which was for a hunter who harvested eight deer and one 
hog. is the assumption that the hunter consumed the entire edible portion of each animal. An 
additional hypothetical model involved a hunter whose total meat consumption for the year consisted 
of SRS deer [81 kilograms (179 pounds) per year] (Arnett et al. 1993). Based on these 
low-probability assumptions and on the average concentration of cesium-137 (6.4 picocuries in deer 
harvested on the SRS). the estimated potential maximum dose from this pathway is 26 millirem: this is 
26 percent of the annual 100-millirem DOE Derived Concentration Guide. Although a large 
percentage of this hypothetical dose is probably due to cesium-137 from worldwide fallout. the 
estimated total contains this background cesium-13? for cons'!rvatism. 
4.9.2 Wetlands 
The SRS has extensive. widely distributed wetlands. most of wl,ich are associated with 
fl oodplains. creeks. and impoundments. In addi tion. approximately 200 Carolina bays occur on the 
Site (Shields et al. 1982: Schalles et al. 1989). 
The southwestern SRS boundary adjoins the Savannah River for approximately 32 kilometers 
(20 miles). The river noodplain supportS an extensive swamp, covering about 49 square kilometers 
( 12.1 48 acres) of the Site: a natural levee separates the swamp from the river. Timber was cut in the 
swamp in the late 1800s. At present. the swamp forest cons ists of second-growth bald cypress 
(Taxodiwn disticllllm). black gum (Nyssa sy/wlfica). and other hardwood species (Workman and 
McLeod 1990: USDA 199Ia). 
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Five major streams drain the SRS and eVl!ntually now into the Savannah Ri ver. Each stream has 
floodplains characterized by bottomland hardwood forests or scrub-shrub wetlands in varying stages of 
succession. Dominant species include red maple (Acer rttbrwn ). box elder (A. negllndo). bald cypress. 
water tupelo (Nyssa aqll(l/ica). sweetgum. and black willow (Sa lix Iligra ) (Workman and McLeod 
1990). 
Carolina bays are unique wetland features of the southeastern United States. They are islands of 
wet land habi tat dispersed th roughout the uplands of the SRS. The approximately 200 bays on the Site 
exhibit extreme ly variable hydrology and a range of plant communities from herbaceous marsh to 
fore sted wetland (Shields et al. 1982; Schalles et a l. 1989). SRS scientists have studied Carol ina bay 
ecology extensively. particularly in relation to the construction of the Defense Waste Processing 
Facility (DWPF; SREL 1980). 
4.9.3 Aquatic Ecology 
The aquatic resources of the SRS have been the subject of intensive study for more than 
30 years. Research has focused on the flora and fauna of the Savannah River and the five tributaries 
of the river that drain the Site. Section 4.8. 1.1 describes those ponions of the aquatic systems that 
spent nuclear fuel management activi ties could affect. In addition, several monographs (Pat rick et al. 
1967; Dahlberg and SCOll 197 1; Bennell and McFarlane 1983). the eight-volume Comprehensive 
Cooling Water Study (Du Pont 1987), and three EISs (DOE 1984; DOE 1987b; DOE 1990) that 
evaluated operations of SRS production reactors describe the aquatic biota and aquatic systems of the 
SRS. 
4.9.4 Threatened and Endangered Species 
Threatened. Endangered. and Candidate Plant and Animal Species of the Savannah River Site 
(HNUS I 992b) describes threatened. endangered. and candidate plant and animal species that are 
known to occur or that might occur on the SRS . Table 4-15 lists these species. 
The fo llowing Federally listed endangered animals are known to occur on the SRS or in the 
Savannah Ri ver adjacent to the Site: the red-cockaded woodpecker (Picoides borea lis). the southern 
bald eagle (Haliaeeltls lellcocepllllllls ). the wood stork (Mycrerillllmericlllla ). and the shortnose 
sturgeon (Acipellser brevirosrrum ) (HNUS I 992b). Researchers have found one Federally listed 
endangered plant species. the smooth conefl ower (£ chillacea laevigaw), on the Site. several Federally 
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Table 4-15. Threatened. endangered. and candidate plant and animal species of the SRS. 
Common Name (Scientific Name) 
Animals 
Rafinesques (= Southeastern ) big-eared bat (PlecolIIs rajillesqlli i ) 
Loggerhead Shrike (ulllillS Illdovicialllls) 
Bachman's sparrow (A imophila aesrivalis ) 
Carolina crawfi sh (= Gopher) frog (Rana areolara capiro) 
Southern hognose snake (Hererodoll simlls) 
Northern pine snake (Piltlophis melalJolellclls melanole llclfs) 
Bald eagle (Haliae""s lellcocepha/lls) 
Wood stork (Mycteria americana) 
Red-cockaded woodpecker (Picoides borealis) 
American alligator (A lligator mississippiensis) 
Shortnose sturgeon (Accipellser brevirostrllm) 
Smooth coneflower (£chinacea laevigara ) 
Bog spice bush (Lindera sllbcoriacea) 
Boykin's lobelia (Lobelia boykinii) 
Loose waterrnilfoil (Myriophyllllm Ia.wm ) 
Nestronia (Nestronia wnbellllla ) 
Awned meadowbeauty (Rhexia aristosa) 
Key: E = Federal endangered spe:ies. 
Plants 
T/SA = Threatened due to Similarity of Appearance. 
Status 
FC2 
FC2 
FC2 
FC2 
FC2 
FC2 
E 
E 
E 
T/SA 
E 
E 
FC2 
FC2 
FC2 
FC2 
FC2 
FC2 = Under review (a candidate species) for listing by the Federal government. 
listed Category 2 species, and several state listed spec ies (Knox and Sharitz 1990). At present . the 
SRS is implementing strategies for the protection of these species. 
F· and H-Areas and the representative host site contain no habitat suitable for any of the 
Federally listed threatened or endangered spec ies found on the SRS. The Southern bald eagle and the 
wood stork Feed and nest near wetlands. streams. and reservoirs. and thus would not be attracted to the 
host site. a densely fore sted upland area. Shonnose sturgeon. typically res idents of large coastal rivers 
and estuaries. have never been collected in Fourmile Branch or any of the tributaries of the Savannah 
River that drain the SRS. 
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Red-cockaded woodpeckers prefer open pine fore sls wilh malure Irees (older Ihan 80 years) for 
foraging and nesling. The pines of Ihe undeveloped hosl sile are 5 10 40 years old. Ihus red-cockadcd 
woodpeckers probably would not forage or nesl in Ihe area. 
The Red·cockaded Woodpecker Mallagemelll Standards alld Guidelines. Sa\'annalr Ri\'e r Site 
(USDA 1991 b) describes Ihe SRS managemenl slralegy for Ihe red-cockaded woodpecker. The mosl 
significanl elemenl of Ihis managemenl slralegy is Ihe conversion of slash (and some loblolly) pine in 
a designaled red-cockaded woodpecker managemenl area 10 longleaf pine. wilh a harvesl rolalion of 
120 years. 
4.10 Noise 
The major noise sources al Ihe SRS occur primarily in developed operalional areas and include 
various facilities. equipment. and machines (e.g .. cooling towers , transformers, engines. pumps, boilers. 
sleam venlS. paging syslems. conslruclion and malerials-handling equipmenl. and vehicles). Major 
noise sources outside the operational areas consist primarily of vehiclr.s and railroad operations. 
Previous sludies have assessed noise impacls of exisling SRS operalional aClivilies (NUS 1991b; DOE 
1991b; DOE 1990; DOE I 993a). These slUdies concluded Ihal. because of Ihe remole localions of Ihe 
SRS operational areas. there are no known conditions associated with existing onsile noise sources that 
adversely affecl individuals al offsile localions. Some dislurbance of wildlife aClivilies mighl occur on 
the SRS as a result of operational and construction activities. 
Exisling SRS-relaled noise sources of importance 10 the public are Ihose resulting from the 
lransportation of people and malerials 10 and from the Site. These sources include lrucks. private 
vehicles. helicoplers. and freighl lrains. In addilion. a portion of Ihe air cargo and business Ira vel 
using commercial ai r Iransport Ihrough Ihe airports al Augusla. Georgia. and Columbia. Soulh 
Carolina. are allribulable 10 SRS operalions. 
The Slales of Georgia and Soulh Carolina and Ihe counlies in which Ihe SRS is localed have not 
eSlablished any regu lalions Ihal specify acceptable communilY noise levels wilh Ihe exceplion of Aiken 
CounlY . A provision of Ihe Aiken CounlY Nuisance Ordinance limils daYlime and nighllime noise by 
frequency band (Aiken CounlY 1991). 
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During a normal week in 1995. about 20.000 employees are likely 10 lravel 10 Ihe SRS each day 
in private vehicles from surrounding communities. Both government-owned and private trucks pick up 
and deliver malerials al Ihe Sile. Mosl privale vehicles and lrucks Iraveling 10 and from the Sile each 
day use Soulh Carolina Highways (SC) 125 and 19. The conlribulion of SRS operalions 10 traffic 
volumes along SC 125 and SC 19. especially during peak traffic periods. affecls noise levels Ihrough 
Ihe lowns of New Ellenlon and Jackson and the CilY of Aiken. 
Noise measuremenlS laken during 1989 and 1990 along SC 125 in Ihe Town of Iackson al a 
poinl aboul 15 melers (50 feel) from Ihe roadway indicale Ihal lhe I-hour equivalenl sound level from 
Iraffic ranged from 48 to 72 decibels (A-weigh led). The estimaled day/nighl average sound level 
along Ihis roule was 66 decibels for summer and 69 decibels for winler. Similarly. noise 
measuremenls along SC 19 in the lown of New Ellenton at a point aboul 15 meters (50 feel) from Ihe 
roadway indicale Ihal Ihe I-hour equivalent sound level from traffic ranged from 53 10 71 decibels. 
The eSlimaled day/nighl average sound level along Ihis roule was 68 decibels for summer and 
67 decibels for winler (NUS 1990). Employmenl al Ihe SRS has increased slighlly since 1989. 
pOlenlially causing small increases in Iraffic noise. especially during peak traffic periods 
(approximalely belween 6:30 and 8;30 a.m. and belween 3:30 and 5:30 p.m .• corresponding 10 Ihe 
major shift changes). Because some residences and al leastlwo schools are wilhin 100 10 200 feet of 
Ihese routes. some annoyance 10 members of the public residing along Ihese highways might occur 
based on Ihe relalionship belween Ihe day/night average sound level and Ihe "percenl highly annoyed" 
(Schultz 1978; Fidell el al. 1989; FICON 1992). 
Noise sources from rail transport include diesel engines. wheel-track contact. and 
whistle-warnings at rai l crossings. 
4.11 Traffic and Transportation 
4.11.1 Regionallnlrastructure 
The SRS is surrounded by a syslem of Inlerslale hi ghways. U.S. highways. Slale highways. and 
railroads. The regional transportation networks service the four South Carolina counties (Aiken. 
Allendale. Bamberg. and Barnwell ) and Iwo Georgia counlies (Columbia and Richmond) Ihal generale 
aboul 90 percenl of SRS commuler traffi c (HNUS I 992a). Two major railroads - CSX Transportalion 
and Norfolk Soulhern Corporal ion - also serve Ihe SRS vicinilY. Although barge lraffic is possible on 
4-53 VOLUME I. APPENDIX C 
100 
the Savannah River. neither the SRS nor commercial shippers normally use barges. Figure 4-13 shows 
the regional transportation infrastructure. 
4.11.1.1 Regional Roads. Two Interstate highways serve the SRS area. Interstate 20 (1-20) 
provides a primary ea5".t-west corridor and 1-520 links 1-20 with parts of Augusta, Georgia. 
U.S. Highways I and 25 are principal north-south routes and U.S. 78 provides east-west connections. 
Several other highways - U.S. 221. U.S. 301 , U.S. 321, and U.S. 601 - provide additional transport 
routes in the region. 
Several state routes provide direct access to the SRS. Running northwest/southeast is SC 125 . 
Access to the Site is provided from the north by SC 19, from the northeast by SC 39, and from the 
east by SC 64. 
U.S . 278 bisects the northern part of the SRS and is available to public access without restriction. 
The SRS maintains barricades at site entries and exits on SC 125 to control public access if necessary, 
although it is generally open to unre~,tricted public travel. The public also has direct access to Site 
Road I . All other site roads have restricted access . 
4.11.1.2 Regional Railroads. Norfolk Southern serves Augusta and Savannah, Georgia, as 
well as Columbia and Charleston, South Carolina. CSX serves the same locations and the SRS. 
4.11.2 SRS Infrastructure 
The SRS transportation infrastructure consists of more than 143 miles (230 kilometers) of 
primary roads, 1,200 miles (1,931 kilometers) of unpaved secondary roads, and 103 kilometers 
(64 miles) of railroad track (WSRC 1993b). These roads and railroads provide connections among the 
various SRS facilities and to offsite transportation linkages. Figure 4-14 shows the SRS network of 
primary roadways and access points. Figure 4-15 shows the SRS railway system. 
4.11.2.1 SRS Roads. Two major public highways traverse the Site : SC 125 and U.S . 278. 
SC 125 connects Allendale, South Carolina, to Augusta, Georgia, by crossing the Site in a 
northwest-to-southeast direction. U.S. 278 also connects Augusta and Allendale , but its route 
approximately follows the northern and eastern SRS boundaries. 
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Ten barricades around the Site limit access from public roads. Five barricades limit SRS access 
from SC 125: Ihree limil access from SC 19, SC 39, and SC 64: and IwO limil access from Ihe public 
areas of Ihe adminiSlTalive complex near Ihe northern SRS boundary (A-Area). 
In general, Ihe primary SRS roadways are in good condilion and are smoolh and free from 
pOlholes. Typically, wide, finn shoulders border roads Ihal are eilher slraighl or have wide gradual 
lums. Inlerseclions are well marked for bOlh lTaffic and safelY idenlificalion and are sufficienlly 
cleared of Irees and brush Ihal mighl obslrucl a driver's view of oncoming lTaffic . Railings along Ihe 
side of Ihe roadways offer proleclion al appropriale localions from dropoffs or olher hazards. In 
general , Ihe roadways are lighled only al gale areas and near major facililies. The SRS has Iwo 
overpasses, one al Ihe cloverleaf inlerseclion of Roads 2 and C, and Ihe olher where SC 125 
overpasses Ihe CSX railroad lTacks in Ihe soulhern part of Ihe Sile. The 60 bridges on Ihe Sile have 
been inspecled and evalualed for safe loading, wilh some bridges raled as high as 200 Ions (181 melric 
Ions) under conlrolled condilions. The sleepesl roadway gradient is on Road C al Ihe eaSI bank of 
Upper Three Runs Creek, where Ihe road drops more Ihan 100 feet (30 melers) in aboul 0.25 miles 
(0.4 kilomeler). AI Ihe base of Ihe dropoff is a bridge over Ihe creek and an immediale lurn in Ihe 
road. This area presents a relatively hazardous roadway condition. 
In general , heavy traffic occurs early in the morning and late in the afternoon when workers from 
surrounding communities commute to and from the Site. During working hours, official vehicles and 
logging lrucks conslilule mosl of Ihe lTaffic. AI any lime, as many as 60 logging lrucks, which can 
impede lraffic, mighl be operaling on Ihe Sile, wilh an annual average of aboul 25 lrucks per day. 
Table 4-16 provides dala on lTaffic counls for various roads and access poinls around Ihe SRS. 
4.11.2,2 SRS Railroads. Railroads on Ihe Sile include bolh CSX Iracks and SRS rolling 
slock and lTacks. Two roules of Ihe CSX dislribulion syslem run Ihrough Ihe Sile: a line belween 
Florence, Soulh Carolina, and Augusla, Georgia, and a line belween Yemassee, Soulh Carolina, and 
Augusla, Georgia. The Iwo lines join on Ihe Sile jusl soulh of L-Lake (Figure 4-15). Early in 1989 
CSX discontinued service on Ihe line from Ihe SRS junclion 10 Florence. 
The 64 miles (103 kilomelers) of SRS railroads are well mainlained. The rails and crosslies are 
in good condition. and the track lines are clear of vegetat ion and debris. Significant clear areas border 
the tracks on both sides. Intersections of railroads and roadways are marked by railroad crossing s igns 
wilh lighls where appropriale. 
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Table 4-16, SRS Iraffic counls - major roads.' 
Measurement point Date 
Road 2 belween Roads C and D 2-23-93 
4-21-93 
Road 4 belween Roads E and C 12-9-92 
12-9-92 
Road 8 al Pond C 2-23-92 
2-23-92 
Road C belween landfill and Road 2 12-16-92 
12-16-92 
Road C north of Road 7 1-20-93 
1-20-93 
Road D 9-29-93 
9-29-93 
Road E al E-Area 8-25-93 
8-25-93 
Road F al Upper Three Runs Creek 2-2-93 
2-2·93 
H-Area Exil 12-2-92 
a. Source: Swygert (1993). 
b. Number of vehicles in peak hour. 
C. Slart of peak hour. 
Day 
Direclion TOlal 
Easl 3,031 
Wesl 3,075 
East 1,624 
West 1,553 
Easl 634 
West 662 
North 6,931 
South 6,873 
North 742 
Soulh 763 
North 1,779 
Soulh 1,813 
North 3,099 
South 3,054 
North 3,239 
Soulh 3,192 
OUlbound 2,181 
Peak' 
800 
864 
352 
306 
274 
331 
2,435 
2,701 
288 
223 
218 
220 
669 
804 
1,438 
1,483 
406 
Average 
Peak speed 
lime' (mph)' 
1530 47 
0630 NA' 
1530 NA 
0615 NA 
1530 58 
0615 56 
1530 53 
0630 58 
0630 53 
1530 54 
1500 
0845 
1530 
0630 
1530 
0630 
1530 
43 
52 
35 
38 
53 
51 
12 
d. mph = miles per hour: 10 convert 10 kilomelers per hour mUltiply by 1.6093. 
e. NA = dala nOI avai lable. 
The SRS rail classificalion yard is east of P-Reactor. This eight-track facililY sorts and redirecls 
rail cars. Deliveries of SRS shipments occur at two onsi le rail stations at the former towns of Ellenton 
and Dunbarton. From these stations. an SRS engine moves the railcars to the appropriate receiving 
facility. The Ellenton station. which is on the main Augusta-Yemassee line. is the preferred de li very 
point. The Dunbarton station. which is on the discontinued portion of the Augusta-Aorence line. 
receives less use. 
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4.12 Occupational and Public Radiological Health and Safety 
The sources of radiation exposure to individuals consist of natural background radiation from 
cosmic. terrestrial. and internal body sources: radiation from medical diagnostic and therapeutic 
practices: and radiation from manmade sources. inclurling consumer and industrial products. nuclear 
facilitie s. and weapons lest fallout. 
All radiation doses discussed in this document are effective dose equivalents (i.e .. organ dose 
equivalents weighted for biological effect and summed to yield a whole·body dose equivalent with the 
same risk as irrad iation of individual organs) as defined by the International Commission on 
Radiological Protection. Publication 26 (leRP 1977). unless specifically identified otherwise (e.g .. 
thyroid dose. bone dose). 
Natural background tadiation contributes about 83 percent of the annual dose of 380 millirem 
received by an avetage member of the population within 50 miles (80 ki lometers) of Ihe Site. Based 
on national averages. medical exposure accounts for 14 percent of the annual dose. and the combined 
doses from weapons test fallollt. consumer and industrial products. and air travel account for 
approximately 3 percent (Amell el al. 1993). 
4.12.1 Occupational Health and Safety 
SRS maintains a network of air monitoring stations on and around the Site to detennine the 
concentrations of radioactive particulates and aerosols in the ai r (Amell el al. 1993). Table 4-17 lists 
average and maximum rad ionuclide paniculate concentrat ions fou nd in 1992 in ai r at the F· and 
H-Areas. SRS boundary. and background [IOO-mile ( 160-kilometer) radius] monitoring locations. 
Table 4· 18 lists average and maximum concentrations of tritium in atmospheric moisture during 1992 
for the F- and H-Areas. SRS boundary. and background monitoring locations. 
Gamma radiation levels measured by thennoluminescenl dosimeters in 1992 at the F- and H-Area 
fences averaged 70 and 74 milli rem per year. respective ly. Gamma radiation levels. including natural 
background (terrestrial and cosmic) radiation. measured at the Site perimeter in 1992 yielded an 
average dose of 35 millirem per year (Amell et al. 1993). 
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Table 4·17. Radioactivity in air al Ihe Savannah River Site and vicinity (pCiJm').' 
Gross Nonvolatile 
Location Alpha Beta SR-89.90' Pu-238' 
F-Area 
Average 1.80xI0·.I 1.94x I0·' 0.62xI0·' 1.26x I0·' 
Maximum 3.55xI0·' 5.56x I 0" 6.02xI0·' 2.64xI0·' 
H-Area 
Average 1.80x10·' 1.93x I0·' 2.69xI0·' 2.03x I0·' 
Maximum 4.24xI0·' 5.39x I0·' 2.83x I0·' 6.03x I0·' 
Site perimeter 
Average 1.80x 10·' 2.30xI0·' 0.13x I0·' O.Ol xIO·' 
Maximum 4.04x I0·' 4.95x I0·' 4.54xI0·' 2.2 IxI0·· 
Background 
( IOO-mile radius) 
Average 1.67<10'> 1.73x 10" 0.49xI0·' O.72xlO·· 
Maximum 3.83xI0·' 4 .37xlO·' 6.89x I 0" 1.98x I0·' 
a. Arnett et al. ( 1993). 
b. Monthly composite. 
Table 4·18. Tritium measured in air at the Savannah River Site (pCiJcc).' 
Location Average Maximum 
a. Amell ( 1993). 
F-Area 8.67xlO·' 2 .98x I 0~ 
H-Area 
Site boundary 
Background ( I OO-mile tadius) 
0.99x I0·' 
2.65xlO"' 
8.32x I 0'· 
6.77xI0·' 
1.03xI0·' 
1.08xI0·' 
Pu-239' 
8. 15xI0·· 
2.48x 10" 
5.14xI0·· 
1.4 IxI0·' 
2.40x I 0''\ 
2.76x I0·· 
< 1.00x IO·· 
6.15xI0·· 
Soil samples from uncultivated areas provide a measure of Ihe quantity of particu lale tadioactivity 
deposi ted from the atmosphere. Table 4- 19 lists maximum measuremenls of radionuclides in the soil 
for 1992 al F- and H-Areas. SRS boundary. and background [IOO·mile ( 160-kilometer)-radius] 
monitoring locations. The SRS measured elevaled concentrations of plutonium-238 and plulonium-239 
around F· and H-Areas. renecting re leases from these areas. From 1955 through 1992. total 
almospheric plulonium releases from the F- and H-Areas were approximately 0.7 curie of 
plutonium-238 and 3 curies of plutonium-239 (Amell el al. 1992: 1993). 
The SRS workers investigated for purposes of assessing occupalional radiation exposures be long to 
the group of involved workers assigned to F- and H-Area facilities. The investigalion selecled Ihese 
fac:i lit ies because they process materials with radiological characteristics similar to the materials being 
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Table 4·19. Maximum radioactivity concentrations in soil at the Savannah Ri ver Site (pCi/g): 
Location Sr-90 Cs-137 Pu-238 Pu-239 
F-Area 2.16x I O' ~ 7.19x I0·1 4.03xI0·1 5.31x10 I 
H-Area 2.89xI0·~ 8.22x I 0·1 2.13x I O' ~ 5.54xIO ' 
Site p:!rimeter (b) 4.84xI0·1 2.19xI0·.1 1.36x I 0" 
Background (I OO-mile radius) 1.46x I 0" (b) 2.34x I O'~ 1.93x I 0': 
a. Arnett et al. (199_). 
b. None detected . 
analyzed in this EIS . The dosimetry results for these two involved worker groups are most useful 
because they depict occupational impacts that are directly relevant to each alternative. The 
investigation selected two dosimetry periods of record for this analysis: 1983 - 1987 and 1993. The 
earlier 5-year period included times when materials processing was occurring at a rate that was 
accelerated in compari on with recent years. The later period includes processing rates that better 
reflect near-tenn DOE mission initiatives. 
Tables 4-20 and 4-21 Ii t the involved worker do imetry data for 1983 - 1987 and 1993. 
respective ly. This analysis adapted these data from monitoring data statistics (Matheny 1994a: 
Matheny 1994b) for operations, maintenance, laboratory, and health protection personnel a 'signed to 
the F- and H-Area Canyons and the associated B-Line facilities. The calculated incidences of excess 
fatal cancer attributable to each facility's collective worker do e are approximately 0.11 and 0.037 for 
the earlier and later time periods. respectively. Similarly. the highest calculated excess fatal cancer 
probabilities attributable to average individual worker doses are approximately 0.0003 and 0.000 I. 
re pectively . The analysis e timated these health effects using ri sk coefficients adopted by DOE 
(DOE 1993). 
4.12.2 Public Health and Safety 
Table 4-22 summarize the major sources of exposure for the population within 50 miles 
(80 kilometers) of the SRS and for the Savannah River water-con uming population in Beaufon and 
1a per Counties. South Carolina, and Pon Wentwonh. Georgia. Most of the sources. suc h as natural 
background dose and medical dose. are independent of the presence of the SRS . 
Atmo pheric relea e of radioacti ve material to the environment from SRS operation from 1990 to 
1992 reo ulted in an average dose of approximate ly 0.02 millirem per year to individual s in the 50-mile 
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Table 4-20_ Annual involved worker doses. 1983 - 1987. 
Facilily 
H-Canyon 
HB -Li ne 
F·Canyon 
FB-Line 
Facilities Average 
Facilities Total 
NA = NOI applicable. 
A verage Worker 
Dose (rem) 
0.41 
0.49 
0.48 
0.74 
0.53 
NA 
Table 4-21. Annual involved worker doses. 1993. 
FacililY 
H-Canyon 
HB -Line 
F-Canyon 
FB-Line 
Facilities Average 
Facilities Tota l 
NA = NOI applicable. 
Average Worker 
Dose (rem) 
0.17 
0.24 
0.22 
0.24 
0.22 
NA 
TOlal Colleclive 
Worker Dose 
(person-rem) 
36.28 
21.84 
87.25 
124.68 
NA 
270.05 
TOlal Colleclive 
Worker Dose 
(person-rem) 
11.07 
21.97 
9.16 
51.16 
NA 
9.1.36 
Table 4-22. Major sources of rad iation exposure to the public in the vicinity of the Savannah Ri ver 
Sile .<I 
Source of Exposure 
Natural background radiation 
Medical radiation 
Consumer and industrial producis. fallout. air travel 
Savannah Ri ver Site operations 
Grand TOlal 
a. Amell el al. ( 1993) . 
Dose to average 
individual 
(mremlyr) 
315 
54 
10 
...Q1I 
380 
Percentage of 
expcsure 
83 
14 
3 
0.06 
100 
(80-kilometer)-radius population. The collec ti ve effecti ve dose equivalent due to atmospheric releases 
from 1992 SRS operallons 10 Ihe populalion of 620. 100 wilhin 50 miles (80 ki lomelers) was 
approximately 6.4 person-rem per year. Atmospheric releases of tritium accounted for more than 
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90 percent of Ihe offsi le populalion dose: lrilium is Ihe only radionuclide of SRS origin Ihal is 
roulinely delecled in offsi le ai r (Cummins el al. 1991: Amell el al. 1992. 1993). Table 4-23 lisls 
average annual atmospheric tritium concentrations in the vicinity of SRS for the Ihree years ending in 
1992. 
Table 4-23. Average atmospheric trit ium concenlrations in the vicinity of the Savannah River Site 
(pCiim' ).' 
Locat ion 1992 1991 1990 
On site 340 250 430 
Site perimeter 27 21 32 
25-mile radius II II 12 
loo-mile radius 8.3 8.5 8.8 
a. Amell el al. (1993). 
From 1990 10 1992, Ihe calculaled maximum individual average annual dose from almospheric 
releases 10 a hYPolhelical individual residing al Ihe SRS boundary was 0.12 millirem (Cummins el al. 
1991: Amell el al. 1992, 1993). 
In general, liquid releases of tritium accounl for more than 99 percent of the total radioactivi ty 
inlroduced inlo Ihe Savannah River from SRS aClivilies (Amell el al. 1993). The calculaled average 
annual dose 10 Ihe maximally exposed individual resulling from liquid releases from 1990 10 1992 was 
0.21 millirem (Cummins el al. 1991 : Amell el al. 1992: 1993). From 199010 1992 liquid releases of 
radioacti ve material to the environmenl from SRS operations resulted in an average dose of 0.04 
millirem per year and 0.05 millirem per year to downstream consumers of drinking water from the 
Beaufort-Jasper and Pon Wentworth water treatment planls. respectively. These doses to the current 
Beaufort-Jasper river-water-consuming population of about 51 .000 and the currenl Pon Wentworth 
ri ver-water-consuming population of about 20.000 would yield a collective effecti ve dose equi valenl to 
Ihese populalions of approximalely 3 person-rem per year (Cummins el al. 199 1: Amell el al. 1992 . 
1993). 
The SRS analyzes samples from other environmental media that onsile releases might affect and 
Ihal mighl provide a palhway for radialion exposure 10 Ihe public and Sile employees: Ihese include 
samples of milk. food products. drinking water. wi ldlife. rainwater. soil. sediment. and vegetation. 
The 1992 SRS Environmenlal Report (Amell el al. 1993) describes Ihe sampling program. moniloring 
locations, and monitoring results for each of these media. 
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Major nuclear faci lities wi th in 50 mi les (80 ki lometers) of the SRS inc lude a low-level waste 
bu rial site ope rated by Chern-Nuclear Systems. Inc" ncar the eastern SRS boundary in Barnwel l. South 
Carolina. and the Georgia Power Company Alvin W. Vogtle Electric Generating Plant . direc tly across 
the Savannah River from the SRS. Plant Vogtle began commercial operation in 1987. and its releases 
are controlled (0 meet U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission requirements. 
4.13 Utilities and Energy 
This section describes SRS e lectricity consumption. water consumption, fuel usage. and domestic 
and industrial wastewater treatment. Table 4-24 contains information on the current status of these 
items at SRS. 
Table 4-24. Current capacities and usage of util ities and energy at SRS . 
ELECTR ICITY 
Consumption 
Load 
Peak Demand 
Capacity 
WATER 
FUEL 
Groundwater usage 
Surface water usage (cooling) 
Oil 
Coal 
Gasoline 
WASTEWATER 
Domestic capaci ty 
Domestic load 
Industrial capac ily~ b 
Industrial load' 
a. FfH Ernuent Treatment Faci lity only. 
659.000 megawatt hours per year 
75 megavolt-amperes 
130 megavolt-amperes 
340 megavolt-amperes 
12.490 million liters (3.3 billion gallons) per year 
75.700 million li ters (20 billion gallons) per year 
28.4 mi ll ion liters (7.5 mill ion gallons) per year 
210.000 metric tons (230.000 tons) per year 
4.7 mill ion liters (1.24 mill ion gallons) per year 
3.97 mi ll ion liters ( 1.05 million ga llons) per day 
1.89 mill ion li te rs (0.50 mill ion gallons) per day 
1.64 million li ters (433.244 ga llons) per day 
44.000 liters ( 11.580 gallons) per day 
b. Design capac ity: permitted capaci ty is about 67 percent of this va lue. 
4.13.1 Electricity 
The SRS purchases electric power from the South Carolina Electric and Gas Company (SCE&G) 
through three purchased power-line interconnects to the SRS transmission grid. The recent total 
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annual power consumption for Ihe SRS was approximately 659.000 megawatt-hours. The average load 
was 75 megavolt-amperes and the peak demand was abOUI 130 megavolt-amperes. Soulh Carolina 
Electric and Gas sources can supply as much as 340 megavolt-amperes 10 the SRS grid with existing 
direct connections. The SRS generating station in D-Area can produce an additional 
80 megavolt-amperes capaci ty. although thai plant currenlly produces only process sleam. The SRS 
transmission grid that would provide power to any spent nuclear fuel facilities consists of more than 
145 ki lometers (90 miles) of 11 5-kilovotllines. four swilching stations. and t 5 subslations. Eleclric 
service to all major production areas provides parallel redundant capac ity to ensure max imum 
ava ilability and reliability (WSRC 1993c). 
4.13.2 Water Consump1ion 
Groundwater from a deep confined aquifer suppl ies domestic and process waler for the SRS 
through approximately 100 production wells. The aquifer system sustains single well yields of aboul 
10.2 mill ion liters (2 .7 mill ion gallons) per day. Current usage from this source is about 14.0 bill ion 
lilers (3.7 billion gallons) per year (DOE 1990). The SRS withdraws cooling water for ils faci lities 
from the Savannah River at an annual rale of about 75.7 billion liters (20 billion gallons) 
(WSRC I 993c). 
4.13.3 Fuel Consump1ion 
Fuels consumed at SRS include oi l. coal. and gasoline. SRS faci lities and equipment bum 
approximately 28.4 mill ion lilers (7.5 million gallons) of oil each year. Th is total includes diese l fuel. 
No. 6 oi l. and No. 2 oil. The SRS bums coal and some waste oi ls in the D-Area powerhouse 10 
produce steam for Site faci lities. Current coal usage is about 208.655 metric tons (230.000 tons) per 
year. SRS vehicles use approximalely 4.7 million li ters ( 1.24 mill ion gallons) of gasoline annually. 
Under the provisions of the Energy Policy Act of 1992 . naturat gas will replace gasoline on Ihe SRS 
wi thin the next 10 years. At thai time. SRS usage of nalural gas would be approximately 12.2 million 
cubic meters (429 million cubic feel) per year. At present. the SRS consumes no natural gas 
(WSRC 1993c). 
4.13.4 Wastewater Treatment 
By 1995. the SRS Centralized Sanitary Wastewaler Treatment FacililY will process most of the 
domestic effluent on the Site. This centra lly located facility has a design capacity of 4 million liters 
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(1.05 million ga llons) per day . Once operational. the plant wi ll use about 50 percent of this capacity. 
In addition. five smaller sani tary treatment plants serve more remote areas of the Site. Facilitie~ for 
spent nuclear fuel management would use the centralized facility . 
The F/H Emuent Treatment Facility (ETF). which decontaminates routine process emuents and 
accidental radioactive releases from operations. treats industrial wastewater in the F- and H-Areas. 
where the spent fuel management activities would occur. 
Effl .. ent Treatment Facility process operations performed on the waste liquids inc lude 
neutralizat ion (adjusts pH). submicron filtrati on (removes suspended solids). activated carbon 
absorption (removes dissolved organic chemicals), reverse osmosis membrane deionization (removes 
salts), ion exchange (removes heavy metals). and evaporation (separates radionuclides from aqueous 
condensate), This facility releases two different streams. The treated water stream is sampled and 
3nalyzed to ensure that it meets discharge requirements and then is released to Upper Three Runs 
Creek via a permitted outfalL The waste concentrate (i.e .. bottoms from the evaporator process) is 
transferred to the H-Area waste tank fann for treatment and disposal in the Z-Area Saltstone facility. 
The design capacity for the Emuenl Treatment Facility is approximately 600 million liters (158 
million gallons) per year. The maximum permitted treatment capacity is about 400 million liters 
(105 .7 mi llion gallons) per year. Under normal operating conditions. the facility treats more than 
16.000 cubic meters (26 million gallons) of liquid waste per year (WS RC 1993d). 
The influent water load to processes discharging to the permiued outfall includes as much as 205 
million liters (54 million gallons) per year of F-Area Canyon process wastewater. 120 million liters 
(32 million gallons) per year of H-Area Canyon process wastewater. 34 million liters (9 million 
gallons) per year from the F-Area collection and retention basins. 34 million liters (9 million gallons) 
per year from the H-Area collec tion and retention basins. 68 million liters ( 18 million gallons) per year 
of Efnuent Treatment Fac ility acid. caustic. nush and rinse water. and similar wastewater from other 
SRS faci lit ies. 
4.14 Materials and Waste Management 
The historic national defense mission of the SRS has resulted in the generation of high-level 
radioactive waste. transuranic waste. low-level radioactive waste (low-act ivi ty and intermediate-level). 
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hazardous waste. mixed wa51e (radioactive and hazardous combined). and sanitary waste 
(nonhazardous. nonradioactive solid wasle). This section discusses Ihe treatment. storage. and disposal 
of waste at the SRS . Section 4.13 discusses domestic and industrial wastewater treatment. 
DOE is preparing an environmental impact statement on Waste Management at the Savannah 
River Site (DOE 1995). The purpose of the EIS is to provide a basis for DOE to select a sitewide 
strategic approach to managing present and future SRS waste generated as a result of ongoing 
operations. environmental restoration activities. transition from nuclear production to other missions. 
and decontamination and decommissioning programs. The Waste Management EIS will support 
project-level decisions on the operation of specific treatment, storage. and disposal fac ilities within the 
near term (10 years or less). In addition. the EIS will provide a baseline for analyses of future waste 
management activities and a basis for the evaluation of the specific waste management alternatives. 
The Waste Management EIS will not include management of spent nuclear fuel which is addressed in 
this document. 
DOE treats and stores waste generated from onsite operations in waste management facilities 
located primarily in E-. F-. H-. N-. S-. and Z-Areas (Figure 4-16). These facilities include the F- and 
H-Area Effluent Treatment Facility. the High-Level Waste Tank Farms. and the Solid Waste Disposal 
Facility. The Defense Waste Processing Facility is nearly operational and the Consolidated 
Incineration Facility is under construction. The SRS places sanitary and inert waste in the Interim 
Sanitary Landfill and the Burma Road Landfill. respectively. 
DOE continues to reduce the amount of waste generated and disposed of at the SRS through 
waste minimizat ion and treatment programs. DOE accomplishes waste minimization by reducing the 
volume. toxicity. or mobility of waste before storing or disposing of it. These activities also include 
more intensive surveying. waste segregation. and use of administrative and engineering controls. 
The waste that DOE presently stores on the SRS includes high-level. transuranic. hazardous. 
mixed waste and some low-level waste. The Site stores high-level waste in underground storage tanks 
that have received South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control industrial 
wastewater penn its. and manages them in accordance with Clean Water Act. Resou rce Conservation 
and Recovery Act. and DOE requirements. The SRS stores transuranic mixed waste on interim-status 
storage pads in accordance with South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control 
requirements and DOE Orders. Hazardous and mixed waste is placed in permitted or interim-status 
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• Waste management areas E-, F-, H-, N·, S·, and Z·Area 
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Source Arnen 91 al. (1992) 
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Figure 4- 16. Waste management facili ties at the Savannah River Site. 
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storage in the Hazardous Waste Storage Facilities (both buildings and pads) and in the mixed waste 
storage bu ildings. 
Figure 4·17 shows the high-level liquid waste management process at the SRS. Figure 4-1 8 
shows the process for handling all other forms of solid waste at the Site. 
Table 4-25 is a forecast of annual waste generation for all waste forms except sanitary and 
high-level waste (WSRC 1994c). The volumes listed do not include waste related to decontamination 
and decommissioning because DOE has not yet completed the planning of these activities. 
Section 5.14 discusses potential consequences of spem nuclear fuel activities as they relate to the 
alternative interim storage and treatment scenarios. 
4.14.1 High-Level Waste 
The SRS generated high-level waste from the recovery of nuclear materials from spent fuel and 
target processing in the F- and H-Areas. It is stored in 50 underground tanks. These tanks also store 
other radioactive waste effluents (primarily low-level radioactive waste such as aqueous process waste. 
including purge water from storage basins for irradiated reactor fuel or fuel elements). The high-level 
waste is stored to permit the decay of short-lived radionuclides and allow separation of solids (sludge) 
from soluble waste. Evaporators concentrate soluble waste to reduce original volumes and to 
immobilize it as crystallized salt by successive evaporations of the liquid supernate. The SRS treats 
the evaporator overheads in cesium removal columns before transferring them to the F- and H-Area 
Effluent Treatment Facility. The SRS processes the sludge and salt to prepare them for vitrification at 
the Defense Waste Processing Facility (high-level waste ). when it becomes operational. or stabilization 
at the Z·Area Saltstone Fac ility (low-level waste). DOE has prepared a Supplemental EIS related to 
Defense Waste Processing Facility operations (DOE 1994d). 
By December 31.1 99 1. DOE had stored approximately 127.9 million liters (33.8 mill ion gallons) 
of high-level radioacti ve waste on the Site. Estimates of current tank capacity and high-level waste 
forecasts should be available in 1995 . In general. however. due to a number of fac tors. the most 
imponant of which has been the extended outage of the evaporators. the estimated inventory of waste 
in the high-leve l tanks is greater than 90 percent of existing capac ity (WSRC I 994d). DOE is 
constructing a replacement high-level waste tank evaporator to augment or replace existing 
evaporators. 
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Figure 4-17. Row diagram for high-level radioactive waste handling at the Savannah River Site. Figure 4-18. Row diagram for w:;sle handling at the Savannah River Site. 
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Table 4-25. A\'erage annual waste generation forecast for Savannah River Site (cubic meters).~ ·b 
Waste Type FY94 FY95 FY96 
Low-Leve l 
Low-Activity 21.350 17.680 
Intennediate-Level 940 580 
Hazardous 140 130 
Mixed 120 130 
a. Source : WSRC ( 1994c). 
b. To convert cubic meters to cubic feet. multiply by 35.3 14. 
4.142 Transuranic Waste 
17.970 
740 
100 
110 
At present. DOE uses three methods of retrievable storage for transuranic waste at SRS. based on 
the time of generation. Transuranic waste generated before 1974 is buried in approximately 
120 belowgrade concrete culverts in the Solid Waste Disposal Facility. Transuranic waste generated 
from 1974 to 1985 is stored on five concrete pads and one asphalt pad that have been covered with 
approximately 1.2 meters (4 fee t) of native soil. DOE stores waste generated since 1985 on 
13 additional concrete pads that are not covered with soi l. Pads I through 17 operate under Interim 
Status approved by the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control. DOE uses 
Pads 18 through 19. which are not required to have interim status, to manage nonhazardous transuranic 
wastes only. 
The SRS stores wastes containing 10 tll 100 nanocuries per gram of transuranic material with 
transuranic waste until it can complete Site-specific radiological perfonnance assessments. which will 
provide disposal limits for transuranic isotopes. SRS transuranic waste inventories and forecasts 
include both transuranic waste and the 10- to 1000nanocuries-per-gram transuranic wastes . 
At the end of 1993. the SRS had approximately 9.900 cubic meters (350.000 cubic feet) of 
transuranic waste in storage (WS RC 19940). u JSed on the 1994-to- 1996 average annual generation 
rate forecast. the Site generates approximately 760 cubic meters (27.000 cubic feet) of transuranic 
waste annually. Transuranic mixed waste (transuranic and hazardous combined) accounts for 
approximately 110 cubic meters (3.900 cubic feet) of this volume (WSRC I 994c). DOE is evaluating 
avai lable storage space for transuranic mixed waste to alleviate any storage capacity deficit. 
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4.14.3 Mixed Low-Level Waste 
The SRS mixed waste program consists primarily of providing safe storage until treatment and 
disposal fac ilities are ava ilable. The current volume of mixed low-level was te at the SRS is 
1.700 cubic meters (60.000 cubic feel) (WS RC I 994e). Based on the 1994-to-1996 average annual 
generation forecast. the Sile generales approximately 118 cubic meters (4. 170 cubic feet) of mi xed 
low-level waste annually (WSRC I 994c). DOE is evalualing available storage space to detennine 
when the SRS wi ll exceed ils capacity. However. DOE is constructing a Consolidated Incineration 
Facility in H-Area. which will treat mixed. hazardous. and low-level waste . When the incinerator is 
operational. existing inventory will be reduced and more storage capacity will become available . 
4.14.4 Low-Level Waste 
The SRS packages low-level waste for disposal on the Site in accordance with the waste category 
and it s estimated surface dose rate . The Site places low-activity waste in carbon stee l boxes and 
deposits it in an Engineered Low-Level Trench (ELL T). The trenches are several acres in size by 
6 meters (20 feet) deep and have sloped sides and noor. allowing drainage to a collection sump. 
When the trenches are fu ll. DOE backfills and covers them with at least 1.8 meters (6 feet ) of soil. 
The Site packages intennediate-Ievel wastes according to the waste fonn and disposes of them in s lit 
trenches. DOE wi ll store long- lived wastes. such as resins. until the Long-Lived Waste Storage 
Building. currently under construction. becomes operational. This building will provide storage until 
DOE develops treatment and disposal technologies. 
The SRS is developing a new disposal facility. known as the E-Area Vault (EAV). This facility 
will include vaults for low-activity waste. intennediate-Ievel non-tritium waste. and intermediate- level 
tritium waste . 
Based on the 1994-to- 1996 average annual generation forecast. the Site generates approximately 
19.000 cubic meters (67 1.400 cubic feet) of low-activity waste and 750 cubic meters (26.600 cubic 
fee t) of intennediate-Ieve l waste annually. DOE expects that Ihe Consolidated Inc ineration Faci lity 
will begin operations by the second quarte r of Fiscal Year 1996: this facilil y will have the capabi lity 
of annually processing as much as 15.850 cubic meters (560.000 cubic feet ) of boxed low-activity 
waste and approx imately 186 cubic meters (6.600 cubic feel) of hazardous and mixed waste. 
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4.14.5 Hazardous Wasle 
DOE stores hazardous wastes generated at various SRS facilities in buildings in the B· and 
N-Areas. and on the Solid Waste Storage Pads. The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act 
regulates these wastes. 
The inventory of hazardous waste in storage at the SRS is about 1.6 million kilograms (3 .6 million 
pounds). occupying a volume of about 2.430 cubic meters (86.000 cubic feet) (WSRC I 994e). Based 
on the 1994-10-1996 average annual generation rate forecast. the Site generales approximately 
124 cubic meters (4.370 cubic feet) of hazardous waste annually (WS RC I 994c). 
4.14.6 Sanitary Waste 
The SRS disposes of most of ils solid sanitary waste in onsile landfills. the most recent of which 
began operation in 1985. Current disposa l operations include the Interim Sanitary Landfill. About 
30 trucks per work day arrive at this facility carrying approximately 18.125 kilograms (40.000 pounds) 
of waste that. after compaction. occupies approximately 115 cubic meters ( 150 cubic yards) of landfill 
space. The recent implementation of SRS paper and aluminum can recycling programs and disposal of 
offi ce waste off the Site in a commercial landfill has increased the projected life of the landfill to the 
fourth quarter of 1996 (WSRC I 994e). 
DOE also maintains an inert material landfill on the Site near Bunna Road. This faci lity receives 
demolit ion and construction debris. DOE is evaluating the construe lion of a new SRS sanitary landfill 
or the use of a commercial landfill . 
4.14.7 Hazardous Materials 
The SRS 1993 Tie r II emergency and hazardous chemical inventory lists 205 reportable hazardous 
substances prese nt on the Site in excess of the 10.000-pound (4.536-kilogram) threshold quantity 
IWS RC 19941). The number and the total we ight of any hazardous chemicals used on the Site change 
daily in response to use. The annual Superfund Amendments and Reauthorizat ion Act (SARA) reports 
for the SRS include listings of hazardous materials used or stored on the Site during each year. 
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5. ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES 
5.1 Overview 
This chapter discusses the potential environmental consequences for each spent nuclear fuel 
management alternative described in Chapter 3. The representative host site locations. as described in 
Chapter 2. are the F- and H-Areas and an undeveloped site close to H-Area. These sites are 
representative of avai lable areas that could support spent fuel management missions. Based on generic 
facility characteristics. this chapter analyzes representative consequences in terms of the envi ronmental 
attributes of the potential host areas and the Savannah River Site (SRS) at large. as described in 
Chapter 4. Table 3-2 compares the envi ronmental consequences of each alternative. The impacts 
associated with the construction and operation of a Navy Expended Core Fac ility are not included in 
this chapter. but are included in Appendix D of Volume I of this Environmental Impact Statement. 
5.2 Land Use 
Overall environmental impacts on land use by any of the alt';!rnatives would be small because the 
U.S . Department of Energy (DOE) would construct most new facilities in F- and H-Are.s. which are 
already dedicated to industrial use and which previous ac tivities have disturbed . New construction on 
the undeve loped representative host site near H-Area would probably be necessary only for the 
construction of a dry storage vault. 
The Centralization Alternative (Alternative 5). under which DOE would transfe r all spent nuc lear 
fuel to the SRS. would result in the greatest changes in land use. Under this alternative. the SRS 
would dedicate between 70 and 100 acres (0.3 and 0.4 square kilometer) for use in spent nuclear fue l 
management ; the exact location and size of the area affec ted would depend on whether DOE chose to 
use the wet storage. dry storage. or processing option . Of this affec ted area. a maximum of 
approximately 100 ac res (0.4 square kilometer) would change from managed pine forest to industrial 
use. 
DOE would retain under its control any lands supporting the spent nuclear fuel management 
program for the li fe of the project. No alternati ve would require the acquisition of publ ic lands. 
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5.3 Socioeconomics Table 5· 1. Direc t construction employment and total population changes by alternative. 1995-2004. 
Allcmall\'c 1995" 1996' 1997' 1"98' 1999' 2000 2001 2002 2003 2~ 
Soc ioeconomic consequences resulting from the implementat ion of any of the alternatives would Alternative J. 
re late primarily to changes in employment within the region of influence (ROI). DOE has based Ihe 
EmpJoY ffil!nI' 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 
Population 200 150 150 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
analysis in the followin g section on estimated employment and population data for each SRS spent Option 2a-
nuclear fue l alternative. as listed in Table 5- \. The population wi thin Ihe region of influence in 1995 
Employment 50 50 50 50 50 200 400 600 500 200 
Populalion 200 150 150 100 100 850 1.550 2.250 2.000 750 
is est imated to be approximately 462.000. The labor force will be about 257 .000 persons of which Option 2b-
about 242.000 wi ll be employed. Employment 50 50 50 50 50 200 400 600 500 200 Populalion 100 150 150 100 100 850 1.550 2.250 2.000 750 
Option 2e-
DOE expects the employment leve l at the Site to decline from about 20.000 (in 1995) to about Employment 50 50 50 50 50 200 350 550 500 150 
Population 200 150 150 100 100 700 1.350 2.050 1.850 600 
15.800 (in 2004) as the SRS mission is redefined. This anticipated decline would be somewhat offset Option 33-
by the jobs created by the spent nuclear fuel management ac tivities. Therefore. none of the Employmcni 50 50 50 50 50 200 400 600 500 200 
alternati ves would require additional operations employees because the SRS could fill all operational 
Population 200 150 150 100 100 850 1.550 2.2'0 2.000 750 
positions through the reassignment of existing workers. Consequently. this analysis addresses only 
Option 3b-
Employment 50 50 50 50 50 200 400 650 600 250 
employment impacts from construction activities. Given the natural variation in construction 
Population 200 150 150 100 tOO 800 1.600 2.550 2.400 900 
employmenl levels. the analysis could not accurately determine the reassignment of existing 
Option 3c-
Employment 50 50 50 50 50 200 350 550 500 150 
construction workers. As a result. this assessment analyzed the maximum potential impact. which 
Population 200 150 150 100 100 700 1.350 2.05e 1.850 600 
assumes that all construction employment would represent new jobs that in-migrating workers would Option 4a-Employment 50 50 50 50 50 200 400 650 600 250 
fill. Population 200 150 150 100 100 800 1.600 2.550 
2,400 900 
Option 4b-
Employment 50 50 50 50 50 200 400 650 600 250 
DOE estimated to tal employment impac ts using the Regional Input-Output Mode ling System that Population 200 150 150 100 100 800 1.600 2.550 2,400 900 
the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis developed for the SRS region of influence. This assessment Option 4c-Employment 50 50 50 50 50 200 350 550 500 150 
also analyzed changes in population based on historic data that indicate that 90 percent of SRS Population 200 150 150 100 100 700 1.350 2.050 1.850 600 
employees li ve in the six-county region. Option 40-
Employment 50 50 50 50 50 300 500 700 650 250 
PopUlation 200 200 150 150 150 1.100 1.900 2.800 2.500 900 
5.3.1 Potential Impacts Option 4e-
Employment 50 50 50 50 50 250 500 800 800 300 
Populalion 200 200 150 150 150 1.000 2.000 3.200 3.000 1.100 
Table 5-1 lists direct increases in construction employment for each alternative and the Option 4f-
corresponding change in population . As listed. potential impacts to socioeconomic resources would be 
Employment 50 50 50 50 50 200 450 650 600 200 
Population 200 200 150 150 150 850 1.700 2.550 2.350 700 
smallest under Alternative I (No Action) and would be greatest under Option 5b (Centralizalion - Wet Option 4g-
Storage) . Therefore. Option 5b provides the bounding case for maximum pOlential impacts to 
Employment 50 50 50 50 50 100 150 200 100 100 
Population 200 150 150 100 100 250 500 700 450 300 
socioeconomic resources. 
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Table 5-1. (continued). 
Alicmalivc 1995' 1996' 1997' 1998' 1999' 2000 2001 2002 2003 200-l 
Oplion 5a-
Emplo)'menl 50 50 50 50 50 900 1.750 2.550 2.500 2.450 
PopulJlion 200 150 150 100 100 3.500 6.800 9.900 9.700 9.450 
Opllon 5b-
Emplo)'nlCm 50 50 50 50 50 1.000 1.900 2.700 2.650 2.600 
Populalion 200 150 150 100 100 3.850 7.450 10.550 10.350 10.100 
Option Se-
Employment 50 50 50 50 50 900 1.750 2.550 2.500 2.450 
Population 200 150 150 100 100 3.500 6.800 9.900 9.700 9.500 
Oplion 5<1-
Employment 50 50 50 50 50 100 150 200 100 100 
Population 200 150 150 100 100 250 500 700 450 300 
a. Construction is related to renovation of reactor bas in and Receiving Basin for Offsite Fuels. 
Table 5-2 lists indirect employment and corresponding population changes associated with 
construction phase actiVJlies under Option 5b. As listed. the number of fu ll -time construction workers 
required to support the implementation of this option from 1995 to 2004 would range from 
approximately 50 to 2,700. When added to the indirect employment of 1,600 jobs in the peak year 
(2002), the total employment impact in the region would be approximately 4,300 employees. 
Table 5-2, Estimated increases in employment and population related to "onstruction activities for 
Option 5b, from 1995 to 2004. ROI refers to the six-county region of influence. 
F3Ctor 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Dlrt'ci 50 50 50 50 50 1.000 1.900 2.700 2.650 2.600 
t:mploymenl 
Sccondouy )0 ) 0 )0 )0 30 600 1, 100 1.600 1,550 1,500 
cmploymcnl 
Tocal cmploymcnl 80 80 80 80 80 1.600 ).000 4.300 4.200 4. 100 
change 
% Ch:angc In ROI 00) 0.03 00) 0.03 0.03 0.54 1.00 1.41 1.36 1.32 
labor force 
CJi; Ch3lliC In ROI 003 003 00) 00) 0.0) O.S7 1.06 1.50 1.45 1.40 
employment 
Popul:auon ctwlgc 200 150 150 100 100 ).850 7.450 IO,SSO 10,350 10. 100 
lin rt' IJOn) 
Ii\ Ch:angc In ROI 004 003 00) 0.02 0.Q2 0.81 1.56 2.21 2.16 2.11 
populallon 
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Assuming in-migrating workers filled all jobs, the regional labor force and employment would increase 
by 1.4 percent and 1.5 percent. respecti vely. These changes would be temporary and would have no 
adverse impact on the region . After 2004. employment would gradually decline to a relati vely 
constant level of about 50 jobs. 
Based on historic data, approximately 90 percent of new employees would live within the 
six-county region of innuence. Assuming each new employee represented one household with 2.72 
persons per hJusehold. there would be approximately 10,550 additional people in the region during the 
peak year (2002). These changes would be temporary and would represent an estimated 2.2 percent 
increase in baseline population levels. Given this minor change in popUlation, DOE expects potential 
impacts on the demand for community resources and services such as housing, schools. police, health 
care , and fire protection to be negligible. 
Because all the other alternatives would require fewer employees, they would result in smaller 
changes than those listed in Table 5-2, and would have no adverse impacts on socioeconomic 
resources in the region of influence. 
5.4 Cultural Resources 
A Programmatic Memorandum of Agreement (SRARP 1989) between the DOE Savannah River 
Operations Office. the South Carolina State Historic Preservation Office, and the Advisory Council on 
Historic Preservation, ratified on August 24. 1990, is the instrument for the management of cultural 
resources at the SRS. DOE uses this memorandum to identify cultural resources. assess them in terms 
of eligibility for the National Register of Historic Places. and develop mitigation plans for affected 
resources in consultation with the State Historic Preservation Officer. DOE would comply with the 
tenns of the memorandum for all activi ties needed to support spent nuclear fuel management actions. 
The potential for adverse impacts on cultural resources would be smallest under Alternat ive I 
(No Action) and would be greatest under Alternative 5 (Centralization). Any facilities that DOE 
would construct in F- and H-Areas, north of Road E (Alternati ves 1-5). would be in SenSitivity 
Zones 2 and 3. Section 4.4 describes these zones. The undeveloped representative host si te south and 
east of H-Area (Alternat ive 5) is in Sensitivity Zone 3. Although there are no known archeological 
sites in the area, it has never been surveyed. Surveying being conducted ncar F-Area (north of 
Road C and west of Road 4 along Upper Three Runs Creek) has recorded some historic and 
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prehistoric sites. However. DOE expects no impacts in F- and H-Areas due to thei r eXlensive 
industrial development. Until DOE has detennined the precise locations of fac ilities connecled wi th 
any of the alternati ves. it cannot predict impacts on cultural resources in the undevelcped site area 
(Sassaman 1994). However, DOE would mitigate. through avoidance or remuvai. impacts to 
potentially significant resources that future site surveys might discover. 
5.5 Aesthetic and Scenic Resources 
None of the alternatives for spent nuclear fuel management at the SRS would have adverse 
consequences on scenic resources or aesthetics. Most new construction would be in F- or H-Area. 
both of which are already dedicated to industrial use. New construction on the undeveloped site, 
which would occur primarily under Alternative 5. would be adjacent to H-Are. in an already heavily 
industrialized ponion of the SRS. In all cases. new construction would not be visible off the Site or 
from public acce~S roads on the Site. No alternative would produce emissions to the atmosphere that 
would be visible or would indirectly reduce visibility. 
5,6 Geologic Resources 
The SRS contains no unique geologic features or minerals of economic value. Therefore. DOE 
anticipates no impacts to geologic resources at the SRS from any of the spent nuclear fuel 
management alternatives. 
Other sections in this chapter consider the re lationships of the Site' s specific geology and the 
region's historic and analyzed seismicity to the local environment and to SRS spent nuclear fuel-
related structures and faci lities, Section 5.8 discusses the consequences of analyzed seismic events on 
both surface-water and groundwater resources. Section 5.15 describes estimates of risk that consider 
both the probability of and the conscquences from a wide range of seismic events. ranging from local 
and regional historicall y documented eanhquakes to postulated lower probability. higher consequence 
events. 
The accident analyses in this chapter. which DOE based on infonnation from approved safety 
analysis repons for applicable fac; 'ities. address the frequency and consequences of historic 
eanhquakes. as well as postulated less likely. but more damaging. seismic events. DOE has evaluated 
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the consequences from seismic challenges to the facilities and structures up to 0.20g lateral ground 
acceleration. 
5,7 Air Quality Consequences 
The SRS is in compliance wilh both Federal and state ambient air qualilY slandards for criteria 
and loxic air pollutanls. As shown in the following tables. the predicted incremental air pollutant 
impacts would not conlribute to exceeding either Ihe National Ambient Air Quality Standards or South 
Carolina's Ambient Air Qualify Slandards. 
DOE perfonned analyses using computer models in order to assess the pOlential air qualilY 
impacts of operations under each of the spent nuclear fuel management ahematives. This section 
describes the results of these analyses. All the concentrations discussed below are ground-level 
estimations based on results from the ISC2 and FDM models for nonradiological pollutants, and 
MAXIGASP- and POPGASP SRS-c1imatology-specific models for radionuclides. The analyses 
assume that facility operations would result in both radiological and nonradiological emissions. DOE 
assessed construction impacts qualitatively in relation to the land area to be disturbed under each 
alternative. 
Nonradiological Emissions. DOE analyzed the potential incremental impacts of only those 
substances for which it expects releases to the atmosphere during the nonnal operation of spent nuclear 
fuel facilities. The nonradiological releases evaluated for each alternative include seven criteria 
pollutants and 23 toxic pollutants. DOE selected the toxic substances for analysis by comparing the 
anticipated chemical usage at the proposed spent nuclear fuel facilities to the list of 257 tox ic air 
pollutants in the South Carolina Air Pollution Regulations (SCDHEC 1976). The SRS modeled 
potential emissions of the listed toxic chemicals that DOE anticipates would be used during spent 
nuclear fue l ac ti vities. The following subsections discuss the results for both criteria and tox ic 
pollutants. Tables 5-3 and 5-4 list the estimated maximum incremental concentrations of these 
pollutants at the Site boundary. while Tables 5-5 and 5-6 contain the incremental rates of release. 
Radiological Emissions. DOE evaluated the potential radiological releases to the atmosphere 
from spent fuel management at the SRS using existing Site historical opemtions infonnation. Based 
on the actual 1993 emiosions data from the Receiving Basin for Offsite Fuels (WSRC 1994d). DOE 
estimates that emissions from any of the wet storage options under Alternatives I through 4 wou ld 
5-7 VOLUME I , APPENDIX C 
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Table 5-3. Estimated incremental air quality impacts at the Savannah Rive r Site boundary from operations of spent nuclear fuel alternatives -
cri teria pollutants (~g/m\ ) :' 
Pollutant" 
Averaging 
Time 
CRITERIA POLLUTANTS (Jlg/mJ ) 
Carbon monoxide S-hour 
I-hour 
Ozone (as VOC) I-hour 
itrogen oxides Annual 
geometric 
mean 
Particulate matter Annual 
«IOjJm) 24-hour 
Total suspended Annual 
particulates (TSP) 
Sulfur dioxide Annual 
24-hour 
3-hour 
Lead Calendar 
quarter mean 
Gaseous Fluorides (as I-month 
HF) I-week 
24-hour 
12-hour 
Regulatory 
Standard' 
10,(}()() 
40,(}()() 
245 
100 
50 
150 
75 
SO 
365 
1,300 
1.5 
O.S 
1.6 
2.9 
3.7 
Maximum 
Potentia l 
Concentration 
SIS 
3,553 
N/Ad 
30 
9 
93 
20 
IS 
356 
1.210 
<0.01 
0. 11 
0.6 
1.20 
2.40 
Actual 
Concentration' 
23 
ISO 
N/Ad 
4 
3 
56 
II 
10 
ISS 
634 
<0.01 
0.03 
0. 15 
0.31 
0.62 
/36 
No 
Action 
<0.0 1 
<0.01 
1.6 
<0.01 
<0.01 
Incremental Concentrations from Alternatives 
Decentralization 
2a 2b 2e 
0.1 0.1 
O.S O.S 
0.3 0.3 
0.01 <0.01 
<0.01 <0.01 
<0.01 <0.01 
0.01 0.01 
0.05 0.05 
4.3 
32 
2.6 
11 .00 
<0.01 
0.40 
<0.01 
0.01 
0.43 
3.2 
0.02 
0.10 
0.20 
0.40 
199211993 Planning Basis 
3a 3b 3c 
0 .1 0.1 
O.S O.S 
0.3 0.3 
<0.01 <0.01 
<0.01 <0.01 
<0.01 <0.01 
0.0\ om 
0.05 0.05 
4.3 
32 
2.6 
11.0 
0.01 
0.40 
<0.01 
0.01 
0.43 
3.2 
0.02 
0.10 
0.20 
0.40 
Table 5-3. (continued). 
Incremental Concentrations from Alternatives 
Maximum Rcgionalization A Regionalization B 
Averaging Regulatory Potential Actual 
Pollutantb Time Standard' Concentration Concentration' 4a 4b 4c 4d 4e 4f 4g 
C RITERIA POLLUTANTS (~glmj) 
Carbon monoxide 8-hour 10.000 818 23 0.2 0.2 4.3 0.2 0.2 5.5 
I-hour 40.000 3.553 180 1.2 1.2 32 1.5 I.5 41 
OlOne (as VOe) I-hour 245 N/Ad N/Ad 0.5 0.5 2.6 0.6 0.6 3.3 1.4 
Nitrogen oxides Annual 100 30 4 <0.01 <0.01 II <0.01 <0.01 14 
geometric 
mean 
Particulate matter Annual 50 9 3 0.01 0.01 
(<I0Ilm) 24-hour 150 93 56 0.4 0.5 
Total suspended Annual 75 20 II <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 
Vl particulates (TS P) I 
\0 
Sulfur dioxide Annual 80 18 10 <0.01 <0.01 0.01 <0.01 <0.01 0.01 
24-hour 365 356 185 0.02 0.02 0.43 0.02 0.02 0.55 
3-hour 1.300 1.210 634 0.09 0.09 3.2 0.11 0.11 4.1 
Lead Calendar 1.5 <0.01 <0.01 
quarter mean 
Gaseous Fluorides I-month 0.8 0.11 0.03 0.02 0.02 
(as HF) I-week 1.6 0.6 0.15 0.10 0. 13 
24-hour 2.9 1.20 0.31 0.20 0.25 
12-hour 3.7 2.40 0.62 0.40 0.51 
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Table 5·3. (continued) . 
Incremental Concentrations from Alternativ.:s 
Maximum Centralization 
Averaging Regulatory Potential Actual 
Timt: Standard' Concentration Concentration' 5a 5b 5c 5d 
CRITERIA POI.I.UTANTS ("glm-') 
Carbon monoxide !:I-hour 10.000 818 23 1.0 1.0 5.1 
I-hour 40.000 3.553 180 6.7 6.7 37 
OLUnt: (as VOCl I-hour 245 N/Ad N/Ad 1.4 1.4 3. 1 1.4 
Nitrogen oxides Annual 100 30 4 0.04 0.04 11.1 
geometric 
mean 
Paniculatt: matter Annual 50 9 3 0.01 
« 10Ilm) 24-hour ISO 93 56 0.40 
Total suspended paniculates (TSP) Annual 75 20 II <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 
Sulfur dioxide Annual 80 18 10 <0.01 <0.01 0.02 
24-hour 365 356 185 0.09 0.09 0.49 
3-hour 1.300 1.210 634 0.50 0.50 3.5 
Lead Calendar 1.5 <0.01 <0.01 
qUarler mean 
Gaseous Fluorides (as HF) I-month 0.8 0. 11 0.03 0.02 
I-week 1.6 0.6 0. 15 0.10 
24-hour 2.9 1.20 0.31 0. 10. 
12-hour 3.7 2.40 0.62 0.40 
- = No impact. 
a. Maximum modeled ground-level concentration at SRS perimeter unless higher offsite concentrations are otherwise specified. 
b. Major pollutants of concern regarding spent nuclear fuel management activities. 
c . Most stringent Federal and state regulatory standards (CFR 1991 a). (SCDHEC 1976). 
d. Measurement data currently unavailable. 
e . Maximum operational air pollutant emissions projected for baseline year 1995. Concentration estimates based on actual emissions from all SRS sources for calendar year 1990 
plus maximum potential emissions for sources permitted through December 1992. 
/3? 
Table 5-4. Estimated incremental ai r quality impacts at the Savannah River Site boundary from operat ions of spent nuclear fuel alternatives -
toxic pollutants (llg/m·I) ." 
Incremental Concentrations from Alternatives 
Maximum 0 
Averaging Regul atory Potential Actual Action Decentralization 199211993 Planning Basis 
Pollut:mt' Time Standard' Concentration Concentrationd 2a 2b 2e 3a 3b 3e 
TOXIC POLLUTA TS Cllglml) 
itrie ac id 2-l-hour 125 51 6.7 <0.01 <0.01 
1.1.1.- Trichloroet hane 24-hour 9.550 8 1 22 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 0.01 <0.01 <0.01 0.0 1 
Benlene 2-l-hour 150 32 31 0.04 0.04 
Ethanolamine 24-hour 200 <0.01 <0.01 <0.0 1 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.0 1 <0.0 1 <0.01 
Ethyl benzene 2-l-hour -l.350 0.58 0.12 <0.01 <0.0 1 
Ethylene g lycol 24-hour 650 0.20 0.08 <0.01 <0.0 1 <0.0 1 <0.01 <0.0 1 <0.01 <0.01 
Formaldehyde 2-l-hour 7.5 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.0 1 <0.01 <0.0 1 <0.01 <0.01 <0.0 1 
Glycol ethers 2-l -hour + <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.0 1 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 
Vl , Hexaehloronapthalene 24-hour 1.0 <0.01 <0.01 <0.0 1 <0.01 <0.01 <0.0 1 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 
Hexane 2-l -hour 200 0.21 0.07 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 0.04 <0.01 <0.0 1 0.04 
Manganese 2-l-hour 25 0.82 0.10 <0.01 <0.01 
Methyl alcohol 2~-hour 1.3 10 2.9 0.51 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 
Methyl ethyl ketone 2-l-hour 14.750 6.0 0.99 <0.01 <0.01 <0.0 1 <0.01 <0.0 1 <0.01 <0.01 
Methyl isohutyl ketone 24-hour 2.050 3.0 0.51 <0.01 <0.01 
Methylene chloride 2~-hour 515 10.5 1.8 0.02 0.02 
aphthalene 24-hour 1.250 0.01 0.01 <0.01 <0.0 1 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 
Phenol 24-hour 190 0.03 0.03 <0.01 <0.01 
< Phosphorus 2-l-hour 0.5 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 0 Sodium hydroxide 2~ -hour 20 0.01 0.01 <0.01 <0.01 r 
c: 
3:: Toluene 24-hour 2.000 9.3 1.6 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 0.04 <0.0 1 <0.01 0.04 
m 
- Trichloroethylene 2-l-hour 6.750 4.8 1.0 <0.01 <0.01 
» Vinyl acetate 24-hour 176 0.06 0.02 <0.01 <0.0 1 "'0 
"'0 
m Xylene 24- hour 4.350 39 3.8 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.05 z 
S2 
x 
() 1s<1 
< Table 5-4. (continued). 
0 
r Incremental Concentrations from Alternatives c: 
?:: Maximum 
m Averaging Regu latory Putential Actual Regional ization A Regional ization B 
-
> Pullutant" Time Stanllard' Concentration Concentration~ 4a 4b 4c 4d 4e 4f 4g 
-0 
TS (jJglm l ) -0 TOXIC POLLUTA m 
Z 
itric acid 2,",·hou r Q 125 51 6.7 1.0 1.3 
x 1.1 .1.- Trichloroethane 2~- hou r 9.550 81 22 <0.01 <0.01 0.01 <0.0 1 <0.01 0.01 <0.01 () 
BC!lI.cnc 2~- hour 150 32 31 0.04 0.05 
Ethanolamine 24-hour 200 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.0 1 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 
Ethyl benlene 24-hour ~.350 0.5l:i 0.12 <0.01 <0.01 
Ethylene glycol 2~-hour 650 0.20 0.08 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 
Formaldehyde 24-hour 7.5 <0.0 1 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 
Glycol ethers 24-hour + <0.0 1 <0.0 1 <0.01 <0.01 <0.0 1 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 
Hcxachloronapthalene 24-hour 1.0 <0.0 1 <0.01 <0.01 <0.0 1 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 
Hexane 24-hour 200 0.21 0.07 <0.0 1 <0.01 0.04 <0.01 <0.01 0.05 <0.01 
'..Jl Manganese 24-hour 25 0.82 0.10 <0.01 <0.01 I 
IV Methyl alcohol 24-hour 1.310 2.9 0.51 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 
Methyl ethyl ketone 24-hour 14.750 6.0 0.99 <0.0 1 <0.0 1 <0.01 <0.0 1 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 
Methyl i obutyl ketone 24-hour 2.050 3.0 0.51 <0.01 <0.01 
Methylene chloride 24-hour SIS 10.5 1.8 0.02 0.02 
aphthalene 24-huur 1.250 0.0 1 0.0 1 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.0 1 <0.01 <0.01 
Phenol 24-hour 190 0.03 0.03 <0.01 <0.0 1 
Phosphorus 24-hour 0.5 <0.001 <0.00 1 <0.001 <0.001 
Sodium hydroxide 24-hour 20 0.01 0.01 <0.01 <0.01 
Toluene 24-hour 2.000 9.3 1.6 <O.O! <0.01 0.04 <0.01 <0.01 <0.05 <0.01 
Trichloroethylene 24-hour 6.750 4.8 1.0 <0.0'1 <0.0 1 
Vinyl acetate 24-hour 176 0.06 0.02 <0.01 <0.0 1 
Xylene 24-hour 4.350 39 3.8 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.06 0.01 
/1() 
Table 5-4. (continued). 
Incremental Concentrations from Alternatives 
Maximum Centralization 
Averaging Regulatory Potential Actual 
Pollutantb Time Standard' Concentration Concentrationd 5a 5b 5c 5d 
TOXIC POLLUTANTS (~g/m \ ) 
itric acid 24-hour 125 51 6.7 1.0 
I. I. 1.- Trichloroethane 24-hour 9.550 8 1 22 <0.01 <0.01 O.oI <0.01 
Benzene 24-hour 150 32 31 0.04 
Ethanolamine 24-hour 200 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 
Ethyl benzene 24-hour 4.350 0.58 0.12 <0.01 
Ethylene glycol 24-hour 650 0.20 0.08 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 
Formaldehyde 24-hour 7.5 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 
Glycol ethers 24-hour + <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 
Hex achloronaptha lene 24-hour 1.0 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 
Hcxane 24-hour 200 0.21 0.07 <0.01 <0.01 0.04 <0.01 
Vl Manganese 24-hour 25 0.82 0. 10 <0.01 
I 
t...> Methyl alcohol 24-hour 1.310 2.9 0.51 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 
Methyl ethyl ketone 24-hour 14.750 6.0 0.99 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 
Methyl isobutyl ketone 24-hour 2.050 3.0 0.51 <0.01 
Methylene chloride 24-hour 515 10.5 1.8 0.02 
aphthalene 24-hour 1.250 0.01 0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 
Phenol 24-hour 190 0.03 0.03 <0.0 1 
Phosphorus 24-hour 0.5 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
Sodium hydroxide 24-hour 20 0.01 0.01 <0.01 
Toluene 24-hour 2.000 9.3 1.6 <0.01 <0.01 0.04 <0.0 1 
< Trichloroethylene 24-hour 6.750 48 1.0 <0.01 0 Vinyl acetate 24-hour 176 0.06 0.02 <0.0 1 r-
c 
~ Xylene 24- hour 4.350 39 3.8 0.0 1 0.0 1 0.05 0.01 
m 
:> o impact. 
" 
+ ot avai lable. 
" m a. Maximum modeled ground-level concentration at SRS perimeter unless higher offsite concentrations are otherwise specified. z Q b. Major pollutants of concern regarding spent nuclear fuel. 
X c. Most stringent Federal and state regu latory standards (CFR 199 I a). (SCDHEC 1976). 
() d. Maximum operational air pollutant emissions projected for baseline year 1995. Concentration estimates based on actual emission from all SRS sources for calendar year 
1990 plus maxi mum potential emissions fo r sources permitted through December 1992. 
ii/ 
< Table 5-5. Incremental air quality pollutant emission rates re lated to spent nuclear fuel alternatives - criteria pollutants." 0 
r 
c Baseli ne Alternatives 
3:: 
tTl 
-
No 
);- Maximum Action Decentralization 199211993 Planning Basis 
"'0 Design 
"'0 2b 2c tTl Pollutant Capacity Actualh 2a 3a 3b 3c Z 
Q 
CRITERIA POLLUTANTS (TONS PER YEAR) X 
Ii 
0, 2.22xI0' 2.62x1OJ 6.0x1Oo 6.0x 1Oo 2.0x I O· 6.0x1Oo 6.0x1Oo 2.0x 10· 
Particulates 
TSP 3.62x1OJ 9.80x1Ol 4.0xlO·1 4.0x I0·1 1.5x 101 4.0x 10.1 4.0x I0·1 1.5x 101 
PM IO 2.66x1OJ 4.97x1Ol 2.6xI0·1 2.6xI0" 9.3x1Oo 2.6x 10.1 2.6x 10.1 9.3x 100 
CO 6.77x1OJ 1.99x I 02 1.5x 10° 1.5x 10° 3.8x101 1.5x 10° l.5x 10° 3.8x 101 
SO: 6.42x 10' 6.68x1OJ 1.6xI0·J 4.0xI0·1 4.0x I0·1 I.2xlOI 4.0x 10-1 4.0xI0·1 1.2x 101 
Gaseous Fluondes 2.14x I0·l 1.07x 10.2 2.4x 101 2.4x 101 
Ozone (as YOC) NIN NIN 6.0xlO·1 6.0xlO·1 1.8x 10.1 6.0x I0·1 6.0xlO·1 1.8x 10.1 
VI Regionalization A Regionalization B I 
~ 
CRITERIA POLLUTA TS (TONS PER YEAR) 4a 4b 4c 4d 4e 4f 4g 
0, 2.22x 10' 2.62xlcY 8.5x 10° 8.5x1Oo 2.0xI0· 1.1 x 101 I.lx 101 2.5x 10' 
Pdrticulates 
TSP 3.62xlcY 9.80x102 6.0x I0·2 6.0x 10.2 1.5x 101 7.6xlO·1 7.6x 10.2 1.5x 101 
PM IO 2.66x IcY 4.97x 102 1.45x 101 1.45x 101 9.3x1Oo 1.8x 101 1.8x 101 9.3x1Oo 
CO 6.77x lcY 1.99x lOl 2.0x1Oo 2.0x l(f 3.8x101 2.5x 1Oo 2.5x1Oo 5.2x 101 
SOl 6.42x10' 6.68xlcY 5.5xI0·l 5.5x lO.l I.3x 101 7.6xlO·1 7.6x 10·l l.7x 101 
Ga eous Fluorides 2.14x 10·l 1.07x I 0.2 2.4x 101 3.0x101 
Ozone (as YOC) N/A< NIN 8.5x I0·1 8.5xI0·1 1.8x10·1 1.1 x 10° 1.1 x 10° 2.3xI0·1 
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Table 5-5. (continued). 
Maximum Alternatives 
Design 
Pollutant Capacity AClUalh Centralization 
CRITERIA POLLUTA TS (TONS PER YEAR) Sa 5b 5c 5d 
NO, 2.2xIO· 2.6x1OJ 5.6x1OI 5.6x1OI 2.0x 10' 
Particulates 
T P 3.62x I 0" 9.8x102 2. lxlOo 2. lx 10° 1.8x 101 
PM 10 2.66x 10" 4.97x102 1.4x 10° 1.4x 10° 9.3x1Oo 
CO 6.77xIOJ 1.99x 102 2.7x101 2.7x101 6.9x101 
S02 6.42x I 0" 6.68x1OJ 8. lxlOo 8. lxlO° 2.0x101 
Gaseous Fluorides 2.14x 10.2 1.07x 10.2 2.4x 101 
Ozone (as VOC) N/N N/A' 4.6x1Oo 4.6x1Oo 2.4x 101 
a. Source: WSRC (1994a). 
b. Maximum operational air pollutant emissions projected for baseline year 1995. Concentration estimates based on actual emissions from all SRS sources for calendar 
year 1990 pl us maxi mum potential emissions for sources permitted through December 1992. 
c. Emissions data currently unavailable. 
No proposed incremental emissions. 
J13 
< Table 5-6. Incremental air quality pollutant emiss ion rates related to spent nuclear fuel alternatives - toxic pollutants." 0 
r 
c Base line Alternatives 
3: 
tTl 
-
No 
> Maximum Action Decentralization 199211993 Planning Basis 
-0 Design 
-0 2a 2b tTl Pollutant Capacity Actual" 2c 3a 3b 3c Z Q 
X TOXIC POLLUTANTS (TONS PER YEAR) 
n 
Ni tric Acid 1.13x10-' 2.56xI0" 5. lx 10.2 5. lxI0·2 5. lxI 0·: 1.24x 102 5. lx 10.2 5. lx 10.2 1.24x102 
1.1.1-Trichloroethane 8.0xI0' NA' 7.02xI0·' 7.02x I0·' 
Benzene 2.9xI0' 4.48x I 0° 8.02x 10" 8.02xI0·' 
Ethanolamine 2.21x102 5.35x I 0') 1.46x 10') 1.46>. . ' 1.46xI0·) 1.46x 10') 1.46x 10') 1.46x 10·J 1.46x 10') 
Ethyl Benzene 2.56x1Oo 1.07x 10° 8.02xI0'" 8.02xI0'" 
Ethylene Glycol 6.83xI0·' 4. 17xI0·' 2.25x 10.2 2.25x I0·2 2.25x I0·2 4.27x I0·2 2.25x I0·2 2.25xI0·2 4.27xI0·2 
Formaldehyde 4.55xI0·2 4.8xI0'" 3.6x 10-6 3.6xI0·6 3.6xI0·6 3.6x 10.6 3.6xI0·6 3.6x 10.6 3.6xI0·6 
VI Glycol Ethers 4.36xI0·) 1.99x I 0'" 4.06xI0·) 4.06xI0·) 4.06x I0·) 4.06xI0·J 4.06xI0·) 4.06xlO·) 4.06xI0·) 
I 
Q\ Hexachloronaphthalene <0.01 NN 3.65xI0·\ 3.65x 10'\ 3.65x 10'\ 3.6x 10'\ 3.65x 10'5 3.65xI0·5 3.6x 10's 
Hexane 3.54x I 0° 2.22xI0·' 3.28xI0·) 3.28xI0·) 3.28x I0·J 8. 13x 10" 3.28x I 0') 3.28xI0·) 8. l3xI0·' 
Manganese 2.84xI0·' 3.43x 10" 1.51x10·2 1.51 x I 0.2 
Methyl Alcohol 6.62xlO·' 3.46x 10" 6.84xI0·2 6.84xI0·2 6.84x 10.2 8.68x 10.2 6.84x I 0.2 6.84xI0·2 8.68xI0·2 
Methyl Ethyl Ketone 6.41 x I 0° 3. 17x1Oo 2. 19xI0·) 2. 19xI0·) 2. 19xI0·) 3.47xI0·2 2. 19x 10') 2.19xI0·) 3.47x I0·2 
Methyl Isobutyl Ketone 8.25x I 0° 2.25x 10° 1.27x 10.2 1.27x I 0.2 
Methylene Chloride 1.53x 10° 1.19xl oo 8.23x 10" 8.23xI0·' 
Naphthalene 7.22x I 0.2 3.08x 10.2 5.84x I 0'" 5.84xI0'" 5.84xI0'" 6.08xI0'" 5.84xI0'" 5.84)(10'" 6.08xI0'" 
Phenol 8.07xI0·2 1.37x I 0.2 6.0IxI0·\ 6.01x 10'\ 
Phosphorus 2.97xI0·) 1.65x 10" 1.6x I 0.6 1.6xl0 6 
Sodium Hydroxide 1.26x 10" 1.26x 10" 5.97x 10.1 5.97xI0·2 
Toluene 3.91x1Oo 7.66xlO·' 5.0x 10.2 5.0x 10.2 5.0x 10.2 9.2xI0·' 5.0xI0·2 5.0x10 2 9.2xI0·' 
Trichloroethylene 2.52xI0' 9.8x1Oo 5.52xI0'" 5.52x I 0'" 
Vinyl Acetate 4 .38x I0·2 5.9xI0· 5.0x 10'\ 5.0xI0·\ 
Xylene 1.46x 10) 1.22x 10' 1.58x 10" 1.58xI0·' I 58x I0" 1.4x I 0° 1.58x I 0" 1.58x 10" 1.4x 10° 
J4t-j 
Table 5-6. (continued). 
Baseline Alternatives 
Maximum Regionalil.ation A Regionalization B 
Design 
Pollutant Capacity Actual" 4a 4b 4c 4d 4e 4f 4g 
TOXIC POLLUTANTS (TO S PER YEAR) 
itric Acid 1.1 x 10-' 2.6x 10° 5.lxI0·2 5. lxI 0·: 1.2x I 02 6.5xI0·2 6.5x 10.2 1.5x 102 
I. I. I-Trichloroethane 8.0x 1O' NN 7.0xI0·' 8.9xI0·' 
Benzene 2.9x1O' 4.5x 10° 8.0xI0·' 1.0x I 0° 
Ethanolamine 2.2x 10.1 5.4x 10') 1.5xI0·) 1.5x I 0') l.5x 10') 1.9x 10') 1.9x 10') 1.9xlO·) 
Ethyl Benzene 2.6x 10° 1.1 x 10° 8.0xI0'" 1.0x 10') 
Ethylene Glycol 6.8xI0·\ 4.2x I0·\ 2.3xI0·2 .3x 10.2 4.3x I0·1 2.9x 10.2 2.9xI0·1 5.5xI0·2 
Formaldehyde 4.6x 10.1 4.8xI0'" 3.6x 10.6 3.6xI0·6 3.6xI0·\ 4.6xI0·6 4.6xI0·6 4.6x 10.6 
Glycol Ethers 4.4xI0·) 2.0xI0'" 4. lxI0·) 4. lx 10') 4. lxI0·) 5.2x 10') 5.2x 10') 5.2x 10') 
Vl 
0 Hexach loronapthalene <0.01 NA< 3.7x 10'\ 3.7x 10'\ 3.6x 10'\ 4.7xI0·\ 4.7xI0·) 4.6x 10'\ 
-.J 
Hexane 3.5x1Oo 2.2x 10' \ 3.3xI0·) 3.3xI0·) 8. lxlO·\ 4.2xI0·) 4.2xI0·) l.Ox 10° 
Manganese 2.8xI0·\ 3.4x 10'\ 1.5xI0·1 1.9x 10.2 
Methyl Alcohol 6.6xI0·\ 3.5x 10'\ 6.8xI0·2 6.8x 10.2 8.7xI0·2 8.6xI0·1 8.6xI0·2 1.1 X 10'\ 
Methyl Ethyl Ketone 6.4x 10° 3.2x 10° 2.2xI0·) 2.2x 10') 3.5xI0·2 2.8xI0·) 2.8x 10') 4.4xI0·2 
Methyl I obutyl Ketone 8.3x 1Oo 2.3x100 1.3xI0·1 I.7x10·2 
Methylene Chloride 1.5x 10° 1.2x 10° 8.2xI0·\ 1.0x I 0° 
Naphthalene 7.2xI0·2 3. lx 10.2 5.8x 10'" 5.8xI0'" 6. lxI0'" 7.4xI0'" 7 .4~10'" 7.7xIO'" 
< Phenol 8. lxI0·
2 1.4x 10.2 6.0xI0·\ 7.6xI0·) 
0 3.0x:0 ) 1.7x10'" 1.6x 10.6 2.0xI0 " l Phosphorus 
c: 
3:: Sodium Hydroxide 1.3xI0·\ I.3x 10' \ 6.0x10 2 7.6xI0·2 m 
-
» 
Toluene 3.9x1Oo 7.7xI0·\ 5.0xI0·2 5.0x 10.2 9.2x 10'\ 6.4x 10 2 6.4xI0·2 I.2x 10° 
" Trichloroethylene 2.5xI0\ 9.8x1Oo 5.5x 10'" 7.0xlO" 
" m z Vinyl Acetate 4.4xI0·2 5.9x I0·\ 5.0xI0·\ 6.4x 10" S2 
x 
(j Xylene 1.5x 10) 1.2x I 0\ 1.6xI0·\ 1.6x 10'\ 1.4x 10° 2.0x 10' \ 2.0xI0·\ 1.8x 100 
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Pollutant 
TOXIC POLL TA TS (TONS PER YEAR) 
Nitric Acid 
1.1.1-Trichloroethane 
Benzene 
Ethanolamine 
Ethyl Benzene 
Ethylene Glycol 
Formaldehyde 
Glycol Ether 
Hexachloronapthalene 
Hexane 
Manganese 
Methyl Alcohol 
Methyl Ethyl Ketone 
Methyl Isobutyl Ketone 
Methylene Chloride 
aphthalene 
Phenol 
Phosphorus 
Sodium Hydroxide 
Tol uene 
Trichloroethylene 
Vinyl Acetate 
Xylene 
Source: WSRC (1994a). 
Maximum 
Design 
Capacity 
1.1 Y. IO) 
8.0x1O' 
2.9x1O' 
2.2x 10.2 
2.6x1Oo 
6.8xI0" 
4.6x 10.2 
4.4x 10.3 
<0.01 
3.5x 10° 
2.8x 10" 
6.6xI0" 
6.4x1Oo 
8.3x 1Oo 
1.5x 10° 
7.2xlO·2 
8. lxI0·2 
3.0xI0') 
I.3x 10" 
3.9x 100 
2.5x1O' 
4.4x 10·l 
I.5x 10) 
b. M;uimum operational ai r pollutant emissions projected for baseline year 1995. 
Alternatives 
Centralization 
Actualb 5a 5b 5c 
2.6x 10° 5. lxI0·2 5. lx 10.2 1.2x 102 
NN 7.0x I0" 
4.5x1Oo 8.0xlO" 
5.4xI0') I.5x 10.3 I.5x 10.3 1.5x I0·3 
1.1 x 10° 8.0xI0'" 
4.2xlO" 2.3x 10.2 2.3x 10.2 4.3xI0·2 
4.8xI0'" 3.6xI0·6 3.6x 10.6 3.6x 10.6 
2.0xI0'" 4. lxI0') 4. lxI0') 4.1 X 10') 
AC 3.7x 10·$ 3.7x 10·$ 3.6x 10·$ 
2.2x 10" 3.3x 10') 3.3x 10') 8. lxI0·' 
3.4xlO·' l.5x 10.2 
3.5xI0·' 6.8x 10.2 6.8x 10.2 8.7x 10.2 
3.2x1Oo 2.2xI0 ) 2.2x 10.3 3.5x 10.2 
2.3x 10° I.3x 10.2 
1.2>:10° 8.2x I0" 
3. lx 10.2 5.8xI0'" 5.8xI0'" 6. Ix 10-4 
1.4xI0·2 6.0xI0·$ 
1.7x10'" 1.6x 10.6 
I.3x 10" 6.0xI0·2 
7.7x 10" 5.0xI0·2 5.0x 10.2 9.2xI0" 
9.8x1Oo 5.5x 10'" 
5.9x 10 ) 5.0 10·$ 
1.2x 10' 1.6xlO ' 1.6x 10' 1.4x I 0° 
Concentration estimates ba ed on actual emis ions "rom all SRS source 
year 1990 plus m;uimum potential emissions for sources permilled through December 1992. 
c. NA= Emissions data currently unavailable. 
No propo ed incremenlal emissions. 
J'11rJ 
5d 
for calendar 
consist of about 2 x 10.1 curies per year of cesium·!37. Releases from dry storage activit ies under 
these alternat ives would be somewhat less. For Allemati ve 5 where SRS would managr about 2.740 
MTHM (3.020 Ions) of spenl fu el (versus aboul 206 10 257 MTHM [227 10 283 Ions] for Ihe olher 
alternatives) . the atmospheric releases of cesium· 137 would be proport ionally higher. 
DOE used aClual emissions from F- and H-Areas during 1985 and 1986. a period when Ihe SRS 
was processing material through the separations facilities at close to maximum capacity to evaluate 
potential releases from spent nuclear fuel management activi ties. DOE believes that the isotopes 
released during this period. and their emission rates. represent maximum emissions that cou ld occur 
under any of the alternatives (Table 5-7). The results of the analyses are presented in this section and 
Ihe human heallh consequences are discussed in Seclion 5.12. Seclion 5. 15 presenlS Ihe analysis of 
the consequences of accidents. 
Construction Emissions. Potential impacts to air quality from construction activities would 
include fugitive dust from the clearing of land. as well as exhaust emissions from support equipment 
(e.g .. eanh-rnoving vehicles. diesel generalOrs). The amounl of duSl produced would be proponional 
to the land area disturbed for the new facilities. all of which would be located near the center of tile 
Site. The areas affected by each alternative would be as follows: 
No Action· 0 acres 
Decenlralizalion. 1992/ 1993 Planning Basis and Regionalizalion A (by fuel Iype) - 610 
9 acres 
Regiona lizalion B (by localion) - 7 10 II acres 
Centrali zation· 70 to 100 acres 
Shipping fue l offsile - I ac re 
DOE anticipates that overall construction impacts to air quality wou ld be minimal and of a short 
~uration (6 months to 3 years). The SRS sitewide compliance with state and Federal ambient air 
quality ~tandards wou ld not be affected by any construction· re lated act ivi ties associated wi th spent fuel 
managemen" 
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Table 5-7. Estimated maximum annual emissions (in curies) of radionuclides to the atmosphere from 
spent nuclear fuel management ac tivities. 
Radionuclide Annual Emissions3 .b 
Trilium (elemenlal) 1.88x 10" 
Cesium-134 3.60xI0' 
Cesium-137 4.07x I0·) 
Curium-244 2.oox I 0·' 
Cerium-141 1.83xI0·) 
Cerium-l44 3.llxI0·2 
Americium-24I 2.27x104 
Coball-60 4.oox I 0" 
PlulOnium-238 1.28xI0·) 
Plulonium-239 4.0IxI0·' 
SIronlium-90 1.39x10·2 
Rubidium-103 7.25xlO·) 
Uranium-235 2.ooxlO·) 
Osmium-1 85 3.60x I 0" 
Nibium-95 2.89x I 0.2 
Selenium-75 1.52xlO·' 
Zirconium-95 1.68x 10·2 
Rubidium-106 5.12xI0·) 
KryplOn-85 6.80x 10' 
Carbon-14 2.80x1O' 
a. Source: Hamby (1993). 
b. Source lerms are laken from 1985/86 F-/H-Area releases. . 
I c. Historically. less than 10 percent of the atmospheric tritium releases have been from processmg 
I operations in the F·/H-Area Canyons. 
5.7.1 Alternative 1 - No Action 
The SRS would nOl process any spenl nuclear fu el under Ihe No AClion ailemalive. Normal sile 
baseline emissions wou ld conlinue (Tables 5-3. 5-4. 5-5. 5-6 and 5-7). DOE would nol conSlrucI any 
new faci lit ies under this alternative. 
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5.7.2 Alternative 2 - Decentralization 
Atmospheric emissions under two of the Decentralization options (dry storage and wet stoT<.Ige) 
would be similar to those for No Action . Those from the processing of the spent fue l (Option 2c) 
would be of somewhat higher concentrations (Tables 5-3. 5-4. 5-5. 5-6 and 5-7). The emissions would 
originate from existing facilities involved in the management of spent fuel under this alternative as 
well as new ones that DOE would construct (Figure 3-2). 
5.7.3 Alternative 3 - 199211993 Planning Basis 
Emissions to the atmosphere would be si milar to those for Alternative 2 because the amount of 
fue l managed would be similar [223 and 220 MTHM (246 and 243 tons). Alternative 3 and 
Alternative 2 respectively] and the faci lities requi red would be the same (Figure 3-2). 
5.7.4 Alternative 4 - Regionalization 
Regionalization A (by fue l type). Atmospheric emissions would be similar to the releases from 
Alternative 2 because of the similarity in volumes of fuel managed [2 t 3 and 220 MTHM (235 and 
243 tons). respectively] and in the faci lities involved (Figure 3-2). 
Regionalizalion B (by location). Emissions would be somewhat higher than for 
Regionalization A for both dry and wet storage opt ions if the SRS receives all the spent fuel in the 
eas;em panioo of the country. because the Site would manage about 20 percent more fue l. 
Atmospheric emiss ions from process ing would not change from those under other alternatives because 
the amount of aluminum-c lad fuel involved would be the same. Facility requirements would also be 
similar (Figure 3-2). 
Shipping all of the current SRS inventory off the Site (Option 4g) would result in the lowest 
emissions to the atmosphere of any of the options under this alternative. These releases would result 
from the characteri zation and canning of the fuel prior to shipment. 
5.7.5 Alternative 5 - Centralization 
The atmospheric emissions result ing from cent ralizing all the spent nuclear fue l at the SRS would 
be the greatest of a ll the alternatives. The Site would manage about 2.740 MTHM (3.020 tons) of 
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fuel. Releases from storage ac tivi ties for centralization would be proportionally higher than for the 
other a lternat ives where the SRS would manage about 206 to 257 MTHM (227 to 283 tons) of spent 
fuel. HO\\c\·cr. emissions from process ing under Alternative 5 wou ld be similar to those under the 
other alternatives because the same amount of aluminum-clad fuel would be processed in each case . 
The facilities required under all three options would be similar in function (Figure 3-2) but of much 
larger capac ity than for other alternatives. 
Shipping all the SRS fuel to another site (Option 5d) would result in the lowest level of 
atmospheric releases of any alternative. similar to those under Regionalization B. Option 4g. 
5.8 Water Quality and Related Consequences 
SRS use of surface-water and groundwater resources under any of the alternatives would not 
substant iall y increase thl.: volumes currently used for process. cooling. and domestic water on the Site. 
Table 5-8 summarizes the groundwater and surface water usage requirements for each alternative and 
option. and compares them to current SRS usages. 
The Centralization Alternati ve (Option 5c). under which DOE woutd transfer all spent nuclear 
fuel to the SRS. would result in the largest amount of water use [approximate ly 378.5 million liters 
(\00 million ga llons) per year]. which is a small amount compared to current SRS water requirements 
of approximalely 89.7 billion liters (23.7 billion gallons) per year. This represents an increase of 
approximately 0.4 percent above current usage. Therefore. DOE anticipates that water u e under any 
of the alternatives would have minimal impact on the water resources of the Site. 
The impact on water quality of the operation of any of the alternatives would also be minimal. 
t xisling SRS treatment fac ilities cou ld accommodate all new spent fuel-related domestic and process 
wastewater streams. The expected total SRS fl ow volumes would still be well within the design 
capacit ies of the Site treatment systems. Because these plants would continue to meet National 
Pollutant Discharge Eli mination System limits and reponing requirements. DOE expects no impact on 
the water quality of the receiving streams. The increased cooling water nows would also meet all 
discharge pennit limits and would have minimal impacts on the receiving water. 
Each of the alternati ves would contribute to the very small releases of radionuclides that nonnal 
SRS operations discharge to the surface water through federally permitted wastewater outfalls. 
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Table 5·8. Annual groundwater and surface water usage requirements for each ahernative .",·b 
Groundw~lIer Surface Water 
Altcmall\e Usage per Y car Usage per Year Total Annual 
Current SRS Usage 14.0 billion liters 75.7 billion liters 89.7 billion liters 
No ActIon 
Opllon 1 - WCI Storage 35.1 million liters None 35.1 mlllion liters 
DecentralIzation 
Option 2a - Dry Storage 48.1 million Illers 6. 1 million liters 54.8 million lilers 
Option 2b - Wei Storage 50.6 mllhon liters 7.2 million liters 57.8 mIlli on liters 
Option 2e - Proccssint ~8. 7 mIllion liters 310.8 million liters 359.5 million liters 
Planning Basis 
Option 3a . Dry Storage 48.7 million liters 6.1 million liters 54.8 million liters 
Option 3b . Wet Storage 50.6 million lilers 7.2 million liters 57.8 million liters 
OptIon 3c . Processin(' 48.7 million liters 310.8 million liters 359.5 million liters 
Regionaliz3tion - A 
Option ~a - Dry Storage 48.7 million liters 6.1 million liters 54.8 million liters 
Option 4b - Wet SlOrage 50.6 million liters 7.2 million liters 57.8 million liters 
Option -ok • Processingt ~7 .6 million liters 308.8 million liters 356.5 million lite rs 
Reglonalization - B 
Option 4d - Dry Storage 48.7 million liters 6.1 mill ion liters 54.8 milli on li ters 
Option -k - Wei Storage 50.6 million liters 7.2 million liters 57.8 million liters 
Option 4f - Processi ng' 48.7 million liters 310.8 million liters 356.5 million lilers 
OptIon ~g - ShIp Out' 38.1 million lilers 3.0 million liters 41 .1 milhon liters 
Centralization 
Ca~ Sa - Dry Storage 67.7 million liters 6.1 million liters 73.8 million liters 
Case 5b - Wet Storage 69.6 million liters 7.2 million liters 76.8 million liters 
Case 5c - Processing' 67.7 million liters 3 10.8 million liters 378.5 million liters 
Case 5d - Ship Out' 38.1 million liters 3.0 million lite rs 41 . 1 mil lion liters 
a. Source: WSRC (I994b). 
b. To conven liters 10 gallons. multiply by 0.264 18. 
c. First 10 years only. 
Table 5-9 summarizes the estimated maximum amounts of rad ioac!iv ity that could be released to the 
Savannah River in liquid effluents from nonnal spent nuclear fuel management activit ies. DOE used 
actual liquid releases from F- and H-Area during 1985 and 1986 to estimate potential releases that 
could occur during spent fuel management activities. DOE believes the isotopes and amounts released 
during this period are representative of releases that cou ld occur during processing under any of the 
alternatives. This is because 1985 and 1986 represent periods when the F- and H-Area separations 
facilities operated at or near peak capacity to process spent nuclear fuel. Estimated releases from wet 
or dry storage would be less than these amounts. Consequently. the estimated releases given in 
Table 5-9 represent the upper limit of liquid radiological releases that DOE expects as a result of spent 
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Table 5·9. Estimated maximum liquid radiological re leases (in curies) to the Savannah River from 
spent nuclear fuel management activities. 
Radionuclide Annual Release3 .b 
Tritium 
Strontium·90 
lodine- 129 
Cesium- I 37 
Plutonium-239 
I.3x 10'" 
2.4xI0·' 
2.2xI0·' 
I.l x lO·' 
7.0xI0·' 
I a. Source: Hamby ( 1993). 
I b. Source terms are taken from 1985/86 F-/H-Area re leases. 
I c. Less than I percent of this quantity was from processing operations in F-/H-Area. 
nuclear fue l management activities. The consequences to human health due to these releases are 
discussed in Sect ion 5.12. Occupational and Public Health and Safety . 
Construction of new facilities under any alternative would require amounts of water that would 
be only a very small percentage of the current daily water use at the SRS. Good engineering practice 
measures would prevent sediment runoff or spills of fuel or chemicals. Therefore. construction 
activities should have no impact on surface or groundwater quality at the Site. 
DOE a lso analyzed the potential impacts of accidents in F- and H-Areas on surface and 
groundwater quality . The analys is evaluated two types of accidental releases: one to the ground 
surface (e.g .. overflow of a wet storage pool) and another direct ly to the subsurface (e.g .. fa ilure of a 
pool li ner). Because pool water could contain some radionuclides. but would not contain any toxic or 
hannful chemicals. the following evaluation addresses only the consequences of radionuclide releases. 
A re lease of pool water onto the ground from the Receiving Basin for Offsite Fuels. in H-Area. 
would not fl ow directly into any stream or other surface-water body . The building is in a graded. 
gravel-covered area among other buildings and a longside a railroad spur and access road. A tank farm 
surrounded by an earthen berm is immediate ly to the south . A channelized drainage ditch begins 
approximately 244 meters (800 feet) west of the basin building and passes through culvens under a 
railroad line and Road E before emptying into a tributary of Fourmile Branch about 500 meters -
(1.650 feel) from the Receiving Basin . The grading at the Site would contain a small volume of water 
overflowing the basin in the immediate area of the bui lding. In the unlikely event that a larger spill 
reached the drainage d itch to the west. DOE could contain the water by blocking either of the two 
cu lvens through which the drainage di tch passes. Afte r conta ining the spilled water. DOE could 
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remove and properly dispose of it. DOE would design and construct new facilities containing storage 
pools in a manner that wou ld confine any overflow or other surface release of pool water. Therefore. 
DOE believes that there wi ll be no direct release 10 surface water from spills of pool water at an 
existing or potential facility. 
An overflow from a pool could reach the groundwater by slowly flowing downward from the 
surface through the unsaturated zone until it reached the water table. which is 9 to 15 meters (30 to 
50 feet) below the grade in the F- and H-Areas. Overtl'!w water would take several years to reach the 
water table. based on a vertical velocity of between 0.9 and 2. 1 meters (3 to 7 feet) per year (DOE 
1987). As discussed in the following paragraphs. once in the groundwater. a plume wou ld take many 
years to reach either of the closest sunace-water bodies, Fourmile Branch to the south or Upper Three 
Runs Creek to the north. 
DOE has calculated the travel times of groundwater in the F- and H-Areas based on specific 
information on the hydraulic conductivity, the hydraulic gradient. and the effective porosity of aquifers 
in th is area (WSRC 1993a) and on the use of Darcy's Law. Water would take between 16 and 500 
years to travel 1.6 kilometers ( I mile) toward Fourmile Branch or Upper Three Runs Creek. These 
estimates of travel time agree with values obtained from the results of DOE modeling studies 
performed on the F- and H-Areas (Geotrans 1993; appended to WSRC I 993a). The reason for this 
wide range of potential travel time is that the hydraulic conductivity of aquifer materials is highly 
variable and can vary in the same aquifer by several orders of magnitude. This slow movement 
through the subsunace. either vertically through the unsaturated zone or horizontally within the 
aquifer. would facilitate the removal of radionuclides from the spill plume through a number of 
processes. These include radioactive decay. trapping of particulates in the soil . and ion exchange and 
adsorption by the soil (Hem 1989). DOE believes that travel time of a contaminant plume through the 
subsurface in the F- or H-Area or in the adjacent representative host site would be such that no 
radionucl ides wou ld reach Fourmi le Branch . Upper Three Runs Creek. or any other surface-water body 
by this route. For the same reasons, no radioactive contaminants introduced into the subsurface in 
these areas wou ld move off the Site in groundwater. 
DOE does not believe that releases of radionuclides such as those described above would reach 
SRS drinking-water sources that lie in deep aquifers under the Site. These aquifers are several 
hundred feet below the ground surface. and a number of thick aquifers and aquitards separate them 
from the water lable aquifer (see Section 4.8). In addition to the distances and the presence of 
confining layers. vertical fl ow in the intervening stratified sedi mentary aquifers is slow in comparison 
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to horizontal flow. Radionuclide contamination of offsitc drinking water sources is even more 
unlikely given the depth of their source aquifers. the distances involved. and the attenuation of 
contaminants in the soils. as described above. 
DOE also evaluated a second kind of unintentional re lease in the F- or H-Area. a direct leak to 
the subsurface from a breach in a storage pool during routine operations. The analysis assumed a 
19-1iter (5-gallon)-per-day leak as a result of secondary containment or piping failure at a new state-of-
the-art wet storage and fuel transfer facility (Creed 1994). The analysis assumed further that the leak 
would go undetected for I month. a conservative assumption given the sensitivity of the leak detection 
equipment that these new facilities would require. The reliability and sensitivity of the leak. detect ion 
devices would be equal to or superior to those required by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
(NRC 1975) for spent nuclear fuel storage facilities in commercial nuclear power plants. DOE would 
require spent nuclear fuel storage pools (whether fuel unloading pools or storage basins) to have leak 
detection monitoring devices. pool water level monitors, and radiation monitors designed to alarm both 
locally and in a continuously staffed central location. Constant process monitoring, mass balance. and 
faci lity design (including double-walled containment of vessels and piping) would also be used by 
DOE to limit operational releases from new wet storage facilities. including fuel unloading pools and 
storage basins. to near zero. 
To provide a common basis for analysis of spent nuclear fuel alternatives at its various sites. 
DOE developed a generic infrastructure design for a hypothetical spent nuclear fuel complex (Hale 
1994). This design includes proposed criteria for temporary wet storage basins. fuel loading and 
unloading pools. and transfer canals. 
Based on the design criteria in Hale (1994). a leak from one of these basins if constructed in 
F- or H- Area could result in the introduction of radionuclide-contaminated water into the ground at 
depths as much as 13.4 meters (44 feet) below grade. Such a release would go direct ly 10 the water 
table aquifer or to the unsaturated zone above it . depending on the deplh of the waler table. In either 
case. the processes governing the slow plume movement (i.e .. the hydraulic conductivity. hydraulic 
gradient. and effective porosity of aquifers in the F- and H-Areas) and the processes resulting in the 
attenuation of contaminants and radionucl ides (i.e .. radioactive decay. trapping of particulates in the 
soil. ion exchange in the soi l. and adsorpt ion to soil part icles) described in the previous paragraph~ 
wou ld also prevent or mitigate impacts to surface-or groundwater resources from releases of this type. 
There could be localized contamination of groundwater in the surface aquifc:: r in the immediate vicinity 
of the storage faci lities. This aquifer is not used as a source of dri nking water. DOE believes that no 
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radionuclide contamination of deeper confined aquifers that are sources of onsite or offsite drinking 
water could occur from a release of this type. And. as noted earlier. these wet storage fac ilities wou ld 
be equipped with state-of-the-an leak detec tion devices. pool leve l monitors. and radiation monitors 
that would limi t and mitigate any subsurface releases. 
5.8.1 Alternative 1 • No Action 
5.8.1.1 Option 1 • Wet Storage. During operations under this alte rnat ive. current leve ls of 
water usage would not change. Nor wou ld t.:hanges occur in thennal discharges from cooling water or 
the quantity or quality of radioactive and nonradioactive wastewater effluents. 
The viable accidents under this alternative would be a release of pool water onto the ground 
surface or a breach of the liner of Ihe wei storage basins in which the spent nuclear fuel would be 
stored. As discussed above. radionuclides in the re leased water would enter the water table aquifer but 
would not reach any surface-water or any drinking water aquifer on or off the SRS. Basin water 
contains no toxic or hazardous chemicals. Therefore, accidental re leases from the basins would have 
minimal impacts on surface- and groundwater resources. 
Spills of chemicals would not reach surface- or groundwater due to exist ing proper engineering 
design and environmental controls. and to rapid containment and cleanup. 
5.8.2 Alternative 2 • Decentralization 
Operations under e ither the dry or wet storage option for the Decentralization alternative would 
increase Site water usage by less than 0 .1 percent above current levels. Processing would inc rease use 
by about 0.4 percent. Release of nonradioactive and radioactive materials to surface waters would 
increase only slightly and would be well within discharge permit limits and DOE dose limits. There 
wou ld be no releases to groundwater during nonnal operations. Overall impac ts to water quan tity and 
water quality would be minimal. 
Impacts to water resources due to accidental re leases onto the ground or imo the subsurface 
wou ld also be minimal as ex plained above . Potentia l contamination would be limited to the surface 
aquifer. 
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5.8.3 Alternative 3·199211993 Planning Basis 
DOE expects that the impacts to water resources under the dry storage. wet storage. and 
processing cases for this alte rnative would be similar to those described for Ihe same options under 
Altemativl! 2. Decentralization. Overall impacts would be minimal. 
5.8.4 Alternative 4 • Regionalization 
DOE expects that the impacls 10 water resources under Ihe three options for regionalization by 
fuel type (Regionalization A) would be similar to those described for the same options under 
Alternative 2, Decentralization. Regionalization B (by geographic location) would result in impacts 
somewhat greater than those for Alternative 2 because the SRS would have to manage an additional 37 
MTHM (4 1 tons) of spent fue\. In either case, overall impacts would be minimal. For Option 4g. 
shipping all SRS fuel to Oak Ridge Reservation. impacts to water resources would be the smallest of 
any a lternative. similar to those for Oplion 5d - Centralization. 
5.B.5 Alternative 5 • Centralization 
The first three options for th is alternative· dry storage (Option 5a), wet storage (Option 5b). and 
process ing (Option 5c) . assume that DOE would transfer all spent nuclear fuel to the SRS for 
management. The impacts of operations to water resources under Ihese options would be similar in 
nature to the impacts for the same options under Alternat ive 2. Decentralizarion. as described in 
Section 5.8.2. However. the extent of the impacts would be greater because the number and size of 
faci lities that DOE would construct and operate and the quantities of fuel it would manage would be 
larger than those for any othe r alternative. Even so. DOE expects the overall impacts of construction 
and operation 10 be minor. For example. the total volume of water that Ihe SRS would wi thdraw for 
construction. cooling. processing. and domestic use under any of these th ree options would not exceed 
approximately 378.5 mi ll ion liters (100 million gallons) per year. This requirement would be 
approximate ly 0 .4 percent of the 89.7 billion liters (23.7 billion gallons) that the SRS currently uses 
annually. 
Similarly. DOE believes that the overall impacts of accidents under any of these three options 
would be minor. even though the number and size of the fac ilities would be greater under this 
alternative than for any other. Radionuclides re leased during an accident would not affec t any 
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surface-warer or any drinking water aquifer. However. surface aquifer resources would receive 
contamination in the area of any release. 
For Option 5d (shipping the spent nuclear fuel off the Sitel. impacts to water resources would be 
smaller than those for any other alternative or option. DOE would have to build only one new facility 
(for fuel characterization) and the spent fue l would remain at SRS only for the first part of the 40-year 
managemenr period. Overall impac ts would be minimal 
5.9 Ecology 
DOE expects that construction impacts. which would include loss of some wildlife habitat due to 
land clearing. would be greatest under the Centralization Alternative. Dry Storage option. 
Represenrative impacts from operations would include disturbance and displacement of animals caused 
by movement and noise of personnel. equipment. and vehicles ; however. these impacts would be 
minor under all the proposed alternatives. Construction and operation would not disturb any critical or 
sensi tive habitat. nor would they affect any wetland areas. Releases of radionuclides to the 
environment from any of the proposed alternatives would be small and would not be expected to 
accumulate in aquatic or terrestrial ecosystems or measurably affect the health or viabi lity of plant and 
animal communities. 
5.9.1 AHernative 1 - No Action 
Under this alternat ive. DOE could refurbi sh or modify existing wet storage facilities and would 
confine any activity to these facilities. As a consequence. DOE expects no impacts to ecological 
resources. Impacts of operations under this alternative would be minimal. limiled to some minor 
disturbance of animals by vehicular traffic. 
5.9.2 AHernative 2 - Decentralization 
5.9.2.1 Option 2a - Dry Storage. This option would require some new construction. but any 
construction ac tivi ty would occur e ither within the boundaries of F- and H-Areas. which are a lready 
heavily developed. or adjacent to them. As a result . this construction would have linle or no impact 
on ecological resources. There would be no impacls to wet lands. threatened or endangered species. 
socially or commercia lly importan t species (such as the eastern wild turkey). or disturbance-sensi ti ve 
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species (such as wood warblers and v;reos). Impacts of operations under this option would be limited 
to some minor disturbance of animals by slight increases in vehicular Iraffic. No threatened. 
endangered. or candidate species occur in the area of operations. Species likely to be disturbed or 
ki lled by vehicles (e .g .. conon rat. ray squirrel . opossum. and white-tailed deer) are common to 
ubiquitous in the area. Overall impact to ecological resources would be minimal . 
5.9.2.2 Option 2b - Wet Storage. Construction impacts would be similar to those described 
for dry storage (Option 2a). impacts of operations under this option would also be similar to those 
described for dry storage (Option 2a). Overall impacts to ecological resources would be minimal. 
5.9.2.3 Option 2c - Processing and Storage. Construction and operations impacts for this 
option would also be similar to those for dry storage (Option 2a). Overall impacts would still be 
minimal. 
5.9.3 Alternative 3 - 199211993 Planning Basis 
Both construction and operational impacts for the three options under this alternative would be 
similar to those descri bed for Alternative 2 - Decentralization. Overall impacts would be minimal. 
5.9.4 Alternative 4 - Regionalization 
Under the Regionalization A alternative. impacts to ecological resources would be minimal as 
described for Ahemative 2. impacts due to the Regionalization B options would be somewhat greater 
due to the larger volume of spent fuel that the SRS would manage. Overall impacts would still be 
minimal. however. 
The smallest impacts would occur under Option 4g because DOE would ship all spent fuel off 
the Site. 
5.9.5 Alternative 5 - Centralization 
5.9.5.1 Option 5a - Dry Storage. The discussion that follows assumes that any facility 
development would take place in an area that does not conlain any pristine wetlands. old growth 
timber. threatened and endangered species. or designated critical habitat. More specifically. because 
the upland areas south and east of H-Area are dominated by planted pine (primarily loblolly and slash) 
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stands. the di scussion of impacts as umes that any facility development in support of pent nuclear 
fuel management would take place in an area of 5- to 40-year-old pines. Finally. the analysis assumes 
that any facility development would require a s ite-specific National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) 
review as required under 10 CFR Part 1021 and in accordance with the Council on Environmental 
Quality ' NEPA implementing regulations (CFR 199Ib). 
The proposed interim dry storage facility and support faciliti es, requiring approximately 
0 .28 square kilometer (70 acres) to 0 .4 square kilometer ( 100 acres) of land. would be built 
somewhere within the largely wooded roughly 2.8 square kilometer (700-acre) area south and ea t of 
H-Area west of F-Road, and north of Founnile Branch . Thi area has a number of advantages; among 
them: it would be relatively easy to connect with existing utilities (gas, water, sewer); it would 
minimize the amount of supporting infrastructure (e .g. , railroad spurs. access roads, and transmission 
lines) that would have to be built; and it would enable DOE to consolidate spent nuclear fuel 
management activities in an area that has been altered many times over the years by fanning (before 
1951) and timber management activities (after 1951 ). 
Construction activities would result in the clearing of as much as approximately 0.4 square 
kilometer (100 acres) of planted 5- to 40-year-old loblolly or slash pine for new facilitie~ on the 
undeveloped representative host site south and east of H-Area. This land clearing would involve a 
relatively small number of loggers and heavy equipment operator, but probably would drive most 
birds and larger, more mobile animals from the area. Some smaller, les mobile animal . such as 
turtles, toads, lizards, mice, and voles, probably would be killed . Aside from the loss of 0.28 to 
0 .4 square kilometer (70-100 acres) of planted pines that provide habitat for a limited number of 
reptiles, birds , and mammals, construction impacts would be minor. 
Any land clearing and timber harvesting conducted on the undeveloped host ite would be 
carefully planned and conducted according to widely accepted Best Management Practices to minimize 
erosion and soil loss and to prevent impacts to downgradient wetlands and streams. DOE and SRS 
policy is to achieve "no net 10 s" of wetlands. DOE has is ued a gu idance document. Information for 
Mitigation of Wetlands Impacts at the Savannah River Site (DOE 1992), for project planners that puts 
forth a practical approach to wetlands protection that begins with avoidance of impacts (if possible). 
moves to minimization of impacts (if avoidance is impossible). and requires compensatory mea ures 
(wetlands restoration, creation, enhancement, or acqui it ion) in the event that impact cannot be 
avoided. 
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In the event thJ t new facility deve lopment was required. DOE would perfonn predcvelopment 
surveys to ensure that its activi ties would not affect threatened and endan g.ered species or :.cnsiti ve 
habit::ns. To the extent prJcticable. land clearing and timbe r harvesting would be restricted to times of 
the year when songbirds and game bi rds we re not nesting or rear ing young. . In SOll th Carolina. Illost 
songbirds ne" . rear. and ncdgc young from March to September (Sprunt and Chamberl ain 1970). 
Quail. dove. and wi ld turkey in the region normally ncst and nedgc young during the spring and 
summer (Sprunt and Chamberlain 1970). 
No thre::nened or endangered phnts or anima ls are known to be present in the area unde r 
consideration for deve lopment. Construction ac tivi ties probably would not affect two small wetlands 
(Carolina bays) lying in the east-central portion of the undeve loped host site . ConstnIction ac tivi ties 
would not affec t plant and an imal di ve rsity locally or regionally. because the managed loblolly and 
slash pine stands th<!t would be removed are not unique. nor do they provide habitat for any protected. 
sensitive. unusual. or Federa lly listed plant or animal spec ies. 
Impacts of operations under this option would be similar to. but slightly greate r than. those 
described for Option 2a . Overall impacts to ecological resources would be minor. 
5.9.5.2 Option 5b • Wet Storage. Construction impacts under this option would be less than 
those described for Option Sa because less land area would be required for new faci lities. Impacts of 
operations under thi s case would be similar to those described for Opt ion ja. Overall impacts to 
ecological resources would be mi nor. 
5.9.5.3 Option 5c • Processing and Storage. Construction impacts unde r this case wou ld 
be similar to those desc ri bed for Option Sa. This case would require the largest number of workers of 
all the cases under consideration. It wou ld result in more nOise. more traffic. and a generally higher 
level of disturbance 10 terrestrial wild life (specifically reptiles. songbird; . and small and large 
mammals) accustomed to feeding. foraging. perching. hunting. nesting. or denning in the area. Some 
<lllImals would be driven from the a rea permanently. while others probably would become accustomed 
to the increased noise and ac tivity levels. and would return to the area. Overall impac ts to ecological 
re~ou rces would be minor. 
5.9.5.4 Option 5d· Shipment off the Site. Construction impacts unde r this case would be 
smaller than those for any othe r alternative. excluding Alte rnative I - No Action. Impacts of operation 
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undt.~ r Ih i ~ ca~e wou ld a lso be minimal. li mi ted to ..;ome minor di~turbances of animals by vehicular 
traffi c. Ovcrall impl.lc ts to ccologil.:a l resources wou ld be minima l. 
5.10 Noise 
As dcscribed in Section 4 .10. noi ~es gene rated on the SRS do not travel off the Site at levels that 
affect the general populat ion . The refore. SRS noise impacts for each a lternative wOJ,l ld be limited to 
noise resulting from the transportation of personne l and materials to and from the Site that cou ld affect 
nearby communi ties and from onsi le sources that could affec t some wi ldlife near these sources. DOE 
would address the effec ts of noise on wildli fe near spent nuc lear fuel management faci lities under any 
alternative in a projec t-specific NEPA evaluation. 
Transportat ion noises would be a function of the size of the workforce (i.e .. an increased 
workforce would produce increased employee traffic and corresponding increases in de live ries by truck 
and rail and a decreased workforce would produce decreased employee traffic and corresponding 
decreases in deli veries). The analysis of traffic noise took into account rail road noise and noise from 
the major roadways that provide access to Ihe SRS. DOE does not expect the number of freight trains 
per day in the region and th rough the Site to change as a result of any of the alte rnatives. although 
some trains could be dedicated to the transport of spent nuclear fuel. Ra il shipments of spent nuclear 
fue l. regardless of the alternative. would not substantially increase the rail traffic on the CSX line 
through the SRS . Therefore. vehicles used to transport employees and pe rsonnel on roadways would 
be the principal sources of community noise impacts. This analys is used the day-night average sound 
level (DNL) to assess community noise. as suggested by the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA 1974 : 1982) and the Federal Interagency Committee on Noise (FICON 1992). The anal ys is 
based its estimate of the change in day-night average sound leve l from the base line noise leve l for 
each alternative on the projected changes in employment and traffic levels. The base line levels are 
those for 1995 . The ana lys is also considered the combinat ion of construc tion and operat ion 
employment. The traffic noise ana lys is considered SC 125 and SC 19. both of which arc used to 
access the SRS . Changes in noise level be low 3 decibe ls wou ld not be likely to result in a change in 
community reaction (FICON 1992). 
DOE projects no ncw employme nt due to operat ions for any o f the altl.!rnati vcs. Some additiona l 
construction jobs may be required but overa ll SRS employment would not e.ceed the 1995 base line 
leve ls. e.cept for Alternati ves 5a. 5b. and 5c . The maximum Si te employme nt of about 20.000 jobs 
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would occur in 19~5 for all alternatives except 5a. 5b. and 5c for which the peak would occur in about 
2002 due to a peak in construct ion employment. The general decrease in employment after 1995 
could result in some decrea!'c in vehicle trips to and from the Site. There wou ld be at most a few 
truck trips per day to and from the Site carrying spent nuclear fuel under any of the alternatives. This 
increase in truck trips would not result in a perceptible increase in traffic noise levels aiong the routes 
to the SRS. The day-night average sound level along SC 125 and SC 19 and other access routes 
would probabl y decrease slightly except in the peak construction years under Alternatives 5a. 5b. and 
5c . as a result of the overall decrease in employment leve ls at the SRS after 1995. DOE expects no 
change in the community reaction to noise along these routes. Consequently. no mitigation efforts are 
necessary . 
5.11 Traffic and Transportation 
This section discusses the consequences of both the onsile transportation of spent nuclear fuel 
and the increased traffic patterns due to construction activi ties at the SRS. Traffic due to operations of 
spent nuclear fuel faci lities will remain at or below current Site levels because workers for the new 
acti \ ,lies will be drawn from the existing SRS workforce. The consequences of the transportation of 
spent fuel between the SRS and other DOE sites are described in Appendix I of Volume I of this 
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS). 
5.1 1.1 Traffic 
Traffic impacts would be bound by Alternative 5b (Centralization - Wet Storage) which would 
result in the greatest number of additional construct ion workers (and vehicles) onsite. Level of 
service. a measure of traffic now. was estimated for each road to and from the SRS. Traffic delays 
could be experienced at SC 19 and SC 230 intersections during peak hours. However, the number of 
construction vehicles in support of spent nuclear fuel construction act ivities would contribute less than 
17 percent (HNUS 1994) to the total traffic now. Therefore. the change in level of service due to 
Alternati ve 5b would be minimal. 
5.11 .2 Transportation 
This section di scus~es the potential radiological consequences due to incident free transportat ion 
and accidents during transport . All SRS onsite shipments are carried out by rail. 
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5.11.2.1 Onsite Spent Nuclear Fuel Shipments. DOE based the number of fuel 
shipments on the amount and type of spent nuclear fue l stored at various SRS locations and the final 
storage locat ion or disposition spec ified in the spent nuclear fuel alternati ves. The number of 
shipments from each location was determined by di viding the amount of spent nuclear fuel at each 
location by the capac ity of the shi pping cask. Individual shipments from the various facilities were 
summed to obtain the total number of shipments for each alternative (HNUS 1994). 
Onsile shipments are those that originate and terminate at the SRS. Movements of spent nuclear 
fuel within functional areas (e.g .. H-Area or F-Area) are operat ional trdnsfers, not onsite shipments; 
therefore. this analysis does not consider them. 
5.11.2.2 Incident-Free Transportation Analysis. Under each alternative. DOE analyzed 
incident-free (normal transport) radiological impacts to transport vehicle crews and members of the 
general public from onsite rai l shipments. The analysis calculated occupational radiation doses to the 
transport vehicle crew members (four locomoti ve operators). Because the general public does not have 
immediate access to areas where the SRS would transport spent nuclear fuel, the analysis assumed that 
any general public dose is to escorted individuals on the Site wai ting at any of several train crossings 
at the time a fuel shipment passed. The analysis calculatcd radiological doses to the general public 
using the RISKI ND (Yuan et al. 1993) computer code. The results are presented in Table 5-10. 
The magnitude of incident-free consequence depends on the dose rate on the external surface of 
the transport vehicle. the exposure time, and the number of people exposed. For each receptor. the 
analysis assumed the external dose rate 2 meters (6.6 feet) from the shipping cask was 100 millirem 
per hour (HNUS 1994). which is the SRS procedurally-allowed maximum dose rate during onsite fue l 
shipments. Actual receptor dose rates would depend on receptor distance from the shipping c.,k 
[5 meters (16.4 feet) for the general public]. The duration of exposure would depend on the transport 
vehicle speed and the number of shipments. In addi tion. occupational ex posure time would depend on 
the distance of each shipment. 
The analysis calculated health effects measured as the number of latent cancer fatal ities (LCF, ) 
by multiplying the resultant occupational and general public doses by risk factors of 4 x 10" and 
5 x 10" latent cancer fatalities per person-rem (DOE 1993a). respectively. 
Table 5- 10 summarizes the collec ti ve doses (person-rem) and health effects (latent cancer 
fataliti es) associated with the incident-free onsite shipment of spent nuclear fuel at the SRS. Collective 
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Table S-IO_ Collective doses and health effects for onsile . incident-free spent nuclear fue l sh 'llenls 
by alt~m:.Ilin~. 
Number of LCFs:l 
Occupational General Public 
Opt ion (person-rem) (person-rem) Occupational General Public 
No Action 
Option Ib -Wet Storage 1.5x 10° 1.4x10·' 6 .0xI0·' 7.0xI0·' 
Decentralization 
Option 2a - Dry Storage 2.5x Ia" 2.3x 10" 1.0x I0·" 1.2x I0·' 
Option 2b - Wet Storage 2.5x 1Oo 2.3xI0·' 1.0x I0·) 1.2x I0·' 
Option 2c - Processing 5.3x I0·' 3.7x I0·' 2. lx I0·' 1.9xI0·' 
Planning Basis 
2.3x 10" 1.0x I0·) 1.2xI0·' Option 3a - Dry Storage 2.5xlOo 
Option 3b - Wet Storage 2.5x 10° 2.3x I0·' 1.0xI0·) 1.2xI0·' 
Option 3c - Processing 5.3x I0·' 3.7x I0·' 2. lxI0·' 1.9x I0·' 
Regionalization 
2.5x 10° 2.3x I0·' 1.0xlO·) 1.2x I0·' Option 4a - Dry Storage 
Option 4b - Wet Storage 2.5x1Oo 2.3x I0·' 1.0xI0·) 1.2xI0·' 
Option 4c - Processing 5.3x I0·' 3.7x 10·' 2.lxI0·' 1.9xI 0·' 
Option 4d - Dry Storage 2.5x 1Oo 2.3x I0·' 1.0xI0·) I.2x I 0" 
Option 4e - Wet Storage 2.5x la" 2.1x I0·' 1.0xlO·) 1.2x I0·' 
Option 4f - Processing 5.3xlO·' 3.7x1O·' 2. l x I0·' 1.9x I0·' 
Option 4g - Ship Out NAb NAb NAb NAb 
Centralization 
Opti0n 5a - Dry Storage 2.5x 10° 2.3x I0·' 1.0xI0·) 1.2xI0·' 
Option 5b - Wet Storage 2.5x 10° 2.3x I0·' 1.0xI0·) 1.2xI0·· 
Option 5c - Processing 5.3x I0·' 3.7xlO·' 2.l x I0·' 1.9x I0·' 
Option 5d - Ship Out NAb NAb NAb NAb 
a. LCF = latent cancer fatality . 
b. NA = not applicable. 
doses and latent cancer fatalities for members of the public would be approximately a factor of 10 less 
than those for the occupational worker. The data indicate that the lowest collective doses and lowest 
latent cancer fatality would be associated wi th the Processing option under the Decentralization. 
Planning ba~ i ~. Regior.a li zatiOil. and Centralization alternatives. 
5.11.2.3 Transportation Accident Analysis. DOE analyzed radiological impacts from 
potential accidents to both the onsite maxi mally exposed individual (MEl). and offsite members of the 
general public from onsite rail shipments . The analysis calculated doses using the RISK tND (Yuan 
et al. 1993) compuler code wllh site-specific meteorology. demograph ics. and spent fuel activity. Risk 
was calculated using site-specific rail accident rates and accident probabili ties (HNUS 1994). 
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The magnitude of accident consequence wou ld depend on Ihe amount of radioacti ve material to 
which the ind ividual( s) was exposed. the exposure time. and the number of people exposed. The 
analysis assumed that the maximum reasonably foreseeable amount of radioact ive material for (he type 
of spent fuel shi pped on the SRS was released (HNUS 1994). The assumed duration of exposure for 
each receptor was 2 hours. The assumed maximally exposed individual was an SRS worker 
downwind of the accident at distances of 50 and 100 meters ( 164 and 330 feet). 
The analysis calculated offsite exposure using both rural and suburban popUlation density-spec ific 
census data. The rural and suburban population densities have an average of 6 persons per square 
ki lometer and 244 persons per square kilometer. respecti vely. The west-nonhwest sector has the 
highest population density within ao kilometers (50 miles) of the SRS. 
The analysis used si te-specific meteorology at the 50th and 95th percentile to determine dose 
consequences. Joint probability includes both the event frequency and the probability of the maximum 
reasonably foreseeable type of accident occurring. 
The analysis calculated health effec ts measured as the number of latent cancer fatalities by 
multiplying the resultant occupational and general public doses by the risk factors of 4 x 10" and 
5 x 10" latent cancer fatalities per person-rem (DOE 1993a). respectively. Risk was calculated by 
multiplying the resultant doses by the joint probability of I x 10" (HNUS 1994). 
Tables 5- 11 and 5- 12 summarize the collective doses and associated latent cancer fatalities for 
postulated onsile rail accidents wi th subsequent releases of radioactive material to the environment. 
The dose consequences of an accidental release of rad ioactive material was assessed for the 95th and 
typical 50th percentile meteorological conditions ( i.e .. those that would result in lower doses 95 and 50 
percent of the time. respectively). In a ll cases the estimated number of latent cancer fatalities would 
be low. 
5.11.3 Onsile Miligalion and Prevenlalive Measures 
All onsile shipments must be in compliance with DOE Savannah River Directive Implementation 
Instruct ion 5480.3. "Safety Requirements for the Packag ing and Transponation of Hazardous Mater ials. 
Hazardous Substances. and Hazardous Wastes." DOE. DOE-SR. or the Nuclear Regulalory 
Commission (NRC) must approve packages used for onsite shipments wi th a cenificale of 
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Table S- J 1. Impac ts on maximally exposed individual from spent nuclear fuel transponation accident 
on the Sav:mnah River Sitt! . 
Distanct! Dose to Number of 
Dose Percentile (meters) MEI'( rem) LCF,' per year Risk 
50 percent 100 0.16 6.4, I 0" 1.6x 10·' 
95 percent 50 0.37 l .5xIO·' 3.7x I0·' 
a. MEl = maximally exposed indi vidual. 
b. LCF = latent cancer fa tality. 
Table 5-12. Impacts on offsite population from spent nuclear fuel transportation accident on the 
Savannah River Site. 
Population Dose Offsite Population Number of LCFs' 
Densi ty Category Percentile Dose (person-rem) per year Ri sk 
Rural 50th 1.7 8.7xlO"' 1.7x 1O·' 
Rural 95th 7.1 3.6xI0·' 3.6x1O·' 
Suburban 50th 5.2 2.6xI0·' 2.6xI0·' 
Suburban 95th 2 1.3 1.1 x 10" 1.1 x 10" 
a. LCF = latent cancer fatali ty. 
compliance. If DOE or NRC has not certified an onsi te package as Type B. the shipper must establish 
administrative controls and site-mitigating circumstances that will ensure package integrity. The 
admini strative and emergency response considerations must provide sufficient control so that accidents 
would not result in loss of containment. shielding. or criticality ; or the uncontrolled release of 
radioactive material would not crea!e a hazard to the health and safety of the public or workers. 
In the event of an accident. SRS has established an emergency management program. This 
program incorporates activities associated with emergency planning. preparedness. and response . 
5.12 Occupational and Public Health and Safety 
5.12.1 Radiological Health 
This human health effect s analysis relied principally on data on F- and H-Area emissions 
documented for the 1985. 1986. and 1993 operating years (Marter 1986: 1987: WSRC 1994d). During 
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the 1985-1986 period. F- and H-Areas processing facilities operated at high capacity : DOE believes. 
therefore. that these emissions represent conservative estimates as to the emissions that could resu lt 
from spent nuclear fuel management activities al the SRS . This air and surface-water emissions 
information defined the source terms for the baseline evaluation (No Action alternati ve) of health 
effects discussed in this section. To estimate health effects. this analysis defined six human receptor 
groups: 
The F- and H-Area workers assigned to F- and H-Area operations involving nuclear 
materials 
The F- and H-Area workers assigned to the Receiving Basin for Offsite Fuels for storage 
operations 
The maximally exposed individual residing at the SRS boundary 
The projected 1994 offsite population of 628,200 persons residing within an 80-kilometer 
(50-mile) rad ius of F- and H-Areas 
The maximally exposed individual potentially affected by SRS surface-water emissions 
The approximate offsite population of 65.000 persons whom SRS surface-water emissions 
could affect. 
With :he exception of the worker group. this analysis calculated exposures for the remaining four 
receptor groups using the baseltne source terms as input data to automated atmospheric and surface-
water transport. human intake, and human dosimetry models configured for routine use at SRS 
(Hamby 1994). The analys is estimated worker exposures usi ' g averaged dosimetry data recorded for 
F- and H-Area workers from 1983 th rough 1987 and Receiving Basin for Offsite Fuels workers for 
1993 (Matheny 1994), corrected for an assumed occupancy factor of 0 .25 (i.e., a worker could be 
potentially exposed during one-quarter of his/her shift ). This correction was app lied 10 the 19R3- 1987 
data only. At the SRS. the waterborne exposure pathway do"s not exist for the worker receptor group 
because Site dri nking water is drawn from deep aquifers unaffected by any radiological re leases. 
The analysis developed incremental receptor group exposure estimates (millirem per year. person-
rem per year: effec ti ve dose equivalent) based on spent fuel quantities fo r each of the nonbase line 
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alte rnatives (i .e .. Alternatives 2 through 5) and the ir options by applying calculated ratios of metric 
Ions of heavy mel<.l l (MTHM ) for each alternat ive and option compared to the No Action alternative. 
DOE used these ratios as incremental scaling factors to estimate exposures under each option. The 
calculation of the MTHM ratios used the data presented in Table 3- 1. Table 5- 13 lists the results of 
the exposure estimate calcu lations. Since these incremental exposures include contributions to the 
effective dose equivalent from existing (No Action) spent fue l management at the SRS. the change in 
health effects for each alternative can be esti mated as the difference between the alternatives presented . 
The analys is calculated the potential health effects expressed in the exposed receptor groups 
consistent with ri sk dete rmination guidance issued by the DOE Office of NEPA Ovcrsight (DOE 
1993a) and International Commission on Radiological Protection Publication 60 ((CRP 1991). For 
exposed individual s and populations. the potential health effect (detriment) of interest is latent fata l 
cancer. For exposed individuals. this analysis presents Ihe health effect as Ihe maximu m incremental 
probabi lity for detriment expression; for exposed populations. it presents the annual incremental 
detriment incidence. For completeness. it also provides the "project life" (i.e .. 40 years) detriment 
incidence as the annual incidence multiplied by 40. Table 5-14 (worker) and Table 5- 15 (maximally 
exposed individual and offsite population) summarize the health effects calculations. 
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention is conducting a comprehensive reconstruction of 
historic offsite doses associated with SRS operations. The results of this investigation are not yet 
availab le. 
5.12.2 Nonradiological Health 
DOE used the operations air quality data listed in Tables 5-3. 5-4. 5-5 and 5-6 (and Table 8 of 
WSRC 1994a) to evaluate health impacts associated with potential exposure to the following two 
compound c lasses: c riteria pollutants and toxic pollutants. The analys is evaluated two hypothetical 
receptor locations: ( I ) a worker in S-Area and (2) a maximally exposed individual at the SRS 
boundary . However. it was unnecessary to postulate an intake of criteria pollutant or tox ic compounds 
by these receptors because a irborne concentration standards are available for these compounds. 
Tables 5-3 and 5-4 list 8 criteria po llutants and 23 toxic compounds. The toxic compounds were 
classifi ed as carcinogens and noncarcinogens consistent with Environmental Protection Agency 
carci nogenicity group (weight of evidence) designations published in the Integrated Risk Information 
VOLL' ~tE t. APPENDIX C 5-40 
Table 5-13. Incremental radioactive contaminant annual exposure summary. 
Orrsitc 
Population~·oJ 
MEIOrrsitc"'" (person-rem! 
Onsite Workers~ (mrcm!ycar) year 
(pcrson-
(mreml rem! 
Alternati ve year)' year) Air Water Air Water 
No Act ion - Wet Storage COption I ) 100 0.2 9xlO" 3xlO" 4xI0·" 6. 10" 
Decentralization - Dry Storage 83 0.2 8. 10" 2x10" 3xlO" 5x I0" 
(Option 23) 
Decentrali zation - Wet Storage 104 0.2 9x10" 3x I0" 4x I0·" 6. 10" 
(Option 2b) 
Decentrali zation - Processing 145 70 0.4 0.1 14 2.2 
<Option 2c) 
Planning Basis - Dry Storage 8~ 0.2 8xlO" 2x10·R 3xlO" 5xlO" 
(Option 3a) 
Planning Bas is - Wet Storage 105 0.2 IxlO-7 3x 10" -!:<I0·" 6xlO" 
(Option 3b) 
Planning Bas is - Processing 147 71 0.4 0.1 15 2.2 
(Option 3e) 
Regionalization A - Dry Storage 83 0.2 8xlO ' 2x 10" 3x I0" 5xI0" 
(Option 43) 
Regionali zation A - Wet Storage 103 0.2 9xlO" 3x10' 4x I0-" 6.10" 
(Option 4b) 
Regionalization A - Processing 148 76 0.4 0.1 16 2.4 
(Opt ion 4e) 
Regionalization B - Dry Storage 105 0.2 IxlO-1 3x 10" 4x I0" 6x I0" 
(Option 4d) 
Regionalization B - Wet Storage 131 0.3 I xlO-' 4xlO" 5x I0" 7x 10" 
(Opt ion 4c) 
Rcgionali zation B - Processing 175 74 0.4 0.1 15 2.3 
(Opt ion 41) 
Regionalizalion B - Ship OUI <100 <0.2 <9xlO·J <3:dO·M <4x I0-" <6x. 10-7 
(Option 4g) 
Centralization - Dry Storage 1.102 2.2 1;( 10-" 3x I0" 4xI0" 6x10 ' 
(Option 5a) 
Centralization - Wet Storage 1.377 2.8 Ix 10-" 4;(10-7 5x 10" 8x10 ' 
(Option 5b) 
Centralization - Processing (Option 5c) 1.422 79 0.4 0.1 t6 2 . ~ 
Centralizat ion - Ship Out (Option 5d) <100 <0.2 <9x 1 0- ~ <3x 10' <4x. 10-" <6x. 10·1 
a. Insignificant digi ts are displayed for comparison purposes only. 
b. MEl = max imally exposed indi vidua l. 
c . The DOE administrative dose limit is 2.000 mrem (DOE I 994a). 
d . Data is provided separately for the air and water exposure pathways because the receptors are not 
co- located . 
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Table 5-14. Incremenlal fatal cancer incidence and maximum probabil ity for workers. 
Annual ~O·Ycar ~ t a,'lmum 
t\llcmali\'c Incidcncc' Incidenl.'c Prohabihl), 
:'\(1 AcHon • Wei SIOr.lgc (Oplion I ) 8, 10'" 3, 10'" .hlO·' 
Dcccniraliz:mon . Dry SlOragc (Option 13) 7:<10" 1,10" .1 .'10'" 
IXl'C nlr3iJ1J.tlOn • WCI Sioragc IOpllo n 2h) 8'( 10" h lO" .1,\ 10" 
DcccnIr3liz,:ulOn • Proccssing (Option :!c) h lO" 6,\10" 
Planning Basis · Dry SlOragc (Oplion 3al 7., 10" 3,10" 3, 10" 
Pl anning Basis · WCI Storagc (Opti on 3b) 8, 10" 3,10" ~xIO" 
Planning BasIs, Proccs ing (Oplion 3c) 3, 10'" I 6xI0'~ 
RcglOnal ization A • Dry Slor.lgc (Oplion ~a) 7x I0'! 3x I0" 3, 10'" 
Rcglonalizal ion A - Wei SlOragc (O ption ~b) 8x I 0' ~ 3,10' 4xI0'! 
RcglOnalizat ion A - Processing (Option ok) 3, 10'" 6x I0" 
Reglonalizat ion B • Dry Siorage (Oplion ~d) 8x I0" 3,10" ~, I O'" 
Regionalizat ion B - WCI Siorage (Oplion ok ) Ix IO'" 4,10" 5xlO" 
ReglOnali13tion B • Processi ng (Option .1f) 3, 10'" I 7x I0" 
Regionalization B • Ship Out (Option 48) <8xI0" <3xIO" <"'x 10" 
Cenlralizalion . Dry Siorage (Oplion 5a) 9,\ 10'" 4xI0': 4x I 0'" 
Cenlrali zallon - Wei Storage (Option 5b) h i D') ",xI O' ~ 5x I 0..1 
Cenlralizalion - Processi ng (Oplion 5c) 3, 10'" I 6x lO..l 
Cenlralizalion - Ship Qui (Option 5d) <8x I0" <3x IO') <",x 10" 
a. Number of latent falal cancers over a lifetime which could be attributed to one year of spent 
nuclear fuel management activities. 
SySlem (I RIS) dala base (DOE 1994b). For purposes of heallh effects analysis. carcinogens are Ihose 
compounds designaled Group A (human carcinogens). Group 8 I (probable human carcinogen. Iimiled 
evidence in human studies). Group 82 (probable human carcinogen. inadequate evidence or no data 
from human sludies). and Group C (possible human carcinogen). Using this designalion. Ihree of Ihe 
23 lox ic compounds are carcinogens: benzene (Group A). formaldehyde (Group 8 I). and melhylene 
chloride (Group 82). 
Carcinogen health effects are expressed as the incremental probability of an individual 
developing cancer. assuming a lifelime (70 years) of exposure 10 Ihe carcinogn. DOE used cancer 
ri sk (s lope) faclors published in IRIS (Integraled Risk Information System) to obtain unit ri sk faclors 
(risk per concentration) needed to calculate incremental probability. Carcinogens with insufficient (i.e .. 
incomplete or unava ilable carcinogen assessment dala) informalion listed in the Integraled Risk 
fnfonnalion System data base precluded a quant itat ive risk assessment; this analysis evaluated them as 
noncarcinogens, 
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Table S-IS. Incremenlal falal cancer incidence and maximum probability for the maximally exposed 
indi vidual and offsile populalion (ai r and waler pathways). 
Population Population MEl 
Annual 40-Ycar Maximum 
Itemati vc Incidence~ Inc idence Probabi I ity 
No Action - Wc t ~ tora~ (Opl ion I ) 
Air h IO'" 7x 10" 4x 10·1J 
Water 3x lO.JU 1, 10" Ix IO· I~ 
Dccentralization • Dry S torage (Option 2a) 
Air 2x lO" 6x10" 4x IO" ~ 
Water 2x10·\II 9x 10" Ix IO" ~ 
Decentrali zati on - Wet Storage (Option 2b) 
Ai r 2,10" 8,10" 5x IO" ~ 
Waler 3xlO' lO IxlO" 2xI0·1 .. 
Decentra lization - Processing (Option 2c) 
Air 7,10" 0 .3 2xlO" 
Water 1,10" 4xI0" 6x10" 
Planning B::as is - Dry Sto r::age (Option 3a) 
Air 2xI0" 6x10" 4xlO· l .. 
Water 2xlO"u 9,10" I x I O· I ~ 
Planning Basis · Wet Storage (Option 3b) 
Air 2xlO" 8, 10" 5x IO" ~ 
Watcr 3xlO'10 Ix IO" 2x I0"" 
Planning Bas is - Process ing (Option 3c) 
Air 7,10" 0.3 2x I0" 
Water Ix IO" 4, 10': 6x 10" 
Regionali zat ion A . Dry Sto rage (Option 4a) 
Air 2, 10" 6.10" 4xlO"" 
Water 2x 10' 10 9, 10" Ix 10.1" 
Regionali z3tion A - Wct Storage (Option 4b) 
Ai r 2.10" 8.10" 5x IO" ~ 
Water 3x 10,HI Ix IO" 2xlO' lJ 
Regionali zati on A - Processing (Option 4c) 
Air 8.10" 0 .3 2, 10" 
Watcr Ix 10" 5. 10': 6,10" 
Rcgionali zalion B - Dry Storage (Option 4d) 
Air 2xI0" 8. 10" 5x IO" ~ 
Walcr 3x 10.111 1. 10" 2x lO" " 
Regionali zati on B - Wct Storage (Option 4e) 
Air 2xI0'" Ix 10" 6x JO. I~ 
Water 4xlO' lO 1. 10" 2xlO·I" 
Regionalizat ion B - Processing (Option 4f) 
Air 8. 10" 0.3 2x 10" 
Water 1, 10" 5.10" 6. 10" 
Rcgionalization B - Ship Out (Option 4g) 
Ai r <2x 10 " <7x 10.11 <4xlO' u 
Watc r <3x lO'w < l xlO" < Ix IO·IJ 
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Table 5-15. (continued). 
Population Population MEl 
Annual oW-Year MJ;(imunl 
Alternat ive Incidem:e Incidence Prohability 
Centralization .. Dry Storage (Opt ion Sa) 
Air hlO ' 8xl0 5x 10 I.' 
Water 3:<. 10 " Ix 10·' 2:< 10 II 
CcnIT::. li z:nion .. Wet Storage (Option 5h ) 
Air 3:dO'~ Ix 10 " 6x10·1.1 
Water 4x 10·· 2:<10.7 2:< 10' 1.1 
Centralization .. Processing (Oplion 5c) 
Air 8xI0·' 0.3 2:<.10'7 
\Valer IxlO,l 5xI0·: 6x 10·' 
Centralization .. Shin Out (Option 5d) 
Air <2xI0''1 <7x IO'~ <4x to ' l~ 
Waler <3:< 10-111 < 1",10,11 < l x lOd J 
a. Number of latent fatal cancers over a lifet ime that could be attributed to one year of spent nuclear fucl 
management acti\'i ti es . 
This analysis evaluated noncarcinogenic and priority pollutant compound health effects by adding 
hazard quotients to obtain a hazard index. The hazard quotient is the ratio of compound concentration 
or dose to a Reference Concentration (RfC) or Dose (RID) (EPA 1989). The regulatory standard used 
in this anal ysis was the more stringent of the followin g: (I) Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration (OSHA) 8-hour pennissible exposure limit (PEL). (2) American Conference of 
Governmental Industrial Hygienists (ACG IH) threshold limit value (TL V). or (3) State of South 
Carolina ai r quality standards. The use of the noncancer hazard index assumed a level of exposure 
(i.e .. RfC ) below which adverse health effects are unlike ly. The hazard index is not a stati stical 
probability: ther ... fore it cannot be interpreted as such. 
Table 5- 16 summarizes nonradiological health effects attributable to atmospheric emissions of 
tox ic and criteria pollutant compounds. Because no hazard index value would exceed unity ( 1.0). 
adverse health effects are unlikely under any alternative . 
5.12.3 Induslrial Safely 
This section describes the following measures of impact for workplace hazards: (I) total 
reportable injuries and illnesses and (2) fatalities in the work force . This analysis conside rs 
injury/illness and fata lity inc idence rates for construction workers separately because of the re lative ly 
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Table 5-16. Nonradiological annual inc rementa l health effects summary . 
Worker Cancer Worker Ha7ard MEl Cancer 
Al!cma(l\c Prohabllity' Indt.!:< ProbJblliI Y4.~ MEl Hala rd Indc.' 
Nu ~\(l lOn . Wl'( Storage lnsuffit.:icnl data 1;(10'" Insufficient data h lO' 
IOPIIOr: I ) 
Dcn~nlrJhzatlon . Of)' Storage lnsuffidcnI data 2:.. I O-~ Insufficlcnt data hiO' 
,OptIOn 2a) 
Decentralization - Wet 510ragc Insuffi cient d::.Ia 2x10 ~ Insufficicnt data 2'(10 1 
(Option 2b ) 
De,,:cntrahzation . Processing In sufficient data 6x10·' Insufficient data 5 :dO·~ 
(Option 2c) 
Planning Basis· Dry Storagc Insufficient data 2;.; 1 0·~ In sufficient data h10·1 
(Option 3a) 
Planning Basis · Wei Storage Insufficient data 2:c.l0·~ Insuffic ient data 2;.; 10.1 
(Option 3b) 
Planning Basis · Processing Insufficient data 6;.;10·' Insufficient data 5;.; 10'" 
(Option 3c) 
Rcgional ization A . Dry Insufficient data hiO' Insufficient data 2x10·1 
Storage (Option ~a) 
Regional ization A . Wet Insufficient data hIO-" Insufficient data 2xlO·1 
Storage (Option ~b) 
Regio nalization A . Processing Insufficient data 6xIO·} Insufficient data 5x 10'" 
(Opt ion -Ie) 
Regionaiization B . Dry Insufficie nt data hl0'" Insufficient data h IO" 
Storage (Option 4<1) 
Regionali zati on B . Wei Insufficient data 2x10'" In sufficient data hlO" 
SlOrage (Option 4c) 
Regionalization B . Processing. Insufficient data 8x10·' Insufficient d:na 6x 10'" 
(Option ~I) 
Regionalization 8 - Ship 0 ... In sufficient data 2x 10'" Insufficient data 2x 10·I 
(Option 4g) 
Cent ral ization· Dry Storage Insufficient data hIO·" Insufficie nt data h10·1 
(Option 5a) 
Centrali zation · Wet Storage Insufficient data hIO'" Insufficient data hiO ' 
(Option 5b) 
Centralization· Processing Insufficient data 6x10·' Insuffi cient data 5x 1 0'" 
(Oplion 5c ) 
Centralization· Ship Out Insufficient dat a hlO'" Insufficient data hl0 
(Option 5d) 
a. Insufficienl data exi sts in the IRIS data base to perform a quantitati ve inhal3tion cancer risk assessment . 
b. ME l = maximall y exposed individual. 
mort! hazardous nature of construction work. Table 5-17 lists the incidence of injuries/ illnesses and 
fatalities for construction and non-const ruc tion workers. These data are for the highest employment 
year (i .e .. maximum hours worked in any year from 1994 through 2035. assuming 2.000 hours per 
worker) (WSRC 1994b) . Th is analysis used the average occupational injury/illness and fa tality 
incidence rates experienced by DOE and its controctors from 1988 th rough 1992 to calcu h t< the 
incidence of industrial hazards listed in Table 5- 17 (DOE 1993b). 
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Table 5-17. Incremental industrial hazard maximum annual incidence summary. 
Con!ilruclion Nonconslruclion 
Injuries and Construction Injurie<; :-I"d Nonconstruclion 
Allcmali,·c Illnesses Fatalities Illnesses Fatalities 
No Action - Wet Slora!!c 92 < I 159 <I 
(Opllon I ) 
Dcccnlrali z:Uion • Dry Storage 71 <I 159 < I 
(Option 13) 
Decentralization - Wei Storage 71 <I 159 <I 
(Option 2b) 
DcccnlralizJlion . Processing 66 <I 159 <I 
(Option 2c) 
Plan ning Basis · Dry Storage 71 <I 159 <I 
(Option 3a) 
Planning Basis· Wet Storage 82 <I 159 <I 
(Option 3b ) 
Planning Basis· Processing 66 <I 159 <I 
(Option Jc) 
Rcgionalizalion A - Dry 82 <I 159 <I 
Storage (Option 43) 
Rcgionaliz31ion A - Wet 82 < I 159 <I 
Storage (Option 4bJ 
Rcgionali zation A - Processi ng 66 <I 159 <I 
(Option 4c) 
Regionaliz3tion B • Dry 89 <I 199 <I 
Storage (Option 4(1 ) 
Regional ization B . Wet 102 < I 199 <I 
Storage (Option 4<:) 
Rcgionaliz;uion B . Processing 82 <I 199 <I 
(Option 40 
Regionalization B • Ship Out 22 <I 159 <I 
(Option 4g) 
Centrolization . Dry Storage 316 159 <I 
(Option 541) 
Cenlrahzation . Wet Storage 337 159 < I 
(Option 5bl 
Centralization· Processmg 316 159 <I 
(Option 5c) 
CenlralizatlOn . Ship Out 22 < I 159 <I 
(Option 5d) 
5.13 Utilities and Energy 
The ex isling capaci lies and dislribulio n syslems allhe SRS for elecl ricily. sleam. waler. and 
domesl ic waSlewaler Ir ' almenl a re adequale 10 support any o f Ihe five ahemalives . Table 5- 18 
summarizes estimates of the annual requirements for electric ity. steam. and domestic wastewater 
Irealmenl fo r each a llc m alive and case. and compares Ihem 10 currenl SRS usage of Ihese resources. 
Table 5-8 li sls informalion e n waler usage by ahemalive. The ulililY and energy requiremenls for a il 
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Table 5·1 8. Estimates of annual e lectricity. steam. and domestic wastewater treatment requirements 
for each altcmativc .:I_h 
Domestic Wastewater 
Electri city Usage Steam Usage Treatment 
Alternative (megawatt hours per year) (k ilograms per year)' (liters per year),,' 
Current SRS Usage 659.000 1.7 billion 690 million 
I. No A\:tion 
Option I . Wet 1.400 11 .3 million 35.1 million 
Storage 
2. Decentral ization 
Option 241 . Dry 19.400 16.7 million -'8.7 million 
Storage 
Option 2b • Wet 22.400 14.4 million 50.6 million 
StOf3gc 
Option 2c . Processi ng 56.400 19. 1 million 48.7 million 
3. 199211993 Planning Basis 
Option 341 . Dry 19.400 16.7 million 48.7 mil hon 
Storage 
Option 3b . Wet 22.400 14.4 mil!ion 50.6 million 
Storage 
Option 3c . Processing 56.400 19.1 million 48.7 million 
4. Regionali zation • A 
Option 441 • Dry 24.400 16.7 million 48.7 million 
Storage 
Option "b . Wet 27.400 14.4 million 50.6 million 
Storage 
Option 4c . Processing 67.400 16.S million 47.6 million 
Regionaliz3tion • B 
Opllon 4d • Dry 24.400 16.7 million " 8.7 million 
Storage 
Option 4c . Wet 27.400 14.4 million 50.6 mi llion 
Storage 
Option 4f • Processing 56.400 19.1 million 48.7 mill ion 
Opt ion 4g • Ship Out 11.400 11 .7 million 38. 1 million 
5. Centralization 
Option 541 . Dry 44.400 16.7 million 67.7 million 
Storage 
Option 5b . Wet 47.400 14.4 million 69.6 million 
Storage 
Option Sc . Processing 110.400 19.1 mill ion 67.7 million 
Option Sd . Ship Out 11.400 11.7 mill ion .'8. 1 million 
a. Source: WSRC ( 1994b). 
b. Water requi rements are shown in Table 5·8. 
c. To convert ~,logr3ms to pounds. multiply by 2.2046. 
d. To convert liters to gal:ons. multiply by 0.264 18. 
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the alternatives represent a small percentage of current requirements. No new generat ion or treatment 
facilities would be necessary: connections to existing networks would require only short tie- in lines. 
Increases in SRS fuel consumption would be minimal because overall activity on the Site wou ld not 
increase due to changes in the SRS mission and the general reduction in employmen t levels. The 
overall impacts of any of the alternatives on the SRS utilities and energy resources would be mi nimal. 
The smallest increase in demand would result from the No Action alte rnative. which would be 
similar to current spent nuclear fuel-related requirements at the SRS. The largest increases would be 
due to the centralization of spent nuclear fuel at the SRS (Alternative 5). Alternative 5 would result in 
a maximum addi tional e lectrical demand of about 110.400 megawan·hours annually (Option 5c). and 
an increased steam consumption of about 19. 1 mill ion kilograms (42. 1 million pounds) per year 
(Option 5c). Water requirements would also be greatest under this Alternative (Table 5-S). Annual 
withdrawals of Savannah River water for cooling purposes would reach about 3 10.S mi ll ion liters 
(S2 .1 million ga llons) and groundwater usage for domestic and processing purposes would total 
approximately 69.6 million liters ( IS.4 million gallons). The volume of domestic wastewater requiring 
treatment would range from approximately 35 to 70 mill ion liters (9 to IS million gallons) per year. 
This addi tional water usage amounts to an increase of about 10 percent over current SRS water 
requirements. 
Among the three management options. process ing would result in the greatest increase in demand 
on ut ilities and energy in comparison to either the dry or wet storage options. In general. dry and wet 
storage would be similar in their requirements of these resources. 
5.14 Materials and Waste Management 
This section discusses potential impacts of the management of material s and wastes associated 
with the implementation of a lternatives identified fo r spent nuclear fuel management. Sections 5.7 and 
5.12 (Air Quality and Occupational and Public Health and Safety. respectively) discuss the impacts of 
hazardous and toxic materials as they re late to routine operations and acc idents. 
DOE has projected rates and volumes of waste and impacts of waste generation at SRS for low-
level. transuranic. and high-level wastes for each of the alternatives for spent nuclear fuel management. 
Table 5· 19 summarizes the estimated annual average and total volume of these th ree waste types that 
each alte rnati ve would produce during a 40-year management period. The discussion 
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Table 5-19. Annual average and total volume (cubic meters)' of radioactive wastes produced under 
C:3ch alternati ve during the 40-year interim management period.;I 
Low-level wastell Transuranic waste High-level waste~ 
Altern at ive Average Total Average Total Average Total 
I. No Action 
Option I - Wet Storage 400 16.000 17 700 0.4 
2. Decentralization 
Option 2a - Dry Storage 400 16.000 18 720 0.4 
Option 2b . Wet Storage 400 16.000 18 720 0.4 4 
Option 2c . Processi ng 800 32.000 19 760 2.3 23 
3. 199211993 Planning Basis 
Option 3a - Dry Storage 400 16.000 18 720 0.4 4 
Option 3b . Wet Storage 400 16.000 18 720 0.4 4 
Option 3c - Processing 750 30.000 19 760 1.7 17 
4. Regionali7.ation - A 
Option 4a . Dry Storage 400 16.000 17 700 0.4 
Option 4b - Wet Storage 400 16.000 17 700 0.4 4 
Option 4c . Processing 790 31.600 18 720 2.3 23 
4. Regionali zation . B 
Option 4d . Dry Storage 400 16.000 17 700 0.4 4 
Option 4e - Wet Storage 400 16.000 17 700 0.4 4 
Option 4f - Processing 790 31.600 18 720 2.3 23 
Option 4g . Ship Out 400 4.000 18 180 0 0 
5. Centrali zation 
Option 5a . Dry Storage 400 16.000 16 640 0 0 
Option 5b . Wet Storage 400 16.000 20 800 2.3 23 
Option 5c - Process ing 800 32.000 20 800 2.3 23 
Option 5d . Ship Out 400 4.000 18 180 0 0 
a. Based on WSRC (l994b). 
b. Source: WSRC (l994c). 
c. Figures are for the initial 10-year period when most processing would be completed. 
d . To conven cubic meters to cubic yards multiply by 1.307. 
below also identifies the impacts that the wasle produced by spent nuclear fuel ac tivit ies would have 
on the exist ing SRS capacity to manage each waste type . 
DOE has not developed estimates of low-level mixed. hazardous. or solid sani tary wastes that 
spent nuclear fuel management ac tivities at the SRS could generate. a lthough it is anticipated that 
these activ ities would produce these waste types only in limited quantities . Funher. the di scussions in 
Section 5.14.2 related to the impacts of spent fue l management wastes on the SRS waste capacities do 
not include considerations of wastes that will result from Site cleanup because assessments for these 
activi ties are still underway and wi ll undergo NEPA review as pan of the SRS Waste Management 
Environmental Impact Statement (DOE 1995). 
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Volume I of th is spent nurlear fuel EIS provides information concerning the major Federal 
envi ronmental laws and regulat ions. Execut ive Orders. and DOE Orders that apply to pollution 
prevention at the Savannah River Site . The DOE views source reduction as the first priority in its 
pollution prevent ion program. followed by an increased emphasis on recycl ing. Source reduction wi ll 
reduce the W:l!' te management burden while eliminating the potential for future liability and cleanup. 
Recycling and using recycled materials will conserve resources and landfill space. Waste treatment 
and disposal are considered only when prevention or recycling is not possible or practical. Since 
creating a Savannah River Site waste minimization program (the precursor of the SRS pollution 
prevention program) in 1990. the amounts of wastes of all types (excluding low-level wastes, which 
are a by-product of environmental restoration activities) generated have decreased. with greatest 
reductions in hazardous and mixed wastes (Hoganson and Miles 1994). 
5.14.1 Alternative Comparison 
The first four alternatives would generate similar amounts of radioactive waste because the 
activities that produce the wastes would be similar under each of the alternatives. Most of the low-
level and transuranic wastes would be generated during the first part of the 40-year management 
period while DOE was transferring existing inventory and renovating the Receiving Basin for Offsite 
Fuels and a reactor basin . The characterization and canning of the current inventory prior to 
placement into storage would also result in some waste generation. Once in storage. management 
activi ties would produce only small amounts of radioact ive waste for the rest of the 40-year period. 
The dry- and wet-storage options would both produce about 16,000 cubic meters (20.912 cubic 
yards) of low-level waste and between 640 cubic meters (836 cubic yards) and 800 cubic meters 
( 1.046 cubic yards) of t ra~suranic waste during the 40-year management period . Both options would 
generate small amounts of high-level "'aste. The processing of the ex isting aluminum-clad fuels and 
storage of the others (the third option under each alternative) wou ld generate all three types of waste: 
low- level and high-leve l wastes in appreciably greater volumes. and transuranic waste in slightly-
greater volumes. 
Alternative 5 (excluding the Ship Out option) could result in somewhat larger volumes of 
radioactive waste than the other four alternatives. However, any increase in waste wou ld not be 
di rectly propon ional to the larger amounts of fue l that would be managed on the Site. because most of 
the originating si tes would characterize and can their fuel prior to shipment so that it could be placed 
directly into storage at the SRS. Therefore. the radioactive wastes produced during centrali zation at 
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the Site would come from the initial fuel transfer and pool renovations and from characterizing and 
canning small amounts of new fuel. The processing of existing aluminum-clad fuels would produce 
the same types and volumes of waste as for the other alternative5. 
The opt ion for shipping the SRS inventory off the Site for regionalization or centralization 
elsewhere would also result in the production of some radioactive waste. This would occur during 
charac teri zation and canning prior to , hipment and would generate the smallest volumes of waste of 
any alternative action: 4.000 cubic meters (5.228 cubic yards) of low-level waste and 180 cubic 
meters (235 cubic yards) of transuranic waste. This waste would be produced only during the initial 
10 years of the management period . 
5.14.2 Impact on the SRS Waste Management Capacity 
The impact of spent nuclear fuel activities on SRS waste management capacities would be 
minimal because the Site could accommodate the waste with existing and planned radioactive waste 
storage and disposal facilities. DOE would transfer high-level waste to the F/H Tank Farms for 
volume reduction and then to the Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) for conversion into a 
borosilicate glass form suitable for prolonged storage. The SRS would use the Consolidated 
Incineration Facility , once operational , to treat the low-level waste. This faci lity has sufficient 
permitted capacity [105.500 cubic meters (i37.889 cubic yards) per year) to treat the anticipated 
volume of these materials. However. actual through-put volume is dependent upon operational 
variables and waste characteristics. The FIH Effluent Treatment Facility would treat liquid low-level 
waste. This facility has sufficient design process capacity [598 mill ion liters (158 mill ion gallons) per 
year] (Q treat the anticipated volumes of these materials. DOE would manage the transuranic wastes 
with existing and planned storage capacity. 
5,15 Accident Analysis 
Operations involving the receipt. handling, processing. or storing of spent nuclear fuel would 
involve radioactive materials or toxic chemicals. These materials wou ld be received. treated. stored. 
transferred between facilities. disposed of on the Site. and shipped off the Site. Under cen ain 
circumstances. these materials could be involved in an accident. 
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An accident is a s~ries of unexpected or undesirable events initiated by equipment failure . human 
error. or a natural phenomenon such as severe weather. earthquake. or volcanism. These events can 
cause the release of either radioactive or chemically toxic materials inside a faci lity or to the 
environment. 
This section summarizes analyses of possible accidents involving spent nuclear fue l operations at 
the SRS . To provide a perspective on potential accidents. this section summarizes various accidents 
associated with spent nuclear fuel activities that have occurred at the SRS (historic accidents) and 
reviews previous accident analyses for Site operations. This section uses the results of previous 
analyses as a baseline for detennining the impacts for the alternatives that involve new facilities. For 
each alternative. thi s section discusses the accidents with the largest point estimates of risk 
(radiological impacls in lenns of pOlenlial falal cancers x frequency of Ihe inilialing evenl). 
The facilities considered for each alternative are either existing facilities for which the approved 
safely analyses were used. or new facililies (WSRC 1994b) for which exisl ing safely analysis resuhs 
were subsliluled by evalualing Ihe type of accidenl(s) Ihal could be poslulaled 10 occur based on Ihe 
projecled funclion of Ihe facililY. Two facililies Ihal conlain very small amounls of conlaCI-handled 
spenl nuclear fuel. Buildings 331-M and 773-A. were not included in Ihis analysis because accidenls 
analyzed for Ihe major facililies would bound Ihe consequences of possible accidenls in Ihese Iwo 
locations. 
This section addresses historic accidents. faci lity radiological accidents. chemical hazard 
accidents. and secondary impacts. Section 5.11 addresses onsite transportation accidents. 
5.15.1 Historic Accidents at the Savannah River Site 
Impacts fro m accidents can involve fatalities. injuries. or illness. Fatalities can be prompt 
(immediate ) such as in construction accidents or latent (delayed) such as an increase in latent fatal 
cance rs due 10 radialion exposure. Sec lion 5.12 addresses worker injuries. illnesses. and Ihe pOlenlial 
for increased cancer risk anticipated from nonnal operations of the faci lities. Nonradiation accidents 
have dominaled impacls 10 workers al Ihe SRS (Duranl et al. 1987): impacts 10 Ihe public from 
hisloric SRS accidenls have been negligible . 
The SRS has mainlained an operalional evenl dala base on ils facililies since Ihe I 950s. This 
dala base currenlly cOnlains approximalely 450.000 enl ries including dala on Ihe Receiving Basin for 
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Offsile Fuel. Ihe principal weI Slorage pool facililY al Ihe SRS: and bOlh F-and H-Area Canyons. For 
Ihi s EI S. DOE reviewed Ihe dala base 10 idenlify hisloric spenl nuclear fuel-relaled acc idenls al Ihese 
facilities . Fuel cutt ing events. fuel handling events. and various liquid releases related to spent nuclear 
fuel management over Ihe 40-year operaling hiSlory of Ihe SRS were examined. The purpose of Ihe 
data base review was to provide an historic perspective on the types of accidents that have occurred at 
Ihe SRS. EvenlS represenlali ve of fuel failures include higher Ihan expecled conlaminal ion levels in 
fuel slorage basin waler and evidence of fuel canisler cracking at a weld. Fuel handling incidents were 
due in large part 10 crane operalor errors or crane and handling equipmenl failures. The dala base also 
includes reports of incorrecl fuel cropping. where Ihe aClive region of fuel was exposed under waler. 
These historical events provided a basis for the selection of representative accidents covering the 
speclrum of spenl nuclear fuel management aClivilies. No significanl offsile impacls have resulted 
from these historic occurrences. 
5.15.2 Potential Facility Accidents 
The SRS spenl nuclear fuel alternalives have Ihe pOlenlial for radiological accidents (see 
Allachmenl A. Table A-2) Ihal could affecl Ihe health and safely of workers and Ihe public. The 
concerns and characteristics that are common to these accidents would be common regardless of 
whether the cause were a natural phenomenon or human error. For health effects to occur. an accident 
must allow a release of hazardous material to. or an increase in radiation levels in. the facility or the 
environment. The released material must be transported to locations frequented by humans. The 
quanlilies of hazardous malerials Ihal reach local ions where people are and Ihe ways Ihey inleracl wilh 
people are important faclors in Ihe delenninalion of heahh effects. 
A number of sludies have invest igaled Ihe ways in which radioacl ivilY reaches humans. how Ihe 
body absorbs and relains it. and Ihe resulling health effecls. The Inlemalional Commission on 
Radiological Proleclion has made spec ific recommendalions for eSlimaling Ihese health effecls 
(ICRP 199 1). This organizalion is Ihe recognized body for eSlablishing slandards for Ihe proleclion of 
workers and Ihe public from Ihe effecls of radialion exposure. Heallh effects include acule damage 
(up 10 and including deal h) and lalenl effects. including cancers and genelic damage . An 
SRS-developed compuler code. AXAIR89Q. eSlimales pOlenlial radialion doses 10 maximally exposed 
individuals or populalion groups from accidenlal releases of radionuclides. 
The AXAIR89Q code is a highly aUlomaled sile-specific environmenlal dispersion and dosimelry 
code for postulaled airborne releases. The environmenlal dispersion models used are based on NRC 
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RegulalOry Guide 1.145 (NRC 1983). The exposure pathways considered in the AXAIR89Q code 
include inhalation of radionuclides and gamma irradiation from the radioactive plume. 
Doses from the inhalation of radionuclides in air depend on the amount of radionuclides released: 
the dispersion factor: the physical, chemical, and radiological characterist ics of the radionuclides: and 
various biological parameters such as breathing rate and biological half-life. The AXAIR89Q code 
uses a conservative breathing rate of 12,000 cubic meters (424,000 cubic feet) per year for adults. The 
dose commitment factors used in the environmental dosimetry code, as described in the following 
section, are from Interna/ Dose Conversion FaClOrs for Ca/clI/arion of Dose ro rhe Pllblic (DOE 1988). 
External gamma radiation doses from the traveling plume depend on the spatial distribution of 
the radionuclides in the ai r, the energy of the radiation, and the extent of shielding. The AXAIR89Q 
code takes no credit for shielding in calculating doses, The code calculates gamma doses using a 
nonuniform Gaussian model. which has more realistic modeling than doses from the conventional 
uniform semi-infinite plume model . 
In addition to using the worst sector, 99.5 percentile meteorology, conservative breathing rates. 
and taking no credit for shielding, the AXAIR89Q code also takes no credi t for the probable plume 
rise from stack releases. Therefore, the offsite maximum individual doses calculated by AXAIR89Q 
provide conservative bounding estimates of radiological consequences to exposed individuals and 
populations from postulated accidental atmospheric releases. 
AXAIR89Q has been validated for compliance to accepted standards for such software . 
Attachment A, Accident Analysis, discusses AXAIR89Q and its predecessor, AXAIR. When used in 
conjunction with models for predicting health effects, the results from AXAIR89Q can be compared 
with other site-specific codes such as RSAC-5 , because both codes provide relative radionuclide 
concentrations based on the guidance provided in NRC Regulatory Guide 1.145, 
This section summarizes the potential for radiological accidents and their consequences for the 
cases under each alternative. Attachment A describes the methodology and assumptions used in the 
assessment ~ describes radiological accident scenarios in more detail : provides source terms and 
references used to estimate the doses and impacts for each alternative and case : and includes scaling 
factors that the DOE decision maker can apply to the source term or dose for each facility associated 
with a case. 
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DOE assessed the potential impacts from a selected spectrum of radiological release accidents, 
rangi ng from low ( I x 10" event per year) to high (more than I event per year) frequencies of 
occurrence, along with the associated impacts (doses and potential latent fatal cancers) that could 
result . The accidents used as references are attributed to individual facilities based on their functions 
and processes (see Attachment A, Table A-3), not to specific cases or alternatives. This enables a 
comparison of alternatives depending on which facilities support a specific case or alternative. 
Figure 5- 1 is a nowchart for the preparation of accident analysis information . No new analyses 
occurred because existing documemation adequately supports a quantitative or qualitative estimation of 
potential impacts, as required by the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969. The assessment of 
postulated radiological accidents associated with spent nuclear fue l at the SRS indicates that the 
highest point estimate of risk to the public within 80 kilometers (50 miles) of the Site would be 
1.4 x 10" latent fatal cancer per year, The estimated dose to the same population from all causes, 
including natural background sources, would be about 19,000 person-rem per year (DOE 1990), which 
could cause about nine latent fatal cancers per year in the same population. For perspective, natural 
background radiation sources would result in approximately 6,000 times the risk associated with the 
largest consequence accident postulated in this EIS for the various spent nuclear fuel management 
alternatives. 
DOE did not quantitatively analyze the potential health effects for SRS workers less than 100 
meters (328 feet) from radiological accidents. Computer codes used to calculate radiological doses can 
experience potentially large errors as a source disperses throughout a building, However, DOE did 
carry out a qualitative evaluation of the potential radiological effects to SRS workers in the immed iate 
vicinity of an accident related to spent fuel management. DOE estimates that the consequences of an 
accident for the most part would result in higher than normal radiation doses. However, no fatalities 
would occur except in the event of an inadvertent criticality in FB-Line, where up to four fatalities 
may result . This evaluation is discussed in more detail in Section A.2.6.2 of Attachment A. 
5,15,2,1 Alternative 1 - No Action, This alternative identifies the minimum actions deemed 
necessary for continued safe and secure management of spent nuclear fuel at the SRS. As explained in 
Chapter 3, this is not a Slallls qllo condition. Spent nuclear fuel would be maintained close to 
defueling or current storage locations with minimal facility upgrade or equipment replacement. Only 
local transport would occur. SRS activities required to safely store spent nuclear fuel would continue. 
This alternative would require SRS to place corroded and pitted fuel elements in cans to minimi ze 
spread of material into the pool. DOE estimated potential radiological acc ident impacts that could 
occur under this alternati ve using existing DOE-approved safety analyses for the interim wet stor.ge of 
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Figure 5·1. Accident analysis process. 
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spent nuclear fuel at SRS facilities. As indicated in Attachment A. Table A·3. the facilities required 
under this alternative would consist of exist ing facilities. including necessary upgrades to suppon safe 
interim wet storage. In addition. Attachment A. Table A·4. provides a reference accident spectrum 
associated with these facilities for this alternative. Auachment A. Table A-2. lists the references for 
the source terms considered in analyzing potential accidents under this alternative. as well as their 
estimated frequencies . Table 5·20 lists the accident scenario with the highest point estimates of risk to 
the general public. Table 5·21 compares the potential radiological accidents and health effects of the 
interim wet storage (Option I) of spent nuclear fuel for the No Action alternative. 
Table 5-20. Highest point estimates of risk among receptor groups (Option I). 
Receptor Groups 
Maximally Exposed Population to 80 kilometers 
Overall Point Estimate of Ris k~ 1.6xlO ' (Fuel Assembly Breach) l.4x 10') (Fuel Assembly Breach) 
a. Units of latent fatal cancers per year. 
5.15.2.2 Alternative 2 . Decentralizatlon_ Accident assessments considered for this 
alternative include those considered for the No Action alternative for wet storage (Option 2b) plus 
assessments for the dry storage (Option 2a) of spent nuclear fuel and for the processing of spent fuel 
(Option 2c). Option 2c (processing) assumes the use of existing facilities to dissolve. separate. and 
further stabilize spent nuclear fuel. For cases that include some treatment (e.g .. canning) of spent 
nuclear fuel. such treatment is referred to as "stabilization," not processing. The amount of fuel of 
various types to be considered would include those quantities from the production reactors, existing 
research fuel. foreign research reactor fuel. and fuel Iransponed for safety or research activities. 
5.15.2.2.1 Option 2a • Dry Storage - DOE estimated potential radiological accident 
impacts that could occur in this case using existing DOE-approved safety analysis reports submitted to 
DOE by Westinghouse Savannah River Company for vault storage of special nuclear material from 
existing facilities . DOE has not incorporated the technology to support interim dry storage of spent 
nuclear fuel at the SRS. To provide a basis for evaluating the potential impacts from this alternative 
case, this assessment used data from existing safety analyses for special nuclear material storage 
facilities and extrapolated these data to apply to spent nuclear fuel. DOE also considered radiological 
accidents associated with wet storage. at least in the near term, because the spent nuclear fuel is 
currently in wet storage. Similarly. this assessment includes fuel handling accidents throughout the 
transition phase (i.e .. until fuel is in interim dry storage). As indicated in Attachment A. Table A-4. 
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< Table 5-21. Radioac ti ve release accidents and health effects for spent nuclear fuel altematives: ·b 0 
r Potential Fatal Cancers Point Estimate of Risk' c:: 
3: 
m Maximally Maximally 
- exposed Population to Colocatcd exposed Population to Co located 
> Frequency offsite 80 ki lometers" Worker' Worker" orrsitc 80 kilomcters' Worker Worker 
-c 
-c Alternative (tly case) Accident Scenario (pe r year) individual· individual m 
z Q 1. No Action 
X Option I Wet StorJgc AI Fucl Assembly 1.6xlO ' I. Ox I 0" 8.5x 10' \ (a) 4.8xI0" 1.6x10·' 1.4x 10.1 7.7xI0·' (") (a) 
Breach 
A.1 Material Relea.<e 2.4x I0·\ 3.0:<10.0 2.5x I 0" (a) 2.0:<10" 7.2x I0·· 6.0xI0·' (a) 4.8:<10" 
(Adjaccnt Facility) 
A5 Criticality in Water 3. l x I0·' 1.5.~1O" 4 . .1:<10' \ (a) S.6xI0·' .1.7x I0·- 1.4x 10" (a) 1.7x10·' 
A7 SpillfLiquid 2.0xI0'" 2.7xI0" 9.0x I0·\ (a) 1.1 x 10" S.4xIO·'· 1.8x I 0" (a) 2.2x 10.10 
Discharge (external) 
A8 SpilllLiquid 1.1 x 10" 1.2x1 0·1\ 1.0xI0·- (a) 8.0xI0·1l 1.3xI0·" 1.1 x 10"· (a) 8.8xI0·'o 
Discharge (i ntcrnal ) 
2. Decentralization 
Option 2a Dry AI Fuel Assembly 1.6x1 0·' 1.0x1 0" 8.5x 10" (a) 4.8xI0" 1.6xlO·' 1.4x 10") (a) 7.7xI0·' 
VI StorJgc Breach 0 
VI 
co A3 Material Relea.<c 1.4xI0·' 1.1 x 10" 3.5x 10" (a) (b) I.SxIO·1l 4.9xI0·· (a) (b) 
(Dry Vault) 
A4 Material Release 2.4xI0·\ 3.0xI0" 2.5x 10" (a) 2.0xI0·s 7.2xI0·· 6.0xI0·s (a) 4.8xI0· 
(Adjacent Facility) 
AS Criticality in Water 3. lxI0·' I.SxIO" 4.4xlO·} (a) S.6xI0·s 4.7xI0·· 1.4x10·s (a) 1.7:<10" 
A7 SpillfLiquid 2.0x I0'" 2.7xI0" 9.0x I0·' (a) 1.1 x 10" S.4x ((r 'o 1.8x 10" (a) 2.2xI0·\O 
Discharge (external) 
A8 SpillfLiquid I.IxIO·' 1.2x10·1I 1.0xI0·· (a) 8.0x 1O" s 1.3xI0·'· 1.1 x 10'\· (a) 8.8xI0·'o 
Discharge (i nternal) 
Option 2b Wet AI Fuel Assembly 1.6x I0·\ 1.0x10" 8.Sx 10" (a) 4.8xI0" 1.6x10·' 1.4xI0·) (a) 7.7x I 0" 
Storage Breach 
A4 Material Relea.<e 2.4xI0·\ 3.0xI0'" 2.SxI0·' (a) 2.0xI0·s 7.2x 10" 6.0xI0·' (a) 4.8xI0· 
(Adjacent Facility) 
AS Criticality in Water 3.1x10·} I.SxIO" 4.4xI0·\ (a) S.6xI0·\ 4.7xI0·- 1.4x 10" (a) 1.7x10·' 
A7 SpillfLiquid 2 .0:<10~ 2.7xI0" 9.0xI0·} (a) I.lxlO'" S.4xI0·'· 1.8x10" (a) 2.2x 10"· 
Discharge (external) 
A8 SpillfLiquid I.IxIO·\ 8.2xI0·1I 1.0x I 0" (a) 8.0x 10'" 1.3xI0·" 1.1 x 10' \· (a) 8.8x 10"· 
Discharge (internal) 
Option 2c Processing AI Fuel Assembly 1.6x10·' 1.0x 10-- 8.Sx I0·} (a) 4.8xI0'" 1.6x 10" 1.4x10·1 (a) 7.7x I0·' 
Breach 
A2 Material Release 2.6xI0·' 3.4xlO"s 2.6x 10~ (a) 3.6x I0·s 8.9x 10" 6.8xI0·' (a) 9.4xI0·-
(Processing) 
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Table 5-21 . (continued) . 
Allcmaliw Ihy casc ) 
Oplion 2c 
Icunlinued) 
Oplion Ja Dry 
SIOrJge 
0plion 3b WeI 
SlorJge 
0plion Jc Procc. <ing 
Opllon .ta Dry 
S((l rage 
0plion .tb WeI 
Sluragc 
Oplion .tc Procc\<ing 
A(( idenl Scenario 
AJ Malerial Releasc 
(Dry Vau h) 
A.t Malcrial Release 
(AdJaccm Facili ly) 
AS CrilicalilY In Waler 
'\6 CrilicalilY in 
Processi ng 
A7 SpilllLiquid 
Discharg.: (exlernal ) 
A8 SpilllLiquid 
Dischargc (i nlernal ) 
Frequency 
(pe r year) 
1.4x I0·' 
2.4x 10 • 
3. lxI 0 ' 
1.4x 10'" 
2.0x I 0'" 
I.lxIO·
' 
POlcnlial Falal Cancers Poinl E.rlimale of Risk' 
Maximally Maximally 
exposed Populalion 10 Colocaled exposed Populalion 10 Colocaled 
offsilc SO kilomelers" Worker' Worke r" offsilC 80 kilomelers' Worker Worker 
indi vid uald individual 
I.lxlO · 3.5x 10'· (a) (b) 1. 5x I0·" 4.9x 10'· (a) (b) 
3.0x IO" 2.5x I0·' (a) 2.0x I0·' 7.2x I 0" 6 .0x I0·' (a) .t .8x I0 8 
1.5x I 0" 4.4x 10" (a) 56x I0" 4.7x 10" l.4x IO·' (a) I.7x I 0" 
3.5x 10 · 4.3x I0· ' (a ) 1.0xlO'" 4.9x 10·'0 6 .0xI 0' (a) 1.4x I 0" 
2.7x IO·6 9.0x I0·' (a) I.l x lO" 5.4x I 0.10 I.SxIO" (a) 2.2x1O 'o 
1. 2x I0·" 1.0x 10'· (a) 8.0xI0·" 1.3xI0·" 1.1 x 10·,n (a) 8.8x 10"· 
3. 199211993 Planning Basis 
Same as 0plion 2a for Decenlralizalion 
Same as 0plion 2b fo r Decenlrali7.alion 
Same as 0plion 2c for Decenlralizalion 
4. Regionalization - A 
Same a< 0plion 2a for Deccnlralizalion 
Same as 0plion 2b for Decenlralizalion 
Same a< 0plion 2c for Decenlralizalion 
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Table 5-21. (continued). 
Alternative (hy case) 
Option 4d Dry 
Stor~ge 
Option 4e Wet 
Stnrage 
Option 4f Processing 
Option 4g Shipping 
Out 
Option 5a Dry 
Storage 
Option 5b Wet 
Storage 
Option 5c Processing 
Option 5d Shipping 
Out 
Frcquem:y 
(pe r year) 
Maximally 
c .~posed 
offsite 
indi vidual· 
Potential Fatal Can~er.; 
Population to 
80 kilometers" Worker' 
4. Regionalization. B 
Colocatcd 
Worker' 
Same as Option 2a for Decentralization 
Same as Option 2b for Decentralization 
Same as Option 2c for Decentralization 
Same as Option I for No Action 
S. Centralization 
Same as Option 2a for Decentralization 
Same as Option 2b for Decentralization 
Same as Option 2c for Decentralization 
Same as Option I No Action 
Maximally 
exposed 
offsite 
individual 
Point Estimate of Risk' 
Population to 
80 kilometers' Worker 
Colocated 
Worker 
a. The safety analysis reports from which information was extracted for the e accidents were written before the issuance of DOE Order 5480.23 : prev ious Orders did not require the inclusion of workers. 
h. The safety analysis reports from which information was ex tracted for these accidents were written before the issuance of DOE Order 5480.23 : previous Orders did not require the inclusion of 
colocatcd workers. 
c. Units for point estimates of ri sk arc given in potential latent fatal cancers per year. 
d. ICRP 60 risk factor for the general public (5.0 x 10" fatal cancer per year) was used to dctenlline potenti al latent fatal cancers. 
c. ICRP 60 risk factor for workers (4 .0 x Hr' fatal cancer per year) was used to detcnlline potent ial latent fatal cancers. 
the fitcilit ies required under th is alte rnative would consist of existing and new fac ilities necessary to 
support the safe handling. stabili zation. and dry storage of spent nuclear fu el. In addition. Table A-4 
ident ifies a potent ia l acc ident spectrum associated with Ihese fac ilities for this case. Attachment A. 
Titble A·2. lists the references for the source terms considered in analyzing potential acc idents under 
this alternati ve case. as well as the estimated frequency of occurrence for each acc ident. Table 5-2 1 
lists the potential radiological accidents and health effec ts associated with dry storage of spent nuclear 
fu el for the Decentrali zation alternative. For the transition period of wet to dry storage. Table 5-22 
lists the accident scenario with the highest overall point estimate of ri sk to the general publ ic. 
Table 5·22 lists the accident scenario with the highest point estimate of ri sk (after transition) to the 
general publ ic when the fue l had been moved from wet storage (after approximate ly 15 years) and 
placed in interim dry storage. This indicates a substantial reduction in ri sk (more than six orders of 
magnitude) when fuel handl ing events are no longer potentia l accident initiators. 
Table 5-22. Highest point estimates of ri sk among receptor groups (Option 2a). 
Receptor Groups 
Overall Point Estimate of Risk' 
Transitioned to Dry Storage 
Point Estimate of R i sk~ 
Maximally Exposed 
Offsite Individual 
1.6x 10.7 (Fuel Assembly 
Breach) 
1.5x I0·" (Dry Vault Material 
Release) 
a . Units of latent fatal cancers per year. 
Population to 80 kilometers 
1.4x lO·' (Fuel Assembly 
Breach) 
4 .9x I0·' (Dry Vault Material 
Release) 
5.15.2.2.2 Option 2b - Wet Storage - DOE estimated potentia l radiological acc ident 
impacts that could occur under this case using existing DOE-approved safety analysis reports and 
amendments submitted to DOE by Westinghouse Savannah River Company for existing wet storage 
fac ili ties. As indicated in Anachment A. Table A-4. the fac ilities (modules as defined in the WSRC 
I 994b and Figure 3-2) would consist of ex isting fac ilit ies and specific upgrades necessary to support 
safe interi m wet storage. In addition. Table A-4 ident ifies the reference acc ident spectrum associated 
with these faci lit ies for th is option. Anachment A. Table A-2. lists the references for the source te rms 
considered in analyzing potent ia l accidents under this al ternati ve option. as well as the estimated 
frequency of occurrence for each accident. Table 5-2 1 lists the radiological acc idents and 
consequences of the wet storage (Option 2b) of spent nuclear fue l for the Decent ra lization alternat ive . 
Table 5-23 lists the accident scenario with the highest point estimate of ri sk to the general public. For 
wet pool storage options. there are no transition phases. 
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Table 5-23. Highest point estimates of ri sk among receptor groups (Option 2b). 
Receptor Groups 
O\'~ r<l ll Point Estimate of RiskJ 
Max imally Exposed 
Offsite Individual 
1.6x 10.7 (Fuel Assembly 
Breach) 
a. Units of latent fa tal cancers per year. 
Population to 80 kilometers 
1.4x 10·J (Fuel Assembly 
Breac h) 
5.15.2.2.3 Option 2c - ProceSSing and Storage - Processing for the SRS is defined 
as the operation of the separations fac ilities in F- or H-Areas. The H-Area facilities were designed to 
recover uranium and plutonium from spent produc tion reactor fuel. and the F-Area fac ilities were 
designed to recover plutonium. 
DOE estimated potential radiological accident impacts that could occur under this opt ion using 
ex isting DOE-approved safety analysis reports submitted to DOE by Westinghouse Savannah River 
Company for processes and for vault storage of special nuclear material from existing faci lit ies. DOE 
also considered radiological acc idents associated with wet storage. because the spent nuclear fue l is 
currently in wet storage . Similarly, it included fuel handling acc idents throughout the processing 
phase ( i.e .. un til spec ial nuclear materia l is in inte rim dry storage) . As indicated in Attachment A. 
Table A-4. the fac ilities required under this option would consist of exi sting and new facilities 
necessary to support safe handling and processing of spent nuclear fu el into special nuclear material 
for dry storage. In addition. Table A-4 ident ifies the reference accident spectrum associated with these 
fac il ities for this case. Attachment A. Table A-2. Ii ~ ts the references for the source tenns considered 
in analyzing potent ial acc idents under th is a lternati ve case. as well as the estimated frequency of 
occurrence for each accident. Table 5-21 lists the r~dio log i cal release accidents and health effec ts for 
the processing of spent nuclear fue l to spec ial nuclear mate rial for the Decentra lization alternati ve. 
Table 5-24 lists the acc ident scenario wi th the highest overall poin t estimate of ri sk to the general 
public from the transit ion period of wet spent fu el storage into processing for special nuclear material. 
\Vhen the fue l had been processed from wet storage to spec ial nuclear mate ria l and placed in its 
in te rim dry storage. Table 5·24 lists the acc ident scenario with the highest point estimate of risk after 
transition to the general public. This indicates a substantial reduction in ri sk (more than six orders of 
magnitude) when fuel handling events and processing events are no longer potent ia l acc ident initiators. 
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Table 5-24. Highest paint es timates of ri sk among receptor groups (Option 2c). 
Receptor Groups 
Overall Point Estimate of Risk) 
Transitioned to Dry Storage 
Point Estimate of Risk;! 
Maximally Exposed 
Offsite Indi vidual 
1.6xI0·' (Fuel Assembly 
Breach) 
1.5xI0·" (Dry Vault Materia l 
Release) 
a. Units of latent fat al cancers per year. 
Population to 80 kilometers 
1.4x 10') (Fuel Assembly 
Breach) 
4.9x 10" (Dry Vault Material 
Release) 
For this option. DOE assumes it could not process some fu el clad in stainless steel or zirconium 
into special nuclear material and. therefore. would dry-store it as fue l. The technology for dry storage 
of nonaluminum·c1ad fuel has been demonstrated and is assumed to pose no greater ri sk than 
monitored dry storage of special nuclear material. 
5.15.2.3 Alternative 3 • 199211993 Planning Basis. Because this alternative would be 
consistent with the StatllS quo at the SRS. existing documents contain sufficient information to 
examine its accident analys is Impacts. The SRS would continue to receive the spent nuclear fuel 
designated for the Site. and DOE would complete fac ilities already planned to accommodate the 
existing inventory and the spent nuclear fuel receipts. This alternati ve would require the same 
faci lities already used to support the cases discussed in the Section 5. 15.2.2. The major difference 
would be the amount of fuel ultimately stored because this alternative assumes the continued receipt of 
fuel beyond that shipped 10 the SRS under the Decentralization alternative. 
5.15.2.3.1 Option 3a • Dry Storage - DOE estimated potential radiological accident 
impacts that could occur under this case usi ng ex isting DOE-approved safety analysis reports for vault 
storage from ex i!' ting faciliti es and the stud), discussed for Option 2a. DOE also considered 
radiological acc idents associated with wet storage. at least in the near term. because the spent nuclear 
fuel is currentl y in wet storage. Similarly. it included fuel handling accidents throughout the transition 
phase ( i.e .. until the fue l is in interim dry storage). As indicated in Attachment A. Table A-4. the 
faci lities required unde r this option wou ld consist of existing and new facilities necessary to support 
the safe handling and stabi lization of spent nuclear fuel for dry storage. In addition. Table A-4 
identifies the reference acc ident spe(..(rum assoc laled wi th these facilities for this case. Attachment A. 
Table A-2. lists the authorization basis references for the source terms considered in analyzing 
potential accidents under this option. as well as the estimated frequency of occurrence for each 
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accident. Table 5-21 lists the radiological release accidents and health effects for the dry slOrage of 
spent nuclear fuel for the 199211993 Planning Basis alternative. For the entire period, the accident 
scenarios with the highest point estimates of ri sk to the general public would be the same as those for 
Option 2a. as listed in Table 5-22. 
5.15.2.3.2 Option 3b • Wet Storage - DOE estimated potential radiological accident 
impacts that could occur under this case using existing DOE-approved safety analysis reports and from 
amendments submiued to DOE by Westinghouse Savannah River Company for wet storage for 
exist ing facilities . As indicated in Attachment A. Table AA. the facilities required under this option 
would consist of existing facilities and upgrades necessary to support safe interim wet storage. In 
addition. Table A-4 identifies the reference accident spectrum associated wilh these facilities for this 
option. Attachment A. Table A-2. lists the references for the source terms considered in analyzing 
potential accidents under this option. as well as the estimated frequency of occurrence for each 
accident. Table 5-21 lists the radiological release accidents and health effects of the wet storage 
(Option 3b) of spent nuclear fuel for the 1992/1993 Planning Basis alternative. The accident scenario 
with the highest point estimate of ri sk to the general public would be the same as that for Option 2b. 
as listed in Table 5-23 . 
5.15.2.3.3 Option 3c • Processing and Storage. Table 5·21 lists the radioactive 
release accidents and health effects for the processing of spent nuclear fuel for this option. After 
processing is complete. the acc ident scenario with the highest point estimate of ri sk would be 
assoc iated with the storage of special nuclear materials. as discussed for Option 2c and listed in 
Table 5-24. 
5.15.2.4 Alternative 4· Regionalization. This alternative comprises Regionalization A and 
Regionalization B subaltematives. Under the Regionalization A subaltemative (Options 4a. 4b. and 
4c ). the SRS would receive all aluminum-clad fuel from the other sites considered in this EIS and 
would transfer its existing inventory of stain less steel· and Zircaloy·c1ad fuel to other DOE sites. as 
appropriate. These proposed ac tivities would renect current and past activities. so sufficient 
information and analyses are avai lable to enable the scaling or other extrapolation of radiological 
accident impacts. The total amount of spent nuclear fuel to be managed under Regionalization A 
would be slightly less than that for Alternatives 2 and 3: the decision maker could use this amount to 
adjust the estimated point estimate of ri sk by the use of an appropriate adjustment (scaling) factor. as 
discussed in Attachment A. Section A.2.9. 
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Under the Regionalization B subaltemative (Options 4d. 4e . 4f. and 4g). the SRS would rece ive 
all ex isting and new spent nuclear fuel east of the Mississ ippi River. The decisionmaker could use the 
change in spent nuc lear fuel inventories to adjust the estimated point estimate of ri sk by (he use of an 
appropriate adjustment (scaling) factor. as discussed in Attachment A. Sec tion A.2.9. For the purposes 
of this evaluation. Option 4g (Section 5. 15.2.4.7) assumes that DOE would ship all fuel off the Site to 
the Oak Ridge Reservation. 
5.15.2.4.1 Option 4a - Dry Storage - This case is s imilar to Option 2a. with the 
exception of the quantity and type of fuel to be stored. As with Option 2a. this assessment evaluated 
existing analyses: the point estimates of risk are the same as those for Option 23. 
5.15.2.4.2 Option 4b - Wet Storage - This case is s imilar to Option 2b. with the 
exception of a slightly smaller quantity of fuel to be stored. As with Option 2b. this assessment 
evaluated existing analyses. and the point estimates of ri sk are the same as those for Option 2b. 
5.15.2.4.3 Option 4c - Processing and Storage - For this option. the accident 
analysis evaluation is s imilar to Option 2c. DOE assumes that it could process spent nuclear fue l 
assoc iated with regiona liz3tion at SRS with existing facilities. because they are designed to process 
aluminum-clad fue l. However. the small amount of aluminum-clad fuel received after major 
processing options are completed would be placed in wet storage . 
5.15.2.4.4 Option 4d - Dry Storage - The accident analysis evaluation for this option 
is si milar to that for Option 2a. with the exception of the increased inventories and types of fuel to be 
stored. 
5.15.2.4.5 Option 4e - Wet Storage - The acc ident analys is evaluat ion for this option 
is s imilar to that for Option 2b. with the exception of the increased inventories and types of fuel to be 
stored. 
5.15.2.4.6 Option 4' -Processing and Storage - For this option. the accident 
analysis evaluation is similar to Option 2c. DOE assumes that it could process all the current SRS 
aluminum-clad spent nuclear fue l with existing fac ilit ies. However. all receipts of spent nuc lear fuel 
wi ll be placed in dry storage as discussed for Option 4d . 
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5.15.2.4.7 Option 4g - Shipping Off Site - This option assumes that DOE would 
charac teri zt! the fuel and ship it all off the S ite. Thus. the potential radiological accide nt ~ considered 
are the same as those for Alternative I . 
5.15.2.5 Alternative 5 - Centralization. This alternative for the SRS would in\'ol\'e fuel 
types and new facilities beyond those considered for any other alternati ve. For instance. under this 
alternative . the SRS would receive spent nuclear fue l from the U.S. Navy. One of the new faciliti es 
that would be necessary to support this type of spent nuclear fuel is the Expended Core Fac ility (ECF). 
Volume I. Appendix D. includes a detailed accident analyses for this proposed fac ility using 
SRS-specific parameters. 
This alternative would bound the maximum number of spent nuclear fuel-related acc ident 
scenarios that DOE could expect at the SRS. due to the number of new facilities at the Site that would 
have to accommodate the diversity and the increased amount of the fuel to be managed . The 
decisionmaker could use lh is max imum amount of spent nuclear fuel to adjusl the estimated ri sk by 
the use of an appropriate scaling factor. as discussed in Attachment A. Section A.2.9. For the 
purposes of this evaluation. Option 5d (Sec tion 5.1 5.2.5.4) assumes that DOE would ship all fuel off 
the Site to another DOE facility. 
5.15.2.5.1 Option 5a - Dry Storage - The major difference in dry storage fac ilit ies 
be tween this alternative and the others would be the addition of a fac ility for Naval spent nuc lear fuels 
and the large quantity of spent fue l shipped to the SRS from the Hanford Site. DOE estimated 
potent ia l radiological acc ident impacts that could occur unde r th is option using DOE-approved safety 
analysis reports submitted to DOE by \Vestinghouse Savannah River Company fo r vau lt storage in 
existing fac ilit ies at the SRS and the study discussed for O ption 2a. In add it ion. DOE considered 
radiological acc idents assoc iated with wet storage. at least in the near tenn. because the SRS spent 
nuclear fuel is currently in wet storage . Similarly. it included fuel handling acc idents th roughout the 
transition phase (i.e .. until fue l is in interim dry storage) . As ind icated in Attachment A. Table A-4. 
the fac ilit ies required under this opt ion would consist of ex isting and new fac ilit ies necessary to 
support the safe handling anJ stab ilization of spent nuc lear fue l for dry storage. In addi tion. 
Table A-4 Identifies the re ference acc ident spectrum assoc iated with these facili ties for this casco 
Attachment A. Table A-2. li sts the re ferences for the source tenns considered in analyzing potential 
acc idents under this option. as we ll as the estimated frequency of occurrence for each accident. 
Table 5-2 1 compares the radio logical release acc i'dents and health effec ts for the dry storage of spent 
nuclear fue l fo r the Centraliz;:lI ion alte rnati ve. From the transition period of we t to dry storage. the 
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accident scenario with the highest point estimate of ri sk to the general public would be the same as 
.ha. for Op.ion 2a. 0$ liSled in Table 5-22 . When .he fuel had been moved from we. slOrage (afler 
appro;(imatcly 25 years) and placed in inlerim dry storage. the accident scenario witn the highest point 
estimate of risk to the population would be the same as the Option 2a dry storage phase. 
5.15.2.5.2 Option 5b - Wet Storage - The acciden. ar.alysis evalualion for .his op.ion 
is simi lar '0 .ha. for Op.ion 2b. wi.h .he excep.ion of .he amOUn! and .ype of fuel '0 be Slored. 
5.15.2.5.3 Option 5c - Processing and Storage - For .his op.ion .• he acc iden. 
analysis evaluation is similar to Option 2c. DOE assumes thai it could process the current SRS 
aluminum-clad spent nuclear fuel with existing facilities. However. the SRS Ylou ld place a ll receipts 
of fue l in dry s.orage. as discussed for Op.ion 5a. 
5.15.2.5.4 Option 5d - Shipping Off Site - This op. ion assumes .ha. DOE would 
perform .he charac.eriza.ion of .he fuel a •• he SRS. and .hen would ship all fuel off .he Si.e. Thus. 
the potent ial radiological accidents considered are the same as those for the No Action alternative. 
5.15.3 Chemical Hazard Evaluation 
For toxic chemicals. several government agencies recommend the quantification of health effects 
as threshold values of concentrations in air or water that cause short-term effects. The long-term 
health consequences of human exposure to tox ic chemicals are not as well understood as those for 
radiation. Thus. the potentia l health effects from toxic chemicals are more subjective than those from 
radioacti ve materials. 
This section provides a quanti tative di scussion for an analyzed chemical accidenl at the 
Receiving Bas in for Offsite Fuel facility and qualitative discussions addressing chemical hazards for 
eac h of the other existing SRS facili ties involved in the rece ipt. processing. transport. or storage of 
spent nuclear fuel. 
5.15.3.1 Receiving Basin for Offsite Fuel. The maximum reasonably foreseeable chemical 
hazard accident for the Receiving Bas in for Offsitc Fuel wou ld involve the release of nitrogen dioxide 
vapor following the complete react ion of a drum of target clean ing solution ( 13.4 percent nitric acid) 
wi.h sodium ni.ri.e (WSRC I 993b). The ini.ialOr for .his acciden. is a leak from a s.orage .ank in.o 
the target cleaning solution and invol ves multiple failures or maloperations willI an accident 
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probabiJj.y comparable '0 .ha. of a natu ral phenomena acciden!. Table 5-25 shows .he concenlra.ion 
of nilrogen dioxide vapor .ha. an individual a •• he SRS boundary and a maxi mally exposed coloea.ed 
worker could receive. 
Table 5-25. Resu"s of analyzed chemical acciden!. 
Recep'or Group 
Maximally Exposed Offsi.e Individual 
Colocaled Worker 
Frequency 
(per year) 
1.0 x JO" 
1.0 x JO" 
NO~ Concentration 
. (mg/m' ) 
0.083 
0.64 
To determine the potential health effects from this bounding chemical accident scenario. this 
assessment was to compare the resulting airborne concentrations of nitrogen dioxide at various receptor 
distances against Emergency Response Planning Guideline (ERPG) values. where available. Because 
there were no ERPG values available for nitrogen dioxide. the assessment substituted other chemical 
toxicity values as fo llows: 
For Emergency Response Planning Guideline I. the assessmen. subs.ilUled .hreshold limi. 
\,alues/.ime·weigh.ed average (TLVrrwA) values (ACGIH 1987). The .ime-weigh.ed 
average is the average concentration for a normal 8-hour workday and a 40-hour workweek 
from which nearly all workers could receive repeated exposure. day-after-day. without 
adverse effect. 
For Emergency Response Planning Guideline 2. the assessment substituted level of concern 
(LOC) va lues [equal '0 0.1 of .he immedia'ely dangerous '0 life or heal.h (IDLH) 
va lue: - see below}. The level of concern value is the concentration of a hazardous 
substance in the air above which there could be serious irreversible health effects or death as 
a resull of a single exposure for a rela.ively short period of .ime (EPA 1987). 
For Emergency Response Planning Guideline 3. the asseso;; ment substituted immediately 
dangerous to life or health values. This value is the maximum concentration from which a 
person could escape within 30 minutes without a respirator and without experiencing any 
impairmcn. of escape or irreversible side effec.s (NIOSH 1990) . 
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These values as they apply to nitrogen dioxide are as follows: 
Time-weighted average value = 5.6 milligrams per cubic meter 
Level of concern value = 9.4 milligrams per cubic meter 
immedialely dangerous 10 life or heahh value = 94.0 milligrams per cubic meIer 
5.15.3.2 Reactor Basins. There are no poslUlaled chemical acc idenls for Ihe reaclor basins 
that would cause an impact to an individual at the SRS boundary or a colocated worker. 
5.15.3.3 H-Area. There are no pos!ulaled chemical accidenls for Ihe H-Area Canyon Ihal 
would cause an impacI 10 an individual al Ihe SRS boundary or a colocaled worker. DOE has 
performed an accidenl analys is for Ihe H-Area Canyon facility workers Ihal indicales Ihe exislence of 
potential injuries due to chemical contamination or exposure to hazardous vapors at or above the level 
of concern exposure limil (Du Ponl 1983a). The analysis does nol projecI exposure 10 hazardous 
vapors at or above the immediate danger to life and health level to occur. 
The probabililY Iha' a worker could be accidenlally exposed 10 any of Ihe hazardous liquids 
idenlified in Auachmenl A. Table A- 14. is bounded by a frequency of 2.8 x 10" per year (Du POOl 
1983a). The moSI likely injury is an acid bum 10 Ihe skin. 
The probabi lity for exposure to hazardous vapors at or above the level of concern exposure limit 
is 8.5 x 10" per year (Oil Ponl 1983a). The polenlial for chemical uplakes and for illness would 
depend on Ihe safely measures laken before Ihe exposure. Ihe duralion of Ihe exposure. and Ihe 
mit igating ac tions taken afte r the exposure. 
5.15.3.4 F-Area. There are no poslulaled chemical accidenls for Ihe F-Area Canyon Ihal 
wou ld cause an impacI 10 an individual al Ihe SRS boundary or a colocaled worker. DOE has 
performed an acc ident analys is for the F-Area Canyon facility workers Ihat indicales Ihe existence of 
potent ial injuries due to chemical contaminal ion or exposure to hazardous vapors at or above the level 
of concern exposure limil (Du POOl 1983b). The analysis does nol projecI exposure 10 hazardous 
vapors al or above the immediate danger to life and health level to occur. 
The probabi lilY thaI a worker could be accidenlally exposed 10 anyone of Ihe hazardous liquids 
idenl ified in Auachmenl A. Table A-I S. is bounded by a frequency of 1.2 x 10" per year (Du Ponl 
1983b). The moSI like ly injury is an acid bum 10 Ihe skin. 
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The probability for exposure to hazardous vapors at or above the level of concern exposure limit 
is 3.2 x 10" per year (Du Ponl 1983b). The pOlenlial for chemical uplakes and for illness would 
depend on the safety measures taken before the exposure. the duration of the exposure. and the 
mitigating ac tions taken after the exposure. 
5.15.4 Secondary Impacts 
The primary focus of the accident analysis is to detennine the magnitude of the consequences of 
poslulaled accidenl scenarios on public and worker heahh and safely . However. DOE recognizes Ihal 
chemical and radiological accidents can also adversely affect the surrounding environment (i.e .. 
secondary impacls). Accordingly. DOE has qualilalively evaiualed each of Ihe eighl radiolog ical 
accident scenarios considered in this analysis for potential secondary impacts. The following 
paragraphs discuss Ihe resuhs of Ihe evalualion. and Table 5-26 summarizes expecled secondary 
impacts for each accident scenario. 
5.15.4.1 Biotic Resources. Wilh Ihe exceplion of a direcI discharge of disassembly basin 
water to an onsite stream. DOE does not expect radiological contamination resulting from any of tt:e 
analyzed accidents to reach any onsite or offsite surface water. DOE previously evaluated the case of 
a direcI discharge of disassembly basin waler (DOE 1990) and believes Ihal impacls on biolic 
resources would be minor. Therefore. the impacts on aquatic biota from any of the accident scenarios 
would be minor. Small areas of minor surface contamination likely would be outside the 
industrialized area of a postulated accident. Terrestrial biota in or near the contaminated area would 
be exposed to small quantities of radioac tive materials and ionizing radiation until the affectt:d area 
could be decontaminated. DOE believes that the impacts on biotic resources from this exposure would 
be minor. 
5.15.4.2 Water Resources. DOE expecls no adverse impacls on waler quaiily from any of 
Ihe poslUlaled acc idem scenarios. Accidenl A 7 (Exlemai SpilllLiquid Di scharge) would be expecled 10 
haVe:! the most significant impact. With the exception of the reactor disassembly basins. the location 
and configuration of existing or pOlenti al facilitie s would prevent a d irect release of radionuclide-
contaminated water to surface water. However. contamination of the surface aqu ifer in tht! area of the 
release would be likely. The processes govern ing the slow plume move ment and attenuation of 
contaminants described in Section 5.8 would prevent the contamination from reaching surface- or 
groundwater resources. Simil arly. radionuclide contamination of onsite or offsite drinking 
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Table 5-26. Qualitati ve summary of expected secondary impacts. 
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water sources wou ld be unlikely. DOE evaluated the effects of a direc t discharge of di sassembiy basin 
water on wate r resources (DOE 1990) and believes that impacts on water rt! sources would be minimal. 
5.15.4.3 Economic Impacts. DOE expects limited economic impacts as a result of any of 
the postulated accidents. Any c leanup required would be localized. and the existing workforct! and 
equipment cou ld perfo rm it. Contam ination should be contained wi thin a small area inside the SRS 
boundaries for all e ight postulated acc ident scenarios. The ex isting workforce could accomplish any 
required cleanup. 
5.15.4.4 National Defense. None of the postulated accidents wou ld affec t the DOE nat ional 
defense mission. Spent nuclear fuel management ac tivi ties do not involve the production of materials 
needed for national defense. 
5.15.4.5 Environmental Contamination. DOE expects that none of the postulated accident 
scenarios would result in large areas of contaminat ion. Local contamination is likely around the site 
of an accident. but in all scenarios should be contained within the SRS boundaries. Minor 
contamination outside the immediate area of the accident is unlikely to require cleanup of more than a 
small area inside the Site boundary . Impac ts in all cases should be minimal. 
5.15.4.6 Endangered Species. There are no Federa lly li sted threatened or endange red 
species habitats in the immediate vicinity of existing or potential spent nuclear fue l storage or 
proeess ing faci liti es (see Sec tion 4 .9.4). None of the postu lated accident scenarios would like ly result 
in large areas of surface contamination outside the immediate faci lit ies. and DOE does not expect 
adver'\e impacts to surfJce water. There fore . none of the postulated accident scenarios is likely to 
Impact threatened or endangered species. 
5.15.4.7 Land Use. No accident scenario should result in large areas of contamination. nor 
would the Impacts be irreversible. DOE ex pects no change in land use. 
5.15.4.8 Treaty Rights. The environme nta l impacts of each of the accident scenarios should 
be contained within the SRS boundJries. Because the re are no Native American or public lands wi thin 
the <lie boundaries. treaty rights would not be affec ted. 
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5.15.5 Adjusted Point Estimate of Risk Summary 
The accident scenarios described in Section 5. 15.2 differ only slightly be tween the various 
a lternat ives. These scenarios did not account for variations in spent nuclear fue l shipments (including 
onsi te operational transfers) and spent fuel storage inventories across the alternatives. To provide a 
rea listic comparison across alternatives. DOE developed Jdjustment factors to adjust frequencie s or 
consequences, depending on the specific circumstance of each alte rnative. AUJchment A. 
Section A.2 .9. provides the methodology and justifications used to develop appropriate adjustment 
factors. This sect ion prov ides the adjusted poin t estimates of ri sk for each accident scenario by 
receptor group to demonst rate a re lative comparison of each altemJt ive on a case· by-case bas is. 
Tables 5-27. 5-28. and 5·29 summarize the adjusted point estimates of ri sk for each a lte rnati ve for the 
maximally ex posed indi vidual. the general population to 80 kilometers. and the coloeated worke r. 
5.16 Cumulative Impacts 
The Savannah Ri ver Site (SRS) contains major U.S . Department of Energy (DOE) and non·DOE 
fac ili ties. unrelated to spe nt nuclear fu el. that \\Ioul~ continue to operate th roughout the life of the 
spent nuclear fue l manJgement program. The Jctivi ties associJted with these existing fJc ililies 
produce environrnentJ I consequences that this document has included in the baseline environmenta l 
conditions (Chaple r 4) aga inst which it assesses the consequences of the spent nuclear fuel a lternati ves. 
Impacts of both the construction and operation of SRS spent nuc lear fue l fac ilities would be 
cumulative with the impacts of existing and planned fJcilit ies unre lated to spent nuc lear fu e l. 
This cumulJ tive impJct assessme nt considered the incrementa l and synergistic e ffec ts o f the 
operat ion of the Defense Was te Processing Faci lity. which is nearing completion. and the Consolidated 
Inci neration Faci lity. which is under construction. when Jppropriatc and when data ex isted. For 
eXJmplc. the Air Quality analys is factored in emissions from these two faci liti es when conside ring 
potenti al impac ts of operat ions of spent nuc lear fuel racilities. The small volumes of liquid cfn uent 
(trealed sanitary wastes) currentl y ente ring the environmt! nt from the Defense Waste Processing 
Fac ility. on the other hand. we re considered pan of the Wate r Quality baseline . The only major stand 
alone fac ilities schedu led to be bui lt in the near future o n the SRS are the Savannah Ri ver Ecology 
Laboratory Confe rence Center and the new Central ized SanitJry \Vastewater Treatment Fac ility. A 
number of other planned fac ilities have not been factored into the cumulative impacts analys is becau~t! 
final funding approval has not been rece ived or because decisions on these fac ilities involve major 
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< Table 5-27. Adjusted point estimates r risk for the maximally exposed offs ite individual (radiological accidents). 0 
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Table 5-28, Adjusted point estimates of risk for the co located worker (radio logical accidents). 
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a. 
I' ~rldc nl 
Dc~. riplion 
;\~ . Criul"alllY in 
wah:r 
A6 · Croll ahl)" 
dunng pmce~slng 
J\ 7 . ['tern:.!! 
'pollll'qu,d 
di,rharp! 
A8 . Internal 
' p,II11'qu,d 
d", hargc 
t\tlIlbuIC 
AUju, tcd 
Healtn Effecl" 
Adju.<ted 
Annual 
Frequency 
Adju,teu Point 
E., umate of 
R"k" 
Adju,ted 
lIealth Effecl" 
Adju'ted 
Annual 
Frequency 
Adju'tcd Point 
E" tlrmuc! of 
RI ~ kb 
Adju, ted 
Health Effecl" 
AUju>ted 
Annual 
Frequency 
Adju'ted Po,nl 
E.,umale of 
Risk" 
Adjusted 
Health Effect<' 
;\ dju\ted 
Annual 
f'rcquency 
Adju<led POInl 
E,umale of 
R.,kh 
Rcglonalll,Hlon . n 
Opuon Opuon Opllon OptIOn 
old -Ie ~f ~g 
56,10 ' 56,10 ' 5.6.10 ' 56.10' 
gOxlO' 80x10' ~ .10 ' 33 ,1 0 ' 
~ 5. 10 ' ~ 5,10 ' 21. 10 18,10 ' 
(c) (c) 1.0, 10' (c) 
(e) (c) 18x10' (c) 
(c) (c) 1 8x 10 ' (c) 
1 9. 10 ' 3.9,10' 39,10 ' 3 9x 10 ' 
2 Ox 10" 20, 10' 20, 10' 2 0.10 ' 
78,10 ' 78,10 ' 78,10 ' 78,10 ' 
10,10" 10.10 .. 10.10" 10.10" 
I 1.10 ' I 1.10' I 1,10 ' I Ix lO ' 
1 2< 10 " 1.2< 10 " 1 1. 10 " 1.1,10 " 
Units for ndjustcd health effects are given in terms of potential fatal cancers . 
b. Units for adjusted point estimates of risk are given in terms of potential fatal cancers per year. 
The accide nt scenario is not included in the spectrum of potential accidents for this case. c. 
d. The safety analyses from which informatio n was extracted for these accidents were written before issuance of DOE Order 5480.23; previous Orders did not 
require the inclus ion of colocated workers. 
< 
Table 5-29. Adjusted point t:stimatc!s of risk for the general population - 80 kilo meters (radiological acc ide nts). 
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Z a. niL~ for adjusted healt h effec ts are give n in terms of potenti al fatal cancers. 
-=: 
x b. nit:- fo r adjusted poin t estimates of risk are give n in tenns of potent ial fatal cancers per year. 
f") c. The accident scenariu is not incl uded in the spectru m of po tentia l accidents for this case. 
r::.2 /3 
unresolved DOE policy issues. For example. Ihis cumulal ive impact assessment docs not consider 
iong-tt.'nn reconfiguration issue!' Table 5-30 presents a summary of cumulative impacts assoc iated 
wi th the various spent fuel managem!!nt alternati ves. 
5.16.1 Land Use 
The land committed 10 spent nuclear fuel management activities at the SRS would lie. for the 
most part. within existing onsite industrial compounds or undeveloped onsite areas devoted to the 
cont inued mission of the Site. Under two of the alternat ives - Regionalization by Location (at SRS) 
and Centralization (at SRS) - a new Expended Core Faci lity could be required to examine and 
characterize spent nuclear fuels from naval installations east of the Mississippi . Two locations have 
been proposed for the Expended Core Facili ty. one in the approximate center of the SRS and the other 
at the old Allied General Nuclear Services facility (or "Barnwell Nuclear Fuel Plant") that is located 
off Road G (and near SRS Barricade 4) just east of and adjacent to the Site. 
Previously-undeveloped land commiued to new spent nuclear fuel faci lities (excluding the 
Expended Core Facility ) would be limited to a maximum of approximately 100 acres (0.4 square 
ki lometer). Depending on the location chosen. an addit ional 30 acres (0. 1 square kilometer) could be 
required for a new Expended Core Fac ility. Thus. a maximum of 130 acres (0.5 square kilometer) 
could be converted from woodlands or old fields to industrial faci lities and supporting infrastructure 
under the bounding options. Option 5a (Centralization - Dry Storage) and Option 5c (Centralization -
Processing} Any site used for the support of spent nuclear fuel act ivities wou ld be under government 
cont rol. With the exception of the Barnwell Nuclear Fuel faci lity. which the Navy would purchase 
from Allied General Nuclear Services for an offsite Expended Core Facility. DOE would not require 
any additional I ~nd from the public domain for SRS ~~ent nuclear fuel management facilitie s. 
Grou nd was broken for the new Savannah River Ecology Laboratory Conference Center in May 
1994. The new facility wi ll occupy a 70-acre area. but only 5 to 10 acres will be cleared and graded 
for the new conference center. parking areas. and an access road. The remaining 60-65 acres will be 
managed as a nature study area and preserve. Thus. the Savannah River Ecology Laboratory 
Conference Center will require conversion of 5 to 10 acres of planted pines or pine/mixed hardwood 
(depending on the exact location of the building) to light-industriaVpubl ic use. 
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Table 5-30. Cumulative impacts associated with construction and operat ion of spent fuel alternat ives 
at SCJvannah River Site. 
Land Use 
Socioeconomics 
Ai r Resources 
ALTERNATIVE I - NO ACTION 
Option I 
Wei Siorage 
No new land commiued to new usc. 
A maximum of 50 new jobs created annuall y during construction: no new jobs created 
during operation. 
SIte emissions would not exceed any air quality standard. Table 5-3 1 lists cumulati ve Site 
nonradioacti ve releases at the SRS boundary. 
Occupational and Public 
Health and SafelY 
Radioactive ai rborne releases. expressed as cumulat ive dose to a maxima lly exposed 
individua l at the Site boundary. would be 9.0x IO·3 rem. 
Materials and Waste 
Management 
Land Use 
Socioeconomics 
Ai r Resources 
Occupational and 
Public Health and 
Safety 
Materi als and Waste 
Management 
High-Level: Current generation levels 
Transuranic: Current generation levels 
Low-Leve l: Current generation leyels 
Mixed: Current generation levcls 
Hazardous: Current generation levels 
Sanitary: Current generat ion levels 
ALTERNATIVE 2 - DECENTRALIZATION 
Option 23 
Dry Storage 
Option 2b 
Wet Storage 
Small amount of land «10 acres) Small amou nt of land 
committed to new usc. 
Construction 
jobs: 600 peak 
Operation: No new jobs 
Si te emissions would nOI exceed 
any air quality standard. Table 5-
31 lists cumuladvc Site 
nonradioactive releases at Ihe 
SRS boundary. 
Radioactive airborne releases. 
expressed as cumulative dose to a 
maximall y exposed individual at 
Ihe Si te boundary. would be 
9.0x 10" rem. 
Hi gh-Level: No changc 
Transurllmc: 6% increase 
Low-Levcl: No change 
Mixed: No change' 
Hazardous: No changc' 
SaRllary: No change~ 
« 10 acres) commiued to 
Construct ion 
jobs: 600 peak 
Operation: No new jobs 
Sile emissions would not 
exceed any air qualit y 
standard. Table 5-3 1 li sts 
cumulative Site 
nonradioactive releases at 
the SRS boundary . 
Radioacti ve airborne 
releases. ex pressed as 
cumulative dose to a 
maximall y exposed 
individual at the Site 
boundary. would be 9.0x 10" 
rem. 
Hi gh- Leve l: No changc 
Transurani c: 6% IRcrease 
Low-Levcl: No change 
Mi xcd: No ch:l11ge' 
Hazardous: No change' 
Samtary: No ch ;lRge~ 
5-87 
Option 2c 
Processing 
Small amount of land 
«10 acres) committed to new 
Construction 
jobs: 550 pen 
Operation: No new jobs 
Site emissions would nol 
exceed any ai r quality 
standard. Table 5-31 li sts 
cumulative Site nonradioactive 
releases al the SRS boundary. 
Radi oactive ai rborne releases. 
expressed as cumulati ve dose 
to a maximally cxposed 
individual al the Sile 
bou ndary. would be -'.4x 10'" 
High-Lcvel: -'75% increase 
Transuramc: 12% incrca. .. c 
Low-Level: 100% Increase 
MIxed: No changc' 
Hazardous: No change' 
SanitJry: No changc~ 
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Table 5-30. (conlinllcd). 
Land U.;;(' 
Socioeconomics 
AIr Resources 
Occupational and 
Public Health and 
Safety 
Malenals and Waste 
Management 
Land U~ 
SuclocCOnOmlC\ 
Occupational and 
Pubhc Health and 
SafelY 
AI.TERNATIVE 3- 199211993 PLANN ING BASI, 
Oplion Ja 
Dry Storage 
Small amount of land « 10 :lc rcs) 
com mined 10 new usc. 
Construction 
jobs: 600 peak 
Operation: No new jobs 
Site emissions would nOi exceed 
:my ai r quality standard. Table 5· 
31 Iisls cumul:uivc Site 
nonradioacti ve releases at the 
SRS boundary . 
Radioactive ai rborne releases. 
expressed as cumulative dose 10 :1 
maximally exposed individual at 
the Site boundary. 'o'"'U ld be 
9.0xI0 ' fe rn. 
High·Leve l: No change 
Transuranic ' 6~ increase 
Low-Level' No change 
Mixed: No change" 
Hazardous: No change" 
Sanitary: No changeb 
Oplion Jb 
Wei Storage 
Small amount of land 
«10 acres) commItted to 
new usc. 
Construction 
jobs: 650 peak 
Operation: No new jobs 
Site emissions would not 
exceed any air quality 
standard. Table 5-31 lists 
cumulative Site 
nonradioactive releases al 
the SRS boundary. 
Radioacti vc ai rborne 
releases. cxpressed as 
cumulative dose 10 a 
maximally exposed 
indi vidual at the Site 
boundary. would be 9.0x 10.3 
re m. 
High-Level : No change 
Transuran ic: 6% increase 
Low-Level: No change 
Mixed: No change" 
Hazardous: No change" 
Sanitary: No changeh 
AI.TE RNATIVE 4· REG IONALlZATlON 
Option 4a 
Dry Storage 
Sma!1 amount o f land «10 ac res) 
committed 10 new use. 
Con~tructlon 
Jobs 
Operation. 
650 peak 
No new jobs 
Option 4b 
Wet Storage 
Sma ll amount of land 
« 10 acres) committed to 
new use. 
Construction 
Jobs: 650 peak 
Ooeration: No new jobs 
SHe e miSSIOns would nOI exceed Sile emisdons would not 
any :ur quality standard Table 5· exceed any air qua lity 
3 1 hsts cu mulallve Site standatd. Table 5-31 lists 
nonr3choactlve releases at the 
SRS boundary . 
Radloactl\'e ai rborne releases. 
expressed as cu mulati ve dose to a 
maX imall y exposed IOdivldu31 at 
the ollie boundary. would be 
90xlO' rem 
cu~u lati "e Site 
non odioac: ive releases a t 
the SP S bOlJndar), 
Radioacllvt' airoorne 
teleases. eX ;)fessed as 
cumu lative dose to a 
maxlmallyexpnsed 
indi vidual 3t the S :le 
boundary. would Ix 9 .0xl0' 
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c:i10 
Option 3c 
Processing 
Small amount of land 
«10 acres) com mined to new 
usc. 
Construction 
jobs: 550 peak 
Operation: No new jobs 
Site emissions would not 
excced any air quality 
stand:ud. Table 5-31 lists 
cumulati ve Si te nonradioactive 
releases at the SRS boundary. 
Radioacti vc airborne rcleases. 
expressed as cumu lative dose 
10 a maximally exposed 
individual at the Site 
boundary. would be 4.5xI0'" 
High·Leve l: 325% increase 
Transuranic : 12% increase 
Low- l evel: 87.5% increase 
Mixed: No change" 
Hazardous: No change" 
Sani lary: No changeh 
Option 4c 
Processi ng 
Small amount o f land 
« 10 acres) committed to new 
Construction 
jobs: 
Operat ion: 
550 peak 
No new jobs 
Site emissions would not 
ext:eed any air qua lity 
standard. Tab le 5-3\ li sts 
cumulati ve Site nonradioact ive 
releases at the SRS boundary. 
Radioactive airborne releases. 
expressed as cu mul ative dose 
to a m:lXimally exposed 
individual at the Site 
boundary. would be 4 .7x 10'" 
rem. 
Table 5-30. (conlinued). 
Materials and Waste 
Management 
Land Use 
Socioeconomics 
Ai r Resou rces 
Occupational and 
Public Health and 
Sa fet y 
Materials and Waste 
Managemen t 
Land Use 
Socioeconomics 
Air Kcsou rces 
Occupational and 
Public Health and 
Safety 
Option 4a 
Of) Storage 
Hig h-Level : 
T ransuranic: 
Low·Level: 
Mixcd : 
Hazardous: 
Sanitary: 
No change 
No change 
No change 
No change' 
No change' 
No change" 
Option 4d 
Dry Storage 
Approxi mately 40 acres 
commiued to new use. 
Construction 
jobs: 
Operation: 
910 peak 
No new jobs 
Site emissions wc uld not exceed 
any ai r quality slandard. Table 5-
31 lists cumulati ve Site 
nonradioacti ve releases at the 
SRS boundary. 
Rad ioactive airborne releases. 
expressed as cumu lati"'e dose to a 
maximally exposed individual al 
tile Sitc boundary. would be 
9.0,... 10.3 rem. 
High-Level: 
T ransurani c: 
Low·Leve l: 
Mixed: 
Hazardous: 
Sanitary: 
No change 
No change 
No change 
No change" 
No change" 
No changeb 
Option 4b 
Wet Storage 
Hig h·Level: 
T ransurJ nk : 
l ow-Level : 
Mixed: 
Hazardous: 
Sanitary: 
No change 
No change 
No change 
No change' 
No changc" 
No change" 
Oplion 4e 
Wet Storage 
Approximately 35 acres 
committed to new use. 
Construction 
jobs: 9 10 peak 
Operation: No new jobs 
Site emissions would not 
exceed any ai r quali ty 
standard. Table 5·3 1 lists 
cumulative Site 
nonradioactive releases al 
the SRS boundary. 
Radioactive ai rborne 
re leases. expressed as 
cumul ative dose to a 
maximally exposed 
individua l at the Site 
boundary. would be 9.0x 10" 
rem. 
High-Level : 
Transuranic : 
Low- Level: 
Mixed: 
Ha7.ardous: 
Sanitary: 
No change 
No change 
No change 
No change" 
No change" 
No changcb 
Option 4g 
Ship Out 
Less than one acre of land committed to new usc. 
Construction 
jobs: 200 peak 
Operation: No new jobs 
Option 4c 
Processing 
High-Le\'cl : 475% increase 
T ransuranic' 6% increase 
Low- Level: 97.5% increase 
Mixed: No changc' 
Hazardous: No change" 
Sanitary: No change" 
Option 4r 
Processing 
Approximillely 35 acres 
committed to new usc. 
Construction 
jobs: 
Operation: 
860 peak 
No new jobs 
Site emissions wou ld not 
exceed any air quali ty 
standard. Table 5-31 lists 
cumulative Site nonradioacti ve 
releases at the SRS boundary. 
Radioactive airborne releases. 
expressed as cumulative dose 
to a maximall y exposed 
individual at the Sitc 
bou ndary. would be 4 .7xIO~ 
rem. 
High-Level: 
Transurani c: 
Low- Leve l: 
Mi xed : 
Hazardous: 
Sanitary: 
475% incrcase 
6% increase 
97.5% inc rease 
No changc" 
No changc" 
No change" 
Sile emissions would nOI exceed any ai r quality st3ndard. Table 5-3 1 lists cu mul ative site 
nonradioactive releases a t the SRS boundary. 
Radioact ive airborne releases. expressed as cumulati ve dosc to a maxlO13l1y exposed mdl\'ldual at 
the Sile boundary. would be (less than) <9.0xI0·' rem. 
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Table 5-30. (continued). 
MatenJls and Waste High·Leve l: Reduced volume of waste produced 
6'H increase Management Transur.Jmc: 
Land Usc 
Socioeconomics 
Air Resources 
Occupational and 
Puhlic Health and 
Safety 
Matenals and Waste 
Management 
LandU", 
SocioeconomICS 
Low-Level: No change 
Mixed: No change' 
Halardous: No change' 
SaMary: No changc~ 
ALTERNATIVE 5 - CENTRALIZATION 
Option 53 
Dry Storage 
100·130 acres of land commi llcd 
to new use. 
Construction: 2.550 peak: 
Operation: No new jobs 
Option Sb 
Wet StorafC 
70-80 acres of land 
commincd to new usc. 
Construction: 2.700 peak 
Operati on: No new jobs 
Site emissions would nOI exceed Site emissions wou ld nOI 
any al f qualifY standard. Table 5- exceed any ai r quality 
3 1 lists cu mulative Site standard. Table 5·31 lisls 
nonradioactive releases at the 
SRS boundary. 
Radioacti ve airborne releases. 
expressed as cumulative dose to a 
maximally exposed individual at 
the Site boundary. would be 
9.0xI0·' rem. 
High-Level: Reduced volume of 
waste produced 
Transuranic: Reduced volume of 
waste produced 
Low-Level: No change 
Mi xed: No change 
Hazardous: No change" 
Sanitary: No change~ 
cumulati ve Site 
nonradioactive releases a l 
the SRS boundary. 
Radioactive airborne 
releases. expressed as 
cumulati ve dose to a 
maximally exposed 
individua l at the Site 
boundary. would be 9.0x I0·' 
rem. 
High-Level: 475% 
increase 
Transumnic: 18% increase 
Low·Level: No change 
Mixed: No change~ 
Hazardous: No change" 
Sanitary: No changel! 
Option 5d 
Ship Ou, 
Less than one acre of land commined to new use. 
ConstructIon: 200 peak 
Operation: No new jobs 
Option Sc 
Processing 
100·130 acres of land 
commined to new usc. 
Construction: 2.550 peak 
Oper;lIion: No new jobs 
Site emissions would not 
exceed any air quality 
standard . Table 5-) 1 lists 
cumulati ve Site nonradioactive 
re leases at the SRS boundary. 
Radi oactive airborne releases. 
expressed as cumulati vc dose 
to a maximally exposed 
individual at the Site 
boundary. would be 4 . 7x I 0·~ 
rem. 
Hig h-Level: 475% increase 
Transumnic: 18% increase 
Low-Level: 100% increase 
Mi~ed: No changc" 
Hazardous: No change" 
Sanitary: No change'" 
Air Resources Sl1e emissions would nOl exceed any ai r quality standard. Table 5·) I li sts cumulative Site 
nonr3(hoactlve releases althe SRS boundary. 
Occupallonal and 
Public Health and 
Safety 
RadIoacti ve ai rborne relea,\Cs, expressed as cumulative dose to a maximally exposed 
IndiVidual at the Site boundary. wou ld be 9.0x I0·' rem. 
Malenais and Waste Hlgh·Level. Reduced volu me or waste produced 
Management TransuraRlc. 6'k Increase 
Low-Level: No change 
Mixed: 0 change' 
Hazardous: No change' 
SaRltary: No change'" 
:-""N"'''':-:.='=PCC=,cd:i7.,o:-:,;;:h=an::g=,''::. no:;:':.;:n'foat;;'y,;;;,s conducted. 
Noc UpeCled to change. based on J?101 ... "Cled employmenl levels at SRS. 
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Construction on the new Centrali zed Sanitary Wastewater Treatment Facility is scheduled to 
begin in 1994 and should be completed in 1995. This new facility will be built approximately I mile 
south of F-Area on Burma Road. Building the central facili ty will require clearing approximately 
6 acres of planted pines. An 18 mile trunkline/collec tion system will also be required. using existing 
transmission line and steam line rights-of-way to the extent possible. This trunkline will be located in 
the northwest quadrant of the SRS. and will connect the new Centralized Sanitary Wastewater 
Treatment Fac ility to A-Area. F-IH-Areas. and C-Area. 
Depending on the spent nuclear fuel management alternative chosen. a total of 150 acres of SRS 
land could be cleared and converted to fac ilities and infrastructure as a result of spent nuclear fuel 
management (including an Expended Core Facility). construction of the Savannah Ri ver Ecology 
Laboratory Conference Center. and completion of the Centralized Sanitary Wastewater Treatment 
Facility. This represents less than 0.1 percent of the undeveloped land on the SRS. and will have 
minimal cumulative impact on long-teon land use locally and regionally. 
5.16.2 Socioeconomics 
There would be minimal cumulative impacts on the socioeconomic resources of the SRS region 
from any spent fuel management alternative. The greatest change in employment would occur under 
the Centralization Alternative. which would include construction and operation of an Expended Core 
Faci lity at SRS. Construction of an Expended Core Facility would require an es timated 850 addi tional 
employees in the peak year ( 1999). while operation of the facility would add a maximum of 
approximately 500 full- time jobs. DOE anticipates that overall employ ment on the Site will decline 
during the fi rst 5 years of the spent fuel management period and will stab il ize thereafter as the SRS 
mission changes. Workers who might otherwise lose their jobs could be employed by SRS in spent 
fuel program activities. Therefore. DOE expects little or no d irect increase in employment due to the 
program. The Site would fill any new jobs from the existing regional labor force. 
5.16.3 Air Qualily 
Table 5-3 1 compares the cumulati ve emissions of nonradioactive pollu tan ts from the SRS. 
including those from the proposed spe nt nuclear fuel alternatives. to the pertinent regulatory standards. 
The values provided are the maximum concentrations that would occur at ground level at the Site 
boundary . Not all maximum concentrations would occur at the same location. 
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Table 5~3t. Total maximum ground~level concentrations (jJg/cubic meter) of criteria and IOx ic air 
pollutants at SRS boundary resulting from normal operations and spent nuclear fuel manage ment 
alternati ves. l " 
Emi SSions 
Criteria Pollutants 
NO, 
S0, 
PM 10 
TSP 
Ozone (as VOCl 
Gaseous fluoride (as HF) 
Lead 
CO 
Toxic Pollutants 
Nunc aCid 
1.1.I·Tnchloroelhanc 
Benzene 
Ethanolamine 
Ethylbcnzenc: 
Ethylene glycol 
Fonnaldehyde 
Glycol ethers 
He" ac h loronaph I hale ne 
Hexane 
\tanganc:~ 
Methanol 
Methyl ethyl ketone 
~1ethyl ·obulyl ketone 
\1ethy\c"\C chlonde 
NapchaJene 
Phenol 
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Avcraging 
Time 
Annual 
Annual 
2-l-hours 
3-hours 
Annual 
24-hours 
Annual 
I-hour 
I·month 
I· week 
24-hours 
12-hours 
An nual 
d-hours 
I-hour 
24-hours 
2.l-hours 
24-hours 
24-hours 
24-hours 
24·hours 
2-l-hours 
24-hours 
2ol-hours 
24-hours 
2.l-hours 
2.l-hours 
2-l-hours 
24-hours 
24-hours 
Option a 
Dry Storage 
.l (4'7c) 
10 (lNI 
185.0 (50%) 
634 (49%1 
3 (6%) 
56.0 (37%) 
11 {17%) 
0.03 (4%) 
0.15 (9%) 
0.3 1 ( 11 <;!-) 
0.62 (17%) 
<0.01 «1 %) 
23. 1 (0.2%) 
181 (0.4%) 
6.7 (5%) 
22 (0.2%) 
31 (2 1<;!-) 
<0.01 « 0.19r) 
0.12 «0. 1 <;!-) 
0.08 «0.1%) 
<0.01 «0. 1%) 
<0.0 1 NI A 
<0.01 (<1<;!-) 
0.Q7 «0.)%) 
0.10 (0.4%) 
0.51 « 0.1%) 
0.99 « 0.1 %) 
0.51 « 0. 1%) 
1.8 (0.3%) 
0.0 1 « 0.1<;!-) 
0.03 « 0. 1%) 
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Option b 
Wet Storage 
4 (40/() 
10 ( 12'7') 
185.0 (50<;!-1 
634 (49%) 
3 (6<;!-) 
56.0 (37%) 
11 (17%) 
N/Ad 
om (4%) 
0. 15 (9%) 
0.3 1 (11 %) 
0.62 (17%) 
<0.01 «1%) 
23. 1 (0.2%) 
181 (0.4%) 
6.7 (5%) 
22 (0.02%) 
31 (2 1%) 
<0.0) « 0.1%) 
0.12 «0.1%) 
0.08 «0.1%) 
<0.01 «0.1%) 
<O.OINIA 
<0.01 « 1%) 
0.07 « 0.1%) 
0.1010.4%) 
0.51 «0.1%) 
0.99 «0. 1 %) 
0.5 1 «0. )%) 
1.8 (0.3%) 
0.01 «0.1%) 
om «0.1% ) 
CJIlO 
Option t: 
Processing 
15 (15%) 
10(12%) 
185.4 (50'7,) 
637 (49<;!-) 
3 (6%) 
56.4 (37%) 
11 (17%) 
N/A~ 
0.05 (6%) 
0.25 (16%) 
0.51 (18%) 
1.02 (28%) 
<0.01 « 1%) 
27.3 (0.3%) 
212 (0.5%) 
7.7 (6%) 
22 (0.2%) 
31 (2 1%) 
<0.01 «0.1%) 
0.12 « 0.1%) 
0.08 « 0.1%) 
<0.01 « 0.1%) 
<0.01 N/A 
<0.01 « 1%) 
0.11 «0. 1%) 
0. 10 (0.4%) 
0.5 1 «0. 1%) 
0.99 «0.1%) 
0.51 «0.1%) 
1.82 (0.4%) 
om «0. 1%) 
0.03 « 0.1%) 
Table 5-31. (conl inued). 
Emiss ions 
Phosphorus 
Sodium hydroxide 
Toluene 
Trichloroethene 
Vinyl acctate 
Xylene 
Emissions 
Criteria Pollutants 
NO, 
S0, 
PM 10 
T5P 
Ozone (as VOC) 
Gaseous fluoride (as HF) 
Lead 
CO 
Toxic Pollutants 
Ni tric ac id 
I.I.I-Trichloroethane 
Benzene 
Ethanolamine 
Ethylbcnlene 
Ethy lene glycol 
Formaldehyde 
Glycol ethers 
Hexachloronaphthalcne 
Averaging 
Time 
24-hours 
24·hours 
24-hours 
24-hours 
24-hours 
24-hours 
Averaging 
Time 
Annual 
Annual 
24-hours 
3-hours 
Annual 
24-hours 
Annual 
I·hour 
I-month 
I·week 
24-hours 
12-hours 
Annual 
8·hours 
I-hour 
24-hours 
24-hours 
24-hours 
24-hours 
24-hours 
24-hours 
24-hours 
24-hours 
24-hours 
Option a 
Dry Storage 
<0.00 1 «0.2%) 
om «0.1 %) 
Alternatives I through 4 
Option b 
Wet Storage 
<0.001 «0.2'<-) 
0.01 «0. 1%) 
1.6 (8%) 1.618%) 
1.0 (0.3%) 1.0 (0.3%) 
0.02 «0. 1%) 0.02 «0.1 %) 
3.81 «0.1 %) 3.8 1 «0.1%) 
Option 5a 
Dry Storage 
4 (4%) 
10(12%) 
185.0 (50%) 
634.5 (49%) 
3 (6%) 
56.0 (37%) 
11 (17%) 
N/A~ 
0.Q3 (4%) 
0.15 (9%) 
0.31 (1 1%) 
0.62 (17%) 
<0.01 « 1%) 
2410.2%) 
187 (0.5%) 
6.7 (5%) 
22 (0.2%) 
31 (2 1%) 
<0.01 «0.1%) 
0.12 «0.1%) 
0.08 «0.1 %) 
<0.01 «0.1%) 
<0.0 1 (N/A) 
<0.01 « 1%) 
Alternative 5 . Centraliz.ation 
Option 5b 
Wet Storage 
4 (4%) 
10 ( 12%) 
185.0 (50%) 
634.5 (49%) 
3 (6%) 
56.0 (37%) 
11 (17%) 
N/Ad 
0.03 (4%) 
0.15 (9%) 
0.3 1 (1)%) 
0.62 ( 17%) 
<0.01 « 1%) 
24 (0.2%) 
187 (0.5%) 
6.7 (5%) 
22 (0.02%) 
31 (2 1%) 
<0.01 « 0.1%) 
0.12 «0.1%) 
0.08 «0.1%) 
<0.01 «0. 1%) 
<0.0 1 (N/A) 
<0.01 « 1%) 
Option 5c 
Processing 
15.1 (15%) 
10 (12%) 
185.5 (52%) 
637.5 (49%) 
3 (6%) 
56.4 (38%) 
11 (17%) 
N/A~ 
0.05 (6%) 
0.25 (16%) 
0.41 (14%) 
1.02 (28%) 
<0.01 «1 %) 
28.1 (0.3%) 
217 (0.5%) 
7.7 (6%) 
22 (0.2%) 
31 (2 1%) 
<0.01 «0.1%) 
0.12 «0.1%) 
0.08 «0.1 %) 
<0.01 «0.1%) 
<0.0 1 (N/A) 
<0.01 «1 %) 
Option c 
Processing 
<0.00 1 «0.2%) 
0.01 «0. 1'<-) 
2.0(10%) 
1.0 (0.3%) 
0.Q2 «0. 1 %) 
3.85 « 0.1'<-) 
Option 5d 
Ship Out 
4 (4%) 
10 (12%) 
)85.0 (50%) 
634 (49%) 
3 (6%) 
56.0 (37%) 
11 ( 17%) 
NIAll 
0.03 (4%) 
0.15 (9%) 
0.31 (11 %) 
0.62 (17%) 
<0.01 « 1%) 
23.1 (0.2%) 
181 (0.4%) 
6.7 (5%) 
22 (0.2%) 
31 (2 1%) 
<0.01 «0.1%) 
0.12 «0.1%) 
0.08 «0. 1%) 
<0.01 « 0.1%) 
<0.0 1 (N/A) 
<0.01 « 1%) 
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Table 5-3\. (continued). 
Allernalin 5 . Centralization 
A\'cragi ng Option Sa Option 5h Option 5c Opllon 5d 
Emissions Time Dry Storage Wet Storage Processing Ship Out 
Hc;(anc 24-hours 0.07 «0.1<;< ) 0.07 « 0.1<;<) 0.11 1<0.1<;< 1 0.071<0.1<;<) 
Manganese 2-l-hours 0.10 (OA<;< ) 0.10 (OA<;< ) 0.10 (0.4<;<) 0.10 (OA<;< ) 
~1clhano l 24·hours 0.51 «0.1<;< ) 0.5) « 0.1%) 0.51 « 0. 1<;<) 0.51 «0.1<;<) 
Methyl ethyl ketone 2-l-hours 0.99 «0.1<;< ) 0.99 « 0.1%) 0.99 « 0.1<;<) 0.99 « 0.1<;<) 
~;lclhyl isobuty l ketone 2+.hours 0.51 «0.1<;<) 0.51 «0.1%) 0.5 ) «0.1<;< 1 0.51 l<O. I%) 
Methylene chloride 24-hours 1.8 (0.3%) 1.8 (0.3%) 1.82 (0.4<;< ) 1.8 (0.3%) 
NaplhaJene 24-hours 0.01 «0.1%) om «0. 1%) om «0.1%) om «0.1%) 
Pheno l 24-hours 0.Q3 «0.1%) 0.03 «0. 1%) 0.03 « 0.1%) 0.Q3 « 0.1<;<) 
Phosphorus 24-hours <0.001 «0.2%) <0.001 «0.2%) <0.001 (0.2%) <0.001 « 0.2%) 
Sodium hydroxide 24-hours 0.01 «0.1%) 0.01 «0.1%) 0.01 «0. 1 %) 0.01 «0. 1%) 
Toluene 24-hours 1.6 (8%) 1.6 (8%) 2.0(10%) 1.6 (8%) 
Trichloroethene 24-hours 1.0 (0.3%) 1.0 (0.3<;<) 1.0(0.3%) 1.0 (0.3%) 
Vinyl acelale 24-hours 0.Q2 «0.1%) 0.02 « 0.1%) 0.02 «0. 1%) 0.02 «0.1%) 
Xylene 24-hours 3.81 « 0.1 %) 3.81 «0.1%) 3.85 «0.1%) 3.81 «0.1%) 
a. Source: WSRC (l994a). 
b. Numbers in parentheses indicate the percentage of the regulatory standard that each conccnlration represents. 
c. No standard for thi s chemicaL 
d. Measurement data currently unavailable. 
The data demonstrate that. even wi th the emissions from the spent nuclear fuel management 
activities. releases of toxic air pollulants from the SRS would be only a small fraction of Ihe 
regulatory slandards. Therefore. DOE anticipates no cumulative impact. 
The releases of some criteria ai r polluta,lls by SRS operations would approach regulatory 
standards. Site sulfur diox ide emissions wou ld reach about 50 percent of both the 24-hour and 3-hour 
limits under all ahemalives. In addition. the emissions of paniculates less than 10 microns (PM,. ) 
would approach a concentralion equal to about 38 percent of the standard. However. the contribution 
to both these pollutants concentrations made by spent nuclear fuel-relaled activities would be small. as 
explained in Section 5.7. 
The SRS evalualed the cumulati ve impact of airborne radioactive releases in te rms of cumulati ve 
dose to a maxi mally exposed individual at the Site boundary . Table 5-32 lists Ihe resuhs of Ihis 
VOLUME I. APPENDIX C 5-94 
Table 5-32. Annual cumulalive heahh effects 10 workers and offsile populalion due to SRS 
radioactive releases during incident-free operations. 
Workcr Offsilc Po;puiaiion 
Maximally Exposed 
A\'crage Indi vidual TOlal Collective Indi vidual Total Collective 
Falal Fatal Fatal Falal 
Dose' Cancc(' Dose' Cancers'! Dose' Cancer" Dos~~ Cancers'! 
Alte rnative 1 • No Action 
O ption 1 3.2x 10.1 1.3x 1 0'" 9.4:dO ' 3.7xlO·' 9.0x I0·' 4 .5x I0·' 8.9x10" 4.4:dO·) 
Wei Storage 
Alternative 2 • Decentralization 
Option 2a 3.0xlO·' 1.2x 10'" 9.4x I0' 3.7xI0·' 9.0xlO·' 4 .5x I0·· 8.9x1 0" 4 .4xIO·) 
Dry SlOrage 
Option 2b 3.2x I0·1 1.3x 10'" 9.4x 101 3.7xlO·' 9 .0x I0·' 4.5xI0·8 8.9x 10" 4 .4xI 0·) 
Wet Storage 
Option 2c 3.6x I0·' 1.5x1 O'" 1.6x10' 6.5xW' 4.4x 1 0'" 2.2xI0·' 2.6x101 I.3xIO·' 
Processing 
Alternative 3 • 199211993 Planning Basis 
Option 3a 3.0xI0·' 1.2x10'" 9.4xI0' 3.7xI0·' 9 .0xI0·' 4 .5xI0·· 8.9x10" 4.4xI0·) 
Dry Storage 
Uption 3b 3.2x I0·1 1.3x 10"' 9.4x101 3.7x I0·' 9.0xI0·s 4.5x I0·· 8.9x10" 4.4xI0·J 
Wei Storage 
Oplion 3c 3.7xlO·1 1.5x 10'" 1.6xl <T 6.6xI0·! 4 .5xI0'" 2.2xlO·7 2.6xI0' I.3xIO·' 
Processing 
Alternative 4 • Regionatizalion 
Oplion 4a 3.0x I0·1 1.2x 10'" 9.4xl01 3.7x I0·' 9.0xI 0·' 4 .5x I 0" 8.9x10" 4 .4x l0·) 
Dry Storage 
Oplion 4b 3.2xI0·' 1.3x10'" 9.4xI0' 3.7x I0·' 9.0xI0·' 4.5xI0·' 8.9x10" 4.4xI0·) 
Wet Siorage 
Oplion 4c 3.7xI0·1 1.5x 10'" I.7x 10' 6.8xlO·' 4.7xl0'" 2.3x l0·7 2.7xI0' 1.4x 10' ~ 
Processi ng 
Oplion 4d 3.2x10·' 1.3x lO'" 9.4x I0' 3 .7x 10.2 9.0xI0·' 4 .5x 1 0" 8.9x10" ~.4xI0· ) 
Dry Siorage 
Oplion 4e 3.5xI0·' 1.4x10'" 9 .4xI0' 3.7x I0·' 9.0x 10" 4.5x I0·' 8.9x1 0" 4 .4xI0·' 
Wet Sioragc 
Option 4f 4 .0xI0·1 1.6x10"" I.7xIO' 6.8xlO·2 4 .7x 1 0'" 2.3xI0·1 2.6x.10' 1.3xIO·! 
Processing 
Oplion 4g <3 .2:< 10" < 1.3xI0"" <9.4x 101 <3.7x 10'! <9.0xI0·' <4.5xI O·· <8.9xI0" <4.4x. IO·) 
Ship QuI 
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Table 5·32. (continued). 
Work.er 
A\,CT3ge Individual 
Fatal 
Dose' Can('crs~ 
TOIa\ Collecti ve 
Fatal 
Dose' Canccrs~ 
Ofrsilc Population 
Maxi mall y Exposed 
Indi vidual 
Fatal 
Dose' Canccrsb 
Total Coll cell v\! 
Fatal 
Dose' CanccrsJ 
Alternative 5 . Centralization 
Option 5a I.l 5.3;( 10"' 9.6xI0' 3.8< 10" 9.0x lO·} 4.5x 10 ' 8.9< 10" 4.4 :< 10\ 
Dry Storage 
Option 5b 1.6 6.4x 1 0"" 9.6x I O' 3.8< 10' 9.0,10" 4.5x I O· ~ 8.9, 10" 
Wet Storage 
Option 5c 1.6 6.6,10-' 1.7x10" 6.9x10·: 4.7x 1 0""\ 2.3xlO,7 2.7x 1O' IA" IO ' 
ProcesslOg 
:Ilion Sd <3 .2x l0·' <1.3x IO-' <9.4x 10' <3.7xl0·: 0::9.0xIO·5 <4.5x IO' ~ <8.9< 10" <4.4xlO') 
::,hlp Out 
a. Dose in rem. 
b. Probability o f fatal cancer. 
c. Dose in person-rem. 
d. Incidence of excess falal cancers. 
analysis. The highest dose would be 4.7xIO·
' 
millirem, which would occur under the processing 
options of Alternatives 4 and 5. This dose is below the regulatory standard (CFR 1994) of 
10 millirem. 
Airborne emissions from the two-unil Vogile Electric Generating Plant (approximately 10 miles 
southwest of the center of the SRS near Waynesboro, Georgia) were reported to have delivered an 
MEl total body dose of 1.14 x IO·J millirem during 1992 (Georgia Power Company 1993). Since the 
SRS and Plant Vogtle are es entially proximal to the same 80 kilometer popUlation, the ratio of SRS 
population and MEl doses was used as an estimator of the population dose due to Plant Vogtle 
emissions. Using this approach. the population dose allributable to Vogtle was estimated to have been 
about 8.3 x I(), ' person· rem in 1992 . Adding ( I ) the population dose from Plant Vogtle, (2) the total 
collective offsite population dose from all SRS activities in 1992 (both ai r and water source tertns). 
and (3) the highest projected collective dose from spent nuclear fuel management act ivities (Options 4c 
and 5c) yie lds a total cu mulati ve dose of 27 .083 person· rem from all SRS sources and Plant Vogtle, 
which" only 0.3 pacent higher than the dose from SRS alone. Note that the doses in Table 5·32 
(' Total Collective Dose, Offsite Population") represent the sum of (2) and (3) above. 
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5.16.4 Water Resources 
Approx imately 82 . I million ga llons per year of Savannah River water would be required for the 
two most water-intensive options. Option 4f (Regionali z3lion at SRS ~ Processing) and Option 5c 
(Centralization - Processing). Because either of these options would probably require construction of 
an Expended Core Facility, th is faci lity's projected surface water usage of 2.5 million ga llons per year 
was factored into the cumulative impacts analysis. Thus. the two options with the highest surface 
water usage, both of which would require as much as 84.6 mill ion gallons, represent approximately 0.4 
percent of the current (baseline) SRS surface w,ter usage of 20 billion gallons per year (see 
Table 5·8). 
Operational impacts to surface water quality under any of the spent nuclear fuel management 
options examined would be minimal. Existing SRS treatment facilities could accommodate all new 
spent nuclear fuel-related domestic and process wastewater streams. Expected wastewater fl ows would 
be we ll within the design capaci ties of existing (or planned upgrades of) Site treatment systems. 
Sanitary wastewater from lIew spent nuclear fuel facilities would be routed to the new Centralized 
Sanitary Wastewater Treatment Facility. Liquh .. ! radioactive wastes would presumably be sent to the 
F·/H·Area Effluent Treatment Facility. Treated nonradioactive liquid releases from the new spent 
nuclear fuel faci lities would likely be discharged to Upper Three Runs Creek or Fourtnile Branch. 
Water quality in the Savannah River downst ream of the SRS is adequate to good, with most 
parameters analyzed showing va lues below state and Federal Maximum Contaminant Levels or DOE 
Derived Concentration Guides. Iron . present in soils in the region. is the only constituent of surface 
waters that routinely exceeds MCLs. Spent nuclear fu el management activities are not expected to 
result in higher concentrations of iron downstream of the SRS . As noted earlier. in Section 5.16, 
construction on the new Centralized Sanitary Wastewater Treatment Faci lity is scheduled to begin in 
1994 and should be completed in 1995. The new Centralized Sanitary Wastewater Treatment Fac ility 
will replace 14 ag ing sanitary wastewater facil ities with a single state·of· the·art facilit y which will 
treat sanitary wastes by an extended aeration-activated sludge process. Chlorine will not be used to 
treat sanitary wasles in the new facilit y. Usc of non-c hemical uhraviolet light disinfection systems 
will eli minate the use and handling of 32.000 gallons of sodium hypochlorite and 59.000 gallons of 
sodium sulfite per year. Eliminating these chemicals wi ll essentially e li minate the putential for tox ic 
chemical re leases from the wastewater treatment process. 
5·97 VOLUME I. APPENDIX C 
d!}f5 
Operation of th~ n~w C~ntrali zed Sanitary \Vastewater Treatment Faci lity and closure of the old 
A- . B-. S - Ar~a. and Naval Fuel sanitary wast~wat e r facilities would also eliminate wastewater 
disc harges to Upper Three Runs Creek. the stream on the SRS least degraded by past operations. 
Treat~d efnuent from the ne''-' Centralized Sanitary \Vastewater Treatment Facility wi ll discharge to 
Fourmile: Branch. Overall stream quality in Fourmile Branch is expected to improve because the 
effluent from the new facili ty wi ll be cleaner than the effluent from the old package plants in C'. F· . 
and H-Areas that present ly di scharge to Founnile Branch. As a result . the cumulative effect of the 
new spent nuclear fuel management facilities (any alternative considered) and new Centralized Sanitary 
Wastewater Treatment Facility will probably be a net improvement in water quality in two SRS 
streams. Upper Three Runs Creek and Founnile Branch. and may result in bener water quality 
dO\\1lstream in the Savannah River as we ll. 
Sanitary waSlewater from the new Consolidated Incineration Faci lity wi ll be routed to the new 
Centralized Sanitary Wastewater Treatment Facility; there wi ll be no direct process wastewater drains 
to the envi ronment. Liquid wastes will be collected in storage tanks and periodically trucked to a 
penniued hraatdouslmixed waste treatment and disposal faci lity. Sanitary wastes from the new 
Savaonah River Ecology Laboratory Conference Center wi ll be piped to a septic tank-drain field 
system and would not impact surface water in the area. 
Sanitary wastes produced during construc tion of the Expended Core Facility would be treated 
through the use of ponable chemical toilets or through an ex isting wastewater treatment facility . 
Depending on the location chosen by DOE and the Navy for the new Expended Core Facility. sanitary 
wastes from operation of the ECF would either be treated in an existing wastewater treatment facility 
(mo t likely the new Centralized Sanitary Wastewater Facility) or a new treatment facility designed to 
handle the facility's wastewater capacity. No process wastes from operation of the Expended Core 
FacIlity WIll be dIscharged to the envi ronment. 
5.16.5 Occupational and Public Health and Safety 
Table 5· 32 summarIZes the cumulative health effects of incident· free SRS operations. including 
those prOjected for the spent nuclear fuel alternatives. The table lists potent ial cancer fatalities for 
worke" and the pubhc due to radiological exposur s to ai rborne and waterborne releases from the 
Site In additIon. the table prOVIdes the (airborne) dose I" the hypothetical maxi mally exposed 
,nd,v,dual," the offsote populat ion. The evaluation used 1992 as the base line year for nonnal 
opcrauons. because It IS the last year for which the SRS has complete infonnation. DOE believes that 
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this year givC!s a re:\ li stic depiction of current operational releases of radionuc1ides. The assessment 
added the estimated releases from each spent fuel alternati ve to this baseline to delennine the 
cumulative impacts listed in Table 5·32. 
5.16.6 Waste Management 
The analysis of cumulative impacts of SRS waste management activities takes as its starting 
point the assumption that waste generati .:.l under thl! No Action Alternative represents the baseline 
condition for the entire Savannah River Site . Waste generation levels associated with the other 
proposed spent nuclear fuel management ahernat ives (see Table 5-19) thus represent positive and 
negative deviations from this baseline. Cumulative effects of the proposed spent nuclear fuel 
alternati ves on the volume of low-level waste. transuranic waste. and high-level waste produced under 
each of the proposed ahernatives are presented in Table 5-30. 
In addition to baseline waste generation and wastes generated by spent nuclear fuel management 
acti vities. environmental restoration and cleanup activities are expected to become an increasingly 
important pan of the DOE mission at the SRS in the fUNre . These remediation activities are expected 
to produce large quantities of radioactive. hazardous. and mixed wastes. It is estimated that 
approximately 22,000 cubic meters (28,754 cubic yards) of low-level waste. 366.000 cubic meters 
(478.362 cubic yards) of hazardous waste. 82.000 cubic meters (107.174 cubic yards) of mixed wastes. 
and 900 cubic meters ( 1.176 cubic yards) of transuranic wastes would be produced by environmental 
restoration ac tivi ties at the SRS over the 1995-2024 period (DOE 1995). Decontamination and 
decommissioning activities are expected to generate approximately 109.000 cubic meters ( 142.463 
cubic yards) of low-level waste. 32.000 cubic meters (4 1.824 cubic yards) of hazardous waste. 95 .000 
cubic meters ( 124. 165 cubic yards) of mixed wastes. and 4.000 cubic meters (5.228 cubic yards) of 
transuranic wastes over the same 30-year period (DOE 1995). High· level radioactive waste would not 
be generated by environmental restoration or decontamination and decommissioning ac ti vi ties. 
5,17 Unavoidable Adverse Environmental Impacts 
The construction and operation of fac ilities related to any of the fi ve alternati ves at the Savan nah 
River Site (SRS) would resuh in some adverse impacts te the environment. Changes in project design 
and other measures could eliminate. avoid. or reduce most of these to m!nimal levels. The following 
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paragrapt>s identify adverse impacts that mitigation could not reduce to minimal levels or avoid 
altogether. 
The generation of some fug it ive dust ~"ring construction would be unavoidable. but would be 
controlled by water and dust suppressants. This would occur under Alternatives 2 to 5. but greatest 
generation of dust would occur under Alternative 5 (excluding the offsite shipping option). Similarly. 
construction ac tivities would result in some minor. yet unavoidable, noise impacts from heavy 
equipment, generators. and vehicles. 
The maximum loss of habitat would involve the conversion of 70 to 100 acres (0.28 to 0.4 
square kilometer) of managed pine forest to industrial land use; this would occur under Alternative 5 if 
DOE moved all spent nuclear fuel to the SRS. 
The amount of radioactivity that normal operation of the spent nuclear fuel facilities would 
release under four of the five alternatives (Alternatives I to 4) would be a small iraction of the 1992 
operational releases at the SRS and would be well below applicable regulatory standards. 
For the alternative having the most impact (Alternative 5 - Centralization). DOE has calculated 
that the max imum probabi lity for latent fatal cancer for the maximally exposed member of the public 
would be about 3 times higher than that calculated for 1992 at the SRS. For latent fatal cancer 
incidence in the offsite population. this comparison indicates an increase of about 2 times. but the 
number of cancers calculated is less than one. 
The only socioeconomic impacts of the proposed spent nuclear fuel management facilit ies would 
be temporary increases in employment and expenditures in the region of influence during the 
construction phase. These would be unavo"J~bl e beneficial impacts. 
5.18 Relationship Between Short-Term Use of the Environment and the 
Maintenance and Enhancement of Long-Term Productivity 
Implementation of any of the proposed alternati ves would result in some shon -term resource 
demands (e.g .. fuel . construction materials. and labor) and would. under cen ain alternatives (notably 
the Centralization Alternative). reduce the natural productivity of a relatively small trac t of land (less 
than .07 percent of total SRS area) currently committed to timber production. Depending upon the 
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precise location selected for facility development. a small amount of marginal-to-good wildlife habitat 
(see Sections 4.9 and 5.9) would also be lost when the area is cleared. graded. and committed to 
faciliti es and supporting infrastructure. However, these short-tenn resource losses and land-use 
restrictions provide a basis for improved productivity and utility over the long term at the SRS because 
consolidating all spent nuclear fuel at a few onsile locations would free for other uses those locations 
presently committed to spent fuel management. On a national scale. the interim management plan 
described in this EIS would have the same impact of making locations throughout the DOE complex 
available for other long-term uses. 
5.19 Irreversible and Irretrievable Commitments of Resources 
The irreversible and irretrievable commitment of resources resulting from the construction and 
operation of facilities related to the spent nuclear fuel alternatives would involve materials that could 
not be recovered or recycled or that would be consumed or reduced to unrecoverable fonns. The 
construction and operation of spent nuclear fuel facilities at the SRS would consume irretrievable 
amounts of electrical energy. fuel , concrete, sand. gravel. and miscellaneous chemicals. Other 
resources used in construction would probably not be recoverable. These would include finished steel. 
aluminum. copper. plastics. and lumber. Most of this material would be incorporated in foundations. 
structures. and machinery. Construction and operation of facilities for spent nuclear fuel management 
would also require the withdrawal of water from surface- and groundwater sources, but most of this 
water would return to onsite surface streams or the Savannah River after use and treatment. 
The Centralization aitemative (Option 5c - Processing) would consume the greatest amount of 
electricity of any of the aitemati ves. about 11 0.400 megawatt-hours. The Processing option (excluding 
Option 4c. Regionalizat ion by fuel type) would have the highest requirements for coal to produce 
steam. approximately 2.580 me,ric tons (2.843 tons) annually. The Centralization alternative (except 
Option 5d where all spent fue l would be shipped off the site) would involve the greatest irretrievable 
consumption of other resource~. ~uc h as construction materials. chemicals. gases. and operating 
supplies. However. th is demand would not constitute a pennanent drain on local resources or in volve 
any material that is in short supply in the region. 
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5.20 Potential Mitigation Measures 
Thi s st!ction summarizes measures that DOE could use to avoid or reduce impacts to the 
environment c3!Jsed by spent nuclear fue l management ac ti vi ties at the SRS. DOE would determine 
the extent to which any mitigation would be necessary and the selection of which measures would be 
implemented during a detailed site-specific NEPA review tiered from this Programmatic EIS. 
Consequently. the fo llowing sections in this chapter address impact avoidance and mitigation in 
general tenns and describe typical measures that the SRS could implement. In addition. the analyses 
described in this appendix indicate that the environmental consequences of spent fuel management 
would be minimal in most en\ ironmental media . 
5.20.1 Pollution Prevention 
DOE is committed to comply with Executive Order 12856. "Federal Compliance wi th 
Right-to-Know Laws and Pollution Prevention Requirements" ; Executive Order 12780, "Federal 
Acquisition. Recycling and Waste Prevention"; and applicable DOE Orders and Guidance Documents 
In planning and implementing pollution prevention at the SRS. The pollution prevention program at 
the Site was initiated in 1990 as a waste minimization program. Currently. the program consists of 
four major initiat ives: solid waste minimization; source reduction and recycl ing of wastewater 
discharges; liiource reduction of air emissions: and potential procurement of products manufactured 
from recycled materials. Since 1991. the waste of all types generated at the SRS has decreased. wi th 
greatest reductions in hazardous and mix.ed wastes. These reductions are attributable primarily (Q 
material substitutions. 
All spent fuel management ac tivities at the SRS would be subject to the Site pollution prevention 
program. Implementation of the program plan would minimize the amount of waste generated by 
these activities. 
5.20.2 Socioeconomics 
Spent nuclear fuel ac tivities wou ld have minimal impact on the socioeconomic environment in 
the region of influence because most employees wou ld be drawn from the existing site workforce. 
The minor impacts of in-mi grating construction workers could be minimized by DOE possibly 
infonning local communities and county planning agencies as to scheduling of construction activities. 
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5.20.3 Cultural Resources 
A Programmatic Memorandum of Agreement (SRARP 1989) between the DOE Savannah River 
Operations Office. the South Carolina State Historic Preservation Office. and the Advisory Council on 
Historic Preservation, ratified on August 24. 1990, is the instrument for the management of cultural 
resources at the SRS. DOE uses this memorandum to identify cultural resources and develop 
mitigation plans for affected resources in consultation with the State Historic Preservation Officer. 
DOE would comply with the tenns of the memorandum for all measures needed to suppon spent 
nuclear Juel management at the Site. For example, DOE would survey sites prior to disturbance and 
could reduce impacts to any potentially-significant cultural resources discovered through avoidance or 
removal. Any ani facts discovered would be protected from funher disturbance and the elements until 
removed. 
DOE conducted an investigation of Native American concerns over religious rights in the Central 
Savannah River Valley in conjunction with studies in 1991 related to a New Production Reactor. 
During this study, three Native American groups ex.pressed concern over sites and items of religious 
significance on the SRS (see Section 4.4.2). DOE has included these organizations on its 
envi ronmental mailing list, solicits their comments on NEPA actions of the Site. and sends them 
documents about SRS environmental activities. including those related to these SNF management 
considerations. These Native American groups would be consulted on any actions that may follow 
subsequent site-specific environmental reviews. 
5.20.4 Geology 
DOE expects that there would be no impacts to geologic resources at the SRS under any 
alternative evaluated in this EIS. Potential soil erosion in areas of ground disturbance would be 
minimized through sound engineering practices such as implementing controls for storm water runoff 
(e.g., sediment barriers), slope stability (e.g .. rip-rap placement). and wind erosion (e.g. , covering soil 
stockpi les). Re-Iandscaping would minimize soil loss after construction was completed. These 
measures would be included in a site-specific Stonn Water Pollution Prevention Plan that the SRS 
wou ld prepare prior to initiating any construction. 
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5.20.5 Air Resources 
DOE would meet applicable standards and pennit limi ts for all radio logical and non-radiological 
releases to the atmosphere. In addition. the SRS would follow the DOE policy of maintaining 
radiological emissions to levels ··as low as reasonably achievable·· (ALARA). ALARA is an approach 
to radiation protection to control or manage exposures (both individual and collective) and re leases of 
radioactive materia l to the environment as low as social. technical. economic. practical. and public 
policy considerations pennit. AL ARA is not a dose limit. but rather a process that has as its 
objectives the anainment of dose levels as far below the applicable limits as practicable. 
5.20.6 Water Resources 
DOE would minimize the potential for adverse impac ts on surface water during construction 
through the implementation of a storm water pollution prevention plan that detai ls controls for erosion 
and sedimentation. The plan would also establ ish measures for prevention of spi lls of fuel and 
chemicals and for rapid containment and cleanup. 
DOE could minimize water usage during both construc tion and operat ion of faci lities by 
instituting water conservation measures such as instructing workers in water conservation (e .g .• turn off 
hoses when not in use). installing fl ow restrictors. and using self-closi ng hose nozzles. 
5.20.7 Ecological Resources 
DOE does not antic ipate that any of the spent fue l alternatives would impact any wetlands on the 
Site. In any case. DOE and SRS policy is to achieve ·· no net loss·· of wetlands. Pursuant to this goal. 
DOE has issued a guidance document. Information for Mitigation of Wetlands Impacts at the 
Savannah River Site (DOE 1992). for project planners that puts forth a practical approach to wetlands 
protection that begins wi th avoidance of impacts (if possible). moves to minimization of impacts (i f 
avoidance is impossible). and requires compensatory measures (wet lands restoration. creation. or 
acquisi tion) in l ~e event that impacts cannot be avoided. 
The analysis in th is EIS indicates that there are no th reatened and endangered spec ies or sensitive 
habitats in the areas conside red as representati ve of potencial sites for spent nuclear fuel activ ities at 
the SRS. However. DOE would perfonn site-specific predevelopment surveys to ensure that 
development of new faci lities would not impact any of these biological resources. 
VOLUME I. APPENDIX C 5- 104 
~ 
S.20.8 Noise 
DOE ant icipates that noise impac ts both on and off the Site would be minimal. DOE does not 
foresee noise impacts fro m spent nuclear fue l management that would warrant mitigation measures 
beyond those consistent wi th good construct ion. engineering. operations. and management practices. 
5.20.9 Traffic and Transportation 
DOE has a sys tem of on site buses operating at the SRS. The Site would evaluate the need for 
upgrades or changes in service that might be requi red for the spent nuclear fue l management ac tivi ties 
and would make changes. as necessary. 
DOE would manage changes in traffic volume or pallems during construction through such 
measures as designating roules for construction vehicles, providing workers with safety reminders, and 
upgrad ing onsite police traffic patrols, if necessary . 
5.20.10 Occupational and Public Health and Safety 
The DOE program for mainta ining radiological emissions to levels ··as low as reasonably 
achievable·· (ALARA) described in Section 5.20.5 above will minimize any impacts to workers and the 
public due 10 atmospheric releases. Likewise. the Site Pollution Prevent ion Plan and emergency 
preparedness measures will enhance safety both on and off the S ite. 
5.20.11 Utilities and Support Services 
The uti lities and support services at the SRS are sufficient to meet the requirements of any of the 
alternatives for the spent fuel management at the Site. Impacts on these services would be minimal. 
No mi tigalion measures would be required. 
5.20.12 Accidents 
The SRS has in place emergency action plans that would be activated in the case of an accident . 
These plans contain both onsite provisions (e.g .. evacuation plans. response teams. medical and fire 
response. Iraining and drill s. communications equipment) and offsite arrangements (e.g .. response plans 
for medical and fire agencies. coordination with local and state agenc ies. communication plans) . The 
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SRS plans would be updated to include any new facilities or ac tivities related to spent nuclear fuel 
management that would involve the Site. The execution of the plans in response to an accident would 
mitigate adverse effects both on the Site and in the surrounding areas. 
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ATIACHMENT A: ACCIDENT ANALYSIS 
A.1 Accident Evaluation Methodologies and Assumptions 
The potential for facility accidents and the magnitude of their consequences is an important 
factor in the evaluat ion of the spent nuclear fuel alternatives addressed in this EIS . There are two 
health risk issues: 
Would accidents at any of the Savannah River Site (SRS) faci lities that the U.S. Department 
of Energy (DOE) could build for spent nuclear fuel management activities pose unacceptable 
health risks to workers or the general public? 
Could alternative locations or facilities for the spent nuclear fuel alternatives provide smaller 
public or worker health risks? Smaller risks could arise from such factors as greater 
isolation of the facility from the public. a reduced frequency of such external accident 
initiators as seismic events or aircraft crashes. reduced inventory, and process differences. 
Guidance for the implementation of Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) regulations 
(CFR 1986). as amended (5 1 FR 15625). requires the evaluation of impacts that would have a low 
probability of occurrence but high consequences if they did occur; this EIS. therefore. addresses 
facility accidents to the extent feasible. 
A.l .l Radiological Accident Evaluation Methodology 
The alternatives considered in this EIS provide an opponunity to incorporate new features and 
technology in new facilities. processes. and operations that would minimize the possibility of undue 
risk to the health and safety of plant workers and the pUblic. Modifications and upgrades would 
mitigate accident consequences from existing facilities or reduce the likelihood of occurrence. 
Under normal circumstances. DOE would develop accident scenarios and calculate accident 
consequences using safety analyses. mitigation features. and design details on proposed facility 
de.\igns. However, the preliminary design infonnat ion for the proposed facilities that is available 
during the preparation of this EIS does not contain sufficient detail to permit quantitative safety 
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analyses. Therefore. for each spent nuclear fuel alternative. DOE has evaluated the existing and 
proposed fac ilities for the type of radiological accidents it has detennined to be reasonably foreseeable. 
The radiological acc ident types fe ll into four categories: ( I) fuel damage. (2) materia l re leases. 
(3) nuclear criticalities. and (4) liquid spills or discharges. For each acc ident type. DOE detennined 
reference accidents by examining DOE-approved safety analys is repons (SARs) and other appropriate 
documentation (e.g .. previous EISs). In addition. DOE considered accidents from adjacent fac il ities 
for their possible impacts re lated to spent nuclear fuel. DOE ext racted the overall frequency for each 
reference accident from the appropriate source. rather than attempting to calculate individual 
frequencies for all possible initiators: that is. DOE did not use the speci fic probabil ity of a certain 
magnitude earthquake to detennine the frequency of a crit icality or spill. given the occurrence of the 
earthquake. If multiple initiators could lead to one of the reference accidents. or the combined 
frequency of the initiators could lead to one of the reference accidents. DOE used the combined 
frequency of the in itiators. generally provid ing conservative results. For example . the Receiv ing Basin 
for Offsite Fuel has a number of potential release initiators that could result in an uncontrolled 
crit icality. as listed in Table A-I . As listed. a number of incidents. all of which have thei r own 
assigned frequencies . can contribute to the initiation of an uncontrolled crit icality . 
Table A- I. Potential release initiators at the Receiving Basin for Offsite Fuel. 
Natural Phenomena 
Temperature Extreme 
Snow 
Rain 
Lightning 
Tornado 
Earthquake 
Meteorite Impact 
External Events 
A ircraft Crash 
Helicopter Crash 
Surface Vehicle Cr I ... h 
Operations Induced 
Events 
Fuel Cutting 
Spill at Hose Rack 
Fuel Rupture in Storage 
Fire and Explos ion 
Criticality 
Fuel Bundling Error 
Cask Loading Error 
Fuel Ident ification 
Problem 
Fuel Movement Error 
Fuel Near Basin Surface Dropped Fuel 
Spill s and Leaks Crane or Hoist Collapse 
Resin Regeneration Cask Immersion Error 
Faci lity Waste to Cell 
This evaluation results in quali tative comparisons for proposed fac ili ties based on the assumption 
that the facility function is similar to one already analyzed. In additi on. an identical set of initiators is 
not considered in each safety analysis report for existing SRS facilit ies because these reports were 
prepared over several years in accordance wi th requirements in effect at the time. Section A.2 
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includes a comparison of the similarit ies of possible fac ilities to an existing facility. the basis for the 
sc: lection of reference acc idents. and several tables containing data to support a comparison of point 
estimates of risk. 
The qualitati ve comparison supports the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) process. in 
that the dec isionmaker can assess the relative risk from each alternative at SRS and other sites. 
A. 1.1. 1 Notable Accident Initiators. While there are many different types of accident 
init iators of various frequencies that could lead to an accident. three notable initiators - criticalities. 
earthquakes. and aircraft crashes - require additional discussion due to the public' s perception of the 
importance of these ini tiators and the public 's familiarity with these types of initiators. 
Because there has never been an uncont rolled criticality accident at the SRS. DOE must use 
historic experience related to the initiators to estimatl! the frequency for a crilicality incident in the 
Receiving Basin for O ffsite Fuel. Storage bas ins for spent nuclear fuel have excellent safety histories . 
From 1945 through 1980. there were 40 known criticality accidents worldwide. none of which 
occurred in a fuel storage faci lity. From 1975 to 1980. there were. conservatively. 160 reac tors with 
storage basins in operation around Ihe world. and no criticality incidents occurred. Therefore. DOE 
assumes that the upper frequency limit for a criticality event is 3.1 x 10') per year (Du Pont 1983). 
Th is fi gure is applicable to the extent that the storage basins and the operations perfonned in them are 
similar to those of the Receiving Bas in for Offsite Fuel. However. the frequency for a processing 
cri ticality event was determined through a detailed fault tree analysis. as referenced in the safety 
analysis report. to be an overall calculated limit of 1.4 x IO·J per year. This value accounts for the 
implementation of new administrative controls or equipment. 
The SRS is in an area that has a relatively low seismic frequency. Based on three centuries of 
recorded seismic activity. an earthquake with a Richter magnitude grt.!ater than 6.0. which corresponds 
to a Modified Mercall i Intensity Scale (MMI ) of VII. would not be like ly at the SRS. The dcsign-
basis earthquake for the SRS is a MM I VlII event with a corresponding horizonta l peak ground 
accelerat ion of 0.2g. Based on current technology. as applied in various probabilistic evaluat ions of 
the seismic hazard in the SRS region. the 0 .2g peak ground acceleration can be associated with a 
2 x 10" annua l probability of cxceedance (5.000-year return period). There are four scenarios for the 
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Receiving Basin for Offsite Fuel to which an e"'~hquake of intensity MMI VIII or greater might 
contrib~te: 
Deformation of the storage racks leading to a cri ticality incident. 
Derailment of the 1000ton (9 1-metric-ton) crane into the storage basi n with the de forma tion 
of the storage rack leading to criticality. 
Damage to the basin walls leading to the release of contaminated basin water to the subsoil. 
Rupture of a waste tank or pipe in the Resin Regeneration Facility leading to the re lease of 
contaminated liquids. 
An airc raft crash into a spent nuclear fuel facility is of concern because it could resu lt in a 
radioactive release of materials from the stored spent nuclear fuel. Appendix D contains an aircraft 
crash probabili ty analysis based on the examination of large civilian and military ai rcraft crossing the 
airspace within a IO-mile ( l6-ki lometer) rad ius of the SRS. It does not include the crash probability 
of genera) aviation aircraft because ai rcraft of this type generally do not possess sufficient mass or 
attain sufficiently high velocities to produce a serious radiologica l threat in the event that they c rashed 
into an area containing spent nuclear fue l. The ana lys is did not evaluate crash probabilities with a 
like lihood of occurrence of less than 10" per year because they would not s ignificantly contribute to 
the risk. This was the case for spent nuclear fuel facilities located at the SRS. 
A.1.1.2 Use of DOE-Approved Safety Documents. The NEPA guidance issued by the 
DOE Office of NEPA Oversight. dated May 1993. recommends that acc ident impac t analyses 
- reference Safety Assessments and Safety Analysis Repon s. if avai lab le ." This guidance was the 
pnmary basis used to develop the approach used in the accident ana lys is section of this EIS . This 
AppendIX uses severa l re levant safety analysis repons as well as a previously published EIS . Safety 
anal YS IS reports are the primary source of infonnation on reasonably foreseeable acciden ts with the 
po(entlal to cause a release of hazardous materials. These reports are required for a ll reactors and 
nuclear materia ls fac ilit ies with operations that potentia lly pose a significant hazard to on site 
p"r;onnel. offslle popu lat ions. or th~ environment. The refe renced safety analysis repon s and EIS 
approval/d raft <ub. ,i ttal dates encompass a range from 1983 to 1993. The 1983 safety ana lysis repon 
wa.< <upplemented by a 1993 addendu m: the next o ldest safe ty analys is repon was approved in 1988. 
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A.1.2 Chemical Hazard Evaluation Methodology 
This ana lysis reviewed the appropriate safety ana lyses to assess the degree to which they 
addressed chemical accidents. It found that each of the safety analyses addressed chemical hazards in 
a qualitati ve manner. To provide a quantitative discussion of chemical hazards. the analysis evaluated 
a separate ri sk assessment (WS RC 1993c) for the storage ri sk of offsite research reactor fue l in the 
Receiving Basin for Offsite Fue l to de te rmine a bounding chemical accident. The analysis determined 
chemical inventories (see Sec tion A.3) for the ex isting spent nuclear fu e l fac ilities at the S RS using the 
"Savannah Ri ve r S ite Tier Two Emergency and Hazardous Chemical Inventory Repon " (WSRC 
1994a) to dete rmine the fac ilities total chemical inventory . This chemical inventory was funher 
screened using the EPA's "List of Lists' (EPA 1990). 
A. t .3 SRS Emergency Plan 
The SRS emergency plan (WSRC 1993b) defines appropriate response measures for the 
management of emergencies (e.g .. accide nts) invo lving the Site . It incorporates into one document a 
description of the entire process designed to respond to and mitigate the consequences of an accident. 
Emergencies that could cause acti vation of a ll o r portions of this plan include: 
Events (operational. transportation. etc .) with the potential to cause re leases above allowable 
limits of hazardous materials. 
Events such as fires. explosions. to rnadoes. hurricanes. earthquakes. dam failures. etc .. that 
affec t or could affec t safety systems designed to protect site and offsite populations and the 
envi ronment. 
Events such as bomb threats. hostage situations. etc .. that reduce the security posture of the 
Site . 
Events c reated by proximity to other faci lit ies. such as the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant. 
a commercial nuclear powerplant localed across the Savannah Rive r from the Site . 
For rad iological emergencies. protec ti ve actions in this plan me designed to keep om~ ite and 
offs ite exposures As Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALA RA) . This is accomplished by minimi zing 
time spent in the vic inity of the hazard. keeping as far from the hazard as possible . and taking 
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advantage of avai lable shielding. Protective actions that could be used on the Site in the event of an 
emergency include remaining indoors. sheltering, evacuation, and relocation . For events that cause an 
actual or projected radiological relea e. appropriate protective action for on- and offsite populations 
have been determined based on trigger points called Protective Action Guides (PAGs). 
A.1.4 General Assumptions 
This asse sment applied the following key assumptions to examine existing accident analy es and 
to relate these analy es to the pent nuclear fuel alte rnat ive . 
When a referenced accident scenario is used for a possible new faci lity. DOE would build 
the new facility close to an existing referenced facility performing a similar function. 
resulting in consequences and health effects imilar to the existing facilities analyzed. The 
exception could be the proposed Expended Core Facility which Appendix D analyzes 
separate I y . 
For existing facilities to be modified, portions of the facility to be decommissioned. or new 
facilities to be added. potential accident initiators resulting from construction and nearby 
activities \\ ould be bounded by the referenced accident scenarios. 
Type 2 High Enriched Uranium fuel. the dominant type currently in storage or process at the 
SRS, would provide a reference source term for other fuel type (i .e .. Mark-22 fuel) . 
Spent nuclear fuel acceptance criteria would specify that all fue l must be capable of 
indefinite u pen ion in air with no melting. 
The total frequency of an event (e .g., criticality) could be u ed to determine point e timates 
of ri sk, regardle of the type or specific frequencie of the individual contributing initiators. 
Adju tment (scaling) factor could be applied to reflec t a best engineering judgment in term 
of relative risk between the various alternative . 
The point estimate of ri sk for a g iven accident cenario would be representative in that it 
could. fo r the purpo e of thi programmatic EIS . represent a s imilar accident scenario at 
new facilities that perform imilar function s. 
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Refert:nce accidents would be attributed to a facility based on its function (e.g .. fuel canning 
or dry materi al storage) regardless of whether the facility currentl y ex ists. is undergoing 
design. or is in the conceptua l design phase. 
Poss ible new facilities would be des igned to pose no greater ri sk to the workers and public 
than exi sting faciliti es with s imilar function s. 
Thi s evaluation takes no credit for the upgraded des ign requirements for the proposed facilitie s. 
Such facilitie hould have improved reliability or mitigative features and, therefore, would reduce the 
aggregate frequency of accidents . Therefore , the application of values from exi ting safety analysis 
reports would provide con ervative result. In addition. the evaluation makes no attempt to 
di scriminate among similar existing facilities that migh t have slightly different frequencies of 
occurrence or source terms (i .e ., an FB-Line event frequency wa applied to HB-Line an other 
process ing facilities). 
For mo t accidents. the evaluation did not quantify consequences for worker. The safet y 
analysis reports from which information was extracted for the reference accidents were written before 
the issuance of DOE Order 5480.23 (DOE 1992); previous app licable Orders did not require the 
inclusion of worker doses. The hi toric record indicates that DOE facilities have an enviable safety 
record. Figure A-I compares the rate of worker fatalities in the DOE complex (DOE 1993) to national 
average rates compi led by the National Safety Council for various industry groups (NSC 1993). 
Because the DOE worker accident fatality rate compares favorably to rates from such industry groups 
as agriculture and construction and i lightly l e ~ s than trade and services group rate , the ab ence of 
quantitative data regarding acc ident impacts to radiological workers should not impede the 
dec isionmaking process . The di scus ion presented in Volume I adequately addre e the impacts for 
c lose-in workers (i.e., those directly invo lved in the activity or near the accident ource) at the SRS. 
A.1.4.1 Receptor Group Assumptions. To ensur comparative results, the evaluation 
as e sed the measure of impacts among four receptor groups: 
Worker. An individual located 100 meters (32g feet) in the worst sector of a facility 
location where the relea e occurs. 
Colocated Worker. An individual located 640 meters (2, I 00 feet) in the worst ~ector of a 
faci lity location where the re lease occur . 
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Figure A-I. Compari on of fatality rates among workers in various industry groups . 
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Maximally Exposed Offsite Individual (MEl). A hypothetical resident located at the nearest 
Site boundary from the facility loca tion where the re lease occurs . 
Offsite Population to 80 Kilometers. The collective sum of individuals located wi th in an 
SO-kilometer (50- mi le) radius of the SRS. 
As noted above. the worker is 100 meters (328 feet) from the facility where the accident occurs. 
This is because information quantifying accident impacts (i.e .. dose and health effec ts) to workers 011 
less than 100 meters from an acc identa l re lease of radionuclides is unavailable . For each of the 
acc ident scenarios considered In Appendix C of this EIS. there is some ri sk of worker injury or death 
at d istances closer than 100 meters. Furthennore. the safety analyses from which this evaluation 
extrac ted information for the acc ident scenarios often did not include any discussions on worker 
impacts as a result of potential accidents. DOE Orders published before DOE 5480.23 (DOE 1992) 
did not require the inclusion of worker doses. However, Sect ion A.2.6.2 includes a quali tative 
discussion regarding acciden t impacts for the worker at less than 100 meters (328 feet) for each of the 
radiolog ical accident scenario.;;, 
A.l.4.2 Code Assumptions. DOE' s application of the AXAIR and AXA IR89Q (a val idated 
version) dose esti mation mode ls is acceptable for projecting health effecls from accidents at SRS and 
comparing the resu lts to results from other s imi lar codes (RSAC-5 and GENII) used at other s ites. 
AXAIR is a Gaussian model based on the methodology outlined in NRC Regu latory Guide I 145 
(N RC 1983). AXAIR contains a meteorological data fil e specific to SRS that provides conservative 
calculated doses for the radio logical consequences of atmosphe ric re leases. AXA IR and AXAIR89Q 
IncJudt: the following specific functions: 
Pe rform'i bot h environmental transpon and radiation dosimetry calculations 
Bases envi ronmental transfer mode ls on NRC Reg Gu ide 1.145 guideli nes 
Include" expoc;ure pathway" for inhalation of radionucl idcs and gamma radiation from the 
radioacti ve plume 
Calculates gamma shine dose~ usi ng a non-uniform Gaussian mode l 
Uses war"t "ector and 99.5-percenlilc meteorology 
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Doses calculated with this code should bound the radiological consequences for atmospheric releases 
postlilated. 
A.l.4.3 Criticality Assumptions. An estimate of the consequences of a critical ity incident 
requires an estimate of the number of fi ss ions that might occur. While U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission (NRC) Regulatory Guide 3.34 specifies I x 10" fi ssions as the upper tenth of incidence 
experience. the SRS analyses are based on mean values. to the extent possible. for all incidents. 
Criticality incidents have produced from 10lJ to 4 x 1019 fissions with a mean of 2 x 1018 fi ssions for 
incidents in volving fi ssile solut ions and a mean of 5 x 1011 fi ssions for inc idents involving solids. As 
a consequence. two accident scenarios (Table A-2) address crit icality - the wet pool c riticality scenario 
and the processing cri ticality scenario. For the wet pool criticality scenario. the mean value for sol id 
systems (5 x 1017 ) is assu med to apply to the source term used to determine the accident 
consequences. while the processi ng criticality scenario assumes that the mean value for a solut ion 
(2 x IOU) was applied to the source term to determine accident consequences. 
A.2 Radiological Accident Scenarios 
A.2.1 Selection of Reference Jlccidents 
To support the examinat ion of both existing and proposed facilities. this evaluation considered a 
spectrum of potentia l accidr. nt types. To deve lop a meaningful spectrum of potent ial acciden ts. the 
evaluation posed the fo llowing question: 
"What could be done to spent nuclear fuel that would result in a radiological consequence 
to the receptor groups?" 
In determining the answer to thi s question. the fo llowing four general types of events emerged : 
( I) fu el damage. (2) material re leases. (3) criticali ties. and (4) liquid spi lls or discharges. A review of 
app licable safety ana lys is re ports for the SRS faci lities that the spent nuclear fue l alternatives would be 
likely to affec t generated more than 20 accidents involving the transport . rece ipt. process ing. and 
storage of spent nuclear fuel. A consolidation and subsequent "binning" of these acc ide nts for each 
accident type refl ects an appropriate range of case-spt!c ific reference accidents. 
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Table A-2. Reference radio logical accidents considered for spent nuclear fue l ac ti vi ties. 
Reference fo r Source Comparati ve 
Name and Refe rence Term/Dose LI kellhoodlFrequenc y 
AI. Fucl Assembl y Breach Reference Tob 1-3 1.6x IO-1 per year 
Accidem: RBOF fuel cutting DPS ,\-200-10-3, 
Add .um I 
A2. Material Release I Process ing ) Reference Meehan 1995 2.6;'( I 0.1 per ye ~lr 
Accidem: F-Canyon Uncontroll ed 
Reaction 
A3, Material Release (Dry Vaull) Reference Tobie 5-9 I Ax I 0·' per year 
Accident: PSF release DPSTSA-2oo-10- 19 
M , Materi:!1 Release (Adjacent Facility) Tables 1·3 2.4x I 0·' per year 
Reference Accident: Release of Waste DPSTSA-2oo-10-3, 
Tank Activity 10 Cell Addendum I 
AS , Criticality in Water Reference Acridem: Tables 1·3 3.1:<10·J per year 
RBOF criticality DPSTSA-2oo- 10-3, 
Addendum I 
A6. Criticality During Processing Reference WS RC-RP-93-1102 1.4xI0 ..... per year 
Accident: FB-Line 
A7 . Spill/Liquid Discharge (External) Figure 3 2.0" 10...1 per year 
Re ference Accident: Direct discharge of Meehan 1994 
\~ ater from K· Reactor disasse mbl y basin 
AS. SpilVLiquid Discharge (Imernal) Tables 1-3 I.1x IO·' per year 
Reference Accident: RBOF hose rack. DPSTSA-2oo-10-3, 
spill Addendum 1 
The fue l damage event (type I accident) considered was phys ical damage or breac hing of a fuel 
assembly. Three material (type 2 accidents) releases were considered : they re present releases that 
could occur during processing from medium ene rge tic events. those that could occur during dry 
storage of spec ial nuclear materials. and those that could occur from an adjacent fac ility. Criticality 
Hype 3 acc idents) can have diffe rent dose impacts and can occur wi th different frequencies. depending 
on the phys ical or chemical characteristics of the mate rial and the surroundings. Two criticality 
evenrs - in water ar.d during processing - represent these accident scenarios. The evaluation 
considered a dry critica lity accident scenario bounded by the wet pool criticality in terms of frequency 
and bounded by the processing criticality accident in teons of fiumber of fissions assumed. Two liquid 
discharges and spilis (type 4 acc idents) we re considered - d ischarges of pool or bas in wate r assumed to 
contai n trit ium. cesium. and other radioactive constituents from the fue l in the pool (external spill ). and 
spills of <lightl y contaminated liquids inside a facility during fuel handling. spraying. or cask 
unloading ( internal spill )_ 
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Thl!se e ight typical acc idents form the se t of accidents for the selec tion of a reference accident. 
Eac h type ha:- bc:en assigned an alphanumeric designator. which is listed below and used th roughout 
this document : 
Type I - Fuel damage 
A I - Fuel assembly breach 
Type 2 - Mate rial releases 
A2 - Processing release 
A3 - Dry vault release 
A4 - Adjacent fac ility re lease 
Type 3 - Critic al i ties 
AS - Crit icality in wate r 
A6 - Criticality during process ing 
Type 4 - Liquid discharges and spills 
A 7 - Exte rnal spill/ liquid discharge 
A8 - Internal spill/liquid discharge 
A second review of the safety ana lyses and the original list of accidents confinned that each 
specific accident considered in DOE-approved safety ana lyses could be represented or bounded by one 
of the eight "generic" acc ide nts (i.e .. a fire could result in material release or an earthquake could 
result in c riticality or liqu id re lease). The use of this approach wi th documented total frequencies 
avoids the need for unique identification of all in itiating precursor events or their specific probabilities . 
A.2.1.1 Externally Initiated Accidents. The accident ana lys is sect ion of this EIS considered 
acc ide nt scenarios from external events or adjace nt fac ilit ies and their potential impacts on direct spent 
nuclear fue l activities and faciliti es. Th ree significant sources of externa lly induced accident 
mec hani sms were identified as potentially applicable to these facilitie s and activities: a ircraft crashes. 
adjacent fires. and adjacen t explosions. As discussed above. an airc raft c rash scenario is not a 
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reasonably foreseeable event wi thin the probability scope of thi s EIS. For the most part. a fire or 
explosion in a facility adjacent to the spent nuclear fu el facilitie s described in Figure 3-2 would not 
have a signi ficant impact on spent nuclear fuel facilitie s. However. the screening process determined 
that a fire and explosion in the Resin Regeneration Fac ility. located immediately adjacent to the 
Receivi ng Basin for Offs ite Fuel. cou ld result in the airborne release to the shielded ce ll and shou ld be 
included for completeness. 
A..2.1.2 Nearby Industrial or Military Facility Accidents. Within a 40-kilome ter 
(25-mile) radius of the SRS. there are approx imately 120 industrial facilities with 25 or more 
employees (DOE 1990). Four of these facilities are within a 16-k ilomete r ( IO-mile) radius of the SRS. 
Other than those on the SRS. the only major storage faci lities within a 40-kilometer radius are the 
fac ilities at Chern-Nuclear Systems. Inc .. Vogtle Electric Generating Station, and a cluster of natural 
gas storage tanks near Beech Island . The fac ilit ies within a 16-kilome ter radius of the SRS boundary 
are still at leas t 10 kilometers (6 miles) from the nearest spent nuclear fuel faci lity. and thus present 
negligible risk to spent nuclear fuel ac ti vities. 
A.2.1.3 Common Cause Accident. DOE considered acc ident scenarios based on a common 
cause accident during the screening process. A se vere seismic event was the only common-cause 
in itiator identified with the potential to simultaneously impact multiple spent nuclear fuel management 
facilities at the SRS. A design basis earthquake. which has an estimated acceleration of 0.2g and an 
annual frequency of 2.0 x IO·J per year (or one occurrence every 5.000 years). could potentiall y impact 
multiple facilitie s within a single fac ility area, resulting in the simultaneous release of rad ioactive 
and/or toxic materials from these facilities to the environment. It is also considered possible. although 
probably less likely. than an earthquake of the same magn itude could damage facih ties in more than 
one fac ility area (e .g .. F- and H-Areas: K-. L-. and P-Reactor Disassembly Bas ins). resulting in 
simultaneous releases to the environment . 
A semi-qnanutali ve evaluation of the cumulative impacts resulting from multiple releases within an 
area caused by a severe seismic event was performed as part of the accident selection process 
descri bed in Section A.2.1. A review of the sa fety analys is reports fo r the H-Canyon. HB -Line . and 
Recei ving Basin ror Offsite Fuels was perfonned to determi ne the consequences and risks presented 
Indi viduall y by each facilit y foll owing a design basis earthquake. The ri sks presented in each safety 
analySIS report were then summed to approximate the ri sk that would be expected if a ll of these 
releases occurred simultaneuusly from a sing le sei smic initiator. The sum of these risks was compared 
to the ri sks of the other accident scenarios presented within the EIS and were found to be bounded by 
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I those al.:cide:nts. A similar evaluation was performed for the !'pent nuclear fuel-related fac ilith:s in the 
F-Arca. and the: same conclusion was reached. For the reactor di sassembly basins. multiplying the ri sk 
from a se\'en: earthquake calculated for the K-Reactor Disassembl y basin by three could be I.:onside:re:d 
as the outermost bounding estimate for the thn:e re:actor disassembly basins (K- . L-. and P-Reactor 
Di sassembly Basin!'). This is considered an unrealistic estimate of the cumu lati\'e risk because of the 
extremely conser\'at i\'e assumptions that \\'ere made in performing the K-Reactor Disassembly Basin 
analysis (Meehan I 99 .. n. Howe\,er. even if the risk is increased by a factor of three, it is still 
considered to be bounded by other accidents already presented within the EIS. Therefore. consistent 
with the acc ident methodology de ~c ribed in Section A.2. I, no further analysis of this type of scenario 
was required. The SRS does maintain emergency plans that would provide protective actions and 
mitigate consequences that could occur during a common cause accident scenario. 
A.2.1.4 Accidents Resulting from Terrorism. DOE considered accident scenarios based 
on a terrorist attack or an act of sabotage during the screening process and concluded that any accident 
resulting from such initiators would be bounded by or similar to the accident scenarios already 
considered. 
A.2.2 Reference Accident Descriptions 
DnE ec;tablished a reference accident for each of the eight generic or typical accidents. The 
following paragraphs outline the basis for selection of each reference accident by scenario. A 
reference accident was included if it is analyzed in an SRS safety analys is report that has been 
approved by the DOE or submitted to DOE for approval as part of the safet y basis authori zing 
operation of a fac il ity. and if the faci lity is to be utilized as. or is similar iil funccion to. one of the 
facilities included in the five alternati ves and their subordinate cases. For example. the analys is 
assumed that the Receiving Basin for Offsite Fuel was representati ve of any spent nuclear fuel wet 
s'lrage pool. If an acc ident could occur in any pool. the analys is selected a reference scenario from 
the Receiving Basin for Offs ite Fuel Safe ty Analysis Report as the reference accident . as listed in 
Table A-2 . The following paragraphs provide the basis for each se lection. 
A 1. F uel Assembly Breach - Phys ical damage to an assembly could occur from dropping. 
objects fa ll ing onto the assembly. or cutting into the fue l part of an assembly. The 
Receiving Basin for Offsi te Fuel Safety Analysis Report (WSRC 1993a) Addendum contains 
a current analysis of a "fud cutting accident." The inert . non-uranium-containing extremities 
of some spent nuclear fue l elements are cut off (cropped) in the repackaging basin before 
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the bundling of the elements. The spent nuc lear fue l could be inadven ently cut. causing a 
rel~asc of airborne or high waler activity 10 the work arCiJ . Because of the metallic natu re 
of SRS fud . only a very small fract ion of the gases generated in an assembly would be 
released to the basin waler in an acc ident. Consistent with the safety analysis report . fue l 
cooled for 90 days is used in the source (enn for this accident. With fore ign research 
reactor spent nuclear fuel elements. the release of fi ssion product gases would be less than 
with the Mark-22 fue l assemblies previously considered . The physics of the re lease of gases 
(iOm research reactor fu e l is similar to SRS fuel because the fuel is constructed in a similar 
manner. Spent nuclear fuels that could re lease more fission gases than a Mark-22 fue l 
assembly would requi re an Unreviewed Safety Question analysis before the SRS could 
accept them in the Receiving Basin for Offsite Fuel. Air monitors in this area would warn 
personnel in the event of an airborne release. The fue l cutting operation involves only one 
fuel element at a time. This is representative for all cutting and dropping accidents because 
cracking the cladding would release less than cutting into the fuel itself. 
A2. Material Release (Processing) - The primary ac tivities associated with processing 
spent nuc lear fuel include dissolving the fu el in acid in the F- or H-Area Canyon. separating 
the radioactive and fiss ile isotopes, and fonning those isotopes in to a solid material. e ither 
metal or powder. Because of the large volumes of liquid radioactive solution generated 
during the dissolution process. uncontrolled reactions in the Canyons are the most rapid 
means of losing control of the material and inadvertently re leasing potentially significant 
quantities of material to the environment. The most common uncontrolled reac tions. and 
those considered in this scenario. include eructations. foaming. boilover. and gassing while 
dissolving spent fuel. These types of uncontrolled reactions are typically caused by 
chemical addition errors. procedural errors. or equipment fai lure. Although uncontro lled 
reactions can also include deflagrations and explosions (caused by excess hydrogen 
generation due to radio lytic decay and the presence of an ignition source). these types of 
events are much less common, and because of their lower frequency. typica lly present a 
lower n :o. k to workers and members of the pUblic . In developing this scenario. it was 
assumed that the uncontrolled reaction causes a large re lease of mate ria l wi thin the Canyon 
building to the Canyon sumps which results in a greater than normal release of rad ioac ti ve 
material through Ihe ventilation system and Canyon exhaust stack. In add ition. it was 
assumed that the uncontro lled reac tion occurred in the F-Canyon facility s ince the exposures 
result ing from an inadvenent release of plutonium isotopes are expecled to bound potential 
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inadvertent re leases of uranium isotopes from uncontrolled reactions in the H-Canyon 
facil ity. 
A3. Material Release (Dry Vault) - Accident types A I and A2 cover material releases 
fro m fuel handling and processing_ In addi tion. DOE considered a refe rence accident for 
vault-type storage. The Plutonium Storage Fac ility (PSF) Safety Analysis Repon (Du Pont 
1989) analyzed three medium energetic events (shipping container failure. criticality. and 
impact-type events) and an earthquake. As discussed above. medium energetic events are 
acc idents that result in release of material from the primary container and have sufficient 
energy to penetrate the secondary confinement barriers fflr a short period of time. That 
report contains a total frequency of these four initiating events and provides one release 
va lue. Because the SRS has no long-term spent nuclear fuel dry storage facilities. this 
evaluation assumes that the Plutonium Storage Facility vault is representative of dry storage 
facilities. as are the activities and precursor events. A material release from any medium 
energe tic event in the Plutonium Storage Facility was selected as the reference accident for 
nonprocessing material releases. 
A4. Material Release (Adjacent Facility) - For completeness. DOE considered a reference 
acc ident from a facil ity immediately adjacent to the Receiving Basin for Offsite Fuel 
(WSRC 1993,). This scenario includes a fire and explosion at the Resin Regeneration 
Facility in waste tank EP 38 during which the coolant of a received cask. when di scharged 
to the waste tank. results in a nammable or explosive concentration of vapors in the tank. 
Rupture of the tank by an explosion could release airborne activity to the shielded cell if the 
acc ident occurred during one of the projected 150 times per year when regeneration of the 
portable columns takes place. Whi le a fire and explosion have not occurred in waste tank 
EP 38. one fi re and pressure surge did occur when a shipping cask was being vented . The 
spent nuclear fue l remained intact and radionuc1ides were not re leased. The incident has 
been att ri buted to the ignition of a mixture of hydrogen. oxygen. and air emanating from the 
cask and c reated by reaction of hot aluminum fuel with wate r left in the cask by the shipper. 
AS . C ritica lity in Water - This scenario assumes that a wet pool storage facilit y is the 
most like ly to have a ..:ri ticality in water. The Receiv ing Basin for Offsite Fuel provides the 
capabi lity for underwate r receipt. handling. and storage of spent nuclear fuel. Primary 
radiation shie lding is provided by the water covering the spent nuclear fuel. A safe ty 
analys is report detennined frequency and results from many initiating events that could lead 
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to criticality. The following ac ti vities could ultimately lead to a criticality incident: Fuel 
Bundling. Cask Loading. Fuel Identification and Manifest Problems. Fuel Movement. 
Dropped Fuel. Fuel Near Basin. Cask Immersion. and Cranes and Hoist. These events are 
representative for any wet storage pool. 
A6. Criticality During Processing - As noted in the discussion for acc ident type A2. 
FB-Line events are representative for SRS processing facilities. The analysis considered the 
total of the frequencies for criticality initiators for all processing stages. which would. 
therefore. be conservative because not all processing stages would necessarily be in volved in 
a new facili ty and not all stages would necessari ly occur simultaneously. 
A 7. SpilVLiquid Discharge (External) - The reference accident selected for this type of 
event is the d irect discharge of water (i.e .. 3.4 million gallons) from the K-Reactor 
di sassembly bas in to the Savannah River and the exposure of fuel and targets in the basin to 
ai r. Analyses performed by the DOE while developing the EIS for the Interim Management 
of Nuclear Materials at the SRS demonstrate that this scenario could be initiated by a severe 
eanhquake and would result in bounding airborne exposures (from exposed fuel) and liquid 
exposures (contaminated drinking water) to the general public. The selection of the 
direct-discharge event is conservative for existing or possible new facili ties constructed in 
the F- or H-Areas because no free-fl owing surface streams would be near a discharge point. 
The use of the source term from the reactor disassembly basin is considered to be 
conservati ve for the spent nuclear fuel storage pools since its inventory consists primarily of 
the fue l types wi th the largest source terms available for release (i.e .. Mark-22 assemblies). 
Although the disassembly basin has water circulating systems to control radioactivity. 
chemistry. clarity. and temperatu re'. these processes are less efficient than those used in the 
Receiving Bas in for Offsile Fuel. result ing in higher concentrations of tritium. cesium. and 
other contaminants 3\- ... "lable for release . 
AS. SpilVLiquid Discharge (Internal) - DOE considered a second referonce accident for 
contaminated liquids spi lls or discharges to ensure the appropriate onsite impacts. The 
discharge discussed for accident type A 7 would be external to the building and would have 
no measurable worker impact component because the reference acc ident occurred outside the 
facility. The Receiving Basin for Offsite Fuel hose rack spill was selected as the reference 
accident because it is representat ive of small. unplanned. but relatively frequent spills in a 
storage faci lity and could impact the worker. Minor releases of contaminated water could 
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occur at the! hose rack platform during the! handling of ponable deionile r~ for the re!actor 
;J. re!as. 
A.2.3 Source Term and Frequency Determinations 
Table :-\-2 lists source term references from ex.isting documents approved by DOE or submitted 
by \Vestinghouse Savannah Ri ver Company to DOE for approval for each selected reference accident. 
Th e! same! references nominally prescribed the frequency of accidents or initiating events. If it was not 
directly available. the! frequency was derived from information already contained in the appropriate 
safety analysis repon or EIS (e.g .. if only a risk estimate and a dose were listed. the frequency was 
derived by dividing the risk by the dose). These frequencies fall inl<' ranges assoc iated with abnormal 
events (more frequent than I x 10" per year). design-basis accidents ( I x 10" per year to I , 10" per 
year). or beyond-design-basis accidents (less than I x 10" per year to 10.7 per year). 
This document does not analyze beyond-design-basis accidents or accidents with frequencies of 
less than 1.0 x 10.6 ex.plicitly because the accident analys is source material (DOE-approved safety 
analysis repons) considers these accidents to be incredible events. 8 eyond-design-basis acc iaents. 
such as an airplane crash-induced crit icality. have no different consequences ( e .. number of fi ss ions) 
than the criticality estimated to occur with a frequency of 3. 1 x. 10'.1 per year. Because of the use of 
aggregate frequencies in some cases. the contribution to overall risk from 1.0 x 10.7 per year events is 
negligible. and the higher frequency initiators dominate the point estimate of risk. Some init iating or 
precursor event frequencies from the safety analysis reports are at 10.7 per year or lower: thus. these 
repons in fac t conSider events beyond the IO-b frequenc ies. 
Frequencies for reference accidents were determined as fo llows: 
A 1. Fuel Assembly Breach - The frequency for this reference accident was obtained from 
DPSTSA-200-10-3. Recei"illg Basill f or Off site File! IRBOF). Addendum I. Tables 1-5. 
which lists the frequency as 1.6 x 10" per year (WSRC 1993a) . 
A2. Material Release (Processing) - The frequency for this re ference accident lVas 
obtained from DPSTSA-200- 10-4. Safetv Alla/..sis - 200 Area. Sa\'allnah Ri"er Plant. 
F.CaIlYolI Opera/iolls. Addenoum 2 . .. Accident Analysis:' Revision I. Table A.5.5-7 A. 
\\'hich lists the frequency for an uncontrolled chemical reaction (the bounding process ing 
acc ident) " 2.6 x 10" per year (Meehan 1995). 
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A3. ~Iaterial Release (Dry Vault) - The frequency for this reference acc ident was obtained 
from DPSTS A- 200-1 0-1 9. Fillal Safe ty Analysis Report - 200 Area. Sa m llllah R;\'er Site 
Separatiuns Area Operations. Bllilding 22 J F. B-Line, Pluronillm Storage Facility. July 1989. 
Table 5-9. which li sts the frequenc y as 1.4 x 10-" per year (Du Pont 1989 )_ 
A4. Material Release (Adjacent Facility) - The frequency for this reference accident was 
obtained from DPSTSA-200-1O-3. Receiving Basin for Offsite Fllel (RBOF). Addendum I. 
Tables 1-5. which Ii ts the frequency as 2.4 x 10.3 per year (WSRC 1993a). 
A5. Criticality in Water - The frequency for this reference accident was obtained from 
DPSTSA-200-10-3. Receiving Basill for Ojfsite Fllel (RBOF) , Addendum I. Tables 1-5. 
which lists the frequency as 3.1 x 10.3 per year (WSRC 1993a). 
A6. Criticality During Processing - The frequency for this reference accident was 
obtained from WSRC-RP-93-11 02, FB-Line Basis for Interim Operation. November 1993, 
Figure 3, which lists a frequency of 1.4 x I O'~ per year (WSRC 1993d). 
A 7. SpilVLiquid Discharge (External) - The frequency for this reference accident was 
derived from analyses provided in DOEIEIS-0147, Continued Operation of K-. L-, and 
P-Reactors. December 1990 (DOE 1990). as well a other afety analyses developed for 
additional SRS facilities. The initiating event if, a design basis earthquake with peak 
horizontal ground accelerations equal to 0.2 times the force of gravity (i.e .. 0.2g) which 
occur with an e timated frequency of 2.0 x IO'~ per year, and results in the re lease of the 
bas in water (3.4 million gallons) to the Savannah River. 
AS. SpilVLiquid Discharge (Internal) - The frequency for this reference acc ident was 
obtained from DPSTSA-200-1O-3, Receiving Basin for Offsite Fllel (RBOn. Addendum 1. 
Tables I - 3, which li st the frequency as 1.1 x 10.1 per year for a represen tati ve spill at a 
hose rack (WSRC I 993a). 
A.2.4 Applicability of Accidents to Facilities 
Thi evaluation reviewed Sec tion I of the reference document Technical Data Stllltmary 
Supporting the Spent Nuclear Fuel Environmental Impact Statement (WSRC 1994b) to deve lop a 
matrix of the e lected radiological accidents to the fac ilities (module) being con idered fo r the various 
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alternatives and cases. For proposed new facilities. the analysis used best engineering judgment to 
extrapolate from appropriate accident scenarios based on the descriptions provided in the reference 
document. Table A-3 lists the connection of facilities to Jccident scenarios. For example. the 
Examination and Characte ri zation Facility (module B ) identifies a potential accident scenario. AI (as 
defined in Table A-2). that should be considered when this facil ity is utilized to support any case . 
Table A-3. Applicable accidents and fac ilit ies. 
Faclhty 
Spent Fuel Receiving. Cask Handling and 
Fue l Unloading 
Examination and Characteri l alion 
Naval Reactor Spent Fuel Examination and 
Characlerization 
Spent Fuel Repackaging 
Canister Loading 
(nlerim Dry Storage 
Interim Spent Fuel Storage Pool 
F.CanyonIF·Area Separations 
H·(anyonlH·Area Separalions 
Reactor Disassembl y B:uins 
Receiving Basin ror Orrsite Fuels 
a. As defined in WSRC (I994b). 
Module' 
A 
B 
C 
D 
E 
F 
G 
H. I 
I. K. L 
M 
N 
Accidenls 
AI 
A I 
AI. A5. A7 . AS 
AI. A5. A7. AS 
AI. A7. AS 
AI. A3 
AI. A5. A7 . AS 
A I. A2. A3. A6 
AI. A2. A3. A6 
AI. A5. A7 
AI. A4. A5 . A7. AS 
A.2.S Facilities and Reference Accidents Associated with each Altemative Case 
Table A-4 links alternatives. specific cases. supporting facilities (modules). and accident 
scenarios. This lable identifies the faci lities that could be required to support each alternative by 
specific case. The combined associated accident scenarios for each facility provide the accident 
spectrum associated wi th the specific cases for each alternative . 
A.2.6 Impacts from Radioactive Release Accidents 
This '\eclion provides a quantitative discussion of potential consequences to the receptor groups 
identified in Section A. I.4 . 1. It also provides a qualilalive discussion on pOlentia l health effects and 
consequences for workers at less than 100 meters (328 feet) for each of the potential accident 
scenarios. 
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Table A·4. Spenl nuclear fue l facilities and accident spectrum by alte rnatives. 
Option I . Wet Storage 
Oplion 2a . Dry Storage 
Option 2b . Wei Siorage 
Opt ion 2c . Processing 
Option 33 . Dry Storage 
Opt ion 3b - Wet Storage 
Option 3c . Processing 
Option 4a . Dry Storage 
Option 4b . Wei Storage 
Oplion 4c . Processing 
Oplion 4d . Dry Storage 
Oplion 4e . Wet Storage 
Option 4f - Processing 
Option 4g . Ship Out 
Option 5a . Dry Storage 
Option 5b . Wet Storage 
Oplion Sc . Processing 
Option Sd . Ship Qui 
a. Source: WSRC (I 994b). 
Modules~ 
I. NOACTION 
M.N 
2. DECENT RALIZATION 
B. D. E. F. G. M. N 
B. D. E. G. M. N 
G. H. I. I . K. L. M. N 
3. PLANNING BASIS 
B. D. E. F. G. M. N 
B. D. E. G. M. N 
G. H. I. I. K. L. M. N 
4. REGIONA LIZATION 
A. B. D. E. F. G. M. N 
A. B. D. E. G. M. N 
A. G. H. I. J. K. L. M . N 
A. B. C. D. E. F. G. M. N 
A. B. C. D. E. G. M. N 
A. C. G. fl. I. I . K. L. M. N 
M.N 
5. CENTRALIZATION 
A. B. C. D. E. F. G. H. M. N 
A. B. C. D. E. G. M. N 
A. C. G. H. I. I . K. L. M 'I 
M.N 
Accidenls 
AI. A4. A5. A7. AS 
AI. A3. A4. A5. A7. AS 
AI. A4. A5. A7. AS 
A I. A2. A3 . A4. A5. A6. A 7. AS 
A I. A3. A4. A5. A7. AS 
A I. A4. A5. A7. AS 
A I. A2. A3. A4. A5 . A6. A7 . AS 
AI. A3. A4. A5 . A7. AS 
AI. A4. A5 . A7. AS 
AI. A2. A3 . A4. A5. A6. A7. AS 
A I. A3 . A4. A5. A7. AS 
AI . A4. A5. A7. AS 
AI. A2. A3. A4. A5 . A6. A7. AS 
AI . A4. A5. A7. AS 
AI. A3. A4. A5. A7. AS 
AI. A4. A5 . A7. AS 
AI. A2. A3. A4. A5 . A6. A7 . AS 
AI . A4. A5. A7 . AS 
A.2.6.1 Radioactive Release Accidents and Consequences for Spent Nuclear Fuel 
Alternatives. Table A-5 summarizes the information in Tables A-2 through A-4 and provides 
individual consequences (doses) based on accident type for each case. The table lists consequences for 
the four receptor groups .. , follows : Maximum Offsile Individual Dose. the Population to 
80 kilometers (50 miles) Dose. the Worker Dose. and the Colocated Worker Dose. 
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Table A-5. Radioactive release accidents and consequences for spent nuclear fue l alternatives. Table A-S. (continued). 
Ma.;wnall y PopulJllOn 10 fo.bximal ly PopuJ:l1ion 10 
A (("lIkn l ofrslIl! 80 kllomct~n Coloc:lIed Ac(ident offsih! 80 kilometers Coloc:ued 
(r«lucncy Intll\' lilual dos< Workcr do~ workcrdosc: (n."qucncy indh'idu31 do" Worke r dose worker dose 
Accident Ipcr ycar) do~{n:mJ \person-!,I."m) (rl!ml t rl."ml IJcscnplion Ace.den! (pcI' year) dose (rem) (person-rem) (person-rem) (person-n:rn) [k«:npllon 
I. ro;o ACTION 1:. DECENTRALIZATION 
Fuel Assc:mbl~ 1.6:( l tT' 20,,10 ' 1 7;0;10' (,) 1.:! xlO': A7 SpllVliqUid Disc harge 2 .0.t I O·~ 5.4;(10.1 1.8x 10' I') 1.6:t 1(t: Opllon I AI 
Wet SIOr:lgc Bruch (external ) 
A" ,,13lcn31 Rdo:asc 2.h IO" 6.0;(10" ~ .OX I Ol t,) 5.0:<10': AS Spi lVLiquid Disch:ll'gc I. h.IO" 2.4x I0·'''' 2.0:< 111' I') 2.0xlO'li 
(3t1J3Cl!nl f3Cllil Y) (i nll:rna!) 
A5 Cnllc3hlY In W;l1er 3.1:111('" 3.0:1110 ' 8.8x I0" t, ) 1.4xla l 3. PLANNING BASIS 
SpllVLiquid OlScturg~ 2 .0ll I 0~ 5.4:11 10' 1.8x 10' I') 7.6l1lO'; SanlC as Opl ion 23 for Dcccnlra.liz3lion A7 Oplion J3 
lu temal) Dry Slomgc 
A8 SpllVLlquld 01.schar81! I.1x IO" 2 .• b la "· 2.0x l0·" I') 2.0llI0·
11 
Same as Oplion 2b fo r Decenlralizalion Oplion Jb 
(inlemaJ) Wet Stomge 
2. DECENTRALIZATION Oplion 3c SanlC as Oplion 2e fot Decenlra.lizalion 
1.6x l('" 2.0xlO·' 1.7x 10' (,) I.2xlO·; 
Procl:ssing 
~lon2a Al Fuel "\s~mbl)" 
Dry Slom~,= Breach 4. REGIONALIZATION 
AJ M:ul:rial Release 1.4111(1' 2 . hI0·~ 6 .9x l(1' (,) I') Oplion 401 and 4d Same as Oplion 23 for Decentralization 
(dry v3ulI) Dry Siotage 
A" Malenal RelC'3se I .. bla) 6.0x I0· ' 5.0x1O' I') 
S.OxlO·; 
Same as Oplion 2b for Decentr:J.l iZ3!ion Oplion 4b and 4c 
(3ciJ3Cenl fxilill') Wei Stornge 
CnlleaillY in Waler 3.1xla' 3.0lllO·' 8.8x 1OO I') IAxla ' Same as Option 2e for Decenlralization A5 Opl;on 4c and 4( 
A7 SpdVLlquid Discturge 2.0ll l (1' 5.4l1I0·
1 1.8xlO' la) 7.6l1lO·: Processing 
(e!Hemal) Oplion 4g Same as Allemalive I . No Aelion 
AS SplIVliquid DIscharge 1.I :11la ' 2.4l1lO·'" 2 .0x I 0·~ t,) 2.0ll la
l
' Ship Out 
(lnlemal) 5. CENTRALIZATION 
Fuel Assembly 1.6l1la' 2.0,10" I.7x IO' t, ) 1.2l1la: Opuon 2b A) Oplion Sa Same as Opcion 201 (or Decentra.lizalion 
Wel~or:a8e Bre3(h Dr) ~Irlmge 
Malenai Release ZAxlO" 6.0x I0· ' 5.0x I0 ' (,) 
5.0xlO·: 
A" Oplion 5ll Same as OpIion 2b (or Deeenlralizalion (3dJacent (x lilIY) Wet Stomge 
Cn lluhlY In Water J IxUY' 3.0xla ' 8.8dO" (,) I..h: la' A5 Oplion Se Same as Option 2e (or Deccntralizalion 
SpllVLlqUld Dlsch3Jge I Ox 10" S.4xI O'
I 1.811 10 ' t,) 7.6x1(T: Processing A7 
(exlem3!) Oplion 5d Same as Alternative I. No Aelion 
Sl'ulVLlquld Discharge I h lO" 2.4x I0"
0 z .ox la· (,) 2.0xHyll Ship Oul AS 
(Internal) 
The safety analys is reports from which information was extracted for these accidents were wrinen 
2.0xla' I.1xlO' I') Uxla l a. Option 2c Al Fuel As~mbly 16x J(yl before the issuance of DOE Orders 5480.23 (DOE 1992): previous orders did not require the 
ProceSSini Brexh inclusion of worker doses. 
Malenal Release 26xlO ' 68xlO" 52xla ' I') 90.'(10" A' 
Iprocesslng) 
AJ Malenal Relea.~ I "lila' 2. l x I0·· 69x I0" t,) I,) 
(d ry vault) A.2.6.2 Impacts to Workers at Less than 100 Meters from Radiological Releases. 
SOxl(" : 
A" ~'alen31 Release 2 " x 1(,.' 60x I0" SOll lOI (,) 
l3dpeenl rXIIIIY) This sec tion provides a qualitative discussion addressing the impacts due to potential radio logical 
A5 Cnllcahly In W3ter J llII(Y' JOx IO" SSx lO" I') 1.4xlO ' accident scenarios to workers at less than 100 meters (328 feet) involved in SRS spent nuc lear fue l 
14xl()" 70x 1O" 86xl0" t,) 26l11 a l A6 Cnllul!IY In management. While worker fata lities may result from release init iators (i.e .. plane crashes. seismic 
Processing 
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event. crane failure. etc .} and not as a direct consequence of a radiation release. this discussion 
considers only the radiological impacts of an accident. should it occu r. 
A I. Fuel Assembly Breach - No fatalitie s to workers would be expected from radiological 
consequences because the release of the source tenn would be under water. Attenuation by 
the water would occur for most products. but the release of noble gases would cause a direct 
radiation exposure to workers in the area. However. because of the high metallic content of 
SRS spent nuclear fuel . only a very small fraction of the gases generated in an assembly 
would be released to the basin water. Air monitors in the area would warn personnel in the 
event of an airborne release. Timely evacuation would prevent substantial radiation 
exposures. 
A2. Material Release (Processing) - No fatalities to workers would be likely from 
radiological consequences (Meehan 1995). This scenario assumes that the material released 
from the process vessels would remain within the Canyon structure and be processed 
through the Canyon's ventilation and filtration system. Because of shielding effect from the 
thick concrete walls separating the vessels and areas occupied by workers, the exposures to 
workers are not expected to be significantly larger than those that would be received during 
routine operations. 
A3. Material Release (Dry Vault) - No fatalities to workers would be likely from 
radiological consequences. Medium energetic events resulting in the release of radioactive 
material from the Plutonium Storage Facility vault can result in the dispersal of radioactive 
materials. For these events. the radioactive material present would bypass the containment 
and disperse. but would result in a dose well below the lethal level. This assumes that a 
material re lease would be distributed into the volume of the smallest room for each unit of 
operation. lt is funher assumed that the operator is able to exi t the room in 30 seconds 
(Du Pont 1989). This scenario presumes that the fractions of the plutonium volatized and 
transponed are the same as those applied to the dispersal of the nonvolatile fission products 
of a criticality . Based on these assumptions. radiological exposure to the worker could 
occur. 
A4. Material Release (Adjacent Facility) - No fatalitie s to workers would be likely from 
radiological consequences. The rupture of a waste tank by an explosion could release 
airborne activity to the shie lded cell if the accident occurred during one of the projected 150 
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times per year when regeneration of the ponable columns took place (WSRC 1993a). 
Although some radiological exposure to the worker could occur. the risk to the worker from 
the initiating fire and explosion would predominate. Air monitors in the area would warn 
personnel in the event of an airborne release. Timely evacuation would prevent substantial 
radiation exposures. 
AS. Criticality in Water - No fatalities to workers would be likely from radiological 
consequences. The use of casks and the underwater handling of spent nuclear fuel greatly 
reduce the possibility of over-exposure of workers to radiation. The approximately 3 meters 
( 10 feet) of water that covers all fuel provides an attenuation factor of 10' for intense 
gamma radiation and provides protection from direct radiation. even in the event of a 
criticality. However. a small chance of direct radiation exposure could result due to a 
floating fuel element or a fuel element inadvenently being raised too high. Strategically 
located radiation monitors reduce even this probability by alerting workers and sounding an 
evacuation alarm. 
A6. Criticality During Processing - The radiation field generated by a criticality incident 
could lead to fatalities among workers at the FB-Line facility. As discussed in 
Section A.2.2. FB-Line inadvenent criticality events are bounding for F- and H-Area spent 
fuel management processing facilities. This is assumed because workers involved in the 
FB-Line activities are in close proximity to plutonium metal . Of the 74 personnel that could 
be present during normal operations. 56 are expected to be within areas which the safety 
analysis repon (WSRC 1993d) identifies as potential criticality accident locations. The 
shielding due to the concrete floors and walls. the distance between personnel. and the 
specific nature of the event reduce personnel dose so that only nearby personnel on the fl oor 
where Ihe accident occurred would potentially receive a fatal dose. In the event of a 
criticality accident. DOE estimates that up to 4 deaths could occur. and as many as 50 other 
workers could receive non-fatal levels of direct radiation. 
A7. SpilVLiquid Discharge (External) - No fatalities to workers would be likely from 
radio logical consequences because drainage of the water from the pool or basin would be 
expected 10 take several days .. or under the most exlreme circumstances. several hours. 
which provides sufficient time for workers to evacuate the area. 
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A8. SpilllLiquid Discharge (Internal) . No fatali ties to workers would be like ly from 
radiological consequences. Minor releases of contaminated waler have occuITI:d at the 
Receiving Basin for Offsite Fuel hose rack platform during the handling of portable 
de ionizers from the reactor areas. One such release wa~ the result of an opt:' rator attempting 
to correct a small leak on a pressurized portable deionizer. The operator was subsequently 
!"prayed with contaminated water. resulting in a radioactive exposure. A spill al the hose 
rack is not expected to release more than 378.5·liters ( 100 gallons) of contaminated water. 
A.2.7 Point Estimates of Risk 
Table A-6 lists the point esti mate of risk for each reference accident considered for two 
receptors. The point estimate of risk is the product of frequency (in occurrences per year) and the 
number of potential latent fatal cancers. The number of potential latent fatal cancers is the product of 
dose (in rem for the individual or person-rem for the population) and the ICRP 60 ri sk factors 
(4.0 x 10'" latent fatal cancer per rem for the worker or 5.0 x 10'" latent fatal cancer per rem for the 
general public). These point estimates were used to delennine (he re lative risk for each case and to 
determine the accident that becomes dominant if DOE retires specific facilities during the total period 
under consideration. For example. a ll alternatives begin with the immediate storage of spent nuclear 
fuel in weI pools: however. for the alternative considering interim dry storage. the accident dominating 
risk will change as the configuration of facilities utilized changes and as spent nuclear fuel or special 
nuclear material is placed in and remains in interim storage rather than being handled. 
A.2.8 Fuel Transition Staging Risk 
Table A-7 facilitates the examination of the dominant reference accident during the fuel handling. 
processing. and storage stages. The use of stages enabled a realistic comparison of ri sk over the 
evaluated period . For example. when all fuel has been unloaded. characterized. canned. and put into 
an interim storage position. consideration of fue l handling events is no longer meaningful. 
A.2.9 Adjustment Factors for Comparison Between Alternatives 
The accident scenarios described in this document (i .e .. Appendix C) differ only slightly between 
the various alternatives. The scenarios do not account for variations in spent nuclear fuel shipments 
(including onsile operational transfers) and spent nuclear fuel storage inventories across the 
a lternati ves. To provide a realistic comparison across alte rnatives. DOE developed facrors to adjust 
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Table A-6. Point Estimates of Risk for Reference Accident Scenarios. 
a. 
b. 
Potential Fatal Cancers' Point Estim:ue of Riskb 
Max imall y Maxi mall y 
ACCIdent Frequcncy Ex posed Population to Exposed Population to 
Scenario Dc!)criplions (per year) Individual 80 kilometers Indi vidual 80 kilometers 
AI Fucl Assembly Breach 1.6x I0·' 1.0xI0·/\ 8.5x I0·' 1.6x10·1 l.4xIO·) 
A2 M:ucrial Release 2.6xI0·' 3.4x 1 0'· 2.6x1O..a 8.8x I 0·~ 6 . 8xI0· ~ 
(processi ng) 
A3 Materilll Relellse (dry \'aull) l .4x IO·J I.lxIO·~ 3.5x1O.fl 1.5x I O· I~ 4 _9xI0'~ 
A~ M .. teri al Release (adjacent 2.4x IO·J 
facility) 
3.0x I0·" 2.5'10" 7 .2xIO·~ 6.0x I 0.5 
A5 Cri ticality in Water 3. 1x10·J 1.5x I 0'" 4.4xI0·) 4.7xI0·· l.4x IO·' 
A6 Criticality in Processi ng 1.4", 10..1 3.5x I0·6 4 .3xI0·) 4.9",10.10 6.0xIO·
' 
A7 SpilllLiquid Discharge 2.0",10..1 2.7xI0·1I 9 .0xlO·.1 5.4x10"10 1.8x-10·" (ex ternal) 
A8 SpilVLiquid Discharge I.IxIO·1 
(internal) 
1.2,,10·u 1.0 x- 10·' 1.3xI0·'4 I. h. 10.10 
ICRP 60 ri sk factor (5 .0 x 10" ) latent fatal cancer per rem was used to determine potential latent 
fatal cancers. 
Units for point estimates of ri sk are given in potential fatal cancers per year. 
Table A-7. Dominant risks based on fuel transition stages. 
Fuel/Material Stage 
Wet storage 
Dry storage 
Processing (fuel "in-process" 
by DOE definition ) 
Maximally Exposed 
Individual Risk 
1.6x 10" potential fatal cancerlyr 
based on accident scenario A I. 
1.5x 10.1' potential fatal 
cancers/yr based on accident 
scenario A3. 
1.6x 10" potential fatal cancerlyr 
based on accident scenario A I. 
Population to 
80 Kilometers Risk 
1.4x I 0" potential fatal cancerlyr 
based on accident scenario A I. 
4 .9x 10" potential fatal cancerslyr 
based on accident scenario A3. 
1.4x 10" potential fatal cancerlyr 
based on accident scenario AI . 
frequencies or consequences. depending on the specific circumstances o f each alternative. This sec tion 
describes the methodology and justification used to develop adjustment (scaling) fac tors for a re lative 
comparison of adjusted point eSlimates o f ri sk for each alternative on a case-by-case basis. 
A.2.9.1 Classification of SRS Accident Scenarios for Applicability to Adjustment 
Factors. This evaluation screened the SRS accident scenarios to determine which adjustment factor 
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categories were applicable. Table A-8 lists the class ificat ion of the different SRS accident scenarios. 
These adjustment categories are as follows : 
Frequency sensitive due to spent nuclear fuel handling 
Frequency sensitive due to spent nuclear fuel inventories 
Consequence sensit ive due to spent nuclear fuel inventories 
Table A-S. Adjustment factor class ification of SRS accidents. 
Frequency Frequency Consequence 
Accident Sensitive Sensitive Sensitive 
Scenarios Accident Description (Handling) (Inventory) (Inventory) 
AI Fuel Assembly Breach X 
A2 Material Release (Processing) X 
A3 Material Release (Dry Vault) X 
A4 Material Release (Adjacent Facility) X 
AS Criticality in Water X 
A6 Criticality during Processing X 
A7 SpilVLiquid Discharge (External) X 
A8 SpilVLiquid Discharge (Internal) X 
The following paragraphs provide the bas is for each category selection: 
A I. Fuel Assembly Breach - The major initiator for this accident is the mishandling of a 
fuel assembly. For th is reason. the accident frequency for this accident is adjusted to 
account for the annual number of fuel handling events. The amount of material involved in 
this accident is limited by the amount of damage that would occur due to the mishandling of 
a fuel assembly. Therefore. the bounding consequences of this accident are constant and 
independent of the amount of material avai lable. 
A2. Material Release (Processing) - The probability that a release could occur during 
processing depends on the amount of material that would be processed. Therefore. the 
accident frequency for this accident is adjusted based on the spent nuclear fuel inventory. 
Because a maximum amount of material can be processed at anyone time, the bounding 
consequences of this accident are independent of the amount of material on the site. 
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A3. Material Release (Dry Vault) - The major contributor to the probability of occurrence 
for this release was external initiators Ihat did not involve material handling . This supports 
using the same frequency for each alternative. The consequences of this accident are 
proponional to the amount of material available for release. Therefore. the bounding 
consequences for this accident are based on the amount of material to be stored. 
A4. Material Release (Adjacent Facility) - The initiator for this accident involves the 
discharge of coolant from a cask into a waste tank . The frequency of occurrence for this 
accident depends on the number of casks received: therefore. the frequency is adjusted to 
account for the annual number of fuel shipments. 
AS. Criticality in Water - The probability of occurrence of this accident was determined 
by considering the probability of occurrence of several initiating events. Many of these 
init iating events involved a criticality due to the mishandling of fuel. Therefore. the 
freq~ency for this accident is adjusted to account for the annual number of fuel handling 
events. The magnitude of the criticality accident is not a function of the amount of material 
available because the criticality is a highly unlikely. localized evenL The consequences for 
this accident are not adjusted to account for the amount of material available. 
A6. Criticality During Processing - The probability that a criticality could occur during 
processing depends on the amount of material that will be processed. Therefore. the 
frequency for this accident is adjusted based on the spent nuclear fuel inventory. The 
magnitude of the criticality accident is not a function of the amount of material avai lable 
because the criticality is a highly unlikely. localized event. The consequences fN this 
accident are not adjusted to account for the amount of material available. 
A 7. SpilllLiquid Discharge (External) - The major contributor to the probability of 
occurrence for this release was external initiators that did not involve material handling. 
This suppons using the same frequ ency fo r each alternati ve. The consequences depend on 
the amount of fuel in the basin because an increase in the amount of fuel wi ll increase the 
source term in the basin water. Therefore, the bounding consequences are adjusted for the 
amount of fuel to be stored. 
AS. SpilllLiquid Discharge (Internal) - The major contributor to the probability of 
occurrence for this release was external initiators that did not involve material handl ing. 
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Th is supports using the same frequency for each alte rnat ive . The consequences depend on 
the: amount of fuc:1 in the bas in because an increase in the amount of fue l wi ll increase thl! 
~ourcc: term in the ba.lii in \Valer. For this reason the bound ing consequences are adjusted for 
th l! amount of fue l to be stored. 
A.2.9.2 Methodology for Determination of Onsite Shipping Frequencies. This section 
discusses the methodology for dete rmining the onsile shipping frequencies of spent nuclear fue l on a 
ca.se -by-case basis for each alternat i\'e. The annual frequency of handling acc idents will vary in direct 
proport ion to the annual number of handling events. However. the consequences of the acc ident wi ll 
not \'a ry as a result of spent nuclear fuel handling act ivi ties because the amount of material in volved in 
c:ach handl ing e \'ent does not vary . Th is evaluat ion assumes that onsite shipments of spent nuclear 
fue l are near· term shipments. averaged over 5 years. Table A-9 provides a breakdown of currenl spent 
nuc lear fue l inventories at SRS fac ilities. 
Table A-9. Spent nuclear fue l inventories.a 
Number of Nu mber of 
Number of Number of Aluminum- Number of Nonaluminum-
Number of Aluminum Non.,[uminum- Clad Alumi num- Clad 
Aluminu m Slugs Clad Assembly Clad Bucket Assembly 
FJcilit)' Assembliesb (BuckelsC) Assemblies Shipments Shipments Shipments 
Rccci\ inl! Basin for 
Offsitc F~c l (RBOF) 
23~ 107 (2) 26t 20 22 
K·RcJClOr Basin 1.783 349 (7) t49 
L-Rcaclor Basin 86t t J.8~O (256) 72 86 
P-RCJClOr Basin 577 61 (2) 48 
Totals H55 t4.477 (268) 26 t 289 9t 22 
a . Basis for inventory numbers: (WS RC 1994c). 
b. As>emblies inc lude targets and fue l assemblies. Assembly shipments are based on 12 assemblies 
per shipment. 
c . Number of bucke ts calculated using 54 slugs per bucket. Bucket shipments are based on 3 buckets 
per shipment. 
A.2.9.2.1 Alternative 1 - No Action - The SRS would send the following number of 
shipments of a luminum·clad fuel sent to the Receiving Basin for Offsite Fuel from: 
K-Reactor Bas in · 152: 
L-Reactor Bas in· 15S: 
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P-Reactor Basin - 49: 
Total - 359 shipments. 
All nonaluminum·cl ad fuel WOt" " ~e sent from the Receiving Basin for Offsite Fuel to a reactor 
basin (a tota l of 22 shipments). 
The number of shipments would be 3S0 . Because fue l handling would occur at both origin and 
destination. this number would double ( i.e .. 760 total shipments). Therefore. over 5 years. this 
altemati ve would have an average shipping rate of 152 shipments per year. 
A.2.9.2.2 Alternative 2 - Decentralization 
Option 2a - Dry Storage - For this option. initial shipments would be the same as those for 
Alternative I (760 shipments at a rate of 152 per year). Subsequent shipments from all 
storage locations to the new dry storage facilities would total 402 shipments. Because fuel 
handling would occur at both origin and destination. this number would double 
(i.e .. S04 tOlal shipments). Because all fue l would be moved to dry storage within a 5-year 
pe riod. this total would have an average rate of 16 1 shipments per year. Adding all 
shipments would produce a tota l of 1.564 shipments at a rate of 3 13 per year. 
Option 2b - Wet Storage - For this option. initial shipments would be the same as those for 
Alternative I (760 shipments at a rate of 152 per year). Subsequent shipments from all 
storage locations to the new wet storage facilities would total 402 shipments for existing 
S RS fue l. Because the receipt of ofisite fue l would continue prior to the re location of fue l 
to the new wet storage fac ilities. an additional 50 shipments would occur [assuming rece ipt 
of fi ve shipments per year of offsite fuel (per Volu"", I. Appendix I "O ffsite Transportation 
of Spent Nuclear Fuel")) until 2005. The resulting fuel movement would total 
452 shipments. Because fue l handling wou ld OCcur at both origin and destination. this 
number would double (i.e .. 904 total shipments). Therefore. over 5 years this option would 
have an average shipping rate of l S I shipments per year. Adding all shipments under this 
option would produce a total of 1.664 shipments at a rate of 333 per year. 
Option 2c - Processing - In this option. a ll aluminum-clad fue l would move fro m its 
present location to the process facilit ies. All nonalu minum~ cl ad fue l would remain in its 
present storage locations. The result would be in a total of 3S0 shipments. As in the 
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pre\'ious options. this number would double for a tota l of 760 shipments. Therefore. over 
5 years this option would have an average shipping rate of 152 shipments ~r year. 
A.2.9.2.3 Alternative 3 • Planning Basis 
Option 3a - Dry Storage - The movement of materials for this option would be identical to 
that for Option 2a. resulting in a total of 1.564 shipments at a rate of 313 per year. 
Option 3b • Wet Storage - The movement of materials for this option would be identical to 
that for Option 2b. with the exception of a delay in the receipt of foreign fuel until the new 
facilities are in operation. This would result in a total of 1.564 shipmencs at a rate of 
3 13 per year. 
Option 3c • Processing - The movement of materials for this option would be identical to 
that for Option 2c. resulting in a total of 760 shipments at a rate of 152 shipments per year. 
A.2.9.2.4 Alternative 4 • Regionallzation 
Option 4a - Dry Storage - For this option. initial shipments would be the same as 
Alternative I (760 shipments at a rate of 152 per year). Subsequent shipments of the 
aluminum·c1ad fuel to the new dry storage facilities would total 380 shipments. 
(Note: Nonaluminum-c1ad fuel would be sent offsite from the reactor basins and would not 
contribute to any funher onsi te movements.). Because fuel handling would occur at both 
origin and destination. this number would double (i.e .• 760 total shipments). Because all 
fuel would move to dry storage within about 5 years. this total would have an average 
shipping rate of 152 shipments per year. Adding all shipments would produce a total of 
1.520 shipments at a rate of 304 per year. 
Option 4b - Wet Storage - The movement o f materials for this option would be identical to 
that for Option 3b. wi th the exception of movement of the nonaluminum·c1ad fuel to the 
new wet storage facility. This fuel would move off the Site from the reactor basins and 
would not contribute to any further onsile movements. This wou ld result in a tOlal of 
1.520 shipments at a rate of 304 per year. 
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Option 4c - Processing - The movement of materials for this option would be identical to 
that for Options 2c and 3c. resulting in a total of 760 shipments at a rate of 152 pe .. yea r. 
Option 4d - Dry Storage - The movement of materials for this option would be identical to 
those for Options 2a and 3a. resulting in a total of 1.564 shipments at a rate of 3 13 per year. 
Option 4e • Wet Storage - The movement of materials for this option would be identical to 
that for Option 3b. resulting in a total of 1.564 shipments at a rate of 3 \3 per year. 
Option 4r - Processing - The movement of materials for this option would be identical to 
those for Options 2c. 3c. and 4c. resulting in a total of 760 shipments at a rate of 152 per 
year. 
Option 4g - Ship Out - This option wonld require the shipping of all spent nuclear fuel at 
the SRS to a selected regional location. The movement of materials for this option would 
include the entire spent nuclear fuel inventory at the SRS, resulting in a total of 402 
shipments at a rate of 81 per year. 
A.2.9.2.5 Alternative 5 • Centralization 
Option Sa - Dry Storage - The movement of materials for this option would be identical to 
those for Options 2a and 3a. resulting in a total of 1.564 shipments at a rate of 313 per year. 
Option Sb - Wet Storage - The movement of materia ls for this option would be identical to 
that for Option 3b, resulting in a total of 1.564 shipments at a rate of 313 per year. 
Option Sc - Processing - The movement of materials for this option would be identical to 
those for Options 2c. 3c. and 4c, resulting in a total of 760 shipments at a rcte of 
152 shipments per year. 
Option Sd - Ship Out - This opt ion would require the shipping of all spent nuclear fuel at 
the SRS to a selec ted central location. The movement of materials for this option would 
include the entire spent nuc lear fuel inventory at the SRS. resulting in a total of 402 
shipments at a rate of 8 1 per year. 
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A.2.9.3 Methodology for Determination of Offsite Shipping Frequencies. Th is 
evaluation d~termined the lotal number of offsite shipments using the data contained in Volume I. 
Appendix I. ··Offsite Transponation of Spent Nuclear Fue l: · The total number of Naval Fue l 
shipments was determined from Table 3 of ··Methodology for Adjusting SNF Facility Accide nt 
Probabilities and Consequences For Diffe rent EIS Alternati ves·· (dated March IS. 1994). 
Naval. foreign. and university shipments wou ld occur throughout the interim management period 
and could be averaged over the 40-year period covered by this EIS . All other shipments would be 
averaged over 5 years. 
A.2.9.4 Frequency Adjustment Factors for Fuel Handling. For this analys is. DOE 
assu med the baseli ne fuel handling rate (events per year) to be the No Action alternative . For the 
other alternat ives. this evaluation divided the expected spent nuclear fuel handl ing rate by the base line 
spent nuclear fue l handl ing rate (No Action) to obta in the adjustment fact0r (see Table A- I 0). 
A.2.9.S Frequency/Consequence Adjustment Factors Due to Inventory. The No 
Action alte rnati ve for the SRS would require the storage of 206 MTHM (227 tons) of fuel. Using thi 
amount as the baseline. this evaluation compared the amount of fuel for the o ther alternatives to the 
base number. as listed in Table A- II. These adjustment factors can be applied to e ither a frequency or 
a consequence. depending on the class ificat ion of the acc ident scenario as listed in Table A-S. 
A.3 Chemical Hazard Evaluation 
A.3.1 Selec1ion of Reference Chemical Hazard 
A rev.ew of the same safety ana lyses used to generate the spectrum of radiological accident 
"cenano failed to identify a quantitati ve discussion of chemical hazards. However. each of the safety 
analy«' prOVIded a qua litative diSCUSSIOn of chemical hazards. Thus. Section 5.15.3 discuss .. 
chemical hazard , associated with ex isting spent nuclear fu el fac ili ti es qualitati ve ly. Thi s quali tati ve 
e\aluation wa~ determined to be appropri ate based on three c riteria : slid ing ~cal e in proport ion to 
"gn.ficanco. publtc perception of severity. and long-te rm e ffects of chemicals not known. For 
completen.«. a <eparate ri ' k assessment (WS RC 1993c) provided a quantitati ve discussion of 
chem.cal hazard, for the Receiving Basin for Offsite Fue l faci lity. This assessment described a 
bounding chemical hazard accident involving the release of nitrogen dioxide vapor. 
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Table A·IO. Fuel handling frequeney adjustment factors. 
Option Number Estimated Annual Shipping Rate F""I""ncy Adjustment 
Alternative I • No AdioD 
Option I 152 
Alternative 2 - Dec:eatralizatiOD 
Option 2a 316 
Option 2b 333 
Option 2c 157 
Alternative 3 • I'laJmiDg Basis 
Option 33 375 
Option 3b 375 
Option 3c 216 
Alternative 4 - RegjoaalizatioD 
Option 43 421 
Option 4b 421 
Option 4c 269 
Option 4d 394 
Option 4c 394 
Option 4f 234 
Option 4g 160 
Alternative 5 - CeDtralizatioD 
Option 53 803 
Option 5b S03 
Option 5c 643 
Option 5d 160 
Table A-II. Inventory adjustment factor.; for each alternative. 
Alternative 
No Action 
Decentralization 
Planning Basis 
Regionalization - A 
Regioualization - B 
Centralization 
3 . Soun:c: W ichmann (1995). 
Inventory' (MTIIM") 
206.1:1 
219.89 
222.76 
2 13.!19 
256.62 
2,741.80 
b. Metric Tons Heavy Melal; to conve rt to tons, multiply by 1.1023. 
Factor 
Baseline 
2.08 
2_19 
1.03 
2_47 
2.47 
1.42 
2.77 
2.77 
1.77 
259 
259 
154 
1.05 
528 
5.28 
4 _23 
1.05 
Adjustment Factor 
Baseline 
1.07 
1.08 
1.03 
1.24 
13.30 
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A.3.2 Hazardous Chemicallnvenlories 
The inventory of hazardous chemicals at each facility was detennined by using the "Savannah River 
Site Tier Two Emergency and Hazardous Chemical Inventory Report" (WSRC 1994a) to get the 
facility 's total chemical inventory, then listing those chemicals that also appeared on the EPA's "List 
of Lists" (EPA 1990). The chemical inventories listed in Tables A-12 through A-15 represent facilities 
used for wet storage andlor processing of spent nuclear fuel . The SRS maintains no large-scale dry 
storage facilities: thus, chemical inventories for dry storage facilities are not listed. 
Table A-12. Hazardous chemical inventory for the Receiving Basin for Offsite Fuel. 
Chemical 
Ethylene glycol 
Methyl ethyl ketone 
Nitric acid 
Phosphoric acid 
Sodium hydroxide (caustic soda) 
Sodium nitrite 
Maximum Daily 
Amount (Kg)' 
2.981 
2 
4.731 
3.953 
5,800 
3,070 
a. To convert kilograms to pounds, multiply by 2.2046. 
Average Daily 
Amount (Kg) 
23 
2 
2,365 
3,953 
2,900 
1.535 
Table A-B. Hazardous chemical inventory for the reactor basins (typical). 
Maximum Daily Average Dai Iy 
Chemical Amount (Kg)' Amount (Kg) 
Aluminum sulfate (solution) 570 230 
Ethylene glycol (thennal arc torch 2 2 
coolant concentrate) 
Hydrogen peroxide 
Nitric ac id 75 75 
Sodium hydroxide 454 454 
Sodium hypochlorite II 6 
Zinc 0 .5 0.5 
a. To convert IUlograms to pounds, multiply by 2.2046. 
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Table A-14. Haza ous chemical inventory for H-Area. 
Chemical 
Dichlorodifluoromethane (Freon 12) 
Dichlorodifluoromethane (Racon 12) 
Ethylene glycol 
Hydrofluoric acid 
Hydrogen peroxide 
Mercury 
Methyl ethyl ketone 
Nitric acid 
Nitric oxide 
Phosphorus pentoxide 
Potassium pennanganate (Cairox) 
Sodium hydroxide 
Sodium hypochlorite 
Sulfuric acid 
Trichlorofluoromethane (Freon II) 
Trichlorofluoromethane (Genetron II ) 
Maximum Daily 
Amount (Kg)' 
227 
227 
4.0 
0.5 
4,900 
3 
10 
1,300 
I 
200 
41 
1,150 
450 
a. To convert kilograms to pounds, multiply by 2.2048. 
Table A-IS. Hazardous chemical inventory for F-Area. 
Chemical 
Dichlorodifluoromethane (Freon 12) 
Dichlorodifluoromethane (Racon 12) 
Ethylene glycol 
Hydrofluoric acid 
Potassium pennanganatc 
Sodium hydroxide 
Sodium hypochlorite 
Sulfuric acid 
Trichlorofluoromethane (Freon II ) 
Maximum Daily 
Amount (Kg)' 
4 
1,177 
3 
0.5 
7 
30 
900 
a. To convert ki lograms to pounds, multiply by 2.2048. 
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Average Daily 
Amount (Kg) 
68 
o 
2.0 
0.5 
0 .0 
4,900 
3 
1,300 
I 
100 
29 
0 .5 
1,000 
o 
Average Daily 
Amount (Kg) 
0.5 
o 
2 
1,177 
4 
450 
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